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Publication
Metacognition in moral decisions: judgment extremity and feeling of rightness in moral intuitions
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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
This research investigated the metacognitive underpinnings of moral judgment.
Participants in two studies were asked to provide quick intuitive responses to
moral dilemmas and to indicate their feeling of rightness about those responses.
Afterwards, participants were given extra time to rethink their responses, and
change them if they so wished. The feeling of rightness associated with the initial judgments was predictive of whether participants chose to change their
responses and how long they spent rethinking them. Thus, one’s metacognitive
experience upon first coming up with a moral judgment influences whether
one sticks to that initial gut feeling or decides to put more thought into it and
revise it. Moreover, while the type of moral judgment (i.e., deontological vs. utilitarian) was not consistently predictive of metacognitive experience, the extremity of that judgment was: Extreme judgments (either deontological or utilitarian)
were quicker and felt more right than moderate judgments.
Description
Keywords
Metacognition Moral judgment Feeling of rightness Dual-process models
Pedagogical Context
Citation
Vega, S., Mata, A., Ferreira, M. B., & Vaz, A. R. (2021). Metacognition in moral decisions: Judgment extremity and feeling of rightness in moral intuitions. Thinking & Reasoning, 27(1), 124-141. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1741448
Publisher
Taylor & Francis