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Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism
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Resumo(s)
Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the sort of framework naturally derived from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, grasping conceptual contents is not merely a question of mastering general rules or principles codifying the practical import of claims, but decisively involves being sensitive to surrounding features of the particular situation at hand.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Pragmatism Inferentialism Defeasible reasoning Particularism Occasion-sensitivity
Contexto Educativo
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Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia