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INTRODUCTION

The problems of social theory must be research problems.
G.H. Mead

George Herbert Mead is the only sociological classic who never wrote a book. In 1911, he came close to publishing his first book. But at the last minute, with already the galley proofs in his hands, he changed his mind. He kept writing regularly for scientific journals, for edited books and newspapers, but he never wrote himself a book. Neither did he collect his numerous writings in book form. The implications of this circumstance were serious. For the most part, the texts that granted Mead a place next to Marx, Durkheim and Weber in the sociological canon were not written by Mead himself. Consider the famous *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934). The transcript that would later be used by Charles Morris to construct this volume is the work of a professional stenographer, W.T. Lillie, who was hired to record Mead's offering of his popular social psychology course in the winter of 1928. The same is true of *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1936), based upon stenographic notes from a course with the same title. *The Philosophy of the Act* (1938) is not much different either. Only the *Philosophy of the Present*, based upon Mead's Carus Lectures of 1930, can be safely attributed to Mead. These books, in particular *Mind, Self, and Society*, have been the entry-point to Mead's ideas for every generation ever since. In a recent social theory reader, which included selections from over a dozen authors from Marx to Foucault, the only classic whose writings were not his own was Mead.[1] It is nothing short from remarkable that almost 80 years after Mead's death social scientists still lack a comprehensive volume that convey his ideas in the first person. This is what this anthology is set to accomplish.

Let me begin with what this volume is *not*. This is not a complete edition of Mead's writings. His writings span over half a century (1881-1931) and include over one hundred items, from short book reviews and fragments to longer pieces like articles, book chapters and hand-written manuscripts. His personal correspondence is also substantial. The complete edition of Mead's work would encompass several volumes and require considerable editorial effort. This book has a different aim: to provide the reader with a selection of Mead's writings on the several topics which interested him. This brings me to the second thing this anthology does not offer. I have not included in this collection any text whose authorial status is questionable. More specifically, I have kept out the numerous transcriptions of Mead's lectures taken by either students or professional stenographers. Over the years these have played an important role in making Mead's ideas known to social scientists. But at what cost, one may ask. There are plenty good reasons not to rely on such materials as the basic introduction to Mead's work: just consider the omissions and possible mistakes of interpretation students may have made in their notes. More importantly, consider the consequences of poor editorial work. In Morris's creative edition of *Mind, Self,*

[1] Instead, a selection of *Mind, Self, and Society* was included. I refer to Farganis (2007).

and Society this goes as far as preventing the reader from knowing what were Mead's words and what were the Morris's additions – 'social behaviorism', the label that later generations come to associate with Mead's social psychology, is actually a creation by Morris.[2] Mead never used this concept to describe his position.

As a consequence, this volume includes only texts whose authorial status has been established beyond any doubt. The selection criteria of these texts, the order by which they are presented, and the overall logic of the volume are discussed in the following section. The history of the reception of Mead's ideas in sociology is the topic of the next section. Finally, in the last section I discuss why we should read Mead today. My answer is twofold. First, Mead should be read in his own terms: only in this way will we learn the most from his work. Second, from the vantage point of today's social sciences, Mead's work offers a social theoretical foundation for a dialogical conception of action and rationality. Contrary to individualist models (say, rational choice models), Mead's conception and human action and rationality is thoroughly social – without social, cooperative life, there would be no selves. Language is but a product of this social experience, thousands of years old. Upon this foundation, Mead erects a dialogical social theory that he applies to numerous phenomena, from human thought processes and small-scale social interactions to large-scale processes typical of societies' shift to modernity, in the realms of science, politics, warfare, and social issues.

How this volume is organized

The first criterion I followed in selecting these texts refers to their authorship. This is an important question insofar there are three main categories of written materials available for the Mead scholar. First, there are those texts that were published by Mead. Journal articles and book chapters fill this category in the most obvious way. Other texts, like notes written by Mead in preparation of his lectures, were never published but there is no doubt that they were penned by Mead (sometimes, literally so: a sizable portion of the texts here being published for the first time are hand-written). These unpublished manuscripts, which include Mead's correspondence, constitute a second category. A third category is constituted by texts that have not been written by Mead but nevertheless provide us with access to his ideas. I refer to the transcripts of Mead's lectures written either by students or professional stenographers. Texts from all three categories can and have been used to study Mead's ideas. But, as explained above, I find it hard to accept that Mead is the only sociological classic who does not speak to us directly. Hence my decision to circumscribe the texts considered for selection in this volume from only the first two categories, i.e. texts that have been written by Mead.

