Publication
Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly
| dc.contributor.author | Tasnádi, Attila | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-23T13:27:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-05-23T13:27:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003-04 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of de- cisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm. | pt_PT |
| dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.citation | Tasnádi, Attila (2003). "Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly". Portuguese Economic Journal, 2(1):23-35 | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3 | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1617-982X (print) | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1617-9838 (online) | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15469 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.peerreviewed | yes | pt_PT |
| dc.publisher | Springer Verlag | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Price-setting games | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Price leadership | pt_PT |
| dc.subject | Dominant firm | pt_PT |
| dc.title | Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly | pt_PT |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.conferencePlace | Lisboa | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.endPage | 35 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.issue | 1 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.startPage | 23 | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.title | Portuguese Economic Journal | pt_PT |
| oaire.citation.volume | 2 | pt_PT |
| rcaap.rights | closedAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | article | pt_PT |