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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Our lay theories suggest that people who are overconfident in their knowledge are less likely to
revise that knowledge when someone else offers an alternative belief. Similarly, we might
assume that people who are willing to revise their beliefs might not be very confident in their
knowledge to begin with. Two studies with children aged 4-11 years old and college students call
these lay theories into question. We found that young children were simultaneously more
overconfident in their knowledge (e.g., believing they knew what chartreuse meant) and more
likely to revise their initial beliefs (e.g., choosing another color after seeing a peer choose a
different color) than older children and adults. These results bridge the metacognitive and
epistemic trust literatures, which have largely progressed independently from each other. We
discuss the potential causes and functions of the dissociation between the confidence with which
beliefs are held and the revision of those beliefs across development.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Overconfidence Belief revision Metacognition Epistemic trust Arrogance Age differences
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Hagá, S., & Olson, K. R. (2017). Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision. Developmental Psychology, 53(12), 2319-2332. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000433