[2] Although he admits as much in the Introduction to that volume (Morris 1934: xvi), the term appears not only as the title of Part I, but in the text itself (Mead 1934: 6, 91).

With this material in hands, I applied a relevance criterion to choose which texts to include. Given the amount of texts in question, this was arguably the most difficult part of my work and an unavoidably subjective one. The texts here presented are what I consider to be the most relevant of Mead's contributions to contemporary social sciences. Two other criteria were followed in selecting these texts. First, they are presented in chronological order. This allows one to appreciate the evolution in time of Mead's treatment of a certain topic. Second, this selection of Mead's writings covers the three main areas around which Mead's thinking developed: 1) the human self, 2) science and epistemology, and 3) radical democratic politics. By bringing together these three key aspects of Mead's philosophical inquiry, the volume will allow the reader to appreciate the webbed quality of Mead's work, and search out commonalities and connections across the different areas it covers.

In short, this anthology offers three things. First, around a third of the texts here included have never been published before. The importance of this fact needs no further justification beyond the observation that Mead is generally considered to be one of the most neglected figures in American social thought. I am certain that the publication of these texts will make a decisive contribution to changing this situation. Second, the way this volume is organized will shed completely new light on the previously published articles. I refer to their relative location in the development of Mead's ideas over time, the conceptual links relating them to each other, and their relevance from the point of view of Mead's system of thinking. Third, students and academics will no longer have to resort to multiple volumes, sometimes poorly edited, in order to grasp the whole range of Mead's interests. By covering all major aspects of his work, this anthology provides a comprehensive presentation of Mead's thinking.

My aim has been to arrange the materials so that this volume reads like a book; a book on the social origins and nature of the human self, which can only be adequately studied from a scientific approach that does not reduce mental phenomena to externally observable behaviour. But this book is also on how this scientific approach should be extended to the realm of morals and politics. The objectivity Mead praises in the experimental scientist, for instance, can be found in his depiction of the statesman as well as in his discussion of the 'generalized other' in his social psychological writings. This is, of course, my reading of Mead (e.g. Silva, 2007b, 2008). Readers are most welcome to interpret Mead in other ways. Individual chapters can thus be read on their own, and connections can be established between them as well as with other texts by Mead or from other authors. The main aim of this anthology is not so much to provide definite answers as to stimulate new questions. The study of Mead's ideas is a cooperative effort, made from a plurality of perspectives, and my selection of his writings has no other aim but to contribute to this cooperative enterprise.

The making of a sociological classic

The history of the reception of Mead's ideas in sociology is a multi-generational dialogue over the merits and relative positioning of his contributions (e.g. Jacobs 2009). Under certain conditions, this dialogue can become a heated discussion. In other occasions, these conversations are interrupted by more or less long periods of silence. In this regard, Mead is no different from other sociological classics. A case in point is Émile Durkheim. Long considered a conservative thinker, accused by many of ignoring social conflict in favour of order and social stability, there has been recently a re-appreciation of his legacy suggesting a more progressive positioning (see, for example, Turner 1992: xxiv-xxxv). The reception of Max Weber's ideas in sociology has been no less eventful. From Talcott Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action* (1937) in which Weber is depicted as a major sociological thinker alongside Marx, Pareto and Durkheim, to Raymond Aron and Robert Nisbet who, in the 1960s, were pivotal in including the Weberian themes of rationalization, values and culture side by side Marxist concerns with class struggle and the critique of capitalism as the great foundational sociological narratives, the history of the reception of Weber's work is inseparable from the history of sociology itself (Aron 1965-67, Nisbet 1967). These processes of canonization play an important role in the discipline's self-understanding and institutional affirmation. No less important, one cannot understand what 'Weber' or 'Durkheim' mean as significant symbols without a reference to such processes of disciplinary canonization. These refer to, among other things, the inclusion of the corpus of these authors in university curricula and the recurrent reference to their work as inspirational for contemporary research. Such processes of canonization are the material, institutional means by which, for instance, Max Weber became 'Weber', the sociological classic. What sets the canonization of Mead apart from any other sociological classic is the textual bases upon which it was undertaken, something that is ultimately related to the peculiar and distinctive nature of his thinking – problem-driven, processual, and always in a state of flux.

