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Pedro Nuno Alves Vidal de Seabra

Orientador: Prof. Doutor Andrés Malamud

Tese especialmente elaborada para a obtenção do grau de Doutor em Ciência Política, na especialidade de Relações Internacionais

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Summary

A reaproximação do Brasil com África durante a última década é frequentemente apresentada como uma tentativa de melhorar o diálogo político Sul-Sul, aumentar as interações económico-comercias e fornecer cooperação técnica. No entanto, o recurso a tal modelo tripartido de análise obsta a uma apreensão verdadeiramente completa das relações transatlânticas por descartar outros vectores que receberam menor interesse académico, mas conheceram igual crescimento exponencial. Em particular, é possível destacar o caso de iniciativas de cooperação de defesa Brasileiras com países Africanos no espaço do Atlântico Sul entre 2003 e 2014, correspondendo ao período dos governos liderados por Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff.

Procurando responder à questão central de investigação de como enquadrar e explicar o desenvolvimento de uma vertente específica das relações Brasil-África focada em interações ao nível de defesa, recorreu-se à recolha de dados originais, à realização de múltiplas entrevistas com intervenientes-chave e ao tratamento de informação especializada, com o objectivo de traçar um panorama completo do objecto de análise indicado. É assim proporcionada uma sistematização da sua intensidade e variedade durante o período indicado, em termos de contactos de alto nível, celebração de acordos de cooperação, oportunidades de treino para militares Africanos, venda e doação de equipamento militar, e a realização de exercícios conjuntos. É ainda demonstrado como reinterpretações político-militares do Brasil relativamente ao potencial das suas fronteiras marítimas contribuíram para sustentar formalmente a expansão de tais relações de cooperação, com base numa lógica de crescente securitização de problemas regionais. A longo prazo, e da perspectiva das autoridades Brasileiras, tais esforços podem ser inclusivemente caracterizados como equivalendo à potencial criação de um complexo regional de segurança no Atlântico Sul.

Uma vez estabelecido o alcance e limites destas dinâmicas, são propostas e comparadas através de um exercício de *process-tracing* duas hipóteses concorrentes, mas não mutualmente exclusivas, com igual potencial valor explicativo. Argumenta-se assim que a tomada de decisão por parte das autoridades Brasileiras foi primariamente influenciada por elementos geopolíticos, que reforçaram de forma

sustentada a necessidade de incrementar as capacidades de defesa ao dispor de países Africanos. Esses elementos geopolíticos podem ser analisados a dois níveis. Por um lado, percepções relativamente a ameaças emanadas quer dos E.U.A., Europa ou NATO, quer de atores não-estatais, responsáveis por fenómenos de insegurança como pirataria ou tráfico internacional de narcóticos, corroboraram a necessidade de uma resposta proporcional por parte do governo Brasileiro. Por outro lado, e concomitantemente, a prossecução de objectivos de política externa ao nível de redistribuição e reconhecimento internacional, refletiu-se na recuperação e utilização da ZOPACAS enquanto fórum preferencial para a organização de relações regionais baseadas em preocupações de segurança comuns. Propôr e manter iniciativas no Atlântico Sul ao nível de cooperação de defesa, correspondeu assim da parte do Brasil tanto a uma reação perante desenvolvimentos internacionais como a uma mobilização das suas opções externas.

Em comparação, é testado o impacto de elementos económicos enquanto geradores de interesses no plano estratégico e de defesa. Por um lado, assinala-se o esforço assinalável a nível económico-industrial de procurar concertar a agenda oficial e as diferentes iniciativas do governo Brasileiro com relação a África, incluindo os diversos mecanismos existentes de financiamento e promoção ao comércio externo. Por outro lado, interesses do sector privado, com particular enfoque na indústria de defesa Brasileira em expansão, suscitaram uma maior cobertura e apoio nacional para os seus investimentos bem como a prospecção de países Africanos enquanto possíveis novos mercados para os seus produtos. Contudo, e pese embora a observação da sua influência crescente nos últimos anos do período analisado, verifica-se que estes elementos desempenharam apenas um papel secundário no que concerne à génese do posicionamento Brasileiro no Atlântico Sul.

No plano oposto, visa-se também apreender as motivações do lado Africano relativamente à opção de cooperar com o Brasil em tal domínio. África do Sul, Angola e Namíbia são por isso selecionados como três casos de estudo representativos, quer do contexto regional quer das iniciativas de defesa Brasileiras. Argumenta-se que quando confrontados com a disponibilidade de vários possíveis parceiros, estes países podem tomar diferentes elementos adicionais em consideração, como parte de um processo de barganha tácita que dispensa formalidades. Desta forma, é comparada o papel de fatores materiais e sociais, através de uma perspectiva

dual. Por um lado, no plano estritamente material, procura-se evidenciar um possível *trade-off* a nível multilateral, por meio da análise quantitativa de votações de 1291 resoluções na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas entre 1995 e 2012. Os resultados obtidos não permitem, no entanto, confirmar a expectativa inicial da adopção de posições mais convergentes em consonância com o surgimento de iniciativas de cooperação de defesa. No entanto, tanto o apoio técnico-científico Brasileiro em termos de delimitação e expansão das plataformas continentais Africanas como as facilidades conducentes ao desenvolvimento de capacidades locais de indústria de defesa, revelaram-se cruciais para uma evolução favorável das relações estratégicas entre o Brasil e cada um dos países indicados.

No plano social, e contrariamente ao que seria inicialmente expectável, demonstra-se que elementos imateriais presentes nas relações interestaduais assumiram igual importância. Com efeito, regras e procedimentos de regimes internacionais, incluindo as cimeiras ASA, CPLP, IBAS ou ZOPACAS, proporcionaram as condições necessárias para contactos exploratórios entre os três países e o Brasil na área de defesa, com subsequentes desenvolvimentos a nível bilateral. Por outro lado, com a exceção do caso Angolano, níveis assinaláveis de confiança gerada pela interação de elites Brasileiras com os seus homólogos Africanos ao longo dos anos, são também indicados como fundamentais para a manutenção de diálogo e resolução de obstáculos burocráticos com os restantes países.

Esta tese proporciona três contributos originais para a área de Relações Internacionais em que se enquadra. Em primeiro lugar, destaca-se a permeabilidade do processo de decisão Brasileiro face ao contexto internacional, com respeito à formulação e planeamento de prioridades de defesa bem como na sua tradução efetiva em iniciativas externas. Por entre um número crescente de intervenientes oficiais neste domínio com diferentes instrumentos políticos, económicos e militares ao seu dispor, fica patente a sua crescente complexidade formal na direta proporção dos objectivos traçados pelos últimos governos, entre 2003 e 2014. Em segundo lugar, é evidenciada a existência de diferentes realidades no contexto Africano que, em último caso, implicam o ajuste das estratégias de atores externos com vista a facilitar as suas inserções no continente. O grau de sucesso das iniciativas do Brasil em África revela-se assim contingente à provisão complementar de diversos elementos conforme o país

receptor em causa. Tal abordagem confirma, por sua vez, que o apoio desses países a propostas Brasileiras não se encontra nem determinado *a priori* nem necessariamente garantido por laços histórico-culturais anteriores.

Por último, conclui-se pela confirmação de um importante nicho inexplorado nas relações Brasil-África. Tal é manifesto tanto em termos da projeção externa do Brasil como em termos da sua capacidade de projetar influência. Em particular, fica patente a promoção consistente do desenvolvimento de dinâmicas de segurança colectivas ao longo das suas fronteiras marítimas orientais, com base em instrumentos cooperativos previamente negligenciados ou insuficientemente estudados. Uma abordagem completa da temática requer por isso o reconhecimento da importância de tal vertente estratégica, enquanto ditada por interesses de segurança geograficamente concentrados no Atlântico Sul e devidamente sustentada por múltiplas tentativas de reforçar as capaciadades de defesa de possíveis parceiros no continente Africano.

Palavras-chave: Brasil; África; cooperação de defesa; Atlântico Sul

Abstract

This thesis contends that Brazilian-African relations have been predominantly framed under three main vectors of analysis, centred on political relations, economic interactions and the disbursement of development assistance. Such a thematic focus has led to a research gap in the form of defence cooperation ties between Brazil and African countries in the South Atlantic. Drawing from original gathered data and multiple interviews with key officials, it is demonstrated how Brazilian interpretations of its maritime borders incited a considerable expansion of such relations while providing a novel and systematised account of their intensity and diversity between 2003 and 2014. It is posited that the decision-making process over such transatlantic initiatives was primarily driven by geopolitical elements in a spill-over format and only secondarily by economic considerations. Similarly, it is argued that African countries regarded a combination of material and social factors, including technical-scientific support, abidance by rules from common international regimes and trust garnered amongst elites over the years, as decisive in their choice to engage with Brazil in this domain. The main findings underscore the need to adjust the current research focus on Brazilian-African relations while acknowledging brewing regional security-related dynamics in the South Atlantic.

Keywords: Brazil; Africa; defence cooperation; South Atlantic

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similar note, I learned tremendously from working closely with several scholars and colleagues, who shared their experiences and knowledge with me on multiple occasions. In particular, Prof. Adriana Abdenur and Prof. Frank Mattheis, both ended up turning my final year into a whirlwind of unexpected deadlines but equally promising outcomes for the coming years.

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Content

List of acronyms

AAD	Africa Aerospace and Defence exhibition
ABC	*Agência Brasileira de Cooperação*
ABDI	*Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial*
ABIMDE	*Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Materiais de Defesa e Segurança*
AI	Agreement Index
APEX-Brasil	*Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos*
ASA	Africa-South America Heads of State and Government Summits
AU	African Union
BB	*Banco do Brasil*
BDA	*Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola*
BNDES	*Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Social*
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa
CAEPE	*Curso de Altos Estudos de Política e Estratégia*
CAMEX	*Câmara de Comércio Exterior*
CCOPAB	*Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil*
CDRL–LRIT	*Centro de Dados Regionais-Sistema de Informações e Acompanhamento de Navios a Longa Distância*
CFOMA	*Curso de Formação de Oficiais para Marinhas Amigas*
CIDDEMA	*Comissão Interministerial para a Delimitação e Demarcação dos Espaços Marítimos de Angola*
CIRM	*Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos Marítimos*
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

CMID	*Comissão Militar da Indústria de Defesa*
COFIG	*Comitê de Financiamento e Garantia das Exportações*
COMACE	*Comitê de Avaliação de Créditos ao Exterior*
COPAC	*Comissão Coordenadora do Programa de Aeronave de Combate*
CPLP	*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*
CREDN	*Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional*
DAEBAI	*Directriz Estratégica para atividades do Exército Brasileiro na Área Internacional*
DAF I	*Divisão da África I*
DAF II	*Divisão da África II*
DAF III	*Divisão da Africa III*
DCTA	*Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia Aeroespacial*
DHN	*Diretoria de Hidrografia e Navegação*
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DR	Defection Ratio
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EEZ	Economic Exclusive Zone
ECOWAS	Economic Community for West African States
EMBRAPA	*Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária*
EMGEPRON	*Empresa Gerencial de Projectos Navais*
ESG	*Escola Superior de Guerra*
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIESP-COMDEFESA	*Federação das Indústrias do Estado de S. Paulo-Departamento da Indústria da Defesa*
FGE	*Fundo de Garantia à Exportação*

FINEP	*Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos*
FIOCRUZ	*Fundação Oswaldo Cruz*
GAT-FN	*Grupo de Apoio Técnico de Fuzileiros Navais*
GCC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
GTEX	*Grupo Técnico de Estudos Estratégicos de Comércio Exterior*
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
ISBA	International Seabed Authority
IVC	Index of Voting Cohesion
LAAD	Latin America Aero & Defence exhibition
LDC	Least developed countries
LEPLAC	*Plano de Levantamento da Plataforma Continental Brasileira*
MAG	*Mar, Ambiente, Geologica e Serviços Lda.*
MBCTM	*Missão Brasileira de Cooperação Técnico-Militar*
MDIC	*Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior*
MERCOSUL	*Mercado Comum do Sul*
MINUSTAH	*Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haiti*
MNBN	*Missão Naval Brasileira na Namíbia*
MONUA	*Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola*
MONUSCO	*Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo*
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*
MRE	*Ministério das Relações Exteriores*
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NPaOc	*Navio Patrulha Oceânico*
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee
PDP	*Política de Desenvolvimento Produtivo*
PEPCA	*Projecto de Extensão da Plataforma Continental de Angola*
PEPME	*Programa de Ensino Profissional Marítimo para Estrangeiros*
PIA	*Programa Integração com a África*
PNID	*Política Nacional da Indústria de Defesa*
PROAREA	*Programa de Prospecção e Exploração de Recursos Minerais da Área Internacional do Atlântico Sul e Equatorial*
PROEX	*Programa de Financiamento às Exportações*
PRONAVAL	*Programa de Desenvolvimento do Poder Naval de Angola*
PRO-RENOVA	*Programa Estruturado de Apoio aos demais Países em Desenvolvimento na Área de Energias Renováveis*
PT	*Partido dos Trabalhadores*
SAIN	*Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais*
SATO	South Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SCE	*Seguro de Crédito à Exportação*
SENAI	*Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial*
SPAD	*Secretariado Permanente para os Assuntos de Defesa*
SWAPO	South West Africa People Organisation
UEMOA	*Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine*
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Verification Mission in Angola

UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNITAS	United International Anti-Submarine Warfare Training
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNPBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
WFP	World Food Program
ZOPACAS	*Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul*

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"*I used to say, for example, that Africa is 'thirsty for Brazil'. And better than my formulation is the one by a Kenyan professor at Harvard University, Calestous Juma, who says that for each African problem there is a Brazilian solution. That is true in agriculture, it is true in other fields of economy, and is also true in defence, as I have discovered throughout our contacts, with the existing interest in that regard*" (Amorim, 2014c).

Introduction

On March 1st 1994, South African officials relinquished control over the coastal enclave of Walvis Bay to Namibia, thus terminating a protracted sovereignty dispute that surpassed the latter's independence three years before. Together with the regional historical significance, the moment signalled the start of another particular entente. As transition ceremonies winded down, Brazilian frigate *Niterói F-40* became the first foreign vessel to enter the deep-water port under Namibian jurisdiction. Such a symbolic visit portended a cooperation agreement to be signed three days later, through which the Brazilian Navy assumed the responsibility for designing and supporting Namibian maritime forces. In subsequent years, however, Brazil's official interest for the South Atlantic waned in reflection of a changed internal context and other international priorities. Further defence cooperation initiatives in the South Atlantic, as envisioned by the Brazilian military, took a backseat and were relegated to the low-end of the country's foreign agenda.

But nearly 20 years after the first Namibian foray, Brazil returned to the South Atlantic under the same guise and using the same tools. Unequivocal proof of this reengagement came on November 2013, when the Brazilian Naval Mission in Cape Verde was officially launched. The following year, a similar endeavour began with São Tomé and Príncipe. As the initiatives multiplied and as Brazilian concerted efforts rolled-out, an outward agenda became evident in a bid to present the country as a credible security provider to African countries alongside Atlantic shores. However, despite the visible material effort, the root causes of this process remained unaddressed. What drove Brazil to refocus on South Atlantic defence dynamics? What were the sources of such underlying concern for security developments in its Western maritime boundaries?

These queries incite further puzzlement when considering the positioning of Brazil in the world at large between 2003 and 2014. In this context, it is possible to single out the public discourse over South-South relations and the development of ties with Africa, as backed by both former-President Lula da Silva and President Dilma Rousseff governments. Brazilian relations with Africa expanded while primarily focused on traditional vectors of engagement, such as high-level political dialogue,

economic and trade interactions, and disbursement of development assistance. But the application of such model of analysis proves limiting. Where did defence cooperation stand amidst such an agenda? What were the connections between such public traits of transatlantic relation and Brazilian defence interests?

Meanwhile, from an African perspective, the security outlook in the South Atlantic warranted concern. Security perils such as piracy attacks or drug trafficking incited external unease and prompted a more physical presence on the continent. Whether led by the U.S. or European countries, with the matched interest of non-traditional players like China, the South Atlantic began to attract additional outside actors and solutions. Faced with a wide range of possible defence cooperation partners, questions surface over why opt for Brazil in this regard. What kind of additional advantages, if any, Brazil brought to African countries in terms of providing defence-related capabilities?

The combination of these initial queries over a largely unstudied topic in Brazilian-African relations prompts an overall effort to seek out comprehensive answers. To that end, this thesis uses the following general research question as a starting point:

- *How to frame Brazil's relations with African countries along the South Atlantic in terms of defence cooperation and what explains its development during the 2003-2014 timeframe?*

But in order to both obtain and provide a complete depiction of this specific reality, it is required a framework that brings together different elements and approaches. As Baldwin points out, "the accuracy of one's estimate of whether an architect has adequate raw materials to complete his or her project is likely to improve if one first ascertains whether the architect plans to build a birdhouse or a cathedral" (2013: 277). The following sub-sections describe in detail the goals and working hypotheses, the case studies and time period selection, as well as the choice of methods and data used.

Goals and hypotheses

This thesis is structured around three main objectives, two core hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses that remain interconnected throughout the entire length of the text:

(1) The main goal consists in revealing the capacity of Brazil to act both as an active promoter of a common agenda and as a magnet in the South Atlantic, around which new dynamics have come to develop. To that end, I begin in Chapter I by highlighting how ties between Brazil and Africa have been structured around a tripartite model, composed by South-South political ties, economic opportunities and historical-cultural linkages. This serves the purpose of evidencing how the study of Brazilian-African relations has neglected other important vectors worthy of analysis, such as defence cooperation ties. Subsequently, I provide a theoretical recap of key concepts in terms of defence cooperation and models of regional security in Chapter II, which allow for a proper contextualisation of the dynamics in question.

Following initial research inroads (Abdenur & Neto, 2014; Aguilar, 2014; Seabra, 2014), I analyse in Chapter III the increase in defence cooperation between Brazil and African states along the South Atlantic shoreline. While presenting original data substantiated by multiple interviews with key officials, I characterise this specific cooperation drive as potentially conducive to the formation of a South Atlantic regional complex, as led and envisioned by Brazilian authorities. Simultaneously, by highlighting the intensity of ties throughout the indicated period, I provide the first complete representation of this sub-dimension of Brazilian-African interactions, thus adding a novel contribution to the current debate over Brazil's refocus on Africa.

(2) The second goal lies with unpacking possible explanations for such developments. Once the validity of new observations over the dealings of Brazil with Africa is established, it is essential to explain both its occurrence and strengthening during the indicated time period. Chapter IV presents an exercise of Foreign Policy Analysis centred on the decision-making process behind launching, sustaining and expanding the defence cooperation initiatives with African countries. Instead of

attempting to theorise its conception, I choose to focus on key elements that both informed and conditioned the respective process.

Two features require particular emphasis. On one hand, any series of interrelated decisions cannot be dissociated from the surrounding context and should thus be deemed as comprising a "sequential interactive type of decision-making" (Mintz & DeRuen, 2010: 16). The specific characteristics of the environment in which decisions are taken can influence not only their outcome but also their ultimate effects on third parties. In order to facilitate their understanding, they need to be broken down. On the other hand, the number and composition of the actors involved can also influence foreign policy decision-making as they shape decisions according to their own interests (Mintz & DeRuen, 2010: 18). In other words, I assume that any country's initiative abroad reflects the positions of several different actors, who may "differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of their government" (Allison & Alperin, 1972: 42).

Having determined the object of analysis, the nature of the envisioned outcome also requires adequate characterisation and some measure of delimitation. Hence, the use of spill-over under a different reasoning than in International Relations research. Spill-over has been a staple of the academic debate over regional integration theories and how to best explain the development and institutional evolution of regional projects, especially when recurring to a neo-functionalist lens. Schmitter (1969), for instance, perceived spill-over as made up by two defining variables, scope (coverage of issue areas) and level (decisional capacity) of authority, thus accounting for the simultaneous increment of both indicators in regional integration initiatives. Meanwhile, spillback, retrench, spill-around and build-up reflected the different variations of such indicators, thus showcasing greater/lesser levels of authority combined/dissociated with greater/lesser inclusion of different policy issues (Malamud & Dri, 2014: 227-228).

However, spill-over can also be considered on more heuristic terms. Following Lindberg's definition, spill-over can equate to a process whereby "a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more, and so forth" (1963: 9). This sequencing view of how events can

unfold in an interrelated manner towards a single outcome can be applied to the particular topic of this thesis. By admitting the structural interrelation between different factors, it is admitted their occurrence in a self-reinforcing fashion, thus contributing to jointly influence a specific development. Spill-over can therefore be used as a functional characterisation of relational dynamics rather than for purposes of theorisation *per se*. Bearing in mind this proposition, I bring forward the following hypothesis:

- *Brazil assumed a leading role in the South Atlantic due to a dynamic of geopolitical spill-over over its decision-making process, including the material usefulness of such project before new international security developments and the compatibility with Brazil's own foreign policy agenda.*

I argue that the inception and expansion of a defence cooperation drive centred on African countries along the South Atlantic shoreline was generated through a spill-over dynamic of a set of geopolitical elements, concerning Brazil's own regional positioning and interests abroad. With the purpose of providing a detailed operationalisation of such an argument, I divide this process in two separate sub-dimensions of analysis:

- *The role of perceptions of threats to Brazil's stance in the South Atlantic*. The influence of threats in international relations has received a steady focus from theories of war, deterrence, alliances, and conflict resolution (e.g. Myers, 1991; Fordham, 1998; Farnham, 2003; Miguel, 2013). Perceptions can be broadly defined as "the process of apprehending by means of the senses and recognising and interpreting what is processed" (Stein, 2013). But perceptions of threats can also be considered as "anticipations of the future". In order to understand their existence, it is required "to investigate the expectations aroused in the observer by the perceived infringement" (Cohen, 1978: 101).

An adequate operationalisation of perceptions of threats can be achieved through an empirical combination of different indicators. Following Cohen's framework, special focus is attributed to the "articulations of decision makers" (how

they judge and/or react to any threatening development); "descriptions by contemporary spectators of the state of mind of decision makers" (how they corroborate internal dynamics); "evidence of exploration by decision makers of alternative responses to the threat" (how it unfolds internally and externally); and "'coping processes' put into effect by decision makers in response to the threat" (whether at the diplomatic, political or even military level) (1978: 95). Publically vented appreciations and assumptions of security threats, emanating from both within and outside of the South Atlantic comprise one example. Whether effectively demonstrated or merely hypothetically raised by Brazil's political-military leadership, these perceptions serve to assess the level of awareness over regional security problems. They also help to evaluate their role in inciting Brazil to increase its focus towards the South Atlantic under a more materialistic guise.

- *The role of Brazil's wider foreign policy goals.* Traditional conceptions of international affairs often consider the emergence of disagreements in the international system as originating in the distribution of power. Potential revisionist actors are understood as driven by the amount of material capabilities at their disposal. Even cravings for greater prestige are referred "primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state's capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power" (Gilpin, 1981: 31). But the fact is, "being a great power has never been solely about the possession of large amounts of crude material power. It has been closely related to notions of legitimacy and authority" (Hurrell, 2006: 4). Accordingly, and whether acknowledged as "spoilers, supporters or shirkers" (Schweller, 2011: 287), several emerging countries such as Brazil, pursued a similar trend in terms of seeking greater international predominance as a means to an end, while reflecting its desired high-profile and corresponding interests (e.g. Kahler, 2011; Hurrel & Sengupta, 2012; Burges, 2012; Stephen, 2012; Narlikar, 2013).

Such a status-seeking strategy has already been the object of recent studies, with regards to Brazil's African insertion and how it can be construed as fuelling a larger international agenda (Stolte, 2015). For the purpose of this thesis, however, I invert the rationale. I aim instead to exhibit how Brazil's wider Global South agenda fuelled the goal of forming a 'maritime backyard' of sorts in the South Atlantic, structured around defence cooperation with African countries. Seeking to better frame the prosecution of this agenda, I adopt Philip Nel's distinction between redistribution

of power and international recognition, as the chief goals of an emerging power's foreign policy agenda. The focus is set on demonstrating how the pursuit of both redistribution of power, wealth, and privilege – "the *who gets what, when, and how* of international politics" – and acknowledgement of status and social esteem by other states, contributed to Brazil's rekindled interest in South Atlantic dynamics (Nel, 2010: 962-63). I apply this conceptual dyad to the case of the *Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul* (ZOPACAS – Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic), as the multilateral instrument chosen by Brazilian authorities to engage with partnering countries in this area, as an overarching framework for its defence cooperation initiatives.

In contrast to this geopolitical spill-over dynamic, an alternative argument can be brought up. Indeed, the influence of core economic interests driving further transatlantic defence cooperation is imbued with a similar explanatory value. It therefore requires a similar testing effort. Previous research has already focused on how economic factors have played a part in security studies (Mielniczuk, 2012) or how military ties can go hand-in-hand with greater economic relations (Long & Leeds, 2006). While acknowledging the wide range of such subject, I make good use of the triangular framework proposed by John Stopford and Susan Strange. That allows better encapsulating the dynamics between public and private actors, in terms of the internationalisation of both a country's economic interests and companies' operations abroad.

Figure I - Triad of economic relationships



Source: Stopford et al., 1991: 22

In Stopford et al.'s interpretation, the triad represents the main driving forces of international diplomacy, squarely centred on improving interstate business and trade. Their work, however, focuses on host government-company relations and does not distinguish between home and host (target) government. I consider this differentiation significant for it implies that not only governments can constrain bilateral economic transactions but they can also foment it, with an overall agenda in the background. That, in turn, allows acknowledging ties between home governments and multinational companies seeking to invest abroad, under the assumption that industry representatives may also nudge their own governments towards making additional efforts in terms of both opening and securing new potential markets. With those elements in mind, I bring forward the following alternative hypothesis:

- *Brazil assumed a leading role in the South Atlantic due to the influence of economic interests over its decision-making process, as expressed by governmental trade and industrial policies and the interests of the private sector.*

By recognising that "the consistency and the content of foreign economic policies result at least as much from the constraints of domestic structures as from the functional logic inherent in international effects" (Katzenstein, 1976: 2), the crux of this hypothesis is straightforward. It focuses on identifying the preference for South Atlantic economic interactions amidst an overall African interest, as a justification for its elevation to a strategic concern in terms of Brazil's defence priorities. I divide such a set of economics interests between:

- *The role of governmental industrial and trade agenda.* Foreign economic policies are primarily dictated by variations of international effects, which often constrain the allocation of resources. However, "government policies can [also] be explained in terms of the nature of domestic policy networks which link state and society" (Katzenstein, 1976: 4). In this case, how a governments designs and tries to implement a coherent strategy to increment its economic and trade presence abroad, can be driven with more ulterior and strategic motives in the background. I examine governmental industrial and trade policy towards Africa through the scrutiny of the main institutional actors involved, as set out by both the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations, together with the main political, financial and commercial instruments used in that regard.

- *The role of the private sector and industry-federations.* Amidst increasing commercial flows, multinationals are recognised as important actors in their own right as well as generators of significant Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) trends. In this context, emerging countries of the South are no exception and have witnessed their own 'economic champions' look outwards in a more systematic fashion (Gómez-Mera et al., 2015). Trade and national industry features are analysed following the assumption that economic interests might comprise effective pressure efforts from national producers' groups. These, in turn, can end up stimulating governments towards making new overtures for the export of national products. Those public-private interactions derive from the fact that "when firms feel secure that conflict between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states will work together to promote commerce between their respective businesses,

they are more likely to invest in trade" (Long & Leeds, 2006: 435; Gowa & Manfield, 2004). Actions and interests of companies, alone or in cohort, while benefitting from government incentives, are taken into account through an examination of overall private interest in Africa and a detailed look over the aims of the Brazilian defence industry in potential new markets across the Atlantic.

(3) A third and final goal concerns the issue of understanding how South Atlantic African countries acknowledged and allowed Brazil to position itself as the regional leading actor. To that end, I rely on intergovernmental bargaining theory, which deems distribution of benefits as decisively shaped by the relative power of national governments. They can either choose to resort to threats or promises in order to achieve their goals (Schelling, 1960; Snyder & Diesing, 1977; cf. McKibben, 2015). In each case, governments that gain the most, offer the most significant compromises or side-payments to other potential partners (Moravcsik, 1998: 55) while seeking to "sweetening the pot" (Long & Leeds, 2006: 436).

Such kind of exchange needs not to be formalised in order to occur in practice. In fact, "whenever a state attempts to influence the policy choices of another state through behaviour, rather than by relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges", a case of tacit bargaining may take place. By dispensing with formalisation and instead relying on consecutive patterns of behaviour as a means to achieve the desired outcome, the bargaining process may assume a tacit format. It can therefore become complementary to the central relation without necessarily equating to formally binding outcomes. More importantly, such processes do not equate to coercion because "the actions are aimed at influencing an outcome that can only be achieved by some measure of joint voluntary behaviour" (Downs & Rocke, 1990: 3).

