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Building blocks in the economics of mandates

dc.contributor.authorAddison, John T.
dc.contributor.authorBarrett, Richard C.
dc.contributor.authorSiebert, W. Stanley
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-01T09:23:08Z
dc.date.available2018-06-01T09:23:08Z
dc.date.issued2006-08
dc.description.abstractThe paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers’ insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more ‘deserving’ workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts—separating the various worker types—the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.citationAddison, John T., Richard C. Barrett e W. Stanley Siebert (2006). "Building blocks in the economics of mandates". Portuguese Economic Journal, 5(2):69-87pt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10258-006-0009-2pt_PT
dc.identifier.issn1617-982X (print)
dc.identifier.issn1617-9838 (online)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15533
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagpt_PT
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationpt_PT
dc.subjectLabour mandatespt_PT
dc.subjectCompensation packagespt_PT
dc.titleBuilding blocks in the economics of mandatespt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceLisboapt_PT
oaire.citation.endPage87pt_PT
oaire.citation.issue2pt_PT
oaire.citation.startPage69pt_PT
oaire.citation.titlePortuguese Economic Journalpt_PT
oaire.citation.volume5pt_PT
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT

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