Let me briefly discuss the process by which Mead attained a classical status in sociological circles (see, e.g., Silva 2006, 2007a). Herbert Blumer played a pivotal role in the earlier stages of this process. Mead's former assistant in Chicago in the early 1930s, Blumer soon occupied the position of 'official interpreter' of Mead. In the ensuing decades, it was Blumer who established what was sociologically relevant in Mead's work and what was not (e.g. Blumer 1966). Of course, Blumer's reading of Mead cannot be easily separated from Blumer's symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1937: 171). Created as an alternative to Parsons' highly general and abstract structural functionalism, Blumer's symbolic interactionist approach focused instead on symbolically dense, face-to-face interactions (Blumer 1986). It was this particular school of sociological thought that first claimed Mead as a founding father, a process that unfolded gradually from the late 1930s through the 1960s. The fact that during this period the basic introduction to Mead's work was *Mind, Self, and Society,* a transcript from a social psychology course lest one forgets, has certainly contributed to this situation. Since the 1970s, however, other interpretations of the sociological relevance of Mead's ideas have emerged. Two are worth noting here: Jürgen Habermas and Hans Joas.

Habermas, with his monumental *Theory of Communicative Action*, can be credited for having definitely established Mead as a sociological classic. Until the publication of this 2-volume sociological treatise, Mead was the first of the symbolic interactionists. From now on, Mead's contributions to sociology are comparable to those of Marx, Weber, Simmel or Durkheim. In that treatise, Habermas argues that the central sociological theme of rationalization (of institutions such as the state or the economy, but also at the level of groups and individuals) can only be adequately analysed by reference to the work of Mead. It is in Mead's analysis of language as the primary mechanism of socialization and coordination of action[3] that Habermas finds the conceptual elements he needs for the paradigm shift from instrumental to communicative action (Habermas 1987: 27). This does not prevent Habermas from accusing Mead of 'idealism', that is, of systematically neglecting large-scale, structural social processes such as warfare, economics, and politics. This is a harsh and unfair criticism of Mead. It is explained both by Habermas's presentist strategy (he tends to read Mead in light of his own interests, not in Mead's terms) and the poor editorial situation of Mead's writings. Joas did not fall victim of either of these problems. His long and often path-breaking years of archival research allowed him to carefully reconstruct the contexts in which Mead's thinking was developed (Joas 1985). In addition, this historically sensitive reading of Mead's work allowed Joas to develop his own social theory (Joas 1996).

Many other names besides those of Habermas and Joas could be cited here as Mead's work has kept attracting the attention of scholars around the world. With no pretension to completeness, I could indicate the names of Dmitri Shalin (1988), Andrew Feffer (1993), Gary Alan Cook (1993), or Axel Honneth (1996) as social scientists whose work has dealt directly with Mead's ideas in these last few decades. Still a far cry from other sociological classics, Mead scholarship is nonetheless a well-established and growing research area, with new applications of his ideas being found regularly (e.g. Konings 2010).

Why read Mead today

Different authors read Mead for different reasons. They also find in Mead different things. Yet behind this plurality of reasons and perspectives one finds something common to all of them. The shared element of this conversation with Mead is, of course, Mead's oeuvre. This set of texts contains a number of seminal ideas that have caught the interest of readers over the years. The portion of Mead's writings selected for this anthology includes what I consider to be his most brilliant ideas. My aim has been to give readers more reasons to read Mead and make use of his ideas. In what follows I summarily discuss some of these reasons.

[3] These refer, respectively, to language as related to the emergence of norms and identities and as allowing for the perception and manipulation of objects.

One reason why we should read Mead today is related to the modern problematic of selfhood, his most important contribution to sociology. Mead's conception of the social self, with the phases of the 'I' and the 'me', the attitude of the 'generalized other', as well as the crucial mechanism of putting oneself in someone else's shoes, have served as inspiration for many of those unhappy with narrow instrumental models of action and rationality. Part I includes Mead's most important writings on the subject. Turning to William James and John Dewey for inspiration, Mead dedicated most of his career to developing an alternative to the mechanical stimulus-response model of action. In particular, Mead rejected two things: the dualism between body and soul present in psychophysical parallelism and introspectionism, against which he insisted on the social character of self-consciousness. One of the earliest instances of this continued effort can be found in 1903 'The Definition of the Psychical', in which human subjectivity is identified with that phase of experience

> within which we are immediately conscious of conflicting impulses which rob the object of its character as object-stimulus, leaving us in so far in an attitude of subjectivity; but during which a new object-stimulus appears due to the reconstructive activity which is identified with the subject 'I' as, distinct from the object 'me.'