Further distinguishing tacit bargaining from other kinds of negotiated or coercive configurations, it is important to attend to the different goals and means involved. Tacit bargaining vies to reach or maintain a cooperative *status quo* rather than to exclusively secure a formal agreement. Likewise, it encompasses actions through multiple venues, usually backed by various forms of retaliation/reciprocation/cooperation, instead of resorting to mere rhetoric and political discourse (Langlois & Langlois, 1996: 571-572). I contend in Chapter V that

a process of tacit bargaining took place, in which African countries received sufficient incentives and/or promises of engagement, both at a bilateral and multilateral level, that cleared the way for greater cooperation endeavours in the defence domain. With that in mind, the following hypothesis is elaborated:

- *African countries engaged with Brazilian defence cooperation in the South Atlantic due to the provision of multiple material factors, ranging from support in international platforms to the disbursement of technical-scientific cooperation.*

I focus on concrete commitments that were provided in order to reach conformity between Brazil's desire to expand its influence in the South Atlantic and the specific interests of African countries, namely Angola, Namibia and South Africa. Such material factors are operationalised as follows:

- *Support at a multilateral level*. The majority of multilateral organisations can be deemed as constituting international regimes of their own, in which "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures" make "actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1982: 186). But beneath the formal dimension, such arenas also serve an underlined purpose as venues for privileged contacts and negotiations. They can also help reduce the transaction costs of parallel agreements made by its members. In other words, "regimes might lower the likelihood of costly stalemates by increasing the ease of splitting the difference" (Fearon, 1998: 298). Given their susceptibility to issue linkages and side payments, regimes may present themselves as ideal stages for the design of mutually beneficial bargaining arrangements. In other words, they can make sure "more potential *quids* are available for the *quo*" (Keohane, 1984: 91). Previous studies have demonstrated how trade-offs can be achieved between major and minor powers, with the formers offering security to the latters in return for political support in international arenas (Morrow, 1991).

By focusing on such high-level dynamics, I bring into evidence how the participation of Brazil and African countries within such regimes accompanied the

former's overall agenda towards the South Atlantic. I aim to evidence a tacit issue linkage between alignment in international forums and more concrete initiatives of strategic value for both parties in the defence domain. Brazil's multilateral streak was consistently highlighted on varied levels in recent years (e.g. Visentini & Silva, 2010; Fonseca Jr., 2011; Doctor, 2015). But as Brazil's foreign policy expanded its reach, so did its resources and efforts to garner further African support in multiple multilateral initiatives. I thus provide a quantitative analysis of the voting patterns at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), as the most adequate platform to extract inferences over longer periods of time, both with regards to Brazil's bilateral relations with Angola, Namibia and South Africa, and collectively, in the wider South Atlantic context of ZOPACAS.

- *Technical-scientific cooperation*. The notion that aid/cooperation flows are subjacent to wider policy agendas is not novel (e.g. Alessina & Dollar, 2000). When considering the emergence of Brazil as an international donor, however, it is noticeable the consistent attempts by Brazilian authorities to dissociate their country from Western aid standards and practices. Despite such efforts, it is difficult to deny how Brazil has come to use its revamped cooperation endeavours to advance broader foreign policy goals (Abdenur, 2015: 2). In fact, the bulk of the literature acknowledges the thin line between a "genuine" solidarity drive and the underlined interplay with wider foreign policy goals (Burges, 2012: 356; Puente, 2010; Dauvergne & Farias, 2012; Inoue & Vaz, 2012; Pino, 2012;). It is therefore suggested a minimal degree of expectation for some sort of compensation, in exchange for the distributed cooperation abroad.

Recent streams of research have granted considerable accolade to Brazilian cooperation initiatives in Africa on such specific sectors as agriculture (e.g. Milhorance, 2013; Cabral, 2015) and health (e.g. Follér, 2013; Russo, Cabral & Ferrinho, 2013). But a secondary niche area that has not warranted similar focus can be found in terms of technical-scientific cooperation over both military capabilities and maritime issues (cf. Figuerôa, 2014). Given its connections with each country's defence interests over the composition of a military apparatus and the sovereignty of their own maritime borders, this specific type of Brazilian cooperation proves a singular instrument. Specifically, it allows for privileged interactions in the defence domain with African countries as they seek out specialised tools and knowledge over areas of strategic concern. As such, I

map its disbursement in the South Atlantic area with the purpose of pinpointing the linkages between the transference of technological expertise and local countries lenience towards overall Brazilian defence overtures. Formal assistance efforts over the extension of African countries' continental platforms and Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs), collaboration over the delimitation and potential exploration of untapped natural resources in the surrounding oceanic area, as well as existing joint endeavours towards the development of industrial-military solutions receive primary emphasis.

However, in recognition of possible alternative arguments, I hold the abovementioned hypothesis against a different set of explanations concerning the role of social factors in bargaining processes. Drawing from social constructivist tenets, Leonard Schoppa (1999), demonstrated how such kind of "social context" could impact bilateral negotiation and alter expected results. Accordingly, bargaining outcomes do not necessarily reflect the material costs and benefits faced by participants in a negotiation but can rather become an expression of a social construction by all the actors involved (Wendt, 1995; Katzenstein, 1996). By claiming that material factors were not as decisive in the process of tacit bargaining between Brazil and African countries, I focus on the part that social features played in substantiating the latters' positioning towards the former, under the following hypothesis:

- *African countries engaged with Brazilian defence cooperation in the South Atlantic due to social factors, ranging from procedural norms of common regional platforms to trust incited through elite-interaction.*

As most of the literature on the subject, Schoppa's work is focused on the coercive trait of international bargaining. Its general premises, however, are also applicable to more cooperative bargaining contexts in which 'promises' and not 'threats' are made. I opt to divide the treatment of social explanations between:

- *Procedural norms*. Materialist conceptions of bargaining tend to interpret international regimes as reflecting the primary interests of major powers or at least those

actors that possess greater power capabilities, when in comparison with others in a more disadvantageous position (e.g. Keohane, 1984; Martin, 1993). However, if a bargaining procedure takes place within an institutionalised process or is strongly influenced by its structural limitations, its dispositions can also be constrained by the nature of the collective norms, which both parties simultaneously opted to abide to. In other words, the degree to which a state is willing to either accept or offer concessions on specific issues may vary according to how both the "sender and the receptor's tactics" respect procedural rules and norms, as stipulated under an international regime (Schoppa, 1999: 314). I choose to focus on the work carried out by both Brazil and African countries through four specific institutional frameworks that exhibit a set of common rules and procedures for initiatives within the South Atlantic area. The role of the Africa-South America (ASA) Heads of State and Government Summits, the *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* (CPLP - Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries), the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue forum and ZOPACAS in facilitating or expanding further bilateral endeavours in terms of defence cooperation are underscored, with regards Brazil and the three selected cases of Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

- *Trust*. The issue of confidence amidst state-to-state relations in international affairs, while connected to the personal relationships established between policymakers, is considered significant in both inciting and resolving crises (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Larson, 1997; Kydd, 2005). When applying to bargaining situations, its relevance is equally relevant. By fostering an expectation that others will honour particular obligations, trust can be understood as either fomenting or constraining potential concessions within a specific interaction. Or, to put it differently, trust, "as the belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one's own cooperation", can affect the degree to which parties arrive at cooperative agreements or not (Kydd, 2005: 6). Aiming for a reliable measure of such kind of intangible phenomena, I seek out visible connections between the decision-making record and the policy choices of leaders. Moreover, I highlight how sets of rules may have provided actors with varying degrees of decision-making latitude. If I assume the choice of Brazil as a defence cooperation partner to be a "discretion-granting" measure, I am required to demonstrate that African leaders did so because they believed their counterparts to be, even if partially, trustworthy (Hoffman, 2002: 385-387). To that end, I rely on elite interviews

and public statements as a way of uncovering how the specific influence of key decision-makers played a part in official contacts between Brazil and the three involved countries, while conducive to greater defence cooperation.

As systematised in Table 1, by resorting to this complex but wholesome framework, I seek to establish that (1) Brazil's motives towards Africa in recent years were not only largely materialistic, security-driven and in tune with its own strategic goals – both in terms of the South Atlantic area and of its overall foreign policy for the world at large – but also that (2) a process of tacit bargaining based on material factors took place between both oceanic margins in order to facilitate the emergence of such a new regional context.

Table I - Systematisation of main hypotheses and counter-hypotheses

Main hypothesis n. 1		**Counter-hypothesis n. 1**		**Main hypothesis n. 2**		**Counter-hypothesis n. 2**	
Geopolitical spill-over		**Economic interests**		**Material factors**		**Social factors**	
Perception of threats	Foreign policy goals	Trade and industrial agenda	Private sector interests	Support on international arenas	Technical-scientific support	Procedural norms	Trust

I.2 Scope, case selection and time period

Regarding the geographic scope of analysis, this thesis focus on an area broadly delimited in the south by the parallel 60° S – corresponding to the frontier with Antarctica – and in the north by the axis Natal-Dakar. However, seeking to use a more accurate regional portrayal of Brazilian intents, I consider the South Atlantic as the area corresponding in its entirety to the African membership of ZOPACAS and therefore include: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,

Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Togo.[1] The issue of Brazilian interests in Antarctica remain outside of this scope. Likewise, taking into account a generalised African perception that Argentina and Uruguay follow Brazil's lead within the context of ZOPACAS' institutional framework, I opt to exclude them from this exercise.[2]

But any attempt to verify such a wide spectrum of African positions towards Brazil in the South Atlantic is limited by time, financial and logistical considerations. These constrains prevent the inclusion of a large-*n* selection and forces the reining of the intended scope. Accordingly, three African states were considered an appropriate number of cases in order to reach valid conclusions. Looking for a representative sample, the decision fell on Southern Africa as a geographically delimited zone that comprises three South Atlantic countries, Angola, Namibia and South Africa, in various stages of political, social and economic development as well as with different historical backgrounds and different records of interactions with Brazil. More importantly, these countries evidence different levels of intensity and priorities in terms of Brazilian defence cooperation, thus constituting a representative sample of the country's overall efforts in this domain. In that sense, the abovementioned third research goal is primarily concentrated on the study of ties between Brazil and Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

The time period, on the other hand, is subjected to contemporary Brazilian political cycles. In other words, the limits of this analysis abide by the beginning (2003) and end (2014) of the last three terms corresponding to successive *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT – Workers Party) governments, under both Lula da Silva (2003-2006; 2007-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014). This allows tracing the topic of the thesis from its earliest political conception to its most recent developments, while pinpointing possible areas for further research. Whenever possible and data was available, the analysis expands its timeframe to previous governments, in order to provide more adequate comparisons with the two terms of President Fernando

[1] It should be noted that this methodological decision implies excluding Mauritania, given its non-membership of ZOPACAS.

[2] Argentina and Uruguay are, however, exceptionally included as full ZOPACAS country members when voting cohesion within the grouping is calculated, in order to avoid unnecessary distortion of the results obtained.

Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998; 1999-2002), and emphasise the more recent intensity of ties between Brazil and Africa. The analysis of voting patterns at the UNGA comprises one of such cases.

I.3 Methods and data

In light of the proposed scope, it is necessary to adopt a combination of methodologies to account for every single dimension of analysis above indicated. On the qualitative side, I opt to resort to process tracing in order to establish whether a particular factor can be traced and/or linked to another in a causal manner while empirically evaluating the preferences and perceptions of all the actors involved (Porta & Keating, 2008: 223-239). This choice of method allows "to identify the possible Xs that might have caused Y in case Z" while treating every possible explanation *a priori* with similar levels of plausibility and seeking to establish a verifiable causal process than can justify the outcome targeted by this thesis (Mahoney, 2015: 201).

I rely first and foremost on the treatment of primary sources, drawing from extensive fieldwork periods in Brazil in 2013 and 2014 as well as in Angola, Namibia and South Africa in 2014. The main source of original data is composed by a set of 69 semi-structured interviews conducted with key policy and decision-makers in office during the period in question. That data set includes leading representatives from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Defence, Armed Forces, legislative branches and private sector. I focused on elite interviewing as the most suitable means to provide "an insight into the mind-set of the actors who have played a role in shaping the society in which we live and an interviewee's subjective analysis of a particular episode or situation" (Richards, 1996: 199-200; cf. Tansey, 2007; cf. Beckman & Hall, 2013). The geographic distribution includes Angola (7), Brazil (38), Cape Verde (1), Namibia (10), Portugal (3) and South Africa (10). Each individual was selected through a combination of non-random and snowball sampling that focused on actors that (a) played a meaningful part, both directly and indirectly, in the pursuit of cooperation between Brazil and Africa and/or (b) were engaged with the policy areas described by the hypotheses.[3] Anonymity issues were taken into

[3] A complete list of the interviews conducted is provided in Annex I.

consideration and granted upon request for specific cases concerning possible identification or disclosure of sensitive information. Identification details are omitted whenever the content of such interviews is used. Finally, the content of interviews with every Portuguese-speaking individual, whether from Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde or Portugal, is presented in its English translation.

The second main source is based on the collection of official documentation from countries in the South Atlantic area, with an emphasis on Brazil, Angola, Namibia and South Africa. That includes national strategies, guiding orientations and other types of formalised policies in the defence realm as well as discourses from political leaderships of the four countries. Parliamentary records of public hearings in the Chamber of Deputies for the approval of new Brazilian ambassadors abroad (*sabatinas*) and internal procedures of international/multilateral organisations relevant to this case were granted equal treatment. Extensive literature review was also carried out in terms of Brazilian foreign and defence policy towards this area and towards the overall African continent, previous attempts of institutionalising security ties within the South Atlantic, and emerging security threats along international sea lines and African shores.

The third main source consisted of original data gathered through official requests to Brazilian authorities under the Law for Information Access n. 12527, 18/10/2011. Such requests concerned previously undisclosed data of interest to the apprehension of the present topic and were both forwarded to and complied by the Brazilian Armed Forces and the *Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Social* (BNDES – National Development Bank), regarding the country's foreign training cooperation programmes and exports credit lines towards Africa, respectively. Likewise, diplomatic correspondence from Brazilian embassies in the selected countries, as obtained by news magazine *Época* in 2015 also under the Law for Information Access, is used for additional corroboration. Finally, numerical data concerning trade figures and export credit lines, either extracted from the *Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior* (MDIC – Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade) database or gathered under the referred Law for Information Access, is re-systematised and presented in a way as to demonstrate previous understated patterns of engagement with Africa.

Quantitative methods also contribute to corroborate this thesis' argument. While drawing from previous work (Sanches & Seabra, 2015), significant inferences are raised by recurring to UNGA data in terms of Brazil's voting convergence and cohesion at a bilateral (with Angola, Namibia and South Africa) and multilateral (within the ZOPACAS framework) level, respectively. Previous attempts to use such kind of data from a Brazilian point of view have focused exclusively on voting convergence within Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa (BRICS) and/or the *Mercado Comum do Sul* (MERCOSUL – Southern Common Market) (Oliveira & Onuki, 2013; Ferdinand, 2014), between Brazil and the Next Eleven Group (Reis da Silva, 2013) and between Brazil and the US, as a way to explain the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy over time (Amorim Neto, 2012). Relations with Africa in the background of the Global South *élan*, however, have remained under-researched, thus bolstering the originality of the intended approach to the present case.

In light of the complexity associated with the treatment of this particular data, several methodological clarifications are required. First, the analysis provided in Chapter 6 draws from Anton Srezhnev and Erik Voeten's original data set (2013), which contains data on all votes casted at the UNGA between 1946 and 2012, including the individual vote choices of each state member on each resolution.[4] From such vast source material, a total of 1291 resolutions put to a roll-call vote during the 50th through the 67th sessions (1995 through 2012) were extracted, regarding 24 countries from Africa (21) and Latin America (3).

Translating such data set into any empirical exercise requires further specific delimitation. Hosli et al.'s previous work (2010) and its own methodological choices are adopted in this thesis while adjusting them to the particular case of Brazil-Africa relations at the UNGA, whenever required. More specifically, it is important to acknowledge the existence of different coding methods, in terms of the 'yes,' 'no,' 'abstain,' and 'absence' vote choices. Voeten (2000), for instance, understands abstentions as a softer form of voting 'no' and therefore chooses to merge these two voting alternatives, assigning the same code to 'no'-votes and abstentions. He justifies such option with the argument that abstentions at the UNGA have come to represent

[4] The data set builds on various data collections assembled over the years by other researchers (cf. Srezhnev & Voeten, 2013). It contains a unique identifier for each resolution, the date of the vote, codes for the types of votes, the UN resolution number, the vote-tally, short and long descriptions of the content of the votes, and the actual votes cast by all UNGA states members.

the same purpose as a 'no'-vote, given that both choices eventually contribute to a resolution not reaching the required threshold of votes to pass. However, other options can also be found in the literature. Luif (2003), for instance, uses scale measures and codes a 'yes' vote as 1, a 'no' vote as 0, and an abstention as 0.5. Others (eg. Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005) treat all voting alternatives as separate choices: two countries vote in cohesion only if both vote 'yes', both vote 'no', or both vote 'abstain'. Coding 'absences' has also been contentious. While some code 'absence' as 'abstain' (Luif, 2003), other authors do not take the option of 'absence' into account, leaving these vote choices out of the cohesion calculations.

Taking these caveats into consideration, I adopt the so-called Rice-Beyle Method / Index of Voting Cohesion (IVC), as presented and amended by Arend Lijphart (1963; cf. Hurtwitz, 1975). Despite critiques to this formula's applicability to large *n*-case studies (cf. Hosli et al., 2010: 17; Amorim Neto, 2012: 63), I consider it an appropriate tool to test the individual cohesion between Brazil and three single countries. Even though originally designed for uncovering bloc-formation, it holds considerable explanatory value for bilateral voting patterns at the UNGA:

$$\text{IVC} = \frac{\left(f + \frac{1}{2}g\right)}{t} \times 100$$

In this case, *f* indicates the number of cases in which a pair of states both participate and vote identically (for example, they both vote 'yes', 'no' or 'abstain'), *g* denotes the number of votes in which such states display partial cohesion (for example, one state votes 'yes' or 'no', whereas the other abstains) and *t* is the total number of votes in which each states participate. Following Lijphart's lead, I take 'absences' as a "lack of essential data" and therefore choose to discard them in order to not unnecessarily distort or skew the final results (1963: 910).

However, when testing the cohesion of larger groupings, significant discrepancies between the results associated with each method can arise given the variety of options available. Previous analyses (Hosli et al., 2010: 40) have demonstrated that while following the same pretences, different cohesion methods might yield different results. As such, with the purpose of testing collective voting

patterns within ZOPACAS, I adopt a series of four (4) different cohesion assessment measures in order to minimise such a risk and achieve greater confirmation of the results obtained. The first two are closely interrelated to each other and can be labelled CI and CII, following Hosli et al.'s designation. With these measures, 'yes' votes are coded as 1, and 'no' votes as 0. In CI, 'abstain' votes are coded as 0.5, while in CII 'abstain' votes are coded as 0, and thus treated as 'no' votes. With AV*x* standing for the average vote on resolution *x*, the cohesion of votes on resolution *x*, in percentage terms, is given by the following equation:

$$\mathrm{C} = |\mathrm{AV}x - 0.5| \text{ x } 2 \text{ x } 100$$

If all members vote 'yes' or all vote 'no', C=100. If there is an equal number of 'yes' and 'no' votes, then C=0. In CI, where 'abstain' votes are coded as 0.5, if all members abstain, then C=0. In such case, the higher the number of abstentions, the lower is the cohesion index. In CII, however, where 'abstain' votes are coded as 0, all members abstaining would show the same cohesion as all the other members voting 'no,' and C would then equal 100.

A different method to assess voting cohesion in the UNGA can also be found in the so-called 'defection ratio' (DR). Cohesion between states is measured as a function of the degree to which each member of the group defects from the group's overall voting record. This reflects the probability that a randomly chosen member of a given group will deviate from the established common position of the group. Studies by Iida (1988) and Volgy et al. (2003) use such method. In this case, D*x* comprises the number of minority votes on resolution *x*, while c constitutes the total number of votes cast. The defection ratio on resolution *x* (DR), in percentage terms, is given by the following equation:

$$\mathrm{DR} = [\mathrm{D}x/\mathrm{c}] * 100$$

Finally, a different way to assess cohesion consists of the 'agreement index' (AI). Originally applied by Hix et al. (2005), subsequent studies have come to

demonstrate its usefulness in terms of UNGA data (Hosli et al. 2010). The AI treats 'yes', 'no' and 'abstain' as equal, creating a separate count of each vote choice for each resolution, represented by Y, N, and A respectively. AI is given by the following equation:

$$\mathrm{AI} = \mathrm{MAX}\{\mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{N}, \mathrm{A}\} - 0.5[(\mathrm{Y} + \mathrm{N} + \mathrm{A}) - \mathrm{MAX}\{\mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{N}, \mathrm{A}\}]/\mathrm{Y} + \mathrm{N} + \mathrm{A}$$

Perfect cohesion is represented by AI=1, and only when the number of 'yes', 'no' and 'abstain' choices are exactly the same for a group is AI=0, thus representing no cohesion. If there are equal numbers of 'yes' and 'no' votes, but no 'abstain' votes, then AI>0, since the countries were at least cohesive in agreeing to not abstain.

The rationale behind the use of multiple different methods lies in compensating the shortcomings inherent to each particular equation. For example, CI, CII and AI target the exact same level of cohesion while DI comprises, in its essence, the opposite of cohesion and therefore provides a useful comparison to confirm the inverted patterns expected to be observed using the former measures. On the other hand, distinguishing between CI and CII allows directly addressing the problematic of the inclusion and non-inclusion of 'abstain' votes. Finally, AI presents itself as a still rarely used measure but with equally significant explanatory potential.

I.4 Thesis structure

This thesis adopts the following structure. The next chapter recaps both previous and more recent relations between Brazil and Africa, by means of the traditional vectors of analysis, focused on political relations, economic interactions and the disbursement of development assistance. Chapter II verses on key concepts and different models of conceptualising regional security dynamics, with the purpose of obtaining the tools to characterize Brazil's agenda for the South Atlantic. Chapter III brings into evidence past Brazilian interpretations of its maritime borders and provides a systematised account of defence cooperation flows between Brazil and African countries from 2003 to 2014, while drawing from both original and publically accessed data.

Having evidenced the intensity of such cooperation, Chapter IV contends that Brazil's decision-making concerning the investment on defence initiatives across the Atlantic was primarily driven by geopolitical elements in a spill-over fashion and only secondarily by economic considerations. Similarly, Chapter V argues that African countries tacitly bargained Brazilian support in international stages and technical-scientific assistance in exchange for their engagement with the formation of a cooperative environment in their surrounding shores. In comparison, social explanations played only a subordinate role. The conclusion provides a summary of the major arguments brought forward and the results obtained, while underscoring the need to adjust the current focus of analysis regarding Brazilian-African relations.

Chapter I

Brazil and Africa: an overview

From 2003 onwards, Brazil professed a renewed emphasis on its self-'Africanity' traits while following a more assertive foreign policy towards Africa, aimed at conciliating different geopolitical or economic-oriented vectors (Barbosa et al., 2009: 72; Saraiva, 2010: 179). The bulk of research lines on Brazil and Africa tended to consider Brazil's initiatives as falling within the categories of "political discourse/prestige diplomacy" and "economic interest/soft imperialism", or a combination of both, aiming for "socio-economic development/southern solidarity" (Visentini, 2010: 80-82). In other words, structured around the three main features of "political diplomacy, neo-mercantilism and development cooperation" (White, 2010: 228). This chapter recaps previous Brazilian interactions with Africa and uses prior analytical frameworks for a more in-depth analysis of the 2003-2014 timeframe, in order to present an overview of the general transatlantic dynamic.

I.1. Brazil and Africa: early inroads

Despite evident historical linkages emanating from a shared slavery background in the XV and XVI centuries, contemporary contacts between Brazil and Africa were often met with varying degrees of success (Menezes, 1961; Rodrigues, 1960; Saraiva, 1996). Virtually inexistent during the bulk of the XX century, relations between the two sides began to pick up in a post World War II context. However, privileged political ties with Portugal effectively tainted these initial attempts of engagement, while fuelled by the theoretical proposals of Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre. By favouring a 'culturalist' connection with Africa through a luso-tropical community with Portugal and its remaining colonies, Brazil's discourse and actions towards the continent became associated with the defence of a decaying colonial position (Gonçalves, 2003; Dávila, 2010; Leme, 2011).[5] Moreover, as commercial relations with South Africa endured, Brazil remained ambivalent to

[5] For an account of how the 'culturalist' discourse influenced Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa until the early 1990s, see Saraiva (1993).

international pressures to cut-off official ties with such country. This, in practice, equated to a "discrete, but real, tolerance towards the apartheid" regime (Saraiva 2012: 28). As the decolonisation movement increased, both in the number of newly independent countries and in the visibility of their international advocacy, Brazil found itself isolated from the overall continent (Penna Filho & Lessa, 2007).

Seeking to break free from such constrains, the *Política Externa Independente* (Independent Foreign Policy) conducted by Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart between 1961-1964, aimed to establish more pragmatic relations with the developing world, including Africa. The creation of a specific African division within the *Ministério das Relações Exteriores* (MRE – Ministry of External Relations), also known as Itamaraty, and the opening of the first Brazilian embassies on African soil, were presented as tokens of this new approach.[6] But lingering relations with Portugal as well as the political fallout from the 1964-military coup in Brazil brought such intents to a halt.

A second spur of interest emerged from 1969 onwards under Emilio Medici and Ernesto Geisel's military governments. Following the 1973-oil crisis, Brazil began to see Africa as a serious alternative energy supplier and a potential new market for manufactured goods (e.g. Forrest, 1982: 5). In the midst of an import substitution industrialisation strategy, trade instruments like 'countertrade', which involved the exchange of goods and services for regular shipments of oil, encouraged stronger trade relations with Africa (Santana, 2003a). The visit by Minister of External Relations Gibson Barboza to nine African countries in 1972 heralded this policy reengagement. But it was the new positioning towards the Portuguese colonies that allowed reaping greater dividends. By recognising Angola's independence in 1975 and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA – People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) as the legitimate government, ahead of the rest of the international community, Brazil managed to display a pragmatic and non-ideological stance amidst a bipolar geopolitical context.[7] Moreover, it paved the way

[6] These included Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Tunisia, Guinea-Conakry and Togo. The mission to Ghana, in particular, became paradigmatic of Brazilian conflicted views towards Africa, with the ambassadorial appointment of black journalist Raymundo Souza Dantas inciting accusations of "reverse racism" in a failed bid to win over African states (Dávila, 2010: 43-51; cf. Dantas, 1965).

[7] Subsequent research, however, demonstrated that the decision-making process at the time was not necessarily straightforward and involved considerable debate among the different branches of power (Pinheiro, 2007).

for a long-standing supply of oil and the insertion of significant private Brazilian investments in the country (Santana, 2005).

The political focus, however, remained hard to sustain. Despite the first visit by a South-American president to Africa in 1983 with João Figueiredo (1979-1984) (Pereira, 1985: 87), the subsequent democratisation process in Brazil placed South America as the main geographic priority and the northern hemisphere countries as preferential partners. Meanwhile, José Sarney's government (1985-1990) focused on inciting a new framework of interactions with Lusophone African countries (Ribeiro, 2008). In that sense, the first gathering in Brazil of Heads of State and Government from Portuguese-Speaking countries in 1989 comprised the first step towards the creation of CPLP seven years later. But bilateral contacts decreased significantly in parallel with the cutback of the diplomatic network in Africa in the following years (Saraiva, 1996: 217-218; Ribeiro, 2009: 317). Likewise, the envisioned trade opportunities shrank in light of a slow industrialisation process in Africa, political instability throughout the continent and Brazil's own economic woes. If in 1980, Africa amounted to 8,4% of total Brazilian exports, in the next decade such flows were brought to near stagnation (Santana, 2003b). In culmination, the two terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) were perceived as reflecting an overall disengagement from the Third World at the expenses of integration in the international system's structures and closer relations with developed countries (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2009; cf. Pimentel, 2000). At the turn of the century, transatlantic relations thus seemed confined to the rhetorical and discursive domain over shared history traits rather than substantiated by meaningful political contacts or economic interactions.

I.2 Brazil and Africa (2003-2014)

Taking into consideration previous overtures towards the African continent, it is often argued that a revival / "rebirth" of past trends occurred between 2003 and 2014, rather than a brand new foreign policy orientation (Saraiva, 2010: 174). In either case, the PT presidencies sought to bring it to the forefront of priorities. After taking office on January 1st 2003, Lula da Silva used his own inauguration speech to highlight the space he reserved for relations with Africa, by stating:

> "*We reaffirm the deep ties that unite us to the entire African continent and our willingness to actively contribute so that it develops its enormous potential*" (Silva, 2003a: 10).

In his first official act during the first visit to Africa in November 2003, while inaugurating Brazil's embassy in São Tomé and Principe, Lula da Silva elaborated on his initial remarks and set the tone for what would become his country's approach towards the African continent:

> "*For many years Brazil had its back turned to Africa. And we think it's time to catch up. I have the hope and belief that in these coming years, we'll do more than was done in the last 15 or 20 years*" (Silva, 2003b)

The following year, he also took the opportunity of the 59th UNGA to try and rally African countries behind a common and more autonomous Southern agenda (Burges 2013: 580-581)**.** For his part, Lula's Minister of External Relations Celso Amorim went further by classifying Brazil's new drive for Africa in the following way:

> "*It is a search for Brazil's own identity. It's curious. I've been to Africa and it is interesting to note the similarities with Brazil in the way of being, of talking, in music. I felt in all the countries I've been to in Africa, not only the Portuguese-speaking ones, that there is a hunger for Brazil*" (Rangel, 2003).

