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On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions
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ABSTRACT: My aim is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a
proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient featur
e of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of
presentation of objects (individuals, properties), is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even
synonymous sentences might express different Fregean
propositions. My starting point is the principle
labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Differ
ence for Thoughts, which states that it is impossible
coherently to take different mental attitudes to the same proposition. As a logical truth (a consequence of
Leibniz’s Law), this is a synchronic principle, the appli
cation of which is restricted to attitudes held at a single
time. I argue that such a restriction might be reasonably lifted and, on the basis of an adequate notion of
attitude-retention, I propose an admissible
diachronic extension of the principle.
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Branquinho, João. On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions, In Analytic Philosophy and Logic, 17-27, ISBN: 978-1889680101. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University, 2000.