In this definition, the distinction between the subject 'I' and the object 'me' (first introduced by James in his 1890 *Principles of Psychology*) allows Mead to clarify the relation between the psychical and the individual. To the former, Mead attributed the function of cognitive reconstruction of problematic situations. But what happened if it was the individual that was the object of such a reconstruction – could he still perform the reconstructive function responsible for his identity? No, if by the individual one means the empirical self, the 'me'; only the 'I', the 'self of unnecessitated choice, of undreamt hypotheses' can perform such a function. 'On the Self and Teleological Behavior' (chapter 3), is here being published for the first time. Together with 'The Definition of the Psychical' and 'Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology' (chapter 2), this text provides a good illustration of Mead's earlier attempts to define human subjectivity as to avoid the dualism between inner experience and external conduct. Such attempts would prove nonetheless, as Mead would later concede, ineffectual (see chapter 6). For one simple reason: whereas until the early 1900s Mead argued that one could access the 'I' without the mediation of social experience, he would gradually abandon this position in favour of a more thoroughly social conception of the self.[4]

Chapters 4 through 6 show this development in Mead's thinking. In these chapters we can see Mead openly rejecting his earlier identification of the 'I' with a pre-social, immediate flow of experience. His alternative, here developed in detail, point to an 'I' that is no less socially constituted than the 'me'. Both phases of the self are socially constituted, he now emphasizes. From the viewpoint of Mead's contributions to contemporary social theory, these texts are among his most complete statements on the social nature of the self. The last four chapters of Part I belong to a later phase of Mead's social psychology. One finds in them several themes of great sociological relevance. To begin with, there is the notion

[4] On this 'social turn' in Mead's conception of the self, see Silva 2008: 116.

of 'taking the attitude (or role) of the other'. Unlike Erving Goffman's dramaturgical approach (19XX), one of the most innovative proposals to be developed within symbolic interactionism, Mead's notion has no theatrical implications. Mead is concerned not with social roles, but with behavioural dispositions to respond in a similar way to other individuals responding to a given type of stimulus. With this social psychological mechanism Mead believes he is able to explain the social nature of thinking: by importing the attitudes of other individuals into our conduct, we are able to see the world from their perspective – thinking is then but a sort of 'inner conversation'. Closely associated with Mead's analysis of reflective intelligence are his notions of meaning and of the significant symbol. Consider a word as a significant symbol. For Mead, a word becomes a significant symbol when its carrier provokes, both in the individual uttering it and in the individual listening to it, a stimulus that is simultaneously a response. The meaning of a word emerges from social interaction, it is not something intrinsic to it. The sociological implications of this idea are far reaching. Consider the relation between the individual and society. Social order emerges from Mead's account as a symbolically constructed reality, not as something natural or imposed on human beings by external institutions or conventions. Individuals are able to import the social attitudes of the community through what Mead terms the 'generalized other'; only by doing so do they develop a complete self. There is no passive internalization of externally imposed social roles in Mead's account. On the contrary, social actors actively interpret and reformulate in their minds the attitudes that are common to the group. From this insight Mead develops a highly original conception of social control. Society influences individual conduct in the form of the 'generalized other', who is internalized in through the 'me'. Social control, according to Mead, does not crush human individuality; rather, social control actually constitutes and is inextricably associated with that individuality (see chapters 8 and 9). Taken together, these articles constitute the latest expression of Mead's evolutionary, naturalistic, and cooperative approach to the relation between the self and society – as he put it, his 'scientific social psychology'.

This brings me to the second reason why one should read Mead today. I refer to his pragmatist understanding of science and epistemology. Contrary to what is generally believed, Mead taught and wrote extensively on this subject. Three of four of Mead's posthumously published books are on history and philosophy of science – *The Philosophy of the Present* (1932), *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1936) and *The Philosophy of the Act* (1938) – as well as numerous of the papers he published during his lifetime. Although less original than the epistemological writings by Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, Mead's work provides nonetheless contemporary social scientists with a non-positivist yet non-relativistic answer to the question of how to study the social character of human consciousness in a scientific manner. In my view, he does so in a way unparalleled by any other classical pragmatist.