Such an alleged call for Brazil's involvement with African affairs ended up substantiating the official narrative for justifying the redirection of focus towards Africa on multiple levels. In an acknowledgment of previous thematic divisions (Barbosa et al., 2009; Visentini, 2010; White, 2010), I divide the following overview according to the focus granted to the main elements of Brazil-Africa relations, under three sections: South-South political dialogue, economic and trade opportunities, and the disbursement of development assistance.

I.2.1 South-South political dialogue

The first dimension deals with the framing of current Brazilian-African relations within the wider political significance of South-South relations *per se* and its contextualisation in Brazil's foreign policy agenda during the years in question. In light of Brazil's middle power condition amidst an evolving world order (Flemes, 2009), the subject has attracted a sizeable degree of contributions, trying to provide an appropriate explanation for such kind of relations. One trend considers this foreign policy option as originally based on an impetus to create "counterpower" to traditional conceptions of globalisation while abiding to Brazil's craving for "reciprocal multilateralism". The central goal would be "to establish or consolidate the cooperation and power network directed at the South, starting from South America and advancing toward alliances with other regions, so as to achieve the goal of making Brazil into a global-oriented country" (Cervo, 2010: 9, 23). In that sense, reaching out to diverse and disperse actors in Africa would be considered a stepping-stone on the way to a greater international purpose.

The same goals could be inferred if considering such policies as executed along structural axis of international relations. Close contacts with Africa would fall under "the horizontal axis", which "represents the third-world dimension of foreign policy, also defined as South-South relations" and is composed by "partnerships with emerging nations, by their similarities as large peripheral states and developing countries like India, China, South Africa and Russia" and by "least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, whose relative power is lower than the Brazilian" (Pecequilo, 2008: 145). Finally, it is also possible to understand such dynamics as part of a larger strategy of seeking autonomy in the world order through diversification of relations. In this case, Brazil opted to pursue an "adherence to international norms and principles by means of South-South alliances, including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.)" while "trying to reduce asymmetries in foreign relations" (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2009: 86).

A recurrent element in such strategy involved brokering a number of alliances where African votes were key for Brazil's external goals. The trade negotiations of 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, comprised the jumping point. By rallying most of the developing world, Africa included, behind the blocking of negotiations over the Doha

Development Agenda, Brazil heralded a new less accommodating period in North/South relations. The purpose was self-evident given that "the substantive policies of the Brazilian government at and around Cancun (…) meshed closely with the determination of the Lula government to differentiate its own more assertively nationalist foreign policy from that of its predecessor" (Hurrell & Narlikar, 2006: 416). Likewise, the wider but unfruitful campaign for a Brazilian seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) required the continuing support of every possible vote, including the 54 African countries.[8] Even though concrete results were not achieved during this particular timeframe, the derived political leverage never ceased to be present in Brazilian political calculus afterwards (Almeida, 2010: 167).

The promotion of several multilateral forums that could accommodate new shifting patterns of power in the international order, proved an equally useful approach. In light of new opportunities for international redistribution, Brazil chose to invest on selected launching pads that could enhance its profile abroad. This included the revitalisation or reinforcement of previous platforms such as ZOPACAS and the CPLP.[9] But it also involved institutionalising new bodies like the IBSA Dialogue Forum, as a "'trilateralist' diplomatic partnership" (Alden and Vieira, 2005) based on "a discursive strategy that lays emphasis on its representative function for the developing world" (Flemes, 2009b: 406). A more direct instrument towards improving ties with African countries was also created by means of the ASA Heads of State and Government Summits, first instituted back in 2006, following a Nigerian proposal with strong Brazilian backing.[10] The overreaching South-South argument was, yet again, at the core of these developments, as Lula da Silva himself pointed out:

[8] The fact that in 2005, amidst high-level discussions over a hypothetical UNSC reform, African states gathered in a common negotiating block (the so-called 'Ezulwini Consensus') only made their support more coveted.

[9] Brazil's involvement with these two organisations between 2003 and 2014 is explored in further detail in Chapter IV, Section IV.1.2 and Chapter V.

[10] The first summit took place in Abuja, Nigeria from November 29th to December 1st 2006 while the second was hosted by Venezuela, in Isla Margarita on September 26-27 2009. The third summit was initially scheduled for Libya in 2011 but was postponed to February 20-23 2013, in Malabo, Guinea-Equatorial.

> "*Today, Africa is an indisputable priority for Brazil. (...) As the Brazilian writer and diplomat Alberto da Costa e Silva says, the vast sea that separates us is actually a simple river – 'a river called Atlantic'. What we are doing here today is to build a bridge between the banks of this river. Our ambition is to go beyond the existing dialogues and, ultimately, bring closer the two continents. (...) Our main goal today is to set the foundations for a new paradigm of South-South cooperation*" (Silva, 2006).

Such political overtures towards Southern partners became an instrumental component of Brazilian foreign policy agenda in the Lula years, as they played a part in the fulfilment of a larger international insertion agenda that sought the admission of Brazil as a rising power in the world stages. Recognition of "southern heterogeneity" became pivotal for Brazilian policymakers (Lima & Hirst, 2006: 36), with Africa playing a key part in such dynamics.

In order to properly substantiate this agenda, Brazil required a renewed bureaucratic effort that could match words with deeds. The adding of 19 Brazilian new embassies in Africa provided an example of this diplomatic surge.[11] Moreover, 17 new African diplomatic representations were also opened or re-opened in Brasília.[12] Likewise, the reorganisation of Itamaraty with the purpose of best accommodating these goals was evident. By splitting the Department for Africa and Middle East into a unit solely focused on Africa and by creating a third administrative sub-division, *Divisão da Africa III* (DAF III – Africa Division III), together with the already existing *Divisão da África I* (DAF I – Africa Division I) and *Divisão da África II* (DAF II – Africa Division II), more human and material resources were allocated towards the expansion of relations with Africa.

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[11] This diplomatic shuffle included the opening of such posts as São Tomé and Principe (2003), Benin, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Conakry (2006), Burkina Faso (2007), Mali, Congo-Brazzaville (2008), Botswana (2009), Mauritania (2010), Liberia (2011), Sierra Leone (2012) and Malawi (2013). Moreover, embassies in the DRC (2004), Cameroon, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Togo (2005) were reopened. Brazil's embassy in Nigeria was also transferred from Lagos to Abuja in 2004. By 2013, the total of embassies on the ground amounted to 38, which provided Brazil with the 5th largest diplomatic network in Africa, on par with Russia (38) and only behind such countries as the U.S. (49), China (48), France (46).

[12] This included Namibia (2003), Sudan, Zimbabwe (2004), Equatorial-Guinea, Guinea-Conakry (2005), Benin, Kenya, Zambia (2006), Tanzania, Mauritania (2007), Congo-Brazzaville (2008), Botswana, Burkina Faso (2009), Malawi (2010), Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia and Mali (2011).

On the other hand, following a pattern of intensive presidential diplomacy (Almeida, 2004; Cason & Power, 2009), Lula da Silva assumed the bulk of the political lead in improving ties with Africa, as exemplified by his 28 visits to 23 African countries. Likewise, Celso Amorim's own 67 visits to 31 African countries proved instrumental towards those same ends. Such amount of political capital proved reciprocal until the end of Lula da Silva's second term, with Heads of State and Government from 28 African states paying 48 visits to Brazil while their respective Ministers of External Relations recorded a total of 66 visits.

The first term of Dilma Rousseff's presidency (2011-2014), however, was met with a slower dynamic. Unlike her predecessor, the manifestation of a lack of general interest for the country's foreign affairs led to a generalised perception of a "decline" in the country's status abroad coupled with a "visible reduction of international activism" (Cervo & Lessa, 2014; Saraiva, 2014; Cornetet, 2015). This posture was further aggravated by a deteriorating economic context that prompted a detachment from previous multilateral initiatives and the reduction of resources available to the management of the country's foreign policy apparatus. Still, the discourse on Africa remained unaffected:

> "*In the last ten years, Brazil has dedicated itself with considerable commitment to strengthen its relations with Africa. The Brazilian government assumed essential leadership in that process and today, we see more and more with pride that relations with the African continent are set by genuine interest from the Brazilian public society and private interest. Our engagement with Africa is of long term and it has a strategic meaning*" (Rousseff, 2013b)

High-profile visits to the continent such as the attendance of former-South African president Nelson Mandela's funeral and the participation in the 50-years celebration of the African Union (AU) as a guest of honour, on one hand, and the use of Lula da Silva as an occasional personal emissary, on the other hand, helped to provide a modicum of continuity.[13] Moreover, the election of both José Graziano da

[13] For example, in 2011, Lula da Silva was nominated as the Brazilian official representative to the 17th summit of the AU, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. In her written statement, Dilma Rousseff acknowledged the rationale of continuity behind such an appointment: "I have designated former

Silva and Roberto Azevêdo as heads of the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Trade Organisation in 2011 and 2013, respectively, was credited to the widespread African support in the two international organisations. Regardless, a total of 3 presidential visits to 7 countries as well as former-Minister of External Relations Antonio Patriota 20 visits to 13 countries failed to counteract a perception of gradual detachment and less political investment, when in comparison with the previous government (e.g. Cantanhêde, 2015; Mello, 2015; Saraiva, 2014: 31; cf. Oliveira, 2015).[14]

I.2.2 Economic and trade opportunities

A second rationalisation of Brazil's endeavours that escapes political parameters lies with acknowledging the trade and economic opportunities that emerged since Brazil started reconnecting with Africa. Often heralded as the indication of a new geography of world trade (cf. Almeida, 2010: 172), the potential of transatlantic trade and economic was brought into evidence during the years of PT government. As evidenced in Figure II, Brazilian exports to Africa rose 310% between 2002 and 2014, while comprising in 2009 a total of 5,68% of Brazil's total exportation markets. Starting in 2013, however, values started to decrease to pre-2008 levels.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as my representative to this event in order to signal, very clearly, the intention of my Government to follow up on and intensify our policy, initiated eight years ago, of promoting close proximity between Brazil and the African continent. To coordinate this initiative, I have chosen the person responsible for this important inflexion in our foreign policy" (Rousseff, 2011b).

[14] Minister of External Relations Luiz Alberto Figueiredo visited Africa once during his term (2013-2014), while accompanying Dilma Rousseff to Nelson Mandela's funeral in 2013.

Figure II - Brazilian exports to Africa (2002-2014)



Source: MDIC-AliceWeb / systematised by the author

While observing the discriminated list of exports in Figure III, it is possible to highlight that despite the continuing weight of Brazilian primary goods, manufactured products were met with the largest increase throughout the years, specifically in 2008.[15]

[15] According to the methodology used by MDIC, basic products include low-value goods with simple production lines and reduced transformation, like iron ore, grains, or other agricultural derivatives. Semi-manufactured and manufactured products, on the other hand, only differ on the level of transformation with the former including such goods as orange juice or leather, and the latter including goods with higher aggregated value like televisions, computer chips or cars. Given their reduced value amidst Brazilian-African relations, special operations such as, for example, trade operations from drilling rigs in international waters, were excluded from this exercise.

Figure III – Brazilian exports to Africa by aggregation factor (2002-2014)



Source: MDIC-AliceWeb / systematised by the author

A similar growth is observable when considering Brazilian imports from Africa during the same period. Figure IV shows a 538% jump in imports between 2002 and 2014, with 2004 as the year where they amounted to 9,84%, the biggest share of Brazil's overall imports. Meanwhile, a record was also reached in terms of nearly US$ 17.5 billion in imports in 2013.

Figure IV - Brazilian imports from Africa (2002-2014)



Source: MDIC-AliceWeb / systematised by the author

Following an identical trend when regarding Africa's trade with other developing countries (UNCTAD, 2010: 36), Brazil's imports are overwhelmingly characterised by the weight of primary goods, particularly oil shipments, as exhibited by the years of 2008 and 2013 in Figure V.

Figure V - Brazilian imports from Africa by aggregating factor (2002-2014)



Source: MDIC-AliceWeb / systematised by the author

The specific case of the oil import dynamic pictured in Figure VI also shows that Africa consisted of the primary source of supply for Brazilian foreign oil needs over the years. Nigeria, Algeria, Angola and, as of 2004, Equatorial Guinea, accounted for Brazil's major partners in this regard.

Figure VI - Brazilian oil imports from Africa (2002-2014)



Source: Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis / systematised by the author

But the growth in transatlantic trade is even better expressed by trade exchange (exports + imports) from 2002 to 2014, with an increase of 451% from US$ 5 billion to US$ 27.8 billion, including an all-time record of US$ 28.5 billion in 2013, as shown in Figure VII. Trade balance values (exports + imports), however, show that economic relations remained largely deficitary for Brazil throughout the bulk of this period, with the exception of 2009:

Figure VII – Brazilian-African trade exchange and balance (2002-2014)



Source: MDIC-AliceWeb / systematised by the author

The expansion of Brazilian multinationals towards African countries serves as an additional evidence of a rekindled interest for possible economic opportunities. Companies such as Vale, Petrobras, Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, Queiroz Galvão, Camargo Corrêa, WEG or Marcopolo made their way or reaffirmed their position in the continent, with significant investments on local mining, oil exploration, civil construction, transportation and agriculture projects. These entry points were in turn facilitated by the combined effect of the different stimuli provided by the institutions in charge of promoting greater businesses ties with Africa (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 80). The *Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos* (APEX-Brasil – Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency), for instance, opened its first Business Centre in Africa, in Luanda, Angola in 2010, with the aim of providing greater specialised support and promote the implementation of Brazilian companies on the ground.

Public financing to exports was also fundamental for these increased dealings, namely through *Banco do Brasil* (BB – Bank of Brazil) and BNDES. Behind the expansion of this support, was the agenda set out by the *Programa Integração com a África* (PIA – Program Integration with Africa), an inter-governmental effort coordinated by MDIC, vying to increase Brazil-Africa trade relations and expand

Brazil's institutional presence in the continent. The same goals would foster further inter-ministerial efforts, already under Dilma Rousseff's first term.[16] The underlined intent was subjacent to the discourse of Brazil's authorities as Celso Amorim demonstrated, when justifying Lula da Silva's visit to Guinea-Equatorial in July 2010:

> "*Business is business. We are on a continent where countries gained independence recently. This is an evolution that has to do with the social, with the political. (...) We have to imagine that this is an important area, rich in oil, with great possibilities of construction*" (Uchoa, 2010).

The surge of Brazil's economic endeavours in Africa also coincided with similar initiatives carried out by other international actors, with a particular emphasis on China. Competition for new markets and opportunities emerged but the gap between each country's stake remained disproportionate, as Brazilian trade-promotion instruments lagged behind in terms of reach and funding available (IPEA, 2011: 48; Abdenur, 2015: 260-262).

> "*It's difficult to compete. China's strength is something uncontested. It's evident the tools China possesses in order to act in the African continent are not the same as Brazil's nor will they be. At least, in this moment, there is no way we can get close to what the Chinese have to offer to Africa. There is room in Brazil to improve our own conditions but we won't get close enough of what China has. It's a challenge for the whole world, not jut Brazil. You have an asymmetry in economic power and the absence of constrain from the Chinese side in using, for example, cooperation as means to promote trade, using labour force the way they see fit, which isn't our* [way]". [17]

In this context, Brazil opted to distance their practices and projects from the *modus operandi* of China-led operations. By working with local communities and

[16] This topic is further explored in Chapter IV, Section IV.2.1.

[17] Interview with Tatiana Prazeres, Secretary of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil – Brasília, 21/06/2013.

hiring local manpower, Brazilian companies sought to construct an image of an alternative 'anti-Chinese' model, in which the development of local economies and infrastructure trumped the mere stripping of valuable natural resources (e.g. Cropley, 2011; Lewis, 2011; Kermeliotis, 2012).

I.2.3 Development assistance

Despite the centrality of the abovementioned dimensions, Brazilian authorities favoured a third official explanation for the intensification of ties with Africa. In particular, common historical-cultural links between the Brazilian society and populations in Africa assumed a heightened role in the government's discourse, when regarding these specific relations. Celso Amorim corroborated such a view when stating:

> "*Beyond incidental political and economic gains, the search for closer relations with Africa was guided by historic, demographic and cultural bonds*" (Amorim, 2010: 233).

Considerable emphasis was attributed to the notion of indebtedness between Brazil and Africa, as the former attempted to depart from past 'culturalist' interpretations of Brazil's African roots and its own views as a racial democracy role model for Africa. While trying to overcome such legacy, the focal point was set in presenting Brazilian endeavours and investments as a way to not only reconnect with its past but also to repay African populations for its contribution to Brazil's social achievements. Lula da Silva made sure to repeatedly stress this point:

> "*I wanted to tell you that when I went to Gorée Island* [an historical Atlantic slave trade transit point, in Senegal] *and ask forgiveness on behalf of all Brazilians, it was more than a catchphrase. It was the feeling of a Brazilian citizen, a governor of Brazil, who recognises that Brazil would not be what it is if it were not for the participation of millions of Africans in building our country* (Silva, 2010)".

The subscription of this thematic implied the "replacement of a silent period in [Brazil's] relationship with Africa for a cycle of cooperation and common altruistic projects for the other side of the South Atlantic" (Saraiva, 2010: 174). That was directly reflected in the amounts of cooperation projects throughout the years. The horizontal nature of the geographic focus, together with non-conditionality traits and preference for the sharing of technical expertise, comprised the main features of Brazilian cooperation flows.[18] At its centre, laid the *Agência Brasileira de Cooperação* (ABC – Brazilian Cooperation Agency), in charge of promoting "transference of knowledge without a direct transference of resources" (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 36-37). In 2010, ABC was in charge of managing over 300 different cooperation projects in 37 African countries, with varying degrees of execution and with Africa accounting for 57% of all Brazilian technical cooperation (IPEA, 2010).

Agriculture and food safety assumed a key role in this kind of ventures by taking advantage of the expertise of the *Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária* (EMBRAPA – Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation) in tropical environments. Recognising the existing potential, in 2006, an EMBRAPA office was opened in Ghana with the purpose of coordinating operations and requests in this area from nearby countries. The US$ 2.4 million Rice-Culture Development Project in Senegal and the Cotton-4 Project, which vied for the development of the cotton industry of such countries as Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, comprise two examples of experiments with techniques originally developed by EMBRAPA for Brazilian agriculture. Other initiatives included the agrarian development project *ProSavana* in Mozambique, financed together with Japan, as well as the implementation of community seed banks and capacity building to rescue, multiply, store and use native seeds in family-based agriculture in both Namibia and South Africa.

[18] According to external estimates, Brazil's foreign aid commitments could have reached US$ 4 billion in 2010. These numbers, however, included not only ABC's annual budget but also contributions for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Food Program (WFP), *ad hoc* donations to Haiti and Gaza and the loans disbursed by BNDES to Brazilian companies doing business in developing countries (The Economist, 2010). Its overall comparative value, especially when regarding countries that follow the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) guidelines, warrants considerable caution.

Meanwhile, the *Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial* (SENAI – Brazilian National Service for Industrial Apprenticeship) built a network of vocational centres with the goal of promoting industrialisation and supporting youth-employment policies. The Brazil-Angola Vocational Training Centre, in Cazenga, for instance, played a role in supporting national reconstruction through training and rehabilitation of the demobilised labour force, after the end of the country's civil war. Between 2000 and 2008, 18.928 students were trained in such fields as mechanics, civil construction and IT, with over 1.200 Angolans enrolling each year.

Health cooperation was also significant, varying from such projects as the creation of an antiretroviral manufacturing site in Mozambique in partnership with *Fundação Oswaldo Cruz* (FIOCRUZ), support for HIV prevention policy strategies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, assistance in the design of an epidemiological surveillance system for malaria in Cameroon, or the building of a US$ 4.4 million haemophilia and sickle-cell anaemia treatment centre in Ghana. Brazil's policies aimed at fighting hunger and social marginalisation, like the *Fome Zero* and *Bolsa Família* initiatives, were also replicated in the continent. In 2006, representatives from Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and South Africa, visited Brazil to study local conditional cash transfer programs. The following year, Brazil sent three missions of experts to Ghana to help with the design of anti-child labour policies and cash-conditional transfer programs. These joint efforts would evolve into the Ghanaian social grants program Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (World Bank and IPEA, 2011: 74-76).

Finally, energy issues warranted equal interest, with a focus on biofuel production technology (Barbosa et al., 2009: 73). Through the *Programa Estruturado de Apoio aos demais Países em Desenvolvimento na Área de Energias Renováveis* (PRO-RENOVA – Structured Program for Support to other Developing Countries in the Area of Renewable Energy), a memorandum of understanding with the *Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine* (UEMOA – West African Economic and Monetary Union),[19] and bilateral cooperation accords on biofuels production with Angola, the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria or Senegal, Brazil sought to expand its efforts in this area.

[19] UEMOA is composed by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

The transition from Lula da Silva to Dilma Rousseff, however, brought a visible decrease in funds earmarked for development cooperation projects, including with regards to Africa. As visible in Figure VIII, the level of budget execution for projects in the continent reached nearly US$ 20 million in 2010 but remained locked in a reducing pattern in the following years. In 2014, it hit a 6-year minimum of US$ 5 million.

Figure VIII – ABC budget execution for cooperation programmes with Africa (2000-2014)



Source: ABC / systematised by the author[20]

Development cooperation towards Africa under Dilma Rousseff's first term was also marked by a renewed discussion over structural reorganisations. When in Ethiopia in 2013 for the 21st summit of the AU, she announced the intention to transform ABC into a more trade-oriented agency, with the purpose of helping to promote Brazilian investments abroad (Paraguassu, 2013; Fleck, 2013). This model would bring ABC within the institutional fold of MDIC and would allow overcoming legal restrictions to the funding of further projects in Africa. But opposition from

[20] The values presented equal the sum between ABC's budget execution, transferences for international organisations and resources from other governmental institutions, allocated for joint cooperation actions with ABC.

within Itamaraty, who hierarchically oversees ABC, brought such a project to a standstill.

> "*I don't know if Itamaraty agrees with all those conclusions. If there is one thing that we are doing right in Africa – the only problem being the lack of money – is a true South-South cooperation.* (…) *What we do, we do it right.* (…) *But what I now see is an ambition, I don't know where it came from, probably from MDIC itself, that our cooperation returns to being a more 'married' cooperation, like in the 1980s and 1990s, pre-Declaration of Paris.* (…) *Maybe we will be able to do more things, we will have more resources but I don't know how will that affect African perceptions of us. What you win in volume, maybe you loose in image.* (…) *The announcement* [of a new agency] *was a test-tube. The sectors that are more interested in that kind of result, already think it is a done deal. It is not necessarily so, I think there is a process of bureaucratic debate in which the dominant lines have not yet emerged*".[21]

By the end of 2014, these intentions to reform ABC had yet to come to fruition. But such internal discussions over how to best provide assistance abroad reinforced the notion that Brazil's technical cooperation remained "capillary" in its execution. That is, "driven primarily by the implementing institutions and the broader networks in which they exist rather than the coordinating agency" (Abdenur, 2015: 2). Coupled with decreasing resources, this polarisation helped fuelling a lesser favourable comparison with the initiatives developed in previous years and contributed to a perception of a general rollback in terms of cooperation with Africa (Mello, 2015).

I.3 Chapter summary

The increase in Brazilian-African relations between 2003 and 2014 was visible on multiple levels. By improving political connections under a common South-South aegis, promoting further trade opportunities, and expanding the disbursement of significant amounts of development assistance, Brazil was able to

[21] Interview with Brazilian diplomat.

secure a foothold in Africa. Moreover, the simultaneous growth on all three areas corroborated the perception of a cross-governmental effort by Brazilian authorities in a sustained fashion, seeking to effectively expand ties across the Atlantic.

The longevity of this engagement stands in contrast with previous attempts to reach out to the continent. Former Brazilian administrations succeeded in paving the road, whether in term of privileged post-independence political contacts or substantial oil-based economic relations. But as the interest faltered due to internal and external changes, Brazil's position in Africa also diminished. Taking such background into consideration, from 2003 onwards, the PT governments managed to present a discourse that not only highlighted the intensity of the new commitments in a new international context but also the novelty in terms of priority attributed. Despite the perceived decline in interest during Dilma Rousseff's first years in office, the consolidation of transatlantic economic exchanges allowed for a minimum sense of continuity in the official narrative.

However, the focus of this overview on three specific dimensions fails to take into account other domains of the transatlantic relation. Not only is it possible to envision that other relational vectors were met with equal increase but also that its lack of acknowledgment over the years casts a shadow over research on Brazil and Africa as invariably incomplete. More problematic, the tripartite framework adopted in this chapter considers Brazilian-African relations as a single unit of analysis. Such a choice prevents a more tailored observation of sub-regional dynamics that may showcase different but equally meaningful patterns of political and strategic investment. The following chapter presents the required theoretical and conceptual tools to break through with such model and apprehend other significant vectors of engagement

Chapter II

Defence cooperation and regional security: state of the art

This chapter provides a state of the art over key concepts, both in terms of how to frame the issue of defence cooperation in International Relations and how to characterise regional security dynamics. Regarding the former, I provide an overview of the problematic of cooperation, as understood by different theoretical positions in the field, as well as more specific inputs on defence cooperation and concrete analytical derivations that stem from that same debate. Likewise, different formulas for structuring regional security relations are presented with the purpose of pinpointing the most adequate characterisation of the dynamics targeted by this thesis.

II.1 Cooperation and defence

The rationale behind defence cooperation centres on the key query over why would the military interests of a country be better served by the strengthening of the military forces of another nation. Attempting to analyse the state of defence cooperation relations amidst international debates, however, runs counter to an immediate obstacle, namely, the prevalence of security instead of defence, as the key concept underscored by the majority of the literature. Such an option derives from the acknowledgement of international security in a systemic perspective, meant to imped conflicts from rising, regardless of their form or origin. This logic, however, does not forswear other specific configurations and can prove of equal use for the understanding of cooperation relations solely focused on defence issues rather than on a wider-security spectrum. The following sub-section presents the main contributions in the area while bearing in mind such interchangeable trait.

II.1.1 Cooperation in International Relations

Inter-state cooperation generates considerable debate over its limits and reach. At its core, lies the need to know, "if international relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and a Lockean civil society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?" (Oye, 1985: 1). The realist/neorealist position maintains that relations amongst states can only be found within an anarchic

international system, which inevitably constrains any kind of cooperation due to the permanent concerns over relative gains and self-help. In this regard, Waltz is explicit:

> "*When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more?' If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities*" (1979: 105).

When considering the possibility of cooperating at the security level, possible outcomes are deemed risky. Any actions taken by a state with the purpose of heightening its national security, whether by increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond in proportion. This, in turn, can produce increased tensions conducive to a general conflict, in what amounts to a security dilemma. To put it differently, the search of one state for security can limit or reduce the security of others (Jervis, 1978). Cooperation is therefore considered a product of the balance of power between states, as they form alliances against common enemies or threats, rather than pursuing a selfless and disinterested approach. Following an offensive-realist line, Mearsheimer further elaborates:

> "*States can cooperate, although cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concern about cheating. Ultimately, great powers live in a fundamentally competitive world where they view each other as real, or at least potential, enemies, and they therefore look to gain power at each other's expense*" (2001: 51)

Cooperation could still occur following some adjustments (e.g. Grieco, 1990). But the assumptions of realism/neo-realism remain overall pessimistic about any

envisioned cooperative scenario that questions the preferences of states for survival in an anarchical system and distracts the focus from the amount of material capabilities at their disposal (Müller, 2002: 480). This concern with amassing material power has led to different interpretations over its potential use. Military resources, for instance, do not need to be considered solely in terms of force or threat of force. At its core, reside instruments that are equally capable of exerting influence through less confrontational ways, i.e. that can be used in alternative contexts, towards a successful outcome, without forswearing its forceful traits. In that sense, according to Nye Jr., military power can take up multiple sub-forms, including the training of foreign militaries apparatus, international military education programs, regular joint exercises, or even humanitarian assistance and relief to disaster-stricken countries (2011: 47).

Two other specific sub-products of neorealism with ramifications for defence cooperation can be highlighted. The first concerns military emulation. Described as the "deliberate systematic imitation of the military technology, organisation, and doctrine of one country by another" (Resende-Santos, 2007: 2), cross-national emulation can be interpreted as a result of the limits and constrains of the international system. States emulate the military technologies and organisational structures of other countries in response to external threats, while dependent on the "availability of external balancing options, whether in the form of alliances or indirect free riding on the power of others". This process brings the emulator's military or parts of it, into close proximity with the model being emulated. Moreover, states may engage in a selective approach and only emulate specific categories of military capabilities, like in the case of South American nations, which adopted elements of both the Prussian Army and the British Navy in a post-independence context, with external support (Resende-Santos, 2007: 9-13, 93-127).

A second take on the issue is provided through Rezende's proposal of an offensive realist theory of defence cooperation, within a unipolar context (2013). While considering the context of South America, cooperation in defence is observed as serving the purpose of improving the relative position of the partnering countries in relation to the other states or to the unipolar power, without increasing the pressure of the security dilemma. In other words, through defence cooperation, states may be able to increase their power resources without risking their status or survival; improve

their strategic position before the unipolar power; contain possible regional hegemons that seek to disturb regional balances of power; and create institutions that contribute for the strengthening of the state's capacities in this area. Effective outcomes, however, are dependent on the distribution of resources between the different units of the international system, the type of cooperation envisioned, the effect of the cooperation on state capacities, and the emulation of successful cases.

Liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, allows for a measured possibility of cooperation, even if also building upon neorealist premises.[22] In this case, cooperation, as opposed to competition or conflict, occurs when:

> "(…) *actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy co-ordination. To summarise more formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination*" (Keohane, 1984: 51-52).

