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A natureza política da regulação bancária : (1997 e 2019)
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Os últimos anos têm-se caracterizado por um crescente debate, e interesse, relativamente à interacção entre poder político e banca na decorrência da crise internacional de 2007-2009. O argumento proposto neste trabalho fundamenta-se numa abordagem realista em que a lógica associada à preservação do poder político assume-se como determinante. Consequentemente, a necessidade de manter um forte ritmo de dinâmica económica tende a dominar a acção política por forma a satisfazer os eleitores. As preocupações com a rentabilidade pelo sector privado e com o crescimento económico tendem a exigir, respectivamente, uma maior tomada de risco pelos bancos e uma menor intervenção regulatória nas operações creditícias. Esta dinâmica competitiva estende-se igualmente à gestão da interdependência entre estados e por isso recorre-se ao institucionalismo realista. A disputa centra-se agora sobre o efeito redistributivo decorrente, ao nível doméstico, do processo de harmonização regulatório. Neste sentido, importa revisitar a elaboração do contexto regulatório de Basel I, II e III e dos Mecanismos Europeus de Supervisão e Resolução Bancária. A validação do carácter político de todo o processo regulatório suporta a opção dos estados de bail-out no caso de um resgaste bancário, em nome da estabilidade financeira no momento, mas na defesa do interesse político. Em suma, a consequência de uma decisão política traduz-se, posteriormente, numa outra decisão política.
The last few years have witnessed by an increasing debate on the interaction between politics and banking, up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The argument presented in this document is based on the realism theory, which aims to preserve political power, by ensuring a favourable economic environment, in order to satisfy voters. The concerns about the private sector’s profitability and economic growth lead to, respectively, a higher risk-taking by the banks and less regulatory constraints in terms of credit transactions. These competitive dynamics also determine how states manage interdependence among themselves, which justifies the adoption of strategies in line with realist institutionalism. Thus, it is important to review again the setup process of the main international regulatory frameworks – Basel I, II and III and the European Supervision and Resolution Mechanisms. The redistributive impact of the regulatory harmonization process, for the domestic actors, dominates the debate. The unintended consequences of these political decisions, in a scenario of a bank collapsing, lead to opt for the bail-out result. Publicly, this action aims to ensure financial stability; nevertheless, the real driver is to protect political interest. To sum up, the consequence of a political decision reflects, later, on another political decision.
The last few years have witnessed by an increasing debate on the interaction between politics and banking, up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The argument presented in this document is based on the realism theory, which aims to preserve political power, by ensuring a favourable economic environment, in order to satisfy voters. The concerns about the private sector’s profitability and economic growth lead to, respectively, a higher risk-taking by the banks and less regulatory constraints in terms of credit transactions. These competitive dynamics also determine how states manage interdependence among themselves, which justifies the adoption of strategies in line with realist institutionalism. Thus, it is important to review again the setup process of the main international regulatory frameworks – Basel I, II and III and the European Supervision and Resolution Mechanisms. The redistributive impact of the regulatory harmonization process, for the domestic actors, dominates the debate. The unintended consequences of these political decisions, in a scenario of a bank collapsing, lead to opt for the bail-out result. Publicly, this action aims to ensure financial stability; nevertheless, the real driver is to protect political interest. To sum up, the consequence of a political decision reflects, later, on another political decision.
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banca política regulação realismo bail-out banking politics regulation realism