The selection of texts here presented is organized as follows. In the first three chapters one can see the basic tenets of Mead's philosophy of science. In the 1900 'Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines' we have an early and important statement of his pragmatist epistemology: science is

equated with the resolution of problems and the resulting conflicts between different lines of action by means of a specific method. This conception of science as a problem-solving procedure is a central feature of Mead's thinking. Another essential element is evolutionary theory. In a paper here published for the first time, we can see Mead engaging directly with Charles Darwin's ideas by occasion of Darwin's centenary in 1909 (chapter 12). Yet another important element of Mead's epistemology is the way in which he conceives of the problematizing attitude characteristic of modern experimental science as a logical extension of the emergence of the rational self. This is discussed in 'The Nature of Scientific Knowledge', a paper probably written in the early 1920s (chapter 13).

Chapters 14 through 18 are some of Mead's best writings on the history of science and on how science should be applied to concrete social problems. The first two have never been published before.[5] In them one can see Mead analyzing the historical origins of the philosophical disciplines discussed above, from Ancient Greece through the Renaissance all the way to the modern era. The protagonist of these narratives is reflective thinking, the social nature of which Mead never ceases to emphasize. 'A Pragmatic Theory of Truth' is perhaps Mead's most important analysis on scientific knowledge and truth (chapter 16). His point, similar to Dewey's, is that a correspondence theory of knowledge should be rejected in favor of a conception of science that does not separate knowledge from action. In the specific case of truth, Mead identifies it with a hypothesis that successfully reconstructs a problematic situation. As he puts it, there is no 'such thing as Truth at large. It is always relative to the problematic situation'. Moving beyond Dewey, Mead makes use of this social psychological theory to analyze science as a social reconstructive activity (chapters 17 and 18). The last decade of Mead's career was devoted to the reconciliation of his social theory of human consciousness and the relativistic theory of the British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. Mead and Whitehead's theories share the same emphasis on the 'objectivity of perspectives' (chapter 19): 'mind as it appears in the mechanism of social conduct', Mead explains, 'is the organization of perspectives in nature and at least a phase of the creative advance of nature'. The last article I selected to illustrate Mead's philosophy of science is concerned with his ideas on time. [6] Although relatively neglected by social theorists, a social scientific understanding of time remains hugely important. 'The Nature of the Past' (chapter 20) provides an accessible presentation of Mead's social theory of temporality.[7] In a nutshell, Mead conceives of science as a problem-solving activity, the experimental scientific method is but a more complex form of human intelligence, and the internal organization and mode of operation of science are radically democratic.

This last remark ties in with the third reason why contemporary readers still have a lot to gain from reading Mead's work. I refer to his moral and political

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[5] The 1917 'Scientific Method and Individual Thinker' covers very much the same ground than these two and is also an excellent text.

[6] The adequate understanding of this aspect of Mead's thinking requires the reading of a much wider array of materials, including *The Philosophy of the Present* and *The Philosophy of the Act*.

[7] For a discussion of the importance of historicity and temporality in classical American pragmatism, see Koopman (2009).

writings. In my view, this aspect of Mead's life and work deserves more attention than what is usually granted in social theory textbooks. That Mead was a committed citizen during his time in Chicago is sometimes rightly acknowledged. But the recognition that his radical democratic views are indispensable for the understanding of the actual scope and nature of his contributions is still uncommon, at least outside the restrict field of Mead specialists. I hope the selection of Mead's political writings here presented will help remedy this problem and renew interest in this somewhat neglected facet of his thinking.

The first three chapters of Part III are on Mead's political and moral philosophy. Mead develops his position as a critical response to the main ethical proposals of his time, Kantian ethics and utilitarian ethics. Ethics revolve around the question of 'how should one live in society?'. Utilitarianism typically claims that moral action is an action that results in the greatest possible happiness to the largest possible number of individuals. Self-interest would become the basis of altruism. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are two major exponents of this view. On the other hand, there is Kant's ethics of conviction. For Kant, the moral quality of action cannot be identified with its results; rather, Kantian ethics point to the motives or intentions of action – hence Kant's categorical imperative according to which one should act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. In the 1908 'The Philosophical Basis of Ethics' (chapter 21), one of his earliest systematic writings on moral philosophy, we can see Mead positioning himself critically towards these two ethical doctrines. Mead writes:

> It is because the man must recognize the public good in the exercise of his powers, and state the public good in terms of his own outgoing activities that his ends are moral. But it is not the public good which comes in from outside himself and lays a moral necessity upon him, nor is it a selfish propensity that drives him on to conduct.