Expectedly, institutions are considered to play an important part in international cooperation. By changing the preferences of states, institutions can contribute to reduce the possibility of conflict. Moreover, they can become a tool towards reducing transaction costs among parties as they presuppose communication channels with established rules (Müller, 2002: 488). By building upon a rational choice paradigm, governments are able to calculate the utility of existing institutions against the investment costs for new ones, which, in turn, comprises a sufficient justification for countries wishing to cooperate in the security sector (Keohane & Martin, 1995).

Other accounts attempt to go further in this domain. Liberal theories, for instance, claim that external initiatives are originated and moulded by domestic

[22] However, as Jervis notes, "Neoliberalism does not see more cooperation than does realism; rather, neoliberalism believes that there is much more unrealised or potential cooperation than does realism, and the schools of thought disagree about how much conflict in world politics is unnecessary or avoidable in the sense of actors failing to agree even though their preferences overlap (…). [Hence,] they differ over the changes that they believe are feasible and required to reduce conflict" (1999: 47).

structures and processes. The case for democratic peace serves as the best example. Democracies may seek to cooperate amongst each other, as a way to settle conflicts peacefully and find ways to agree on minimalist military postures in order to prevent costly arms races (e.g. Risse-Kapen, 1995). Hence, "what appears a puzzle for other theories", like security alliances or other cooperative efforts between rivals and enemies, "liberal theory sees as the inevitable and consequent outgrowth of a particular form of internal rule" (Müller, 2002: 490-491).

Constructivism has produced equally valuable contributions, especially in terms of how preferences are formed and common identities are generated. By indicating that international structures only produce effects when social meaning is attributed, constructivism overcomes the constrains of anarchy and portrays each case of cooperation as contingent on the experiences and expectations of its participants (e.g. Katzenstein, 1996). This, in turn, opens the possibility of new points of origin for cooperation initiatives that surpass the state-level and include, for example, "epistemic communities" of individuals over such issues as arms control regimes (e.g. Adler, 1992). Finally, the issue of securitisation, as a product of a constructivist-related research agenda within the Copenhagen School, warrants a particular focus. It was formulated with the intention of re-conceptualising the way to understand an issue as a security problem. Through a 'speech act', a relevant actor could thus declare a specific matter as an existing threat to a particular object. The use of the term 'security' or the qualification of any object as such, introduces a particular rhetorical structure that organises, for instance, texts or social relations in security terms. This sequence ultimately implies the discursive construction of every threat. But for Wæver:

> "*The utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security', a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it*" (1998: 55).

The speech act, however, is directed to a targeted audience and can only be considered successful if the audience accepts its validity as well as the extraordinary measures required to cope with it. Inversely, the removal of issues from the security

domain implies its desecuritisation. But given that the security context is malleable to the point that any object can potentially be seen as a threat, with the corresponding suspension of the normal rules of procedure, it also runs the risk of falling into an extreme form of politicisation, i.e. "panic policies", without any limits on the scope of those political acts (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). The classic security dilemma can be therefore re-understood as an application of language-based terms to subjective situations rather than just a mere accumulation of material power.

II.1.2 Foreign military aid and defence diplomacy

Amidst the theoretical debate over the gist of cooperation and its applications to defence issues, it is possible to identify two by-products that focus on the practical apprehension of such specific realities. Morgenthau's take on foreign military aid is illustrative of how the issue was perceived during most of the XX century:

> "*Foreign aid for military purposes is a traditional way by which nations buttress their alliances.* (…) *This traditional military aid can be understood as a division of labour between two allies who pool their resources, one supplying money, material and training, the other providing primarily manpower* (1962: 303).

In this view, military aid or assistance was primarily understood as an executive decision, evidencing the wider political goals of the respective donor country. In a reflection of a Cold War-context, in which each superpower vied to gather further support for its sphere of influence, the provision of such kind of resources entitled an expectation of allegiance or common intervention in the international context. For instance, the U.S.'s military aid allocation during the 1980s was unsurprisingly earmarked for its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies (Poe & Meernik, 1995). This disbursement also interconnected to what Morgenthau deemed "prestige aid", especially when regarding Third World countries. By considering "the outward show of modernity and power" often associated to the provision of equipment unattainable without outside support, such recipient countries

tended to value the psychological or political outcome rather than just its envisioned utility (Morgenthau, 1962: 304).

A more updated concept can be found in terms of defence diplomacy. The intersections with a country's external interests are, in this case, also on display, "to the extent that it involves peacetime co-operative activities as a tool of foreign and security policy" (du Plessis, 2008: 96). In other words, defence diplomacy refers to the "collective application of pacific and/or cooperative initiatives by national defence establishments and military practitioners for confidence building, trust creation, conflict prevention, and/or conflict resolution" (Tan & Singh, 2012: 222). By its own definition, it purposes to include a variety of defence-related initiatives, such as: bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defence officials; appointment of defence attachés to foreign countries; bilateral defence cooperation agreements; training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel; provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence management and military technical areas; contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits; placement of military and civilian personnel in partner countries' defence ministries or armed forces; deployment of training teams; provision of military equipment and other material aid; and bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes (Cottey & Forster, 2004: 7).[23]

Part of the activities listed have remained a constant of every military institution, such as training and education programs, which seeks to "generate or render more effective personnel in foreign military organisations – personnel who serve purposes deemed to be in the interests of the sponsoring states" (Barkawi, 2011: 600; Sachar, 2003). But other endeavours are included as a reaction to a post–Cold War environment. For example, as the demand for peacekeeping operations rises, so does the support for their operationalisation on the ground, which can then be included amidst wider defence diplomacy efforts:

[23] Although the original premises of this approach were confined to defence diplomacy as exercised by Western powers (Cottey & Forster, 2004), it has also been gradually applied to country-case studies in such regions as Southern Africa (e.g. du Plessis, 2008) and Southeast Asia (e.g. Laksmana, 2012; Storey, 2012).

> "*UN peacekeeping partakes both of histories of military integration and cooperation and of those of sponsoring locally raised forces. Expanded forms of peacekeeping seek in various ways to reorder armed forces in conflict torn countries. Programs to demobilise militias or to retrain them as professional, law-abiding soldiers are examples, as are peace processes that involve the integration of formerly warring parties. The idea is for foreign sponsorship to establish local forces for the maintenance of order, as Eisenhower put it*" (Barkawi, 2011: 609).

Given the instruments at its disposal, defence diplomacy can assume multiple purposes. It can either: perform a primarily political role while acting as a symbol of willingness to pursue broader cooperation and mutual trust; contribute to introduce transparency into defence relations, in particular with regard to the intentions and capabilities of states; build or reinforce perceptions of common interests; change the mind-sets of the militaries of partner states; support specific, concrete defence reforms in the partner state; and encourage partner states to cooperate in other areas (Cottey & Forster, 2004: 15-17).

Despite this conceptual amplitude, two caveats need to be brought up. First, efforts of former colonial powers, keen on devising and supporting the security apparatuses of newly independent countries, can equally fall under this interpretation of defence diplomacy. British and French involvement with African military forces, constitute a case in point. In that sense, Barkawi argues:

> "*In north-south context, international military relations are about the struggle to constitute armed force for local, regional, and global projects of order-making. Defence diplomacy is the contemporary euphemism for the management of this struggle*" (2011: 600).

Secondly, defence diplomacy needs to be set apart from other modalities. On the one hand, the concept is often interchangeable with military diplomacy (c.f. Muthanna, 2008). The latter, however, "excludes the broader security concerns, purposive intent and related (civilian) infrastructure of defence diplomacy and pertains exclusively to the functional domain of the military" (du Plessis, 2008: 93).

To put it differently, defence diplomacy covers a wider spectrum of activities that go beyond the mere use of the armed forces. On the other hand, naval diplomacy can also comprise a tool of defence diplomacy as it vies for "political influence" and indirectly targets the "minds and perceptions of policy-makers in hostile and friendly Powers". But its connotation with "gunboat diplomacy" incites undesired parallels. In Widen's definition:

> "*Whilst the former is broader and more neutral in character, incorporating all aspects of the political use of naval forces, the latter is narrower, emotionally charged, and burdened by the history of XIX century colonialism. Gunboat diplomacy is, in fact, a specific type of naval diplomacy that is more overt, aggressive, and offensive, usually conducted by a Great Power against a weaker state and on the latter's territorial waters*" (2011: 717).

In order to apprehend the full content of defence cooperation, these contributions need to be taken into consideration. Even though they do not comprise theoretical frameworks on their own, they can assist in informing the analysis of this kind of phenomenon while structuring the different embedded features.

II.2 Regional security

The autonomy of a region within the international system has proved a contentious issue, in face of the push of globalisation and unipolarity in the last decades. But the claim that "globalisation is encouraging a regional pushback" has also proved appealing, with interest for new regionalist takes spiking (Kelly, 2007: 197).[24] In particular, the concrete limits over the definition of a region and what exact dimensions it can be based upon, have attracted considerable interest. Still, in this regard, Hurrell warns, "there are no 'natural' regions, and definitions of 'region'" inasmuch as "indicators of 'regionness' vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation" (1995: 333-334). The following sub-section considers

[24] For more extensive accounts of regionalist studies, see Väyrynen (2003), and Buzan and Wæver (2003).

regionalist proposals that envision a politico-security dimension as their central leitmotif.

II.2.1 Frameworks of security 'regionness'

The first major contribution to the area emerged in 1957 with Deutsch et al.'s study on the concept of security communities. A pluralistic security community was then understood as whenever states become integrated to the point that they achieved a sense of community, which, in turn, created the assurance that they would settle their differences short of war. "Dependent expectations of peaceful change" or "we-feeling" soon entered the lexicon of the analysis of integration among nations, with a specific focus on security concerns (Deutsch et al., 1957). However, due to its exclusive focus on the Northern Atlantic experience and the theoretical constrains emanating from a Cold War context, the concept remained dormant during the following years.

The topic regained new interest with the constructivist turn in the 1990s and the emphasis on possible common identity development behind such kind of groupings. The most significant subsidy came when Adler and Barnett (1998) proposed that the integrative regional process associated with a security community should follow three sequential phases: nascent, ascendant and mature.[25] This would allow tracing such projects from their initial coordination stages, where the increase of mutual security and reduction of transaction costs prevails, to a point of increasingly dense networks, institutions and organisations that reflect tighter military coordination and cooperation. The theoretical underpinnings sustaining these aims at the time were clear:

> "*Our understanding of the development of security communities can be broadly termed as social constructivist and path-dependent. The notion that security communities are socially constructed means that they have a history and, therefore, exhibit an evolutionary pattern that follows the direction of "the arrow of time" (birth, growth, maturity, etc.). But because security communities*

[25] The consecutive evolution through these stages would be contingent on the fulfilment of three tiers that reflected: precipitating conditions; structure and process dynamics; and the development of mutual trust and collective identity (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 37-48).

evolve from path dependent processes, their origins and paths will vary considerably" (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 49).

This formula implied common identity traits to be shared and, subsequently, the entertainment of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Security communities thus reflected the institutional effects of converging interpretations, values and security cultures, in which countries "develop mutual images of each other that make the thought of violent conflict unthinkable" (Müller, 2002: 499).

The framework, however, incites caution over its widespread application. Hurrell, for instance, points that a "meaningful security community cannot rest on the simple inability to fight (…) nor on a stable balance of deterrent threats, nor on coming together in the face of an external threat (…) But nor can it be based solely on instrumental interest-driven cooperative strategies".[26] More importantly, he warns that "institutions remain rooted in the realities of power and interests and the core assumption of states as rational egoists allows only a very limited place for the redefinition of interests and identities". Only when "cooperation goes beyond instrumental calculation" and "the use of force declines", it is possible to consider the validity of the security community concept in its constructivist reinterpretation (Hurrell, 1998: 229-230). Moreover, the recurrent requirement of "a liberal-democratic milieu featuring significant economic interdependence and political pluralism" proves an additional obstacle (Acharya, 1998: 198). Hence, identification of security communities other than the one structured around the North Atlantic, continues difficult to achieve. This leads analyses of several regional projects to conclude for their inconsistency with general security community practices (Adler & Greve, 2009: 76; Santini et al., 2014: 79).[27]

[26] Collective reactions to common external threats, in term of extra-regional great power intervention, can also be alternatively deemed as "defensive security regionalism" (Mansfield & Solingen, 2010: 158) instead of falling automatically under the security communities' framework.

[27] The shortcomings of their framework were admitted by Adler and Barnett when in their edited volume, "nearly all the contributors found that their case deviated in significant ways from the model". This led them to conclude that "the insufficiency of the [proposed] indicators does not jettison their utility *per se* but rather questions their validity" (1998: 431, 434).

Seeking to deepen the subject of structured security relation, Buzan and Wæver took the next steps by advancing the concept of regional security complexes.[28] Building upon the work carried out under the security community's aegis, they sought to provide a new model of regional integration. Regional security complexes thus comprised a "set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 44).[29] In other words, such structures were based on dense regions, where security dilemmas are sharper among proximate actors with shared histories of interaction. Over time, patterns of amity and enmity can arise from these regular transactions, including flows of threats or friendship, as an expression of more traditional relations of power (Kelly, 2007: 206-207). In order to pinpoint potential regional security complexes, the pattern of regional security connectedness needs to be analysed in the following sequence:

> "*(1) is the issue securitised successfully by any actors?;*
>
> *(2) if yes, track the links and interactions from this instance – how does the security action in this cases impinge on the security of who/what else, and where does then echo significantly?, etc.;*
>
> *(3) these claims can then be collected as a cluster of interconnected security concerns*" (Buzan & Weaver, 2003: 73).

However, the concept's focus on how geographic density generates interdependence and how security interaction is assumed to be more intense in a locally concentrated area, poses a problem. The issue of proximity between the respective members of a regional security complex and how they are affected or not by a security issue raises questions over the membership of such projects. In other words, it is unclear if participation is restricted to specific geographical lines or if

[28] Also worthy of mention is the research carried over the issue of zones of peace and its ties to the necessity (or lack thereof) of a democratic regime towards the ultimate development of a pluralistic security community. In this case, zones of peace are defined as discrete geographical regions in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for at least thirty years (Kacowicz, 1995: 266; Kacowicz, 1998).

[29] The concept, however, suffered slight adjustments over time as it was originally only focused on the political and military sectors (Huysmans, 1998: 498-499).

there are linkages with outside actors, also invested in the security conundrums of a potential regional security complex. In a revised version, Buzan and Wæver entertained this possibility but still warned against an expanded reach of the regional security complex concept:

> "*Security is a distinctive realm in which the logic of territoriality continues to operate strongly. But non-territorial connections are also possible and some may emerge. Such non-territorial subsystems* (…) *are fully compatible with the meta-theory of securitisation and constellations, but they have to override the normal rule underpinning the territorialisation of security relations: that most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones*" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 11-12).

Addressing directly this matter, Lake and Morgan (1997) suggested an adjustment. In their view, regional security complexes should be understood as a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area. This way, limitations over geographic boundaries are overcome. A regional security complex may have "a geographical location, but this is not necessarily an exact guide to its members. The location is where the security relationships of consequence exist" while its "members are states that participate profoundly in those relationships" (Morgan, 1997: 30). This understanding opens the door to the involvement or indirect influence of a vast array of actors who otherwise, would not be included. However, it also warrants criticism by risking loosing the regional trait *per se*.[30] Following such rationale, any great power would be a part of nearly every regional complex in the world, thus transcending the analysis of sub-system dynamics originally intended.

A final attempt to address regional security relations concerns the concept of regional security governance, which views the problematic of international politics as defined by the supply of order and the regulation of conflict without resorting to war (Sperling 2014: 105; Krahmann, 2003). Its ultimate purpose is to provide an overarching concept that allows for the dilution of previous frameworks and a more

[30] Another criticism can also be made in terms of their excessive concerns on inter, rather than intra-state conflict as the primary concern of regional security complexes.

streamlined analysis of regional dynamics. Adler and Greve (2009), for instance, advanced the possibility of co-existence between different systems of security governance under different formats, such as balance of power and security communities. In general terms, however, the focus is attributed to regional security architectures that foresee formal and informal interactions, via discourse, norms, shared understandings, rules and practices. In that sense, regional security governance can be broadly defined as the:

> "*Intentional system of rule that involves the coordination, management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes*" (Kirchner 2007: 3).

Regional organisations take centre stage as they are considered the main units of analysis for the overall provision of security (e.g. Tavares, 2010). But the role of pivot states and extra-regional great powers as the promoters and/or causes of such structures can also be highlighted (e.g. Kirchner, 2014). Ultimately, regional security governance is brought into evidence whenever shared definitions of security issues arise, which can be managed and resolved in collaboration beyond the mere national level.

II. 3 Chapter summary

Relying on core theoretical underpinnings over international cooperation does not provide satisfactory answers for the specific use of defence resources in a cooperative framework. A traditional focus on cooperation amidst great powers, hopping between security dilemmas' choices to the prospects of democratic peace or the rationale behind non-proliferation regimes, leaves little room to analogous bursts of engagement between countries with smaller external profiles, capabilities and prominence in international stages. In other words, the case for defence cooperation remains contentious. The lack of a consensual definition that apprehends such dynamics, on one hand, and the multiplication of several relational sub-modalities, on the other hand, further muddles the area. In that sense, while drawing from defence

diplomacy, I opt to define defence cooperation for the purposes of this thesis as a set of initiatives carried out by the political and defence establishments of a country towards a given partner. That includes high-level contacts and visits, defence cooperation agreement, military training programs, provision of military hardware and joint exercises.

On the other side of the equation, proposals for the structuring of regional security relations are abundant but not necessarily cohesive. While not exhaustive, the account provided demonstrates a visible interest in conceptualising such kind of dynamics, as carried out under a cooperative framework and as a reaction to threats both within and outside of the regional space in question. The regional security complex framework, however, comes across as the more adequate formula for the characterisation of a loose set of relations in an emerging state of cooperation. More importantly, the centrality attributed to processes of securitisation allows for easier identification of aggregating processes, still in their initial gestation. In such cases, it is expected that pivot countries play a leading a role during the initial stages, both in terms of securitising regional dynamics and instilling a sense of collectiveness to procedures initiated at a bilateral level. The next chapter seeks to apply these concepts to the specific case of Brazilian defence cooperation relations in the South Atlantic.

Chapter III

Brazilian-African defence cooperation in the South Atlantic

Bearing in mind the concepts laid out in the previous chapter, is its important to try and ascertain their validity in the South Atlantic scenario. In this case, transatlantic defence cooperation between Brazil and Africa comprises a particular case of inter-state relations, generator of specific regional dynamics. This chapter addresses Brazil's previous engagement with South Atlantic security issues as well as previous defence overtures towards Africa. Subsequently, it provides tentative indications of a securitisation process towards this area, as the first step to the emergence of an autonomous regional security complex. This allows contextualising and presenting in further detail a number of sub-areas representative of the cooperation's intensity during the timeframe of analysis.

III.1 Brazil and the South Atlantic (1945-2002)

Brazilian perceptions over the South Atlantic are geographically fuelled by the country's exposure to an 8,000 km shoreline, with inherent reflections on its trade routes and communications lanes to the outside world. However, the conceptualisation of the South Atlantic as a security priority only began to emerge with World War II and the German threat over transatlantic trade. In this context, concerns over the protection and security of the Brazilian Northeast region drove the U.S. and Brazil towards one another and cemented intense bilateral military contacts (Alves, 2005; Svartman, 2011; Oliveira, 2015). The establishment of the 1947-Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Rio Treaty), the signing of the 1952-bilateral military agreement and the realisation of the UNITAS exercises, were generated as an expression of common strategic interests towards this specific region.[31]

[31] The United International Anti-Submarine warfare training (UNITAS) started in 1960 with the purpose of proving Argentinean, Brazilian and Uruguayan navies with opportunities to jointly train with their North American counterpart. It was set up as a complement to the *Coordenação Marítima do Atlântico Sul* (CAMAS – South Atlantic Maritime Area Command) framework, itself a product of the Inter-American Defence Board created in 1959 (Hurrell, 1983: 189; Oliveira, 2015: 51-52).

Such convergence also found echo in terms of an autonomous Brazilian rational. Based at the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG - Superior War College), nationalistic positions that sought to conciliate security and development towards a common agenda began to take hold in policy circles. General Golbery do Couto e Silva, in particular, saw the need for an "association (but not subordination) with the United States" in order to watch over the South Atlantic (Child, 1979: 91). Moreover, he deemed Africa as Brazil's natural eastern border, while susceptible to the growing international communist threat. In that sense, Brazil should:

> "(…) *cooperate also in the immunisation of the young African countries regarding the fatal injection of communism, be vigilant and wary to any Soviet intent in the direction of Atlantic Africa where the advanced and decisive border of our own national security lies*" (Silva, 1967: 91).

This discursive emphasis on a Soviet build-up in the South Atlantic endured over the years (e.g. Flores, 1984: 458-465) but did not necessarily translate into the development of a cohesive Brazilian approach towards the region. Instead, discussions over possible South Atlantic collective solutions started to emerge as a reaction to non-Brazilian proposals. Argentina, in particular, exhibited an interest on the issue and on May 1957, gathered representatives from Brazil and Uruguay in Buenos Aires (Hurrell, 1983: 181). At the time, Brazilian political and military authorities expressed considerable suspicion over its neighbour's intents and blocked any serious development on the matter. However, in contrast to Itamaraty's institutional caution over such discussions, the Brazilian Navy's reluctance was driven by the desire to not see the headquarters of an eventual South Atlantic regional organisation anywhere else than in Rio de Janeiro (Penna Filho, 2008: 214-216). The latter's position thus demonstrated the first indication of contradictory agendas within Brazil on how to best address the security context of the South Atlantic.

The issue would be brought up again in 1969, with South Africa now playing the leading role, as part of the 'outward policy' led by the B. J. Vorster government. For South Africa, inciting greater cooperation ties in the South Atlantic was seen as an "important means of gaining allies and respectability, of overcoming the country's

political isolation and of defusing the antipathy generated by Apartheid" (Hurrell, 1987: 74).[32] During a visit by South African Minister of Foreign Relations Hilgard Muller to South America, reports surfaced over high-level discussions on a regional security arrangement structured around a possible South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO), modelled under its Northern counterpart. Itamaraty, however, publically denied such proposals and sought to distance itself from any South African-led initiative, due to international reputation costs. But the Brazilian Navy retained its underlined interest. In fact, throughout the 1960s, Brazilian Navy officials engaged in information exchanges and visits with their South African counterparts. More importantly, at the time of Mueller's visit, a Brazilian Navy delegation was visiting the Simonstown military base, in South Africa, aiming for further bilateral contacts (Penha Filho, 2008: 221-225). Even though Itamaraty's policy of excluding any kind of interaction with the Apartheid regime ultimately prevailed, it was clear the Brazilian Navy held its autonomous view on who to partner with in the region and was not opposed to collective arrangements *a priori* (e.g. Mattos, 1975).

The following decade saw the issue surfacing sporadically, according to Argentina and South Africa's own interests. But "despite being pronounced dead on so many occasions, the idea of a South Atlantic pact (…) simply refused to die" (Hurrell, 1983: 179). For its part, the U.S. also contributed to such *status quo*, with the Reagan administration favouring a modicum of structured cooperation in order to face the possible threat of a communist expansion into Southern Atlantic waters. The 1982 war over the Falklands/Malvinas, however, proved that the South Atlantic was not immune to militarised conflict and therefore "tarnished the illusion of continental defence, with the U.S. approval" (Gonçalves & Miyamoto, 1993: 238). Moreover, it distanced Argentina from South Africa and led the former to follow Brazil's loose agenda more closely.[33]

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[32] Part of this strategy included heightening the Soviet threat to the fullest. As stated at the time: "In our minds, there is no doubt whatsoever that Communist penetration and presence in the Southern Hemisphere constitute a threat, directly and indirectly, to the Republic of South Africa. (…) In the regional context it is important that the highest degree of cooperation is achieved amongst the countries concerned. In the Southern Hemisphere this cooperation must obviously extend to states having common interests in the region" (Biermann, 1977: 81, 84).

[33] Even though South Africa's allegiances during the Falklands/Malvinas war were unclear (Lechini, 2011: 151-153), on May 1986, Argentina opted to break diplomatic relations with South Africa, following an approximation to Third World countries and the Non-Aligned Movement during the Alfonsín administration (1983-1989).

Reflecting this new regional context, Brazil floated a proposal for an alternative international legal mechanism in the form of a zone of peace. At its core, the creation of ZOPACAS was seen as part of "an on-going process, searching for peace (…) without expecting to obtain immediate results (Mourão, 1988: 49). In other words, it aimed to address the South Atlantic in a common security format by targeting belligerent behaviour on a long-term basis. By recurring to UNGA Resolution 41/11, Brazil was able to circumvent UNSC veto politics and annul the debate over an overarching regional governance mechanism. Additionally, it comprised a "conceptual shield" (Garcia, 1998: 117) that foiled any undesired participation by South Africa.[34] More importantly, ZOPACAS' rationale succeed in wining the Brazilian Navy support by focusing on the "non-militarisation" of the South Atlantic by outside actors rather than forcing the "demilitarisation" of regional countries, with consequences for their own military capabilities (Miyamoto, 1987: 21).

The success of this initiative, however, was short-lived. After five ministerial meetings and the adhesion of Namibia and post-Apartheid South Africa in 1990 and 1994, respectively, the forum faded away against the backdrop of a generalised decreasing interest for the South Atlantic. Still, revamped defence priorities in a post-Cold War context implied the inclusion of new topics in the Brazilian national agenda, including novel concerns with regards to the environment and technological capabilities (Marques, 2003; Martins Filho, 2006). From the Navy's perspective, that entailed growing concerns for the regulation of international maritime spaces and resources. Accordingly, when the country's first National Defence Policy was issued in 1996, two main priority areas stood out:

> "*For Brazil, a country with different internal regions and a diversified profile, simultaneously Amazonic, Atlantic, Platine and from the Southern Cone, the conception of regional space extrapolates the South-American continental mass and also includes the South Atlantic*" (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 1996).

[34] The U.S. was the only country that voted against, with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, and Portugal abstaining. Despite the Falklands/Malvinas war, the UK voted in favour, in a bid to present itself as a South Atlantic country, in its own right (Mourão, 1988: 54; Pereira, 1997: 23).

In consonance with these dispositions, it was stated the need to "act for the maintenance of a climate of peace and cooperation along our national border and towards the solidarity in Latin America and in the South Atlantic region" while also attempting to "intensify the exchange with the Armed Forces from friendly nations" (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 1996). Subsequent guidelines issued by the different branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces abided by such orientations (e.g. Brasil, Marinha do Brasil, 1997).

III.2 Previous defence overtures with Africa

Amidst Brazil's evolving positioning towards the South Atlantic, it is possible to identify previous bursts of defence engagement with African countries. Even if not comprising a cohesive strategy, defence initiatives followed three general modalities between 1970 and 2002. Firstly, through the participation in several international peacekeeping missions in Africa.[35] More specifically, Brazil contributed to the UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) I (1998-1991), II (1991-1995) and III (1995-1997) as well as to the *Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola* (MONUA – UN Observer Mission in Angola) (1997-1999). Brazil held the command of the military observers contingent of the first two UNAVEM while sending an infantry battalion and engineering company, totalling more than 1.000 blue-helmets, for the third mission.[36] The substantial contribution to the latter was presented as projecting a positive image of Brazil in the region while attending to a larger foreign agenda (Ribeiro, 2009: 320). The intersections with the country's interests abroad were evident in the government's justification to Congress over such a commitment:

[35] It should also be noted Brazil's record in turning down participation requests. In the case of Namibia during the Apartheid occupation, for example, Brazil was repeatedly asked to contribute to an eventual UN mission, to no avail (e.g. Conde, 1978; Salles, 1982). See Chapter V, Section V.2.2.2.

[36] Brazil's participation in UNAVEM III, on the other hand, sparked Angola's interest in having a Brazilian Technical Military Cooperation Mission on the ground afterwards. Following Fernando Henrique Cardoso's visit to Luanda in 1996, negotiations began on an overall agreement, which foresaw the presence of an engineering company from the Brazilian Army, covered by a budget of R$ 38 million (Fontoura, 2005: 271-272). The resume of hostilities, however, brought such a project to a permanent hold.

> "*Brazil, in accordance with its obligation as a United Nations member and under Article 4 of the federal Constitution, and as the main country in the South Atlantic region, has a concrete and special interest in contributing for the consolidation of peace in Angola.* (…) *Brazil's absence in that effort of pacification would have negative repercussions over the image of our international capability to intervene, in light of the permanently manifested interest of the Brazilian foreign policy in favour of Southern Africa and Angola, in particular*" (Brasil, Câmara dos Deputados, 1994).

