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Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?

dc.contributor.authorBarros, Victor
dc.contributor.authorNeves, João Carvalho das
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-26T12:16:47Z
dc.date.available2022-07-26T12:16:47Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to assess whether firms tend to increase tax disclosure when the level of tax avoidance is higher. The paper proposes a new index based on hand-collected data from annual reports of firms listed on eight European stock exchanges, which made it possible to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary tax disclosures. The empirical results show that firms engaged in greater tax avoidance disclose more mandatory information regarding income tax, while they do not disclose voluntary tax-related information when corporate tax avoidance increases. Our results also highlight that IAS 12 does not inhibit firms from following different disclosure practices, as significant variability among countries was found. Stricter lookup tables may shape the variability in tax disclosures and may also limit tax avoidance practices to influence disclosure of mandatory information regarding income tax.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.citationBarros, Victor and João Carvalho das Neves .(2020). "Do managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?". International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 16.No. 4: pp. 354-392.pt_PT
dc.identifier.issn1740-8008
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/24987
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherInderscience Onlinept_PT
dc.subjectCorporate Tax Avoidancept_PT
dc.subjectIncome Taxespt_PT
dc.subjectIAS 12pt_PT
dc.subjectDisclosurept_PT
dc.subjectVoluntary Disclosurespt_PT
dc.subjectMandatory Disclosurept_PT
dc.subjectCorporate Transparencypt_PT
dc.titleDo managers increase tax disclosure when corporate tax avoidance is high?pt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

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