Mead's ethics are based upon his social theory of the self and his conception of science as a problem-solving activity. This is the topic of 'The Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences' (chapter 23). Mead's basic contention is that the content of moral acts can be universalized insofar as one recognizes their eminent social character. A moral end is reached only when an individual is able to identify his motive with the common good of the community in which he lives. The difference between good and evil stems from the social character of the self since a moral end is good when it leads to the realization of the individual as a social being. Furthermore, by granting the perspective of the scientist the status of a model of impartiality, impersonality, and objectivity, Mead suggests that moral conflicts can be resolved insofar as all values and interests are taken into consideration. In other words, the application of the scientific method can be extended beyond the selection of means to the analysis of conflicting social ends or values. This implies a process of reconstruction of the self, which becomes a larger self by assuming the attitude of the 'generalized other', which is also a moral reconstruction (see also chapter 6). The final paragraph of this article, where he sums up his position, is among Mead's most eloquent writings:

> The order of the universe that we live in is the moral order. It has become the moral order by becoming the self-conscious method of the members of a human society. We are not

> pilgrims and strangers. We are at home in our own world, but it is not ours by inheritance but by conquest. The world that comes to us from the past possesses and controls us. We possess and control the world that we discover and invent. And this is the world of the moral order. It is a splendid adventure if we can rise to it.

Science and democracy, sustained by universal education and intelligent social reform, are, in a clear pragmatist fashion, the sources of inspiration for Mead's proposed solutions for the problems of modern industrial society. Consider 'Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution' (chapter 22). In this text, Mead criticizes the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau for conceiving of 'the individual citizen existing before the community, in the possession of rights which afterwards the society undertakes to protect'. Mead contends that, on the contrary, a social scientific theory of the human species shows that the individual citizens are a product of life in society: without social life there would be no individual minds. Political theory should, then, incorporate this scientific fact and elaborate on its democratic implications. In particular, Mead suggests that, in the case of property, there is no 'natural right' that a given individual can appeal to if the common good is at stake. In such cases, the individual's abstract right to property can be legitimately overruled by social legislation oriented to the establishment of the social conditions for individual material autonomy. Hence Mead's interest in the 'social settlement' as a scientific way of solving social problems through the attitude of neighborhood shared by social workers and the deprived populations (see chapters 24 and 25). By conceiving of democracy as an 'institutionalized revolution', Mead is emphasizing not only the gradualist nature of his political creed, but also the logical priority of concrete social democratic practices over abstract legal provisions.

Mead's response to the major political challenges of his time lies in a program of radical democratic social reform that rejects both revolutionary and technocratic solutions. This can be considered one of the central contentions of Mead's political thought. The 1918 'The Psychology of Punitive Justice' (chapter 26) revolves around this idea. In this article, Mead ascertains that most social and political institutions are defined by reference to an abstract theory of natural rights. Mead rejects the abstract individualism and negative conception of liberty that are associated with this conception of natural rights, and argues for a different conception of justice. Such an alternative conception of justice would be based not on the 'attitude of hostility' against the criminal who trespassed our individual rights to property, but based on the friendly attitude that 'reveals common, universal values which underlie like a bedrock the divergent structures of individual ends that are mutually closed and hostile to each other'. Both of these instincts show the social nature of the self for 'his speech is their speech', i.e., human rationality and linguistic communication are products of life in society. The moral implication of this social psychological thesis is, at a time when the World War I was being fought across the Atlantic, that 'advance takes place in bringing to consciousness the larger social whole within which hostile attitudes pass over into self-assertions that are functional instead of destructive', i.e., the 'escape from selfishness is not by the Kantian road of an emotional response to the abstract universal, but by the recognition of the genuinely social character of human nature'.