Secondly, naval exchanges comprised a visible token of military presence in the South Atlantic (Cabral, 1989: 25). The 1961 visit to African shores of the training-vessel *Custódio de Mello-G20*, for instance, helped substantiating the overtures of President Quadros towards the continent (Saraiva, 2012: 38).[37] Sometimes co-organised with Itamaraty but often single-headed by the Navy itself, the so-called Operations AFRICA composed by both training vessels and larger task-forces paid good-will visits to such countries as Cape Verde (1981, 1982, 1985, 1991, 1993, 1994), Cameroon (1987, 1988, 1989), Congo (1988), Cote d'Ivoire (1985, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1994), the DRC (1985), Gabon (1985, 1988, 1989, 1994), Ghana (1994), Guinea-Bissau (1994), Liberia (1988), Namibia (1996) Nigeria (1979, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988), Senegal (1979, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1994), São Tomé and Príncipe (1985, 1988, 1989) and South Africa (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997).[38] After changes in the regional context during the 1990s, these visits were further reinforced by the execution of new multilateral exercises. From 1995 onwards, Brazil joined South African, Argentinean and Uruguayan navies on a biannual basis under the ATLASUR exercises while participating as observers in the first FELINO exercises in 2000, under the CPLP framework.[39]

Finally, African countries in the South Atlantic comprised occasional niche opportunities for Brazil's defence industry during this period (Moraes, 2012: 22-27).

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[37] On August 1968, that same vessel visited Cape Town, in what amounted to a singular moment in Brazil's military contacts with South Africa's Apartheid regime (Penna Filho, 2008: 220-221).

[38] These visits included such vessels as the frigates *Constituição F-42*, *Defensora-F41*, *Independência-F44*, *Niterói-F40*, *União-F45*, the corvettes *Caboclo-V19*, *Forte de Coimbra-V18* and the destroyers *Alagoas-D36* and *Rio Grande do Norte-D37*.

[39] Although ATLASUR first originated in 1993 between South Africa and Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay only joined two years later.

Heavily dependent on foreign markets in order to survive international competition, deals were reached with such Brazilian companies as EMBRAER and ENGESA, for the supply of light aircraft and armoured vehicles, as discriminated in Table II.

Table II – Exports of Brazilian weaponry to African countries in the South Atlantic (1970-2002)

Recipient country	Designation	Description	No. delivered	Year of order	Year of deliveries
Angola	EMB-111	MP aircraft	2	19861	1988
	EMB-312 Tucano	Trainer aircraft	8	1998	1998
Cape Verde	EMB-110 Bandeirante	Light transport ac	1	1998	1998
Gabon	EMB-110 Bandeirante	Light transport ac	3	1980	1980
	EMB-111	MP aircraft	1	1980	1981
	EE-11 Urutu	APC	12	1981	1984
	EE-3 Jararaca	Reconnaissance AV	12	1981	1984
	EE-9 Cascavel	Armoured car	14	1981	1983
Nigeria	EE-9 Cascavel	Armoured car	75	1992	1994
Togo	MB-326GB	Trainer/combat ac	3	1975	1976
	MB-326GB	Trainer/combat ac	3	1978	1978

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers / systematised by the author

On the other hand, exploratory contacts were also made for a greater involvement between the *Empresa Gerencial de Projectos Navais* (EMGEPRON –

Naval Projects Management Company) and Africa, namely with maintenance work in the Nigerian Navy's Wilmot Point Naval Base in 1993.[40] Likewise, in 1994, EMGEPRON unsuccessfully explored the possibility of selling class-*Inhaúma* corvettes to South Africa (Brasil, ABDI, 2013: 17).

Overall, it is observed that even though interactions at the defence level already existed with varying degrees of intensity, they also proved too little and too disperse to amount to any cohesive approach, focused on enlisting further African cooperation. Inasmuch as the level of official interest for the continent wavered according to political cycles in Brazil, defence overtures lacked a common South Atlantic thread and remained contingent to the unfolding of African crises, the interests of specific branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces or the sectorial opportunities for new markets across the Atlantic.

III.3 Brazil and the South Atlantic (2003-2014)

In contrast with previous administrations, the inauguration of Lula da Silva's government led to a clear policy impetus on defence relations with African countries in the South Atlantic. Amidst the evolution of political and economic relations with Africa described in Chapter I, the South Atlantic came to be regarded as central amidst Brazil's renewed defence and strategic priorities and therefore worthy of greater focus in terms of cooperation initiatives. This geographic orientation is best understood if contextualised by a securitisation drive, underpinning Brazil's material emphasis towards such an area.

III.3.1. The securitisation of the South Atlantic

Claims that Brazilian initiatives equated to the emergence of a regional security complex require the observation of an aggregating securitisation process that can originate such dynamics in the first place. Initial sustentation can be found through a brief analysis of Brazil's strategic guidelines during the period in question. The 2008 National Defence Strategy, for instance, indicates the most pressing defence

[40] Interview with Admiral Walter da Silva, Administrative-Financial Director, EMGEPRON – Rio de Janeiro, 23/05/2013.

concerns for Brazil resided not only in the Northern and Western regions but also in the South Atlantic. Accordingly, a possible "threat of an armed conflict in the South Atlantic region" was considered a factor to take into consideration when developing the conditions for the future deployment of Brazilian Armed Forces while an increase of Brazil's military presence in that same area was urged (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 2008: 13, 48, 49).

On the other hand, the National Defence Policy in its 2012-revised edition stated that by "seeking to deepen its ties of cooperation, [Brazil] envisions a strategic environment that exceeds the mass of the subcontinent and includes the projection along the limits of the South Atlantic and bordering countries in Africa". Moreover, 'Brazil attaches priority to the countries of South America and Africa, especially the ones in West Africa and of Portuguese language" (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 2012b: 4.1, 5.9). Following that thread, the 2012 version of Brazil's Defence White Book contended that, "the protection of lines of communication and trade routes with Africa has strategic significance for the country" (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 2012a: 51).

The impact of these general dispositions can be evaluated in terms of the specific interests of the different military branches, as evidenced by the Brazilian Army's directives to operate abroad. In 2001, the *Directriz Estratégica para atividades do Exército Brasileiro na Área Internacional* (DAEBAI – Strategic Directive for the Brazilian Army's activities in the International Area) left the preferred geographic focus dependent on the "national and international contexts, the Brazilian Foreign Policy, specific interests of the Land Forces and foreign military interests in Brazil" (Brasil, Exército do Brasil, 2001: 2c). The 2010 version, on the other hand, identified several areas of greater interest, under the following decreasing order: (1) South America; (2) U.S. and Canada; (3) European Union; (4) Russia, China, India and South Africa; (6) Africa, Israel and Eastern Europe (Santos, 2014: 112). The 2013 edition, however, dully updated its priorities and elevated Southern Africa, CPLP and the strategic surrounding to the second main geographic areas, under the following rationale:

> "*The African continent is one of the priorities of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, receives considerable investments by Brazilian companies and,*

> *historically, the Brazilian Army's support in peacekeeping missions. CPLP possesses cultural bonds that unite it to Brazil, thus favouring the establishment of cooperation with remaining countries in Africa. The countries in Atlantic Africa, especially the ones located in the Brazilian strategic surroundings, comprise another priority for the Brazilian Foreign Policy. It is sought out the consolidation of this area as the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS). The effort carried out by Brazil in these African countries has been one of the most intense in recent years. Cooperation with countries in this area allows for the maintenance of bilateral dialogues and the development of a stable world order*" (Brasil, Exército do Brasil, 2013: 27).

A similar programmatic adjustment occurred within the Brazilian Navy. The *Doutrina Básica da Marinha-EMA 305* (Basic Navy Doctrine) of 2004 did not contain any reference to the Navy's perception of the South Atlantic (Brasil, Marinha do Brasil, 2004). But in the 2014 version, such an omission was corrected and supplanted by the acknowledgment that:

> "*The South Atlantic continues to be an area of priority interest for Brazil, in terms of, mainly, the maritime trade, the exploration and management of maritime resources, the mappings and scientific researches, the interests of defence and security, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic* (…)" (Brasil, Marinha do Brasil, 2014: 6).

In consonance with this renewed South Atlantic drive, the Navy also invested considerable efforts in launching the Blue Amazon public relations campaign (e.g. Vidigal, 2006). Based on the country's goal to expand the limits of its continent shelf, the country's immediate maritime area was named as a complement to the 'green' Amazon, with the purpose of highlighting both the riches within and the perils over its control and defence. As the mentor of this initiative, Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho justified its conception in the following terms:

> "(…) *in the 'Blue Amazon', the limits of our jurisdictional waters are lines over the sea. They don't exist physically. What defines them is the existence of ships patrolling or conducting presence actions*" (Carvalho, 2004).

Under that rationale, protecting such a vast area required a *latu sensum* interpretation of Brazil's possible reach. As expressed in the Navy's 2014 orientations:

> "*The defence of the Blue Amazon, as well as any other defensive operation, should not be restricted to operations within the area to be defended. Opposing or adverse forces should be stopped, or preferentially, dissuaded, way beyond the limits of the Brazilian maritime spaces. That defence implies the adequate employment of the trinomial monitoring/control, mobility and presence*" (Brasil, Marinha do Brasil, 2014: 13).

New priorities in governmental-designed orientations thus led to subsequent adjustments in the guidelines and initiatives of the Armed Forces. The combined effort, in turn, reflected the aim for a growing transatlantic cooperation already underway while providing it with further formal sustentation that could justify the required manpower and financial resources. This convergence of interests and priorities across the governmental and military spectrum was also brought into evidence through the extensive military re-equipment programs announced and executed during this same period. Considerable investments on new naval capabilities, in particular, were presented as attending to interests that went beyond the Blue Amazon area. In fact, according to Navy Chief of Staff, Julio Soares de Moura Neto, "they extend to anywhere where a ship sails with our flag, whose protection is a non-transferable duty of the Brazilian state" (2009: 23).

In this context, Brazil sought to raise the profile of the South Atlantic and the security risks within. Internally, the outcome was evident. In 2011, a public survey was conducted with the purpose of assessing Brazilian perceptions over defence matters. From total respondents, 34% considered a war with a foreign power (but not a regional neighbour) the most menacing threat while 37,1% deemed the U.S. as a

potential military threat to Brazil in the next 20 years. More significantly, 63,1% of the interviewees (45,5% strongly and another 17,6% reasonably) believed that Brazil could suffer a foreign military invasion in the next 20 years, with the purpose of controlling the pre-salt energy reserves along the Atlantic shores (IPEA, 2011). These results point to a successful securitisation of Brazil's original targeted audience, namely its own national constituents.

Meanwhile, externally, the securitisation of the country's maritime neighbourhood was associated to the protection the sensitive peaceful balance that had, accordingly to Brazilian decision-makers, framed the South Atlantic in recent years:

> "*The undue militarisation of the South Atlantic is of interest to none of us. The vocation of our region is one of dialogue and understanding, of mutual trust. It is with those instruments that we will keep ourselves away from the scourge of war. This is the very meaning of being a 'zone of peace'*" (Patriota 2013b).

By reaffirming the need to maintain the peace and stability achieved in the last decades, it was also assumed that threats – varying in kind, number and nature – to such *status quo* existed and needed to be kept at bay. Hence the emphasis on a cooperative tone between every intervening part of this particular area:

> "*We created a true good-will belt around our immediate surroundings, whose reinforcement should be a permanent concern. That good-will belt allows Brazil more freedom for a universalistic foreign policy, without the bindings that the eventual presence of threats in its borders would entail. That perception is extending progressively to Africa. We wish to contribute particularly to the security of our partners in the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic. We need African countries to guarantee that such ocean is a safe trade lane, free from piracy actions and organised crime*" (Amorim, 2012a: 3).

But in order to successfully accomplish this agenda, Brazil needed to incite a similar awareness that the South Atlantic was in need of a more concerted focus from the African side:

> "*We had a problem, OK we were going to implement our Blue Amazon but there was a problem, everything was disorganised in the other side* [of the Atlantic]*, we needed to provoke* [a similar] *organisation in the other side* [of the Atlantic]*. We needed to think both sides*".[41]

In that sense, prospective contacts began to take place, vying to promote Brazil's conceptualisation of the maritime surroundings. On October 2012, for instance, a symposium over "Cooperation between Navies on Security and Situational Awareness in the South Atlantic" was organised in Rio de Janeiro, with the participation of the Angolan, Brazilian, Namibian and South African navies. The goals of this gathering included an increased interoperability between navies, the expansion of cooperation in terms of maritime security and naval operation in the South Atlantic as well as the development of such a concept in African countries. But in order to achieve this collectivist rational for the South Atlantic, Brazil required a sustained material effort that allowed rallying multiple countries in the area, while heightening its security provider profile abroad. That implied a structured policy approach on multiple levels:

> "*I speak of three levels. One is ZOPACAS, the widest, all the countries that border the South Atlantic in South America and Africa, with a certain flexibility in order to consider the South Atlantic more from a geopolitical point of view than a strictly geographic position, given that the majority is north of the Equator in Africa. That is one dimension. The other dimension is those plurilateral exercises, that plurilateral cooperation. And the third dimension is, shall we say, the bilateral cooperation with countries, which we have also sought to develop slowly*".[42]

[41] Interview with Nelson Jobim, former-Minister of Defence of Brazil – 13/10/2014, São Paulo, Brazil.

[42] Interview with Celso Amorim, Minister of Defence of Brazil – Brasília, 15/03/2013.

Such vectors of engagement towards the South Atlantic were enshrined in a larger strategy that envisioned the use of Brazilian resources to instil the notion of a common regional project. The content and execution of the proposed cooperation initiatives requires a more detailed analysis.

III.4 Brazilian-African defence cooperation (2003-2014)

Seeking to examine the full contours of transatlantic defence cooperation, the following sub-sections focus on unpacking Brazilian-African relations in the South Atlantic in terms of high-level exchanges, defence cooperation agreements, training of military personnel, sale or donation of military equipment and joint exercises/good-will visits.

III.4.1 High-level exchanges

The intensity of visits between Brazil and African countries' respective authorities attests to the priority each side attributed to the transatlantic defence cooperation potential. Between 2003 and 2014, Brazilian Ministers of Defence José Viegas Filho, Waldir Pires, Nelson Jobim and Celso Amorim, paid a total of 19 official visits to South Atlantic countries, including Angola (2009, 2013, 2014), Cape Verde (2006, 2009, 2011, 2013), the DRC (2009, 2014), Guinea-Bissau (2009, Namibia (2003, 2009, 2013). São Tomé and Príncipe (2003, 2009) and South Africa (2003, 2004, 2009, 2014).[43]

Inversely, during the same period, Ministers of Defence from 11 South Atlantic African countries paid a total of 30 visits to Brazil, from such countries as Angola (2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2014), Cameroon (2009, 2011, 2013) Equatorial Guinea (2010, 2013), Cape Verde (2010, 2012), the DRC (2009, 2014), Guinea-Bissau (2006, 2010, 2011), Namibia (2004, 2009, 2012, 2013), Nigeria (2005, 2010). São Tomé and Príncipe (2010) Senegal (2010, 2013), and South Africa (2009, 2009, 2011, 2013).

[43] José Alencar (2004-2006) was the only Brazilian Minister of Defence not to visit Africa in any official capacity.

On the other hand, significant strides were made at the highest military level, with particular emphasis on naval contacts. The Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Navy Julio Soares de Moura Neto, for instance, visited Angola (2009, 2012), Cape Verde (2012, 2013) Ghana (2009), Namibia (2008, 2011, 2012), Nigeria (2007), Senegal (2012), and South Africa (2012). In return, he received the visits of his counterparts from Angola (2014), Cape Verde (2009, 2012), Namibia (2009, 2012) and South Africa (2012). The other military branches, however, were less active. The Chiefs of Staff of the Brazilian Army Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque and Enzo Martins Peri visited South Africa in 2004 and Angola and Namibia in 2013, respectively. Their counterparts from Angola and South Africa then visited Brazil in 2010 and 2013. The Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Air Force Chief of Staff Luiz Carlos da Silva Bueno visited South Africa once in 2008 and received a visit by his Angolan counterpart in 2010.

But Brazil also engaged on defence issues when called upon by international or regional organisations. On July 2013, upon the request of the UN Security Council, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC) gathered in Yaoundé, Cameroon to try and tackle the issue of rising piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. Considering itself an invested part, Brazil sent Navy Commander for Naval Operation, Admiral Luiz Fernando Palmer as an observer of the proceedings. Moreover, recognising Brazil's expertise and interests in the South Atlantic, the AU requested in 2014 a Brazilian Navy officer to be assigned to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as a technical advisor, in charge of assisting with the development of the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy.[44]

Finally, this kind of exchanges was also heightened by Brazil's own defence attaché network. In 2004, one year into Lula da Silva's first mandate, Brazil had posts established in Angola (with accreditation in São Tomé and Principe), Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa (Brasil, Presidência da República, 2004). But by 2013 the number of countries had expanded, with new posts created for Cape Verde and Senegal (with accreditation in Benin and Togo), while the post in Nigeria received

[44] Afterwards, this position was merged with the new Defence Attaché post to Ethiopia and the AU, created on August 2014.

additional responsibilities towards Ghana (Brasil, Presidência da República, 2013).[45] Likewise, negotiations began to include the DRC in this network.

III.4.2 Defence cooperation agreements

A considerable increase of formal instruments concerning defence cooperation between Brazil and South Atlantic countries was witnessed during the period in question. Between 2003 and 2014, a total of eight defence cooperation agreements were signed with such partners as Angola (2010), Equatorial Guinea (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Namibia (2009), Nigeria (2010), São Tomé and Príncipe (2010), Senegal (2010) and South Africa (2003).[46] However, as of late 2014, none of these agreements had gone through all the necessary formalities and could be considered fully ratified from Brazil's side. Still, as one Brazilian diplomat putted it, "Itamaraty is not in the business of waiting for Congress" to have international agreements enter into force.[47] Minister of Defence Celso Amorim echoed the same rationale, arguing that the delay has not impeded cooperation endeavours to begin on the ground:

> "*If the agreements were ratified, evidently it would become easier for, shall we say, budgets, travels. But it is not an obstacle. The problem is that instead of placing one action within the* [budget] *section of the agreement, which would already be foreseen, I have to place it as an equivalent action that allows proceeding with the activity. But it is not an obstacle*".[48]

The underlined rationale did not differ given that the main dispositions were also virtually identical. High-level visits by the respective country's civil and military

[45] The post of Defence Attaché to Senegal, however, remained vacant and was therefore not considered to be formally in function. During this period, Angola, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa maintained defence attachés stationed in Brasilia.

[46] In 2010, negotiations also began with Ghana over a similar general defence cooperation agreement. However, the wide scope of envisioned activities, as proposed by Ghanaian authorities, ran contrary to Brazil's pursuit of uniformity in its foreign cooperation framework and bilateral discussions subsequently entered into a deadlock (Santos, 2014: 90). Until the end of 2014, no further progress had been achieved.

[47] Interview with Brazilian diplomat.

[48] Interview with Celso Amorim, Minister of Defence of Brazil – Brasília, 15/03/2013.

leaderships, contacts between military learning institutions, implementation and development of joint programs in defence technology and, specially, exchange of personnel for training purposes, topped such agreements as exhibited by the comparison in Table III.

Table III - Defence agreements between Brazil and African countries in the South Atlantic (2003-2014)

Countries / Measures	ANG	EQ GUI	GUI-B	NAM	NIG	STP	SEN	SA
High-level visits by civil and military leaderships	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Meetings between defence institutions and respective staff	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Exchange of students and instructors	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Participation in courses, seminars, internships, etc.	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Reciprocal visits by each country's Armed Forces, warships and aircrafts	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**		**X**	**X**
Cultural and sport events	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**
Implementation and development of defence technology programs	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**		**X**	
Promotion of trade initiatives in the defence area	**X**		**X**	**X**	**X**			
Cooperation/consultation in defence materials and services	**X**	**X**	**X**			**X**	**X**	
Military legislation						**X**		
Humanitarian, health-medical and search and rescue (S&R) assistance						**X**		
Joint exercises and instruction	**X**					**X**		**X**
Joint research in military production	**X**							**
Presence of observers in national exercises	**X**							
Supply, maintenance and repair of military equipment	**X**							

Source: MRE / systematised by the author

** The development of Brazil and South Africa's A-Darter air-to-air missile falls outside of this agreement.

Complementing this series of international binding agreements, Brazil also overcame initial resistances to the development of a specific defence configuration within the CPLP framework. In 2006, and together with the remaining members, Brazil signed a Protocol for Cooperation in Defence Among the Portuguese-Speaking Countries that foresaw a new institutional architecture for the organisation in this domain. Three years later, a memorandum of understanding for the creation of training centres to support peacekeeping operation was also agreed upon.[49]

On the other hand, several country cases are worthy of further mention. The first resides in Namibia, with whom Brazil has worked extensively on defence matters since the first defence cooperation agreement in 1994.[50] The establishment of a Naval Mission in Walvis Bay effectively helped building Namibia's Navy from scratch. However, the 1994 agreement also faced its share of challenges. The lack of ratification by Namibian authorities, for example, legally conditioned its execution to the fullest. Moreover, the financial responsibilities assumed by the Brazilian Navy took its toll as Brazil's national defence budget dwindled throughout the years, thus making the success of the planned initiatives contingent to shared liability. On December 2001, an additional Naval Cooperation Agreement was thus signed with clearer terms on shared financial costs. The focus was set on providing the material means the Namibian Navy still required all the while reinforcing the training aspects previously offered. Its full ratification was completed on July 2003, under Lula da Silva's first term.

Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, received considerable Brazilian efforts towards the stabilisation of its unlawful security sector. Through a combination of bilateral and multilateral venues, including leadership of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), Brazil sought to play a leading role amidst the remaining international community (e.g. Abdenur & Neto, 2014b). The attempt to install the *Missão Brasileira de Cooperação Técnico-Militar* (MBCTM – Brazilian Mission for Technical-Military Cooperation), as foreseen in the defence cooperation agreement signed in 2006, comprised Brazil's first significant Security Sector Reform foray in

[49] Event though it falls outside of the indicated timeframe of analysis, it is worth mentioning that Brazil only ratified the protocol on June 2015, as the last remaining CPLP member state. The MoU on the training centres, on the other hand, has still to produce any practical effects.

[50] The contours and origins of this relationship are developed in greater detail in Chapter V, Sections V.1.2.2 and V.2.2.2.

Africa. However, disruption of internal order due to a coup d'état in 2011 brought such projects to a halt and the suspension of its envisioned activities.

Brazil also collaborated with UN peacekeeping missions in Africa during this period. In the beginning of Lula's first term, for instance, Brazil provided a Hercules C-130 transport aircraft for the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), dispatched by the UN to address the humanitarian situation in Bunia, DRC. Afterwards, General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, the previous head of the *Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haiti* (MINUSTAH – UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti), was assigned to lead the *Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo* (MONUSCO – UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Silva & Martins, 2014: 162-165). Additionally, Brazil provided low-level personnel to other operations, including the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).[51]

Finally, Brazil also stepped up cooperation with two Lusophone countries, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. With regards to the former, bilateral relations improved significantly after the ratification in 2010 of a previous defence cooperation agreement, signed in 1994.[52] This, in turn, allowed for the establishment of the Brazilian Naval Mission in Cape Verde on August 2013, in charge of assessing local needs, as well as the subsequent creation of a new Defence Attaché position in the country. As Cape Verdean Minister of Defence, Jorge Tolentino, recognises:

> "*Relations with Brazil are state relations that go as far as Cape Verde's independence, and they reached such a level of maturity that we deemed justified that, in this concrete domain of defence and security, we could aim for what we call a strategic partnership. It developed quickly because there was a*

[51] Other overtures were made to convince Brazil in contributing larger military contingents to MONUSCO in 2005 and 2008. However, logistical difficulties were invoked to decline both requests (Santos, 2014: 140).

[52] The only significant break from the 1994 agreement with Cape Verde and the agreements negotiated and signed between 2003 and 2014 was the inclusion of a specific provision on the disbursement of Brazilian grants for training and internships in Brazilian institutions (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1994: 3). The fact that such specification was not inscribe in more recent agreements is indicative of the attempt by the Ministry of Defence to share the costs of eventual activities with potential partners.

> *convergence of interests immediately identified. The Atlantic is clearly a zone of interest for Cape Verde and Brazil.* (…) *It is clear to us that we will never, we don't have and we will never have the necessary operational means to deal with all the existent threats in the region that Cape Verde is inserted, in this part of the Atlantic. Hence, we have betted on having the widest possible selection of partnerships or collaboration with different countries, which go from Portugal to the U.S., Spain, the UK, Italy, China and Brazil.* (…) *Contacts have been intense on several levels, even at a ministerial level with Minister Celso Amorim, who is a promoter, an enthusiast. Since day one, since he was Minister of External Relation and then currently at Defence, the dialogue is the frankest, the openest, understandings happen naturally. Also, the presence of the attaché and the naval mission allows for a more direct and immediate contact, at the ministerial level, at the* [Armed Forces] *chiefs of staff level, and, specially, at the Coast Guard level, where the interest in the Brazilian presence is more direct*".[53]

Following the quick developments achieved with Cape Verde, Brazil sought to replicate the same model of bilateral engagement with São Tomé and Principe. Accordingly, on November 2014, the Brazilian Navy Chief of Staff authorised the creation of a nucleus structure on the ground, with the intent of opening a full naval mission in 2015.

III.4.3 Military training

Training opportunities played a central part in Brazil's outreach to partners in the South Atlantic. On the bilateral level, the efforts exhibited a streamlined use of Brazilian military training institutions.[54] As seen in Table IV, Brazilian Air Force structures, such as *Escola de Comando e Estado Maior da Aeronáutica*, *Academia da Força Aérea* or *Centro de Instrução Especializada da Aeronáutica* provided a total of

[53] Interview with Jorge Tolentino, Minister of Foreign Relations of Cape Verde – Lisbon, 18/12/2014.

[54] The bulk of the data presented in this sub-section was gathered through requests made by the author in 2013 to the three Brazilian Armed Forces under Law for Information Access, n. 12527 of 18/10/2011. It is presumed to comprise the most reliable depiction of this reality. However, given the existence of over 30 different military training institutions in Brazil, eventual discrepancies must be expected to surface when confronted with other accounts. For alternative tallies of such training opportunities, see Santos (2014: 119-128) and Brasil, Ministério da Defesa (2012: 106, 129, 150).

42 vacancies for African officials during the 2003-2013 timeframe. The disbursement of these training slots only gained traction after 2003, albeit if with constantly modest numbers.

Table IV – Training vacancies for African military officials in Brazilian Air Force institutions (2001-2013)

Countries / Years	Angola	Cape Verde	Guinea Bissau	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
2003	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	**5**	**2**	-	-	-	-
2005	-	-	-	-	-	**2**
2006	**4**	**2**	-	**1**	-	**1**
2007	**5**	-	**5**	-	-	-
2008	-	**1**	**2**	-	-	-
2009	**3**	-	-	-	-	-
2010	**1**	-	**2**	-	-	-
2011	-	-	-	-	-	-
2012	-	-	-	-	**1**	-
2013	**4**	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**23**	**5**	**9**	**1**	**1**	**3**

Source: Data gathered and systematised by the author under the Law for Information Access, n. 12527, 18/10/2011

Data from Brazilian Army institutions, on the other hand, points to a total of 29 vacancies offered to African officials between 2005 and 2007, in such specialised institutions, as the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras*, *Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército*, *Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais* or *Escola de*

Instrução Especializada, as shown in Table V. Even though data is scarcer, as numbers from 2008 onwards are considered confidential and were not made available, secondary sources indicate that between 2008 and 2012, 6 other Nigerian officials were enrolled in Army courses (Adesanya, 2013: 72).

Table V – Training vacancies for African military officials in Brazilian Army institutions (2005-2007)

Countries / Years	Angola	Cape Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	São Tomé and Príncipe	South Africa
2005	**6**	**2**	-	**1**	**2**	**-**
2006	**8**	-	**3**	-	-	-
2007	**6**	-	-	**1**	-	-
Total	**20**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**-**

Source: Data gathered and systematised by the author under the Law for Information Access, n. 12527, 18/10/2011

However, amongst the Armed Forces branches, the Brazilian Navy holds a primary role, as a total of 1920 African officials weres offered specialised training in institutions like *Escola Naval*, *Escola de Guerra Naval* or *Centro de Instrução Almirante Alexandrino*. The weight of Namibia in these numbers is unmistakable, as evidenced by Table VI. Between 2003 and 2013, over 1897 vacacies were attributed to Namibian Navy personnel.

Table VI – Training vacancies for African military officials in Brazilian Navy institutions (2002-2013)

Countries / Years	Angola	Namibia	Nigeria	São Tomé and Príncipe	Senegal	South Africa
2003	-	**57**	-	-	-	-
2004	-	**112**	-	-	-	-
2005	-	**49**	-	-	-	-
2006	-	**112**	-	-	-	-
2007	-	**80**	-	-	-	-
2008	**5**	**117**	-	-	-	-
2009	-	**315**	-	-	-	-
2010	-	**383**	-	-	-	-
2011	-	**221**	-	-	-	-
2012	-	**238**	-	-	-	-
2013	**13**	**213**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**-**
Total	**18**	**1897**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**-**

Source: Data gathered and systematised by the author under the Law for Information Access, n. 12527, 18/10/2011

Additional training was also provided for higher officials. The ESG, for instance, offered vacancies in its *Curso de Altos Estudos de Política e Estratégia* (CAEPE – Higher Studies Course on Politics and Strategy) to African personnel, including 1 South African (2006) and 3 Nigerian (2011, 2012, 2013) officials.