The last four chapters are on Mead's ideas on warfare, national identities and citizenship. Arguably, the experience of the Great War of 1914-1918 shaped Mead's mature political thinking (e.g. Deegan 2008). Consider the 1915 'The Psychological Basis of Internationalism' (chapter 27). What is a purely theoretical account of the process of fusion of the two phases of the human self in *Mind, Self, and Society*, can be seen here being applied to the concrete example of patriotism, curiously enough an alluded example that Morris's editorial activity did not give us the chance of reading.[8] Mead starts his analysis of the war in Europe by taking note of its 'great spiritual dividends'. Arguing along similar lines as Simmel and Durkheim, Mead asserts that individual members of societies can fuse into self-conscious nations in moments of exceptional emotional intensity. Like a tide of national consciousness that sweeps across the body of citizens, these emotional moments are as intense as they are brief. When these moments occur, Mead contends, there is a fusion of the 'I' and the 'me': there is an absolute identification between the individual self and the social group. The fusion of the individual and the group is so complete that the individual can even lose himself 'in the whole group in some sense, and may attain the attitude in which he undergoes suffering and death for the common cause'. When this happens, when individual existence is sacrificed for the sake of the community, then, the social fusion is complete and absolute. Mead, however, is far from endorsing the irrationalist implications suggested by this psychological phenomenon. His proposal is, on the contrary, resolutely rational and historically sensitive as we can see in the next two chapters on nationalism and citizenship.

Mead did not consider these texts for publication as they were written as lecture notes. But they are important documents as they complement in several regards the posthumously published *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. Both revolve around the relation between the individual citizen and the state during wartime. Wartime periods are particularly suitable to appreciate this relation for two different reasons. First, Mead discusses these exceptional periods by reference to long-term, structural historical processes. His point is that the understanding of the nature and implications of War World I for the relation between individual citizens and the state requires an analysis of two crucial transformations in political modernity: the rise of the social state, which also occupies a central position in Weber's political sociology, and the rise of nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century (chapter 28). Second, Mead conceives of wartime periods as problematic, disrupting episodes in a country's history that impose a reassessment of the relation between the individual citizen and the state and a subsequent reconstruction of the self

[8] Mead announces the discussion of the 'attitudes of religion, patriotism, and team work', but the selection of the student notes made by Morris includes only his discussion of the other two attitudes. See Mead 1934: 273. For an account of Mead's views on patriotism in that book, one has either to go back to an earlier section, namely to the analysis of the function performed by the sense of superiority for the realization of the self (see Mead 1934: 207-9), or to the discussion of social conflict where Mead asserts that 'It is upon these war-time expressions of the self-protective impulse in all the individual members of the state or nation that the general efficacy of national appeals to patriotism is based' (Mead 1934: 306).

(chapter 29). Faced with the possibility of annihilation of the nation-state to which one belongs, the individual's relationship with the community is brought to consciousness – he becomes suddenly aware of his rights and obligations as citizen. But has he no choice but to sacrifice his individuality, and ultimately his life, for the community if he is to experience the highest 'emotional realization of the supreme value of citizenship'? Mead believes there is an alternative, one which does not involve the sacrifice of the individual. His alternative is premised upon the idea that some social institutions – say, property or the family – express the fundamental organization of society and its values. These need not be in danger of destruction from an external enemy for us to appreciate our attachment to them; we can become deeply identified with the fundamental social norms that govern our community by applying the scientific method to the resolution of social problems. Mead's proposed alternative, based upon the belief on the possibilities of science to solve social and political problems, would be crushed by the realities of the Great War.[9] By 1918, the era of stability, certainty and progress in which Mead's generation lived come suddenly and without notice to an end. A new age of uncertainty was about to begin, but Mead remained faithful to the basic tenets of his Era of Progressivism.

Mead's faith in the progress of science is reiterated a decade later, in 'National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness' (chapter 30). Drawing on his conception of the self as a composite or interaction of two distinct parts, Mead argues that 'national-mindedness and international-mindedness are inextricably involved in each other'. On the one hand, the hostile impulse is responsible for 'the spiritual exaltation of wartime patriotism'; on the other hand, there is 'the power which language has conferred upon us, of not only seeing ourselves as others see us but also of addressing ourselves in terms of the common ideas and functions which an organized society makes possible'. Again, Mead uses history to illustrate his claims. The late nineteenth century tide of nationalism is interpreted as a phenomenon which allowed individuals to realize that they belonged to national communities that transcended narrower groups, such as families and clans. In this sense, 'national mindedness' is but a conversation with a 'generalized other', more general than previous forms of human association, but still less general than the form idealized by Mead – a conversation carried on in international terms. In short, Mead's 'moral equivalent of war' is to be found in the socially acquired capacity for rational linguistic expression of ideas, rather than in some fundamental social impulse. It is still a cognitivist and internationalist solution that Mead proposes.