In light of growing African demand for more training opportunities, the Ministry of Defence and ABC started collaborating in a new oversight of foreign military training programs, which was formalised in 2010 between the latter and the Ministry of Defence's Department of Internal Administration. In total, over US$ 2 million were foreseen between 2010 and 2013, with almost US$ 700.000 effectively

spent. As exhibited in Figure IX, the last two years point to a dual decrease after peeking in 2011:

Figure IX - Amounts budgeted and spent by ABC on military training with African countries in the South Atlantic (2010-2013)



Source: ABC / systematised by the author

This display, however, hides additional evidence. As found in Table VII, a breakdown by each country targeted shows that Angola comprised the greatest recipient of these programs, followed by São Tomé and Principe.[55] As the amounts budgeted to the former decreased significantly, the latter assumed a new priority in 2013. On the other hand, as Guinea-Bissau faced political-military instability in 2011, training programs were suspended in the following years. Moreover, even though the focus originally resided in African Lusophone countries, it is observed that new partners, like Nigeria and Senegal, also became recipients of these opportunities in 2012 and 2013, despite exhibiting similar low levels of execution.

[55] It should be noted that the numbers presented in Table VII do not reflect the complete cost of these initiatives as they only cover airfare and accommodation in Brazil. The total cost of formation is never accounted for given that it does not include the actual worth of the position made available at Brazilian military institutions. Interview with Paulo Lima, Manager for Bilateral Cooperation with PALOP and East Timor, ABC - Brasília, 03/06/2013.

Table VII - Amounts budgeted and spent by ABC in military training programs in the South Atlantic per African country (2010-2013)

Years		2010	2011	2012	2013	Total by country
Countries	**US$**					
Angola	Budgeted	181.200,00	434.400,00	150.000,00	30.000,00	**795.600,00**
	Spent	54.419,68	167.634,90	83.658,54	8.485,36	**314.198,48**
Cape Verde	Budgeted	242.000,00	55.600,00	25.800,00	9.000,00	**332.400,00**
	Spent	42.198,38	24.006,22	21.868,38	4.229,69	**92.302,67**
Guinea-Bissau	Budgeted	81.000,00	15.300,00	-	-	**96.300,00**
	Spent	32.169,26	10.157,85	-	-	**42.327,11**
Nigeria	Budgeted	-	22.000,00	19.500,00	12.800,00	**54.300,00**
	Spent	-	-	5.658,28	6.122,96	**11.781,24**
São Tomé and Príncipe	Budgeted	70.800,00	55.600,00	51.600,00	260.280,00	**438.280,00**
	Spent	56.708,48	46.403,95	47.101,19	44.919,22	**195.132,84**
Senegal	Budgeted	-	66.000,00	19.500,00	57.680,00	**143.180,00**
	Spent	-	-	16.812,52	35.723,26	**52.535,78**
Total per year	Budgeted	575.000,00	648.900,00	498.600,00	369.770,00	**2.092.270,00**
	Spent	185.495,80	248.202,92	175.098,91	99.480,49	**699.278,12**

Source: ABC / systematised by the author

The numbers above presented do not include inverse flows. Between 2004 and 2010, for example, 11 Brazilian Army officials participated in short-term courses organised in South African institutions (Santos, 2014: 117). But Brazilian instructors responsible for providing training in Africa are also unaccounted. In this case, Namibia comprises another example. In 2009, Brazil set up the *Grupo de Apoio Técnico de Fuzileiros Navais* (GAT-FN – Technical Support Group for Naval Marines) on the ground, in charge of training Namibia's first Marine Battalion. By 2014, nearly 40 Brazilian military personnel were stationed in Walvis Bay as the only

permanent contingent abroad, non-attached to an on-going international peacekeeping mission such as MINUSTAH or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Moreover, in that same year, Brazil began assigning Army Military Advisors and Portuguese teachers to Namibia with the purpose of identifying the logistics requirements for further support, while helping to train Namibian soldiers before they enrolled in Brazilian Army institutions. A different GAT-FN composed by 10 Brazilian military personnel was also installed in São Tomé and Príncipe in 2014, with the similar purpose of training the country's first marine units.

Finally, Brazil's specialised training was also sought out. On the eve of the first visit by Lula da Silva to Angola in 2003, one topic in the agenda consisted in the possible Brazilian participation in demining activities, in a post-civil-war context. Itamaraty went ahead and contacted Brazilian defence officials to reach out to Brazilian companies that could perform the task. But reflecting the incipient structure of the Ministry of Defence at the time, the opportunity never came to fruition (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Embaixada em Angola, 2003). More positive outcomes were achieved afterwards. Between 2008 and 2012, the *Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions Post Conflictuelles de Déminage et de Dépollution* (West African Training Centre for Humanitarian Mine Action) in Uidá, Benin, received four missions by 7 Brazilian experts, in charge of providing specialised training to local personnel and African Lusophone military.

III.4.4 Equipment sales and donations

Regarding the sale of Brazilian defence equipment, participation in defence fairs in Africa helped to pave the way for an increase in such kind of deals. High-level delegations were routinely dispatched to attend the several editions (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014) of the Africa Aerospace and Defence (AAD) exhibition in South Africa. At these occasions, the focus was preferably set on larger industrial companies.[56] Embraer is a case in point as its flagship product, the A-29 Super Tucano aircraft, proved the main item garnering the bulk of interest from African countries. In 2011 Angola acquired six units, worth US$ 91 million. On May 2013,

[56] A depiction of Brazilian sales of small arms and ammunitions during this period is provided in Chapter IV, Section IV.2.2.

during the Latin America Aero & Defence (LAAD) exhibition in Rio de Janeiro, Senegal formalised a similar acquisition of three A-29 Super Tucano aircraft for US$ 67 million, together with a program for local training of pilots and equipment maintenance. Negotiations were also opened with Nigeria and Ghana, in order to explore identical opportunities.[57]

But Brazilian maritime industry saw an identical increase of its African markets share. In 2004, Brazil donated to Namibian authorities the former Brazilian corvette *Purus*, later renamed NS *Lt. General Dimo Hamaambo*. Afterwards, Brazil built the 200-ton Naval Patrol ship, NS *Brendan Simbwaye* and two smaller patrol boats, the LP *Terrace Bay* and the LP *Möwe Bay*, both delivered to Namibia in 2009 and 2011, respectively. A class-*Barroso* corvette as well as a Professional Qualification Program for Navy Personnel was agreed upon in 2010 with Guinea-Equatorial's authorities.[58] A similar deal was signed with Senegalese authorities in 2013 with a declaration of intent foreseeing the future acquisition of two patrol vessels (one of 500t and the other of 200t), together with a Professional Qualification Program for Navy Personnel, at the cost of US$ 53 million.

Still, the most significant purchase occurred on September 2014 with Angola. Under a technical memorandum of understanding signed between the two Ministers of Defence, both countries laid the ground for the implementation of the *Programa de Desenvolvimento do Poder Naval de Angola* (PRONAVAL – Angolan Naval Build-up Program). At an estimated cost of US$ 170 million, the construction of seven 500t class-Macaé patrol vessels was formalised, with the first four to be built in Brazil and the remaining three in Angola, in a new local shipyard also included in the deal. Furthermore, Brazil committed itself to provide necessary training and qualifications to Angolan Navy personnel, in order to operate the acquired vessels and handle its maintenance (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa 2014: 2-3).

Finally, donations of Brazilian hardware and equipment to smaller countries were recurrent, with a special focus on Lusophone partners. São Tomé and Príncipe's Coast Guard, for example, received a shipment of munitions and rifles in 2014,

[57] The deal with Ghana was closed on June 2015 for 5 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft to an estimated cost of US$ 100 million.

[58] This particular purchase, however, never concretised after the initial agreement. The ill-fitting of the vessel to Guinea-Equatorial Navy's actual needs is considered one of the reasons for the breakdown of the deal.

coupled with patrol boat LAPE-10 *Águia*. Meanwhile, Guinea-Bissau received 300 uniforms for its Armed Forces while on March 2012, a Brazilian supply of uniforms worth US$ 169.000 was provided to Cape Verdean Coastal Guard forces. On the other hand, Brazil announced the donation of two Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante patrol aircrafts to Cape Verde.[59]

III.4.5 Exercises and good-will visits

An alternative method of cooperating with Africa in the defence domain, resided in good-will tours carried out by Brazilian Navy vessels in African shores. For instances, on May 2006, the hydrographical vessel *Amorim do Valle H-35* represented the Brazilian Navy in the celebration of the Gold Jubilee of the Nigerian Navy in Lagos. Moreover, throughout the summer of 2010, the corvette *Barroso* visited Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria and São Tomé and Principe. Afterwards, the newly constructed *Navio Patrulha Oceânico* (NPaOc – Ocean Patrol Vessel) *Amazonas* spent August 2012 sailing between Benin, Cape Verde, Nigeria and São Tomé and Principe. Another NPaOc, *Apa*, undertook a similar route by visiting Senegal, Ghana, Angola and Namibia during its maiden trip on March-April 2013, while the *Araguari* visited Cape Verde, Liberia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea on August/September of the same year. In all these occasions, Brazilian officials took the opportunity to engage in bilateral exercises, maintenance formation and anti-piracy demonstrations with local officials and military personnel. Likewise, on October 2012, the Brazilian Air Force sent two P3-Orion aircraft to Cape Verde for joint training exercises and air patrolling of the surrounding sea-lanes.

Participation in regional exercises was equally constant. While continuing the participation in the ATLASUR exercises, Brazil promoted the creation of the IBSAMAR naval exercises, together with India and South Africa (2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014), off the coastline of Africa. Similar initiatives within the CPLP framework were also pursued, with the FELINO exercise comprising the most visible example of Lusophone defence cooperation. More specifically, the 2013 edition was organised

[59] Until the end of 2014, Congress had still not completed the required legislative authorisations to conclude the donation process.

off the coast of Espírito Santo state, by the Brazilian Navy. On the other hand, planning began for a joint exercise between Angola, Brazil, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa on African shores, entitled ATLANTIC TIDINGS. Despite its expected inauguration in 2014, it was postponed to an unspecified date.

Finally, Brazil contributed with observers for operations off African shores, organised or led by other third parties. For example, from February 27th to March 1st 2012, two Brazilian Navy observers attended for the first time the OBANGAME EXPRESS 2012 exercise, carried out under the U.S.-led African Partnership Station program. This presence was replicated during the 2013 edition, when six Brazilian officers participated in the manoeuvres on February 19-28. The following year, on April 16-23, Brazil opted to increase its commitment and send the NPaOc *Apa* to participate, together with other 17 countries forces. The vessel took the opportunity to make additional port calls in Walvis Bay, Cape Town and Luanda.

III.5 Chapter summary

Since 2003 onwards, Brazilian officials increasingly attempted to redraw the discursive limits of the South Atlantic from the bottom-up through the disbursement of training opportunities, technical-scientific formation and new defence industry opportunities. Simultaneously, they promoted cooperation initiatives around sensitive sovereign areas, where trust is considered instrumental, albeit if also incrementally slow to achieve. At the centre of this process, resided an overall Brazilian defence cooperation push, seeking "to promote the construction of a regional identity that begins to alter power relations within this space" (Abdenur & Neto, 2014: 5). But the question remains on how to better frame the Brazilian overtures in the defence domain given the shared geographic trait of the targeted countries. Abdenur and Neto (2014), for instance, argue that Brazil assumed the role of a region-builder towards the South Atlantic, while expanding such kind of initiatives. However, despite comprising a valid representation of the dynamics at play, the conceptual terms of such a classification lack benchmarks for sufficient validation. Moreover, its geographic limits can prove difficult to determine.

The use of the regional security complex framework provides a more appropriate characterisation. Regional security complexes comprise a "very specific,

functionally type of region, which may or may not coincide with more general understandings of regions" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 48). Hence the option to highlight the securitisation procedures of national practitioners, which allows for more clear-cut criteria of what Brazilian efforts aimed at, throughout this period. Following the strategic guidelines issued, the South Atlantic scenario was 'constructed' as an area of interest to Brazil's national defence, thus justifying the need and the efforts to protect it from potential threats, in cohort with other partnering countries. Intense securitisation, in turn, generates intense flows of amity. As transatlantic defence cooperation initiatives increased, Brazil's intents were further substantiated by public calls to create a "good-will belt" that could bring every partner under a common thematic umbrella.

However, despite the usefulness of this model, it is important to note that the full evolution of the South Atlantic as a regional security complex is still unverifiable. Single countries, with larger material capabilities, can play a pivot role and drive the course of regional relations towards common outcomes. In this regard, Celso Amorim admits, "there is considerable interest in Africa. Now, shall we say, I think it needs a push, I think Brazil is one of the countries that has the conditions to give that push".[60] But the proactivity of a single country does not necessarily equate to the existence of an automatic regional dynamic. In other words, it cannot be stated that a regional security complex is already in place but rather that Brazil's envisioned goal of a collective South Atlantic fits such a concept. The following chapter seeks to explain the Brazilian reasoning in committing resources towards such an overall agenda.

[60] Interview with Celso Amorim, Minister of Defence of Brazil – Brasília, 15/03/2013.

Chapter IV
Geopolitical spill-over vs. Economic interests

Having traced the contours of Brazil's engagement with South Atlantic Africa in the defence domain and characterised its regional intent as a brewing regional security complex, it is essential to focus on the rationale behind such developments, namely what sparked the interest on such kind of endeavours. Whether more geopolitically or economically defined, explanations for Brazil's decision to invest resources across the ocean need to be unpacked. This chapter tests which of the two proposed hypotheses best substantiates the decision-making process of Brazilian authorities towards re-engaging with the South Atlantic and expanding its defence cooperation with African states.

IV.1. Geopolitical spill-over and the South Atlantic

Materialistic conceptions of international relations tend to perceive the origin of bilateral interactions as driven by the abidance of national interests, with each partner seeking to maximise its gains to the fullest. Asymmetries in power capabilities produce outcomes that reflect such a correlation of force within inters-state relations. In this balancing context, issues of signalling and credibility can dictate the success or failure of planned initiatives (e.g. Schelling, 1960). But misinterpretations over such signals can also generate a significant result by triggering a proportional response (e.g. Jervis, 1976). The interpretation of developments as threating or non-threating can prove key for the resort to reactive measures.

However, threat perception also implies taking into consideration the assimilation process by each intervening part. In such a relational dynamic, "threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in international crisis. When threat is not perceived, even in the face of objective evidence, there can be no mobilisation of defensive resources". On the other hand, identifying potential sources of threats does not equate to the validation of its envisioned purpose, for "threat[s] may be perceived, and countermeasures taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent" (Cohen, 1978: 93). Hence the focus on how Brazilian authorities came to absorb and react to international developments

concerning its South Atlantic aspirations but not on how threats effectively materialised.

While perceptions may condition the exercise of power, the priorities for its use as attributed by each state, are equally significant. Wider foreign policy agendas can reflect diverging goals in terms of international influence and may even vie to alter the status quo, in a reflection of a desired higher profile (e.g. Kahler, 2011; Burges, 2013; Narlikar, 2013). In Nel's formula, "unsatisfied" countries seek to pursue both redistribution and recognition as two distinct but related objectives. The former deals with attempts to both reform and benefit from existing institutional arrangements, in consonance with national and foreign interests. The latter, however, concerns the acknowledgement of states not only as full and equal members of the international society but also as "agents with distinct needs and interests that may or may not coincide with the presumed universal interests of established states" (Nel, 2010: 964-965). The Brazilian efforts taken to present South-South relations as an example of such dynamics finds echo in the specific case of ZOPACAS, when considering the South Atlantic scope.

The following sub-sections concentrate on evidencing the accumulative process that played a key-part in forming the context for Brazilian elites, thus producing a sequential effect in terms of devising and expanding defence cooperation initiatives with Africa. In other words, it is contended that a spill-over dynamic occurred amidst such developments. Bearing a self-reinforcing trait, each perceived threat bolstered the need for alternative multilateral responses, and each attempt to redistribute international power heightened the response to such threats. Brazil's perception of external threats and its foreign policy goals of redistribution of power and international recognition are thus analysed in greater depth.

IV.1.1 Perceptions of threats

The issue of Brazil's maritime resources and its connections with the interests of the U.S., the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept in association with the Atlantic debate, and the evolution of non-state threats alongside African shores, are explored in detail in the following sub-sections.

IV.1.1.1 Maritime resources and the U.S.

The origins of Brazil's discursive reconnection with the South Atlantic can be traced back to 2006, coinciding with the election of Lula da Silva for a second term. In that year, the first official discoveries of untapped energetic resources in the pre-salt region, between the shores of Espírito Santo and Santa Catarina states, were also made public. Additional testing in the following years would confirm the massive reserves that such area withheld, with estimates ranging up 1.6 trillion cubic meters of oil and natural gas. The potential revenues allowed the country to foresee its future energetic self-dependency as in reach. Faced with these developments, Brazilian authorities began to grant an increased focus to the security of installations in its nearby waters and beyond. The National Defence Strategy, for instance, determined the "proactive defence of the oil platforms" as one of the main goals for the Brazilian Navy (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 2008: 20). This growing awareness for maritime developments escalated when potential new threats started to be assimilated in the official narrative over the control, management and security of this area.

The U.S., in particular, assumed a new centrality as tensions flared up. The first episode emerged in 2008 with the reactivation of the 4th Fleet in the Atlantic. Inactive since 1950 after playing a crucial role in World War II, it was brought back into service, with the official purpose of increasing coordination amongst the different assets of the U.S. Navy in Latin America and providing security in international waters in light of such threats as terrorism and drug trafficking. In practice, it amounted to the reorganisation of the logistical means already at the disposal of the U.S. South Command (USSOUTHCOM) (Maclay et al., 2009). Brazil, however, perceived it differently. Given the timing of the announcement and the previously apparent U.S. neglect of regional affairs, the reactivation was seen as inherently linked to the discoveries in the pre-salt, thus prompting a series of public declarations that exhibited national concern. In a recollection of his first reaction to such news, Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim conceded on its non-novelty but pointed the threatening trait to Brazilian interests:

> "*It was more rhetorical because it already existed. What happened was a mere administrative relocation.* (…) *I understood that the supposed creation of the 4th Fleet was nothing new, everything already existed, and it was a simple administrative issue. But the Americans committed a mistake, a political mistake.*

> [SOUTHCOM's Commander Admiral] *Stavidris invited me for a meeting and during his exposition over the 4th Fleet, he used a map to show the intended area of operations with a typical American-thing, small red boxes, which surrounded Brazil. And I said: 'do you want to know my opinion? You are surrounding us! I don't know what the intention is but you better change it*".[61]

In public, however, Jobim's remarks illustrated a far more heighted level of distrust over the U.S. The official discourse not only reinforced Brazil's sovereignty claims over its maritime territories but also displayed an explicit warning to undesirable intrusions:

> "*They may act in areas not under Brazilian jurisdiction. Here* [in Brazil]*, they do not enter. (...)* [The 4th Fleet] *will only enter if authorised by us and for friendly visits, but it will absolutely not supervise the Brazilian area. We are the ones who oversee it. (...) I hope others do not worry about my things. Who has to worry about things in Brazil, is Brazil*" (Gaier, 2008).

But even after a change in office in Washington D.C with the election of Barack Obama and subsequent pledges by U.S. officials that the 4th Fleet was not a direct threat to South American countries or its natural resources (e.g. Sobel, 2008), the issue continued to be brought up. Moreover, Brazilian officials actively used South American multilateral institutions to express their position and garner support for regional condemnation. In 2008, for instance, two representatives of the Brazilian delegation to MERCOSUL's Parliament, Aloizio Mercadante and Inácio Arruda, authored a declaration approved in plenary session by all participating countries, stating that "the reactivation of the United States Navy 4th Fleet is considered entirely unnecessary and inopportune given the current global and regional circumstances" (Parlamento do Mercosul, 2008a: 2). On the other hand, an association was also made between the previously announced pre-salt discoveries and the range of action of the 4th Fleet. As Lula da Silva emphasised:

[61] Interview with Nelson Jobim, former-Minister of Defence of Brazil – 13/10/2014, São Paulo, Brazil.

> "*At some point, we'll have to talk to President Obama, because we have already sent a letter when it was still President Bush over the issue of the 4th Fleet. We sent a letter saying that we did not see with good eyes the idea of the 4th Fleet because it seems to me that its territorial line is almost on top of our pre-salt, pre-salt layer, where major discoveries of oil reserves were made*" (Warth, 2009).

This concern with the country's oil reserves was further enhanced by the U.S.'s continuing non-ratification of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As the sole international framework that could provide Brazil with formal assurances that its energetic and economic interests in the Atlantic would be legally safeguarded, the continuing non-commitment by the U.S. managed to stoke further suspicions. A related kind of assurances had been sough backt in 2004, when Brazil filed a case before the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) arguing it should be allowed to expand the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles up to 350 miles, under UNCLOS's Article 76. This extension would add an additional 953.525 km² to the area under its direct control. Much of the technical work required had already been carried out through the *Plano de Levantamento da Plataforma Continental Brasileira* (LEPLAC – Brazilian Continental Shelf Survey Plan), on-going since 1989. Moreover, Brazil was in the process of securing rights over underwater iron, manganese and cobalt reserved in the oceanic area by means of the *Programa de Prospecção e Exploração de Recursos Minerais da Área Internacional do Atlântico Sul e Equatorial* (PROAREA – Program for the Prospection and Exploration of the Mineral Resources in the International Area of the South and Equatorial Atlantic).[62]

Lula da Silva brought all these variables into question when making the connections between the pre-salt discoveries, the 4th Fleet announcement, the need to reinvest in maritime defence capabilities and the uncertainty over the recognition of any seabed rights Brazil might bolster:

[62] On December 2013, Brazil presented a proposal to the UN-led International Seabed Authority (ISBA) for the mineral exploration of a 3,000-km2 area in the international waters of the South Atlantic, using the data collected under PROAREA. On July 2014, ISBA granted Brazil with a 15-year permission to explore the resources within that area.

> "*The Navy plays an important part in protecting our pre-salt, because men are already there with the 4th Fleet almost on top of the pre-salt. So, our Navy has to be the guardian of our platforms at high-sea to monitor this heritage because shortly thereafter comes a wise guy and says: 'That's mine, it's at the bottom of sea, nobody knows, it's mine'*" (Silva, 2008).

These doubts were aggravated after the CLCS' first decision in 2007 did not fully meet Brazil's claim. Of the total area in question, the CLCS did not agree with 190,000 km² or roughly 20% of the original Brazilian proposal. This triggered a political reaction. While awaiting the conclusion of a new formal submission, the *Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos Marítimos* (CIRM – Inter-ministerial Commission for the Resources of the Sea) issued a resolution in 2010, announcing that regardless of the lack of definition over the outer limits of the country's continental platform, Brazil had the right to pre-assess applications for authorisation to conduct research on that area beyond the 200 nautical miles limits, based on the proposal forwarded to the CLCS in 2004 (Silva, 2013: 116).[63] This unilateral move was seen as a pre-emptive action against outside cravings. A perception only reinforced by the fact that, despite being a state not involved or affected by the delimitation of Brazil's boundaries, the U.S. had been the only country to deliver a *note verbale* questioning the merits of the Brazilian submission to CLCS.[64] As Nelson Jobim noted in 2010, this position hampered any possible discussions:

> "*How can we talk about the South Atlantic with a country that does not recognise the* [legal] *titles referred to by the UN? The Atlantic spoken there is*

[63] The same official line was adopted by Brazilian Navy in the 2014 guidelines: "Regarding UNCLOS, the Brazilian government understands that the Convention's dispositions do not authorise other states to conduct exercises or military manoeuvres in the EEZ, in particular those that imply the use of weapons or explosives without the consent of the coastal state, inasmuch as the Brazilian government understands that, according to the Convention's dispositions, the coastal state has in the EEZ and in the continental shelf, the exclusive right to construct, authorise and regulate the construction, operation and use of all kinds of installations and structures, with no exception, whatever their nature or purpose" (Brasil, Marinha do Brasil, 2014: 13).

[64] Aside from the complex process regarding the Antarctic Treaty, this was only the second time in the CLCS's history that a non-affected country intervened. The U.S. pointed differences between the data included in Brazil's executive summary and data available from public sources as well as discrepancies in the terms used. The CLCS responded by noting that it only considered communications from states with opposite or adjacent coasts that have unresolved land or maritime disputes. It opted to disregard the U.S. comments in its entirety (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2004: 3-4).

the one that goes up to the Brazilian coast or the one that goes up to 350 miles off the Brazilian coast?" (Antunes, 2010).

Legal concerns aside, the politicisation of this issue was evident as arguments evolved into a circular discursive mechanism, meant to preferentially draw public attention and garner support for a brewing national project of engagement with Brazil's own maritime space. In that sense, potential threats to the control and exploration of that same area were crafted as rally points that expressed the range of Brazil's interests both at an internal and external level, regardless of their feasibility.

IV.1.1.2. NATO and the Atlantic debate

The public positions manifested towards the U.S., however, would be overshadowed by Brazil's misgivings over NATO's intentions for the region and the African continent as a whole. The first case to arouse concern coincided with Brazil's reconnected interest for the South Atlantic. On June 15-28 2006, the organisation carried out the Steadfast Jaguar exercise in Cape Verde. It involved over 7,000 military personnel, the largest deployment of NATO's Response Force at a strategic distance from mainland Europe. This demonstration of force and projection of operational capabilities produced repercussions in the assessments being made across the Atlantic. For instance, in the following year, during the confirmation hearings in Congress for her new post in Praia, Brazilian Ambassador to Cape Verde Maria Dulce Barros cited such exercise as one of the reasons why Africa was so high on the agenda and why Brazil did so well to pursue reinforced ties with local countries:

"*NATO conducts exercises on African soil with increasing frequency and with more regularity* [in light of] *the privileged situation, from a strategic and geographic point of view, of the African continent.* (…) *So Brazil is correct, in my opinion, to pursue this policy, which as I said is not new, but needs to be intensified, because we are not alone in this pursuit of privileged partnerships*".[65]

[65] Transcript of Confirmation Hearing for Ambassador Maria Dulce Silva Barros before the *Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional* (CREDN – National Defence and External Relations Commission) of the Federal Senate of Brazil – 13/02/2007, Brasília, Brazil.

Coinciding with NATO's forays into Africa, international interest for regional dynamics surged and new proposals to address and re-conceptualise the Atlantic multiplied. The first public attempt occurred on June 12-13 2009, when Spanish Minister of External Relations Miguel Ángel Moratinos sought to gather 12 South Atlantic countries in the island of Lanzarote, Canaries. The goal was to discuss the problems of the region, promote new articulations between the North and the South and create the so-called South Atlantic Initiative.[66] According to former Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relation, Luis Amado, the Brazilian position was already in evidence at the time.

> "*Brazil's concern was not simply 'move over', to discard any process of dialogue. It was merely to affirm first a leadership in a region where Brazil has responsibilities that come from its own geopolitical reality. In that sense, as long as that process does not develop, it is natural that Brazil won't be available for any other kind of initiatives.* (…) *It was possible to observe the sensitivity lines of each actor in that meeting* [in Lanzarote]".[67]

As analysed in greater depth by former Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Relations and Cooperation, João Gomes Cravinho:

> "*Brazil, and Celso Amorim, had a very strong reaction. I recall Celso Amorim saying: 'I will agree to that on the day you invite Brazil to attend geostrategic reflections over the Mediterranean'.* (…) *There was this rather utopian posture from Spain but there was also a formal clash with the sovereign positions associated with Brazil's power projection, or what Brazil imagined its power projection capabilities in the Atlantic to be*".[68]

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[66] Argentina, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Portugal sent their respective Ministers of Foreign Relations, while Uruguay sent its Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations. Ambassador-ranking emissaries represented Angola, Brazil and France. Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa and Venezuela were invited but did not attend.

[67] Interview with Luis Amado, former-Minister of Foreign Relations of Portugal – 21/10/2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

[68] Interview with João Gomes Cravinho, former-Secretary of State for Foreign Relations and Cooperation of Portugal – 14/09/2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

The low-level emissary sent to Lanzarote signalled the level of interest and priority that Brazil was willing to attribute to such kind of initiatives in an area that was already attracting an increasing focus by its own authorities. Official reactions, on the other hand, varied from institutional indifference to outright hostility. As Celso Amorim recalls:

> "*I said clearly to my then-Spanish counterpart, 'what would you think of me now starting a group to study defence in the Gulf of Biscay* [northern Spanish coast]*, led by Brazil and South Africa? Would you find that amusing?' So I think we cannot simply follow other initiatives, we have to have our own, we have to present alternatives, and do things*".[69]

Regional susceptibilities were further aggravated as NATO prepared to review and update its Strategic Concept, whose process of approval coincided with the organisation's summit in Lisbon, on 19-20 November 2010. Under former-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, a group of experts was convened with the purpose of laying the ground for what would become the latest guidelines to steer the course of action of NATO in years ahead. Following the Lanzarote initiative, Portuguese authorities played an active part in trying to make the organisation look southwards, while emphasising Lusophone linkages and how they could be translated into a more effective cooperation geographic triangle (Seabra, 2015: 340-341). The goal was to convince "NATO, as a global security actor and provider, to establish collaborations and find partners in the South Atlantic, particularly with countries in Latin America and through the bridges that they are establishing with Africa", in order to face growing non-stately threats rising from the Maghreb and Gulf of Guinea regions.[70]

Meanwhile, civil society contributions, floating such concepts as "Atlantic Rim" or "Atlantic Basin", gained considerable traction in foreign policy circles (Hamilton et al., 2009; Hamilton & Burwell, 2010; Lesser, 2010). A similar thread could be found in terms of building upon years of past transatlantic cooperative ties under the NATO institutional umbrella and seeking common ground for future joint

[69] Interview with Celso Amorim, Minister of Defence of Brazil – 15/05/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

[70] Interview with Augusto Santos Silva, former-Minister of Defence of Portugal – 10/09/2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

interaction. More prominently, energy issues and the need "to erase the historic line dividing the North and South Atlantic" topped the agenda (Hamilton & Burwell, 2010: 68). NATO's new Strategic Concept, however, failed to inscribe any direct or indirect mention to the South Atlantic *per se* in its final version, thus rebutting any underlined intents of theses approaches.