This anthology has no intention of fixing once and for all the meaning of Mead's work. On the contrary, it was done with the explicit aim of sparking new ideas, new avenues of research, and of establishing contact points between Mead and other authors. Most important, behind this volume is the intention of respecting

[9] Mead's support of America's involvement in World War I should not be confused with the endorsement of militarism or any related sort of bellicose thinking. Mead gave his support to what he believed to be a 'just war', in name of principles such as democracy and international cooperation. He did question, later on, these arguments and became deeply disillusioned with political affairs. But he never abandoned a rational, internationalist approach to morals and politics.

the processual, fluid nature of Mead's thinking. And of doing so by letting Mead convey his ideas to us directly. I cannot think of a better tribute to a theorist like Mead than to offer his readers yet another incentive to keep dealing with his ideas and, by doing so, give them meaning and life. I believe this to be the best way to keep Mead, the sociological classic, alive.

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Biographical summary

1863	Born at South Hadley, Massachusetts.
1869	Family moves to Oberlin, Ohio, following the appointment of his father as professor of homiletics at Oberlin College.
1877-83	Student at Oberlin College. Father dies in 1881.
1884-85	Works as a surveyor for the Wisconsin Central Railroad and later for the Minneapolis and Pacific Railroad.
1885	Works as private tutor in Minneapolis.
1887-88	Student at Harvard University.
1888	Works as private tutor for William James' son during summer.
1888-89	Student at University of Leipzig, Germany.
1889	Student at Humboldt University, Germany.
1891-94	Marries Helen Castle. Joins the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, by invitation of John Dewey. Henry Castle Mead, his first and only son, is born. Dewey moves to University of Chicago.
1894	Follows Dewey to Chicago, as Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy. Delivers paper on a theory of emotions from a physiological standpoint at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association.
1900	Publishes article on a theory of the philosophical disciplines.
1902	Associate Professor at the University of Chicago.
1903	Publishes article on the definition of the psychical.
1904	Dewey leaves the University of Chicago.
1906	Joins City Club of Chicago.
1907	Professor at the University of Chicago.
1908	Helps to found Immigrants' Protective League. Chairman of the City Club committee on public education (until 1914). Publishes article on the philosophical basis of ethics.
1910	Joins citizen's committee to mediate the so-called 'garment strike'. Publishes article on social consciousness and the consciousness of meaning. William James dies.
1912	Elected to the Board of Directors of the City Club of Chicago. Publishes article on the mechanism of social consciousness. Co-author, with Ernest A. Wreidt and William J. Bogan, of City Club's *A Report on Vocational Training in Chicago and in other Cities*.
1913	Publishes article on the social self.
1915	Publishes article on natural rights and political institutions. Reviews *Report Upon the Survey of the University of Wisconsin*.
1917	Chairman of the Board of Directors of the City Club of Chicago. Mother dies. Publishes chapter in the book *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude*. Publishes series of newspaper essays in the Chicago *Herald*.
1918	President of the City Club of Chicago (until 1920). Publishes article on the psychology of punitive justice.
1922	Publishes article on behaviorist account of significant symbol.
1923	Publishes article on scientific method and the moral sciences.
1925	Publishes article on the genesis of the self and social control.

1926	Presents paper on the objective reality of perspectives at the Sixth International Congress in Philosophy, Harvard University.
1928	Delivers lectures on social psychology, later published as *Mind, Self, and Society*. Gives undergraduate course on the 'movements of thought in the nineteenth century', later published under that title.
1929	Publishes articles on a pragmatic theory of truth, national-mindedness and international-mindedness. Publishes chapter on the nature of the past in the book *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*.
1930	Delivers Carus Lectures in Berkeley, California. Chairman of the department of philosophy at the University of Chicago. Controversy with President Robert Maynard Hutchins.
1931	Dies at sixty-eight of heart failure in Chicago.