Throughout this process and in line with initial reservations over foreign insertions in the South Atlantic region, Brazil adopted a vocal stance that underscored its national position. The first main official declaration came through Nelson Jobim, when attending a conference in Lisbon on September 10th:

> "*I see with reservations initiatives that seek to somehow associate the 'North Atlantic' to the 'South Atlantic' – this one, the 'South', a geostrategic area of vital interest to Brazil. Security issues related to the two halves of this ocean are noticeably different. The same is true about a hypothetical 'Central Atlantic'. Such questions deserve different answers - as more efficient and legitimate as they less involve organisations or states foreign to the region*" (Jobim, 2010).

Soon afterwards, Jobim conveyed the same message during a five-day visit to the U.S., starting on October 17th, where he attended a closed meeting at John Hopkins University's Centre for Transatlantic Relations, the institution co-responsible for the bulk of the "Atlantic Basin" academic line of work. With the presence of ambassadors to the U.S. from France, Spain, Portugal, Angola and two other African countries, the meeting sought to readdress the Atlantic limits amidst NATO's debate over its future guidelines:

> "*As everything in the U.S., it all starts out as an academic discussion. The military don't take the initiative; it always starts out as a survey of sorts.* (…) *John Hopkins University invited me to a close meeting to discuss such issue. I knew what it was about, to discuss the fate of the Atlantic, a common Atlantic policy*. (…) *I said: 'There is this preliminary issue that I am having trouble addressing, because I don't really know what you are talking about.* (…) *Given that the U.S. did not ratify UNCLOS, international waters for the U.S. includes the Bay of Guanabara* [off Rio de Janeiro]*, and therefore it is difficult to*

> *understand if you are talking about that or if it is about something else. Before you define what you understand to be the Atlantic, I ask, is the LEPLAC project respected in your view? I saw no reference to that. What are the decisions over exploration in the Economic Exclusive Zones? The U.S. doesn't recognise that. As such, I cannot discuss anything about this issue now. Only after' – and then I pointed to* [U.S. Ambassador to the UN John] *Negroponte – 'only after Ambassador Negroponte here secures a decision by the U.S. Senate'* [to ratify UNCLOS]".[71]

This stance would be again on display on November 3rd, in Rio de Janeiro, where Nelson Jobim renewed his criticism of the U.S. and an alleged proposal of "shared sovereignties over the Atlantic". At the time, he warned, "neither Brazil or South America could accept that the Americans or NATO claimed any right to intervene in every theatre of operations, under the most varied pretexts" (Antunes, 2010). Finally, at the CPLP's XII Ministers of Defence meeting in Brasília, on 10-11 November and on the eve of NATO's summit in Lisbon, Jobim summarised Brazil's position in his prepared remarks. As transcribed in the collective final declaration:

> [The Brazilian Minister of Defence] "*Underlined the concern with delimiting the extent of the 'area'* [of the continental shelf] *in the South Atlantic, given that the non-delimitation of the continental shelf of the African partners could make it legally feasible for other states to obtain rights for commercial exploitation of resources located in this zone, no doubt already attracted by its immense potential. The concern is justified by the rise in the North Atlantic of new concepts such as 'Atlantic Basin', 'shared sovereignty', and concrete policy actions such as the South Atlantic Initiative and the new strategic concept of the North Atlantic Organisation (NATO).* [He also] *Noted that the South Atlantic has particular characteristics, among which stands out being an area free of nuclear weapons. Then stressed the importance of preserving the current environment of peace and stability, without the interference of foreign powers to the region*" (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, 2010).

[71] Interview with Nelson Jobim, former-Minister of Defence of Brazil – 13/10/2014, São Paulo, Brazil.

Seeking to further express its stance on the matter and project it in wider international stages, Brazil used CPLP was a resonance incubator for its official discourse. Still, subsequent developments helped to tone down overall concerns. As recalled by then Portuguese Minister of Defence, Augusto Santos Silva, during the abovementioned meeting:

> "*The concept was* [about to be] *approved and Minister Jobim was still fearful that the intention* [of a formal mention to the South Atlantic] *would still be there.* (…) *I remember clearly that right during the first session, I made a presentation about NATO* [Strategic Concept's] *proceedings, with the purpose of precisely explaining that there was no cause for concern and, shall we say, put some minds to ease, specially from my peers of the two most relevant Lusophone countries, military-speaking, Brazil and Mozambique. I recall, clearly, that the feeling of the meeting was of a certain relief*".[72]

At this point, however, Brazil's position over what such kind of outside actors could bring to the regional equation had already been made clear. On the other hand, the inauguration of Dilma Rousseff in 2011 contradicted the notion that such issue was circumscribed to Lula da Silva's government. On August 2013, then-Minister of External Relations Antônio Patriota took the opportunity of an open debate at the UN to demonstrate that previous interpretations of the South Atlantic security reality continued to retain its appeal and validity for Brazilian authorities:

> "*We are concerned that NATO is seeking partnerships outside of its area of defensive action, far beyond the North Atlantic, including in regions of peace, democracy, social inclusion and that don't admit the existence in its territory of arms of mass destruction. It would be extremely serious for the future of the relationship between the spheres of regional and global peace, as envisaged by the UN, if groups of countries start to unilaterally define its sphere of operations beyond the territories of its members*" (Patriota, 2013a).

[72] Interview with Augusto Santos Silva, former-Minister of Defence of Portugal – 10/09/2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

Likewise, as revised proposals over the conceptualisation of the Atlantic as a whole continued to emerge in subsequent years under different formats (e.g. Hamilton, 2014), Brazil continued to stress its diverging view on the subject and reaffirm that the South Atlantic should not be absorbed by a political-academic debate. The fact that the point of origin of such a debate was perceived as being designed and fuelled by Northern actors incited particular distrust. Already as Minister of Defence, Celso Amorim elaborated on the continuing geographic distinction:

> "*In recent years, there have been frequent attempts to 'subsume' the South Atlantic into a more general 'Atlantic issue". But this is incorrect. The South Atlantic, from a political rather than strictly geographic perspective, is a distinct reality and we are interested in keeping it so. The South Atlantic is neatly different from the North Atlantic, the arena of a military alliance, and is characterised, among other factors, by the presence of nuclear weapons. We can respect other initiatives, and nothing prevents us from cooperating with other countries, but we should bear in mind the very clear notion that the South Atlantic – just like South America – constitutes a specific reality, different from others*" (Amorim, 2014b: 7-8).

From a Brazilian point of view, the rationale remained consistent throughout this period of time. To engage with extra-regional proposals would imply undermining the intended centrality of Brazil in the evolving South Atlantic dynamics and add undesired third parties to the equation, be that on a singular and/or collective basis. Public suspicions over the true intentions for the region of these potential players thus retained a central prominence amidst Brazilian policymaking over the South Atlantic.

IV.1.1.3. Non-state actors and Africa's security context

While NATO and the U.S. attracted the bulk of Brazil's focus in the initial stages of its renewed South Atlantic drive, other factors began to be more accounted in later years. In part, that adjustment reflected the change at the helm of Brazil's Defence Ministry, where Celso Amorim replaced Nelson Jobim on August 2011. Even though the latter played an undisputed role in bringing up the Brazilian

government and public opinion's awareness over South Atlantic dynamics, it would be left to the former to add a more cooperative trait to the official discourse, in tune with growing international security concerns for this area.

The issue of piracy, for instance, climbed up in the agenda as it became more violent and organised around the Gulf of Guinea and West African waters, promptly labelled as the "new danger zone" (International Crisis Group, 2012). Countries like Nigeria, Benin and Togo became the main targets of these attacks with local pirates deriving their income more from oil theft than from ransoms of captured crewmembers, in a stark contrast to their Somali counterparts.[73] Taking advantage of poor maritime surveillance and still-incipient regional cooperation, piracy spiked while associated with other criminal activities. This reality found new echo in Brazil's justification for cooperating abroad in the defence domain. When analysing ties with Cape Verde, Celso Amorim confirmed:

> [Any] "*cooperation we can provide to Cape Verde, especially when it comes to surveillance of their maritime environment, will not be just a gesture of solidarity with a brother country; it will also attend to our own interest in combating crime and piracy in areas not too far from our own jurisdictional waters*" (Amorim, 2012b: 9).

This reasoning did not necessarily comprise a novelty but began to be inserted more prominently in every major Brazilian cooperative endeavour in the South Atlantic, during Dilma Rousseff's first term. The extensive relationship with Namibia, for instance, started to publically evidence such unease over non-stately threats. As Brazilian Ambassador to Namibia Ana Maria Fernandes noted in 2012:

> [The Brazilian training] "*of Namibia's Navy will provide it with the capacity to police its waters with respect to piracy, drug trafficking, arms trafficking.* (…)

[73] Records of both committed and attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery indicated the following incidents: 23 in 2005; 31 in 2006; 60 in 2007; 50 in 2008; 46 in 2009; 47 in 2010; 61 in 2011; 64 in 2012; 54 in 2013; and 41 in 2014. These attacks occurred in an area comprised by Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, and Togo (International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau, 2015: 5).

So that concern exists, in the sense of policing their coasts. And again, the Brazilian partnership is an important instrument to them".[74]

Piracy, however, was not the sole issue of concern. The unrest after the fall of Muammar Gadhafi in Libya and the spread of the activities of such groups as the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine or the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa culminated in the structural disarray of Mali. In particular, it demonstrated how the regional context could quickly unravel. In this regard, Amorim elaborated during a public hearing in the Senate:

"*That is not an abstract thing. We are talking of situations – and I am not referring specifically to near-unpredictable issues –, I am really referring to situations in the world that are getting closer to Brazil. When there was the crisis in Libya, I remember of commenting, during a conference I gave, that our concern was that kind of situation started to move down. And indeed, it reached Mali, which is already a country bordering others in West Africa. West Africa is an area of interest to Brazil for several reasons.* (…) *So we have to be aware of such threats.* (…) *I repeat, I feel slightly concerned with West Africa's own situation, which seemed limited to a certain number or, shall we say, to a certain geographic area, but which has now expanded. That, surely, could have an impact on Brazilian interests*" (Amorim 2013: 6, 54).

Transatlantic drug trafficking flows also continued to figure high as a threat. While taking advantage of local weaknesses in African countries such as deficient controls at ports, poor inspection equipment, porous land and sea borders and endemic corruption, South American drug cartels targeted Atlantic waters as preferable transit routes for European markets. Major trafficking flows were established between producing countries like Bolivia, Colombia or Peru and intermediary destinations like Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau or Nigeria, on their way to the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain or the UK (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). On the other hand, the international spotlight also grew on how

[74] Transcript of Confirmation Hearing for Ambassador Ana Maria Sampaio Fernandes before CREDN – 18/10/2012, Brasília, Brazil.

"linguistic ties (…) play a role in cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe via Brazil, Portugal and Lusophone countries in Africa" (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013: 43). Guinea-Bissau, for instance, comprised a frequent hotspot with its exposure to drug trafficking routes. Given the considerable efforts allocated to the country referred in Chapter III, former-Brazilian Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau Jorge Geraldo Kadri was explicit on why local drug trafficking constituted a security issue to Brazil:

> "*What worries more, not only the U.S. who have already stated, but also the EU, which in the end is the final consumer, also worries Brazil. Why? Of all the drugs that go through the Gulf of Guinea, in the case of Guinea-Bissau, 60% come from Brazil. Not that it is produced in Brazil, but circulates through Brazil and from here goes there. (...) So, one way or the other, Brazil is involved in this*".[75]

Such kind of threats, in turn, was considered to be conductive to greater stately instability in the region. The case of Guinea-Bissau remains illustrative due to the row of destabilising coups that the country faced since independence. Couple with structural political debilities and military unrest, conditions were further aggravated by the presence of international drug traffickers (e.g. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). But what concerned Brazil was also the possibility that worst-case scenarios could open the door to outside interventions that did not factor Brazilian input or interests. As evident in Brazilian Ambassador to Bissau Fernando Apparicio da Silva's statement:

> "*Africans know, deep down, that Brazil may be the country that, outside of Africa, better understands Africa. So they want the presence of Brazil. And Guinea-Bissau is at the entrance of the South Atlantic, is one of the entrance gates to the South Atlantic. So a stable Guinea-Bissau is very important because instability in that country may even serve as a pretext for the entry of troops*

[75] Transcript of Confirmation Hearing for Ambassador Jorge Geraldo Kadri before CREDN – 13/12/2007, Brasília, Brazil.

from other regions. And we want a South Atlantic free of troops from other regions: a South Atlantic as a zone of peace".[76]

While reflecting a growing trend of escalation of the security risks in Atlantic waters and nearby African shores, issues such as piracy or drug trafficking evidence linkages to developments or structural fragilities present in the state apparatuses of many African countries. Connections between risks ashore and offshore can thus be made. Such potential threats, ranging from institutional to national and non-stately origins, were factored into Brazil's strategic interpretation of the regional surroundings. That was manifest in public interventions and in the subsequent political use of such developments. By displaying increased levels of official appreciation over the near surroundings and the possible action of external actors within its limits, Brazil sought to pre-emptively exclude participation or interferences that did not cognate to its overall agenda. Moreover, as the rhetorical confrontation with the U.S. and NATO subsided in later years, it was complemented by a generalised concern over the unfolding of Africa's security scenario on multiple levels. Even if with different gradations of intensity over time, a series of possible security threats intersected in terms of contributing to raise the awareness for the risk they entailed for Brazil's interests in Africa and in the South Atlantic.

IV.1.2. Foreign policy goals

Amidst regional calculations, it is important to take into consideration Brazil's wider foreign policy agenda. Despite the generic designation, it vies to encompass the wider range of action of Brazil's foreign policy and its use of the observable South-South relations with the African continent, including with South Atlantic countries. The goals of redistribution of power and international recognition, as expressed in the political investment attributed to the revitalisation of ZOPACAS, receive particular focus.

[76] Transcript of Confirmation Hearing for Ambassador Fernando Apparicio da Silva before CREDN – 08/12/2011, Brasília, Brazil. The concern over extra-regional interventions in Africa was also expressed by Dilma Rousseff when commenting the situation in Mali: "The fight against terrorism cannot itself violate human rights nor rekindle any temptations, including former colonial temptations" (Flor & Marcello, 2014).

IV.1.2.1 Redistribution

In order to achieve fairer redistribution in the international system, multiple strategies are available to emerging powers. Affecting the process and distributional outcomes of global governance comprises one possibility. In this regard, Brazil proved considerably active from 2003-onwards. Lula da Silva's foreign policy included brokering a number of alliances where Southern votes were fundamental for Brazil's external goals. Likewise, the design, creation and development of several multilateral projects remained a constant. The wider campaign for a Brazilian seat in the UNSC and the institutionalisation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum comprise two examples, already referred in Chapter I. However, the rationale sustaining these various efforts was not exempt from challenges. Any Southern concerted effort was contingent not only to each participating member's unmitigated support but also on the respective pushback of the previous structures and countries, whose leadership was being questioned (Lima & Hirst, 2006: 27).

In this context, devising or reenergising new platforms in which Brazil could secure better distributional outcomes, not only for itself but also for its partners among the developing and equally unrepresented world, became a valid option. The discursive formation of the South Atlantic as a regional entity was no exception to this redistributive emphasis, and more so when regarding the prime example of Brazil's intention to institutionalise regional security dynamics, namely ZOPACAS. Its centrality in Brazil's overall overtures towards the African continent was evident:

> "*There was an adjustment of foreign policy in the transition for the Lula government, a greater focus on South-South relations and to Africa in particular. And in the context of construction and rediscovery of mechanisms of cooperation with African countries, ZOPACAS emerged as something that already existed and that was worth investing in and developing further*".[77]

Created in 1986 by UNGA Resolution 41/11, this intergovernmental forum was originally formed with the purpose of maintaining the region free of weapons of mass-destruction. Opportunities for cooperation in common security and defence-related matters as well as in transatlantic maritime issues topped the workload during

[77] Interview with Marcelo Viegas, Head of the United Nations Division, Ministry of External Relations of Brazil – 17/06/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

its early stages. However, a period of significant institutional hibernation followed until June 18-19 2007, when the VI Ministerial Meeting of member states took place in Luanda, Angola, following considerable Brazilian backstage support.[78] In consonance with Brazil's agenda, the dispositions agreed reflected the changes felt and demanded at a global scale. That is inferred from the Final Declarations of the Luanda and Montevideo Ministerial Meetings in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Extensive references, for instance, to the need for the reform of the UNSC (2007: 31; 2013: 16), the completion of the Doha round trade talks (2007: 22; 2013: 65, 66), the revision of the international financial architecture (2013: 17) or even climate change negotiations and the future of the Kyoto Protocol (2007: 12; 2013: 87, 88) were repeatedly conveyed in contrast to its non-existence in the previous declaration of Buenos Aires (1999).[79] In other words, the purpose of ZOPACAS expanded in order to include a vast list of pressing topics for like-minded nations in the Global South. While vying for the common goals of reform of global rules and institutions, ZOPACAS retained, but surpassed, its original core of concerns for the stability, security and peace of the South Atlantic. As agreed upon in Montevideo, the group should seek to evolve into:

> "(…) *a forum for the development of cooperation among its Member States in areas such as science and technology, education, capacity building, coastal surveillance, environment, defence, strengthening of national institutions, trade, sports, tourism, economy, communications, transport, culture and political dialogue*" (United Nations General Assembly, 2013: 3).

From a Brazilian perspective, these changes fitted with the South Atlantic notion that authorities had envisioned and allowed to justify the political capital and resources invested in ZOPACAS development as in tune with the foreign policy goal of international redistribution. As the former-head of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry's department that oversees the activities of ZOPACAS confirmed:

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[78] Brazil's participation in the VI Ministerial Meeting in Luanda is further addressed in Chapter V, Section V.2.1.1.

[79] The new variety of issues covered is also manifested in the length of the declarations. If by 1999 in Buenos Aires, the final declaration included a scarce 23 points, in Luanda that number expanded to 80 and afterwards, in Montevideo, to 124.

> "*It is a global approach, it is countries with which we also seek to concert our multilateral action, not only in terms of specific actions but also of the vision for a system in which countries less, or more or less disadvantaged, may act in a sovereign way, are adequately represented and respected in the international system. So, there are many commonalities that bring us together.*"[80]

These "commonalities", which included the desire to reshape/reform international governance structures, provided an opportunity for Brazil to grant a new policy impetus to ZOPACAS and frame its course of action not only within the overall struggle of the developing world but also within the activities of other Brazilian-backed projects. This was further evidenced by multiple cross-platform references during the same period. The praising of the work carried out by ZOPACAS in the final declarations of all three ASA summits (2006: 7; 2009: 21; 2013a: 19) or the proposals of recommendation to MERCOSUL, urging it to endorse the upgrade of ZOPACAS to a fully-fledged international organisation (Parlamento do Mercosul, 2008b), constitute two examples of such institutional intersection.

IV.1.2.2. Recognition

The relation of Brazil with ZOPACAS was also on display in terms of the recognition it craved for in the international system, and particularly the efforts taken to present Brazilian-led South-South relations as in a league of their own. The latter concept gained considerable traction during the PT governing years as a means to identify countries that could reap better outcomes by cooperating with each other and exploring similarities in their own national development processes, rather than resorting to established practices of the developed world. Expanded relations with the African continent came to epitomise this particular policy drive, while guided by the acknowledgment of "southern heterogeneity" and the need to come together as such (Lima & Hirst, 2006: 36). As Dilma Rousseff stated during the III ASA summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea:

[80] Interview with Glivânia Oliveira, Director of the Department for International Organisations, Ministry of External Relations of Brazil – 17/06/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

> "*We are gathered in one big common project. A project of growing closeness and shared goals. A partnership among equals, unlike what they did to us over several and several decades ago. A partnership among equals that is built in mutual respect, focused on the development and welfare of its people. A partnership that does not allow any off-the-record demands, any strange demands, which often do not attend the interests of our nations, in-between any relationship between our countries or our companies. Above all, we require a partnership focused on the development and welfare of our people that is only admissible if we all win*" (Rousseff, 2013a).

The common thread in such declarations was the stressing of the contrast between Southern nations and the 'rest', with a considerable gap of differences distinguishing them. More importantly, the transposition of this thematic into the South Atlantic was also visible in Brazil's interpretation of what ZOPACAS should stand for. To put it differently, ZOPACAS developed not necessarily by opposition to its outside surroundings but rather by congregating the distinctiveness of South-South relations and by inherence, of Brazilian interactions with Africa and with South Atlantic countries:

> "*I think ZOPACAS develops itself, in first place, through identification; it is the elements of shared identity that are at the base of this exercise. In a second moment, it is that identity or that way of seeing the world or having a goal for the region, and the world also respecting that region and that region seeking to act in a positive and constructive manner in the world*".[81]

ZOPACAS and the South Atlantic in-between were presented as a South-South sub-product. But also as an instrument that merited the appreciation of the international community for the gains achieved as a whole throughout the years, with particular focus on the maintenance of peace and exclusion of weapons of mass destruction, and the possibilities that joint cooperation entailed. When in Montevideo for VII Ministerial Meeting, Antônio Patriota was emphatic on the need to disseminate the notion of growing transatlantic identity links:

[81] Interview with Glivânia Oliveira, Director of the Department for International Organisations, Ministry of External Relations of Brazil – 17/06/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

> "*This meeting proves, once again, the commitment of African and South American countries to a South Atlantic identity. An identity that consolidates itself and takes on even greater importance in light of the transformations we observe in the international domain.* (…) *We have our own identity as a region, we are aware of it and we are proud of it. But that it is not enough. It is imperative that this identity, that is ours, has a visibility worldwide*" (Patriota, 2013b).

However, in order to achieve such a goal, it was required initiatives that could foster a sense of collectiveness. Hence, much as other integration projects in which it was involved (cf. Malamud & Castro, 2007), Brazil was faced with an expectation to assume its condition of leading regional paymaster. A first example of such predisposition can be found in terms of the logistical support granted to Uruguay for the organisation of the ministerial meeting. Aiming to secure the largest possible participation, the Brazilian Air Force provided transportation for African delegations to Montevideo, while using Senegal as a hub to collect African officials.

But more importantly, Brazil floated concrete cooperation opportunities on this occasion to each participating member. Firstly, possible Brazilian support over the delimitation of African continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles was put forward, in a bid to capitalise on the experience gained with LEPLAC. Secondly, preparation and training of specialised human resources was also offered, through the *Curso de Formação de Oficiais para Marinhas Amigas* (CFOMA – Officer Training Course for Friendly Navies) and the *Programa de Ensino Profissional Marítimo para Estrangeiros* (PEPME – Maritime Professional Education Programme for Foreigners), both with the support of ABC.[82] These arrangements were further reinforced after Brazil subsequently offered other 122 openings in training initiatives for officials from every ZOPACAS country.[83] Moreover, on November 2013, Brazil organised a training workshop on maritime search and rescue in Salvador, with the

[82] PEPME, however, was only made available to officials from Angola, Cape Verde, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe.

[83] These courses included such areas as: management and planning of the coastal and maritime zone; sustainable management of fisheries and aquaculture; transnational crime; organisation of services in tuberculosis control; and abiotic and biotic oceanography. However, until the end of 2014, none of the scheduled activities had taken place due to a lack of candidates from African countries.

country covering the total cost of R$ 594.458,95 for the participation of each member in the planned activities.

Thirdly, Brazilian officials envisioned the sharing of experiences, by means of the *Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil* (CCOPAB – Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre)[84] and of Brazil's ballast water management programme. Likewise, eventual participation in the *Centro de Dados Regionais-Sistema de Informações e Acompanhamento de Navios a Longa Distância* (CDRL–LRIT – Regional Data Centre-Long-Ranging Identification and Tracking) system was made available as a way to enhance maritime security and surveillance in the South Atlantic.[85] Finally, increased maritime domain awareness through joint navy exercises with African military forces was also brought up. The common theme to these proposals was straightforward: to increase the consciousness of a common South Atlantic, ideally structured around defence-related initiatives. As the flyer distributed in Montevideo by the delegation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence summarised:

> "*Expanding the opportunities for Cooperation under Defence between the Member States of the ZOPACAS is a Brazilian initiative with the vision of revitalising this regional mechanism and strengthening and deepening relations between Brazil and nations bordering the South Atlantic, in order to contribute to the stability and development of the region*".

The pursuit of redistribution and recognition was not an exclusive trait of Brazil's South Atlantic endeavours but rather part of a wider foreign policy agenda that substantiated the country's international course during the period in analysis. South Atlantic regional dynamics in general and ZOPACAS resurgence in particular, were inflated by an official discourse based on such dual goals. By infusing the revitalisation of ZOPACAS as part of a larger South-South drive, Brazil was able to position such a forum as both evidence of changing international dynamics and confirmation of the need for a renewed multilateral format. The development of this

[84] A second joint seminar on the planning, management and execution of peacekeeping operations, also organised by Brazil, was expected to take place in 2014 but was postponed indefinitely.

[85] On July 2015, Namibia became the first African country to join CDRL-LRIT.

specific venue was achieved by both underlining the exclusion of outside partners and promoting common identity traits around a 'South Atlanticist' ideal. However, at the same time as ZOPACAS was brought back from institutional hibernations, Brazil also sought to tie such a process to the disbursement of new defence cooperation initiatives that could simultaneously incite greater cohesiveness and affirms its status as the leading country in the area.

IV.2 Economic interests and the South Atlantic

In a globalised world, mutual economic gains are subjacent to coordination amongst public and private actors. In fact, the relation is often bidirectional: "internationally competitive producers favour liberalisation [and] all other things being equal, governments favour the benefits from increased exports" (Moravcsik, 1998: 38). But foreign economic agendas are also influenced by international factors, as different strategic and security goals may dictate the preference for either more outwards or inwards polices (e.g. Holsti, 1986). When alliances are explicitly linked to economic cooperation, it is possible to expect increased economic exchanges together with greater coordination in security policies (Long & Leeds, 2006). How a governments designs and tries to implement a coherent strategy to increment its economic and trade presence abroad, can thus be driven with more ulterior motives in the background. For instance, allies may have strategic motivations to invest on trade contacts given that trade might also increase the envisioned power of the partnership (Gowa & Mansfield, 2004). Such kind of contingencies, in turn, produces consequences in terms of the resources allocated and facilities dispensed to create the necessary conditions for bilateral growth. In other words, specific material incentives are given in order to foment such relations.

On the other hand, economic interests can also reflect effective pressuring efforts from local producers. These private actors can stimulate governments towards making new overtures for the export of national products while displaying a preference for partners that are deemed more politically in tune with their home country. Such public-private proximity derives from the fact that "when firms feel secure that conflict between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states will work together to promote commerce between their

respective businesses, they are more likely to invest in trade" (Long & Leeds, 2006: 435). But when security issues are taken into consideration, it is possible to single out the interests of national defence industries within the wider private sector. Much as the remaining sector, they primarily vie for profit. Indeed, "domestic armaments producers seek no general social goals; as firms, they engage instead in strategic behaviour aimed at maximising their private gain" (Moravcsik, 1993b: 132). Still, the intersection between the operations of such companies and national strategic guidelines is also considerably close. As they consider a country's preferences of partners, they enlist national officials to assist making inroads and secure new market opportunities, thus achieving the desired profit as well as a correspondence with wider political orientations. This dynamic is even more on display when considering private defence contractors, with public stakes in its shareholding structures.

The following sub-section focuses on identifying the preference for South Atlantic economic interactions as a part of an overall African interest, as justification for its strategic elevation in terms of Brazil's defence priorities. The analysis is divided between Brazil's industrial and trade agenda towards Africa and the interests of the private sector, particularly the defence industry, amidst overall African forays.

IV.2.1. Industrial and trade agenda

With the inauguration of Lula da Silva's government in 2003, multiple different ministries, agencies and other institutional actors began to engage with Africa at the same time as Brazil's economic interest in the continent expanded. The first attempt to coordinate such actions, however, only surfaced in 2008, under the formal umbrella of the country's *Política de Desenvolvimento Produtivo* (PDP – Productive Development Policy). In this context, and as the public agency traditionally in charge of handling and executing the government's industrial agenda, the *Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial* (ABDI – Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development) was entrusted with the responsibility for the *Programa Integração com a África* (PIA – Program Integration with Africa).

In its essence, PIA comprised an inter-governmental attempt to increase Brazil-Africa trade relations and expand Brazil's institutional presence in the continent. It combined 'soft coordination' in terms of public and institutional actors

engaged in Africa with support for the implementation of industrial development projects throughout the continent. Three main goals guided its actions: to support the (1) increase of trade flows between Brazil and Africa; the (2) increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) by Brazilian companies in Africa; and the (3) intensification of technical cooperation initiatives. Afterwards, concrete measures were also designed in three specific areas, namely, cooperation and transfer of knowledge, financing and investment promotion, and foreign trade promotion. The range of the latter two was extensive as it foresaw increasing Brazilian exports to Angola, creating and strengthening new lines of foreign trade financing, promoting FDI in Africa, promoting events and fairs to expand transatlantic trade, and strengthening trade by small and medium enterprises in the IBSA context, amongst other items (Brasil, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, 2008; Brasil, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, 2009). Above all, PIA sought to conciliate economic interests with political goals, while seeking to project a "non-predatory stance" towards African countries and open up new opportunities for Brazilian exports and companies.[86]

Its results, however, were mixed. On one hand, it allowed for an initial degree of governmental cooperation between Brazilian actors while identifying new opportunities and a possible subsequent agenda for further efforts. On the other hand, it showcased existing institutional challenges and limits in terms of the capabilities of Brazilian to act abroad and with other external partners. Furthermore, the lack of ABDI's capacity to continue to answer to the growing demands from Africa as well as the bureaucratic turf wars between APEX, ABC and the *Câmara de Comércio Exterior* (CAMEX – Foreign Trade Chamber), dictated the end of PIA in 2011.

But the original purpose of intergovernmental coordination would be later semi-absorbed by *Plano Brasil Maior*, the follow-up to PDP under Dilma Rousseff's government. Following her visit to Angola, Mozambique and South Africa on October 2011, she dictated the creation of a new inter-ministerial working group to try and coordinate existing initiatives towards Africa. The first meetings began to take place unofficially under the supervision of the *Casa Civil da Presidência da República* (Office of the Chief of Staff of the Presidency) but would be eventually

[86] Interview with Manager, ABDI – 16/05/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

formalised in April 2012. While embedded in the wider structure of CAMEX and, by inherence, of MDIC, the African offshoot of the *Grupo Técnico de Estudos Estratégicos de Comércio Exterior* (GTEX – Technical Group for Foreign Trade Strategic Studies) was created.

Composed by representatives of every Ministry that takes part in CAMEX's Council of Ministers, the GTEX-Africa also included BNDES and APEX as "permanent guests".[87] It began its activities under the assumption that "the main point of the relationship [with Africa] is truly trade. From thereon, a lot of things go together, but trade is central". Hence, its main goal consisted in seeking better coordination in terms of policies and initiatives towards Africa, with a special focus on exports and trade relations. Overall, it sought "to bring together the interests of the private sector companies, interests of Brazil's foreign policy, of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, interests of the Brazilian exporter, of the internal Brazilian industry. All of that has to be considered in order to devise a common strategy".[88] The option to centre on Africa alone proved instrumental:

> "*I would highlight GTEX-Africa as the biggest development in terms of coordination within the Brazilian government, for a more effective action in Africa. It became evident* (…) *that several ministries were developing their own initiatives in a less coordinated fashion and, therefore without reaping the best possible outcome.* (…) *The meeting of ministers was the opportunity to present the results of the technical group and for the definition of some concrete actions, but with the instruction of the President of the Republic that the ministers* [gathered] *at CAMEX should focus on Africa. That is, to adopt a geographic snip, when in reality CAMEX's approach is thematic, it is not geographic. For*

[87] GTEX members include representatives from MDIC, *Casa Civil*, Itamaraty, *Ministério da Fazenda* (Ministry of Finance), *Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento* (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply), *Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão* (Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management) and *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário* (Ministry of Agrarian Development). Moreover, whenever it chooses to, GTEX can invite other public or private entities to participate in its working meetings (Brasil, Câmara de Comércio Exterior, 2012: 3).

[88] Interview with Adviser, CAMEX/GTEX-Africa – 16/05/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

the first time, CAMEX adopted, it gathered under one geographic focus and that focus was on Africa".[89]

CAMEX's institutional reach also included sub-governmental structures directly or indirectly linked to Brazil's foreign trade promotion. More specifically, it oversaw the *Comitê de Financiamento e Garantia das Exportações* (COFIG – Financing and Export Guarantee Committee), the body in charge of regulating and monitoring the operations of the *Programa de Financiamento às Exportações* (PROEX – Exports Financing Program) as well as the *Fundo de Garantia à Exportação* (FGE - Exports Guarantee Fund). To put it differently, control over the parameters and conditions for the totality of Brazil's financial exports assistance was concentrated in CAMEX during Dilma Rousseff's first tenure. This confirmed its weight amidst the Brazilian governing framework.

Taking into consideration such attempts in governmental planning and coordination, concrete examples that underscore the preference for South Atlantic countries within the wider African context can be found. More specifically, when the focus turns to the evolution of the different Brazilian export financing mechanisms and how budgetary resources were geographically assigned over the years. In this context, the role of BNDES proved central. Despite lacking hierarchic subordination in relation to CAMEX, BNDES remained in direct dependency of MDIC and was an active participant of CAMEX and GTEX-Africa's meetings and agenda. This is relevant given that the "very own definition of a policy towards Africa ends up being constructed in such kind of forums".[90] Reflecting such permeability, the bank not only created a new sub-directorate in April 2013 to oversee Latin American and Africa operations but also ended up opening, later in that year, its first office in the African continent, namely in Johannesburg, South Africa. The underlined purpose was straightforward: "to fill up not only the gap in BNDES's knowledge over Africa but also in Africa's knowledge of BNDES".[91]

[89] Interview with Tatiana Prazeres, Secretary of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil – Brasília, 21/06/2013.

[90] Interview with Foreign Trade Manager, BNDES – 24/05/2013, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

[91] Interview with Manager, BNDES Africa – 27/05/2014, Johannesburg, South Africa.

These changes came in consonance with a redesign of the bank's overall purpose as it increased its support for the internationalisation of domestic producers, with a concentration of the disbursements in a few large recipients. More importantly, specific credit lines were issued for a limited number of countries, including Angola. Even though previous research demonstrated that "actual disbursements to foreign governments have been considerably lower than the credit lines Lula often announced with a flourish" (Hochstetler & Montero, 2013: 1494), the numbers reported were still considerable. In 2012, for instance, media reports indicated the signing of yet another US$ 2 billion credit line to Angola (Portal Brasil, 2012). Moreover, on February 2014, BNDES signed a memorandum of understanding with *Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola* (BDA – Angolan Development Bank) to improve the exchange of information between the two institutions. Following calls for greater transparency, data over BNDES contracts for civil constructions abroad was released. Figure X demonstrates the weight of Angola in Brazilian disbursements overseas:

Figure X – BNDES funding for Brazilian services of civil construction in Angola (2007-2014)



Source: BNDES / systematised by the author[92]

[92] Data concerning funding contracts signed in 2010 was unavailable at the time of this analysis, hence the exclusion of the year from the graphic representation.

Between 2007 and 2014, a total of US$ 3.490.938.491,82 funded the contracts of Angolan public entities with Brazilian companies for the execution of engineering and construction work, with a peak of US$ 756.924.353,15 in 2011. But if this example only highlights one single country in the South Atlantic, the case of the BNDES-EXIM credit line warrants mention amidst the bank's portfolio.[93] In terms of post-shipment disbursements, the main destinations in Africa were chiefly focused on the South Atlantic countries. Between 2005 and 2014, and apart from the US$ 109.704 to Mozambique, a total of US$ 3.467.813 was contracted, with Angola holding again the primacy (US$ 3.346.564), followed by Ghana (US$ 66.754), South Africa (US$ 43.355) and Equatorial Guinea (US$ 11.140).

Meanwhile, an additional instrument used to promote Brazilian exports abroad confirms a similar geographic display. The case of PROEX is illustrative. Overseen by *Banco do Brasil*, through delegation by CAMEX, it can be divided between two different modalities: PROEX-Financing and PROEX-Equalisation.[94]

[93] BNDES-EXIM credit lines are divided between pre-shipment (finances the production of internationally competitive companies established under Brazilian law) and post-shipment (finances the trade of goods and services abroad by refinancing the exporter, or through the buyer's credit category, in accordance with international standards).

[94] In the PROEX-Financing modality, loans are given by BNDES directly to exporters or foreign buyers while in PROEX-Equalisation, banks or financial institutions provide loans to exporters or importer of Brazilian goods and services. In the latter case, PROEX pays part of the financial expenses, in order to equalise the differences between Brazilian and foreign interest rates.

Figure XI - PROEX-Financing to Africa (2002-2014)



Source: CAMEX / systematised by the author

As observed in Figure XI, amounts attributed to companies doing business with South Atlantic African countries (US$ 1.039.629.092,64) overshadowed any funding for the remaining continent until 2014. On the other hand, the declining values over the years are explained by a preference for the use of PROEX-Equalisation line, which reflects an identical trend:

Figure XII - PROEX-Equalisation to Africa (2002-2014)



Source: CAMEX / systematised by the author

Between 2003 and 2014, of the US$ 295.937.633,74 attributed under this credit line, US$ 267.895.845,7 concerned exports to South Atlantic countries. Even though variations in both cases over the years are dependent on additional contracts with Angola, both figures signal a common trend over the years in terms of geographic preferences concerning Africa.

Finally, a third instrument of interest concerns FGE, whose daily management was delegated by CAMEX on the *Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais* (SAIN – Department of International Affairs) of the Ministry of Finance and which provides coverage to the operations involving the *Seguro de Crédito à Exportação* (SCE - Export Credit Insurance).[95] SCE is responsible for insuring Brazilian exports from commercial, political and unforeseen risks that might affect financial and economic transactions, made under credit export operations. Its pattern of distribution followed similar regional lines in terms of Africa, as shown in Figure XIII. Between 2003 and 2013, a total of 100 promises of guarantee and 87 certificates of guarantee were

[95] SCE/FGE only supports post-shipment credit exports operations with over two years' duration. Amidst *Brasil Maior*'s action plan, was also included FGE's overhaul in order to better attend to demands regarding countries normally branded as of considerable credit risk, namely in Africa. The pursuit of such goal was assigned to GTEX-Africa/CAMEX (Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial, 2014: 18).

issued to South Atlantic African countries, while the remaining continent only witnessed 7 promises of guarantee and one certificate of guarantee.

Figure XIII – SCE Promises of Guarantee and Certificates of Guarantee issued to exports to Africa (2003-2013)



Source: data gathered under Law for Information Access n. 12527 / systematised by the author

It is also important to note the obstacles standing in the way of greater disbursements under the abovementioned exports mechanisms. The case of debts by African countries to Brazil, for instance, comprises a recurrent issue. Past debts, mostly originated in the 1970s, often withheld BNDES from opening further credits lines due to legal imperatives. Meanwhile, responsibility for its resolution continued to reside with the *Comitê de Avaliação de Créditos ao Exterior* (COMACE – Foreign Credit Evaluation Committee), under the SAIN/Ministry of Finance.[96] Regardless, as Lula da Silva took office in 2003, debt pardons and/or renegotiations began to be announced at the same time as new economic overtures were made towards Africa.[97] In this context, between 2003 and 2014,over US$ 1.2 billion were pardoned or

[96] SAIN is also a statutory member of CAMEX's Executive Management Committee (Brasil, Câmara de Comércio Exterior, 2005: 15).

[97] During Lula da Silva's two terms, the following pardons were concluded: US$ 331.7 million with Mozambique in 2005; US$ 152 million with Nigeria in 2006; and US$ 3.9 million with Cape Verde in 2010.

restructured during the period of analysis. But in this case, as shown in Figure XIV, the largeste ammounts pardoned were concentraded on non-South Atlantic countries (US$ 725.6 million).

Figure XIV – Brazilian debt pardons and renegotiations with Africa (2003-2014)



Source: Senado Federal / systematised by the author[98]

Figure XIV, however, misrepresents the geographic evolution during the later stages of the analysed period. In fact, the amounts announced by Dilma Rousseff in May 2013 paint a different picture in terms of South Atlantic relevance. On this occasion, it was unveiled a package of US$ 795.4 million, ranging from full pardons to selected restructuring of payments. Of such total, US$ 401.6 million (51%) were assigned to Congo Brazzaville (US$ 352.7 million), the DRC (US$ 4.8 million), Gabon (US$ 24.1 million), Côte d'Ivoire (US$ 9 million), São Tomé and Principe (US$ 4.3 million), and Senegal (US$ 6.7 million).[99] The provision of financial relief

[98] Despite included in the 2013 announcement, formal proceedings concerning Mauritania, Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau had not reached the Brazilian Senate by the end of 2014 and were not included in this exercise.

[99] Those amounts were announced together with the US$ 394 million regarding other African countries that were part of the same package, including Sudan (US$ 43.6 million), Tanzania (US$ 237 million) and Zambia (US$ 113.42 million).

followed indications taken within CAMEX to heighten Brazil's profile abroad and reduce the bureaucratic hurdles in the way of increased trade ties.

> "*It became evident that the indebtedness capacity of states in Africa was an impediment to the growth of trade, because it complicated* [public] *funding. It was also identified that old debts were important obstacles for those countries to be able to regain their funding capacity. So there was that decision* [in CAMEX] *to pardon the debts of a group of countries*".[100]

The underlined rationale behind these developments was also on display, when Dilma Rousseff argued:

> "*The purpose of that* [debt pardon] *negotiation is as follows: if I can't establish such negotiation, I can't have relations with them, both from an investment point of view, of financing Brazilian companies in African countries, and in terms of trade relations that add greater aggregated valued.* (…) *So, it's a double edge: it benefits the African country and benefits Brazil*" (BBC Brasil, 2013).

It is noticeable the evolution in the architecture of Brazil's set of mechanisms for exports promotion and its facilitating measures over the years. Based on a cross-governmental coordination, whose origins can be traced back to the first PT government, only after 2011 did it achieve concrete results by means of the institutional centrality attributed to CAMEX. Following a general political will to expand the economic stake of Brazil in Africa, the country's resources and bureaucracies began to be reassigned and reformulated in order to reflect new priorities in the continent. Specifically, such outward mechanisms were tailored to the point of reflecting more intensely an emphasis on South Atlantic countries. This, in turn, increased the value of such partners for Brazil, who increasingly deemed them as of strategic interest. But measuring the effectiveness of this approach also requires

[100] Interview with Tatiana Prazeres, Secretary of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil – Brasília, 21/06/2013.

unpacking how private-led actors benefited or took advantage from such arrangements.

IV.2.2 Private sector interest

The internationalisation of the Brazilian private sector surged relatively late. A favourable international context, the end of the 1990's economic instability and the *Real*'s subsequent valorisation, produced propitious conditions for external expansion. In culmination, the volume of Brazilian FDI overcame foreign investments in the country in 2006, for the first time ever. But an account of Brazilian FDI and its regional distribution is not exempt of risks. Despite the annual exercises carried out by *Banco Central do Brasil* (Central Bank of Brazil), Austria, Cayman Islands, the Netherlands and the British Virgin Islands often dominate the top destinations, which raises suspicions over the final destination for Brazilian money abroad and whether such countries serve as laundering intermediary stops for other operations. Hence, reliable considerations over Brazil's FDI in Africa are difficult to attain.[101] On the other hand, private-led attempts portrait a bleak picture. According to an Ernest & Young survey, for instance, Brazilian investors have lagged behind in Africa, when in comparison with other international competitors. Despite a 10.7% growth of FDI towards African countries between 2007 and 2011, between 2003 and 2011 Brazilian efforts only accounted for 0.7% of total foreign investment in the continent (Ernest & Young, 2012: 33).

An alternative source to assess Brazil's private sector interest in Africa can be found in the rankings of internationalisation compiled by *Fundação Dom Cabral*.[102] The level of regional dispersion of the sample of companies analysed was taken into account and provides a barometer of private engagement with different parts of the world, including Africa. An accentuated spike in recent years is exhibited in Figure XV:

[101] Since 2007 onwards, Angola is the only African country listed as a main destination for Brazilian FDI, often accounting for 0.1% of total assets abroad. In 2012 and 2013, however, it spiked to US$ 1.027 million (0.4%) and US$ 1.392 million (0.5%), respectively.

[102] The ranking is calculated through a combination of three indicators, including the ratio between international and total assets, the ratio between profits of subsidiaries and total profits, and the ratio between the number of employees abroad and the total number of employees.

Figure XV - Regional dispersion of Brazilian multinationals towards Africa (2006-2013)



Source: Fundação Dom Cabral / systematised by the author

Growing private involvement with Africa was in tune with Brazil's official desire to diversify trade linkages. Given that the main "challenge was the tremendous difficulty of gaining entry to either European or North American markets for value-added products such as capital goods, consumer durables or simple manufactured goods", "Africa and the rest of Latin America were the obvious alternative markets" to invest on (Burges, 2013: 583). But in light of the wide scope associated with overall Brazilian private sector presence in Africa, some limitation is required. The focus is thus drawn towards a concrete industry, namely the country's defence sector and its exporting dynamics. Given the inter-state nature of is business opportunities, which makes "commercial and technological dealings between firms subject to political conditionings", defence sector actors are often dependent on state incentives to grow, both internally and externally (Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial, 2010: 7).

In the Brazilian case, with Lula's government, the sector was met with a new official dynamic. In 2005, for instance, the Defence Ministry created the *Comissão Militar da Indústria de Defesa* (CMID – Military Commission for the Defence Industry) and issued a new *Política Nacional da Indústria de Defesa* (PNID – Defence Industry National Policy), both with the dual aim of fostering greater

dialogue between the public and private sector and establish guidelines for an industry growth. The PDP industrial policy in 2008, the follow-up *Plano Brasil Maior* in 2011, and Law 12.598 (Brasil, Presidência da República, 2012) completed the formal framework and provided additional incentives and assurances for national producers of defence products (Moraes, 2012: 7-8).[103] Moreover, Brazilian strategic orientations such as the National Defence Policy and the National Defence Strategy, already mentioned in Chapter III, placed the revitalisation of the Brazilian defence industry as one of the cornerstones of the country's new defence priorities.

Underlined in these official efforts, was the incitement for the private sector to increase their exports and investments overseas. As Dilma Rousseff stated: "we don't want to produce [defence products] only to Brazil. We are aware that our capability of being competitive is based on the fact of being able to export" (Agência Brasil, 2011). The potential of African markets was no exception as it was growingly acknowledged that "Brazil can be a great option for Africa and Africa can be a great option for the Brazilian defence industry".[104] Facing potentially reducing orders from traditional buyers due to contingencies of the international crisis, the African continent turned into a coveted market.

Specialised industry federations, in particular, exercised significant influence in raising new business opportunities. Within the *Federação das Indústrias do Estado de S. Paulo* (FIESP – São Paulo State Industries Federation), the *Departamento da Indústria da Defesa* (COMDEFESA – Department of Defence Industries), was responsible for accompanying the sector and lobbying in favour of greater governmental support for its growth and expansion. Additionally, it helped opening up new opportunities abroad by facilitating contacts with foreign delegations.

> "*Whenever a delegation from Nigeria arrives to FIESP, there is always someone from COMDEFESA who has to be present, because they will certainly*

[103] Law 12.598 established special norms for the purchase, hiring and development of defence systems and products while providing a framework of incentives to the expansion of the Brazilian defence industry.

[104] Interview with Vice-Admiral Carlos Pierantoni Gambôa, Executive Vice-President, ABIMDE – 29/05/2013, São Paulo, Brazil.

make questions about defence. There is a lot of demand for either defence products or information over [Brazil's] *defence industry*".[105]

The interest of African countries on the Brazilian defence industry was already taken into account in 2009. At the time, COMDEFESA identified Angola, Namibia and South Africa (together with Tunisia and Zimbabwe) as the main African countries in which Brazilian defence companies should be given further support to expand into (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de S. Paulo-COMDEFESA, 2009: 5). On the other hand, the *Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Materiais de Defesa e Segurança* (ABIMDE – Brazilian Association of Defence and Security Industries) functioned as an additional pressure group. In essence, it followed the same methods and adopted the same goals as COMDEFESA in attracting and networking with foreign dignitaries. As recalled by one of its directors:

"*We have a lot of cooperation with Ghana, we received here Ghana's Minister of Defence who told me: I spent 40 years in Ghana's Army looking only to my right* [to the North]*, not once looking in front and now I see that in front of me* [in Brazil]*, I have several options which I can work with*".[106]

Following a close working relation since 2006, ABIMDE signed a protocol with APEX worth US$ 1.5 million on September 2012, aiming to further promote national defence and security products in international fairs. In this context, Ghana, Angola and Namibia were identified as the three main priority markets in Africa (Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos, 2012).[107] Data regarding the sale of Brazilian smalls arms and ammunitions, as evidenced by Figure XVI, corroborates the South Atlantic emphasis on African destinations:

[105] Interview with Anastácio Katsanos, Director, FIESP/COMDEFESA – 28/05/2013, São Paulo, Brazil.

[106] Interview with Vice-Admiral Carlos Pierantoni Gambôa, Executive Vice-President, ABIMDE – 29/05/2013, São Paulo, Brazil.

[107] It should be noted that APEX's own priority markets in Sub-Saharan Africa included Angola, Nigeria, South Africa and Mozambique (Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimento, 2013: 34-41).

Figure XVI - Exports of Brazilian small arms, ammunitions and spare parts to Africa (2003-2014)



Source: MDIC-AliceWeb / systematised by the author

Between 2003 and 2014, a total of US$ 20.929.543 in small arms, ammunitions and related spare parts was sold to Sub-Saharan Africa, US$ 10.912.906 (51%) of which, to South Atlantic countries. Despite the 2003 and 2013 spikes, which concerned one-time deals with Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso respectively, the South Atlantic received a constant emphasis over the years, particularly from 2008 onwards.

But much as in the past, the geographic preferences of the private sector were also assisted by governmental structures.[108] A case of overt support can be found in terms of the official trade missions to Sub-Saharan Africa, where a South Atlantic inclination was again evident. Between 2008 and 2014, 7 official trade missions were organised by MDIC or APEX, sometimes to multiple countries. In this group, Angola, Nigeria and South Africa received more than one visit. More importantly, defence firms demonstrated their share of interest as they participated either individually (like in the trade mission to Southern Africa, in November 2009) or collectively (through

[108] The push of the Brazilian private sector into Africa during the 1970s and the 1980s was done under the guise of the government's import substitution strategy (Santana, 2003a: 127). Moreover, Brazil's first ever trade mission to Africa in 1973, also took 37 private sector representatives to Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Zaire (DRC), with Libya comprising the non-South Atlantic outlier (Santana, 2003b: 528).

ABIMDE in the trade mission to Ghana in June 2009, for instance). But the success of such initiatives remained dependent on tight contacts with public officials, in terms of how to best enter into new markets and consolidate previous ones. In other words, "the political edge in a commercial defence negotiation is extremely important".[109] Factors such as the need for high-level security clearances, response to international competition and the management of constrains and preferences from armed forces hierarchies need to be taken into account. State officials thus emerge as indispensable amidst these prospective processes.

This kind of close public-private interactions were put on display during Celso Amorim's trip to Angola and Namibia on February 2013, as he was accompanied by representatives of 12 different Brazilian defence companies, including EMBRAER, Condor, Schmid Telecom, Avibras, Agrale, Andrade Gutierrez, Taurus, Odebrecht, EMGEPRON, CBC, VBR and H2Life. Such public support for Brazilian exporters heralded its first results when Namibian authorities went ahead with an extensive purchase of 141 Marrua military utility vehicles from Brazilian manufacturer Agrale.

On the other hand, the Brazilian diplomatic network and defence attachés stationed in Africa also played a part in fomenting overall private sector interest. As indicated in Chapter III, such network is predominantly present in South Atlantic countries, including Angola, Cape Verde, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa. Their work intensified after the ban over the promotion of Brazilian defence products was lifted in 2006. In fact, with the publication of Normative Decree n. 586, one of the strategic actions for the implementation of PNID included training "future Brazilian military attachés as for the promotion of the national defence product, as well as to institutionalise the support that they may provide to the initiatives of the Industrial Defence Base businessmen, in the countries which they are accredited to" (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 2006).

These permanent representatives, in turn, paved the way for the larger deals accounted for in Chapter III, and which increased in both value and scope regarding Africa. EMGEPRON, for instance, saw its international profile rise as it contracted and delivered three vessels to Namibia. For its part, EMBRAER aggressively promoted its A-29 Super Tucano aircraft in Africa. On the other hand, the

[109] Interview with Manager, EMBRAER – 17/06/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

development of the A-DARTER air-to-air missile between the Brazilian Air Force and South African Denel Dynamics since 2006 onwards, enlisted the participation of Mectron (owned by Odebrecht Defesa & Tecnologia), Opto Electrônica and Avibras as the main Brazilian private actors involved.[110]

But a more practical example of intersections between public and private interests can be found in Brazilian-Senegalese relations. Over the years, the latter withheld a debt of US$ 6.2 million. But in March 2013, Brazilian Congress approved a full pardon, including the cancellation of US$ 3 million and the restructuring of the remaining US$ 3.6 million. This decision produced an immediate consequence. The following May, during the LAAD exhibition in Rio de Janeiro, Senegalese Minister of Defence Augustine Tine formalised the acquisition of three EMBRAER A-29 Super Tucano aircraft for US$ 67 million. Moreover, two patrol vessels were commissioned to EMGEPRON, at the cost of US$ 53 million. The package was covered by a credit loan of US$ 120 million provided by BNDES, who was now legally allowed to provide such kind of financial support once the debt pardon was formalised.

A final factor that helped driving the rekindled interest for defence opportunities in Africa was the perceived challenge by Chinese competitors. As they vied for the same markets and contracts as Brazilian companies, concern increase over the possible loss of lucrative opportunities and the need for a more consistent approach. In this regard, the reactions of the private sector were unanimous as the case of Namibia exemplified. Following an intense defence partnership with Brazil since 1994, Namibia opted in 2011 to purchase a new logistical support vessel, the NS Elephant, to China instead of choosing a Brazilian contractor, as local industry observers expected (Abdenur, 2015: 7-8).

> "*Basically, China is expanding in the whole world, and in the African case, it has very little limitations to its entrance. I mean, when China arrives to do business in Africa, is with a cheap, simple and uncomplicated product, without bureaucracy.* (…) *I think Brazil has an image, not of Chinese aggressiveness, but of a country that doesn't look for a fight, doesn't create conflict, doesn't generate controversy and when it develops a product, it is able to deliver, and it*

[110] The latter project is further addressed in greater detail in Chapter V, Section V.1.2.3.

has quality and everything else. It is not state of the art as the Americans or Europeans but it accomplishes what it promises. That is the feedback we are getting from African countries. (…) *Namibia turned to China, bought a Chinese vessel and now must be deeply disappointed with the Chinese product. That's why they always come back to Brazil*".[111]

"*The Namibians told us, the last time that they were here, that I think 90% of their Navy speaks Portuguese and that they were keen on putting Portuguese in the children's curriculum at schools. Such is our influence over there. But one of the threats that we have, the whole world has, is China. So China donated a vessel to Namibia. We are very curious given the quality of the vessel and the logistics of the maintenance of the vessel, we are very curious about that*".[112]

"*We understand China's aggressiveness. In Namibia, for example, when I was talking with the Minister of Defence, I said,* [Brazil] *'is setting up Namibia's Naval Marines corps…what about the Air Force, would you like any kind of* [Brazilian] *cooperation?'. And he said, 'No, China has already offered, they already gave us twelve training aircrafts for free'. But then each spare part costs a plane.* (…) *Now they have most of the planes grounded*".[113]

The recognition that China was a strong competitor in this specific market was generalised. But despite such setbacks, Brazil's response was to publically reinforce its collaborative traits in the continent while remaining confident on the long-term perspective of its inroads in Africa. In other words, in order to counterbalance China in Africa, Brazilian officials presented their products as a more reliable alternative, while trying to both avoid falling in the same pitfalls as their competitors and step in to complement third-party deals, if so required.

"*Look, China is set to become a global power, there's nothing that Brazil can do to prevent that from happening. Nor am I saying that we would like that to*

[111] Interview with Anastácio Katsanos, Director, FIESP/COMDEFESA – 28/05/2013, São Paulo, Brazil.

[112] Interview with Admiral Walter da Silva, Administrative-Financial Director, EMGEPRON – Rio de Janeiro, 23/05/2013.

[113] Interview with Vice-Admiral Carlos Pierantoni Gambôa, Executive Vice-President, ABIMDE – 29/05/2013, São Paulo, Brazil.

> *happen because we have a relation, a strategic partnership with China, with good results. Now, what I think is that we need to publicise our presence and I think that helps Africans a lot, I will tell you candidly. Not only with the help we provide but also by the fact that when we provide such help, it raises the standards of their requirements in relation to other countries, which is good for Africans. And that happens in several sectors, it will surely happen in the military sector. Inclusively, we don't have that much prejudice. For example, in Namibia, they recently bought a big Chinese vessel.* (…) *I'm not going to say 'oh no, I will only help* [with maintenance] *if you buy Brazilian', it's not like that. I think you need vision and with time, I think they will see the difference, the quality* [of the product]*, that for some things it is possible to keep purchasing in other places, for others they can purchase here* [in Brazil]".[114]

As Brazilian strategic interests towards the South Atlantic expanded, so did the lobbying of the private sector, keen on finding new markets for their respective products. After Dilma Rousseff took office, the agenda of public officials and the country's reenergised defence industry became more interchangeable while intersecting in the direct proportion of new opportunities in Africa. Encouraged by a new legal framework and rallied by competition from China, the Brazilian defence industry revamped its exporting strategy and sought to accompany a general insertion in Africa with more concrete defence-related initiatives. In that sense, Brazilian authorities came to assume such economic goals as critical enough to integrate them in the wider defence cooperation agenda towards the South Atlantic.

IV.3. Chapter summary

This chapter tested two competing, albeit not mutually exclusive, hypotheses that could explain Brazil's overtures in the South Atlantic during the PT governments. Attempts to trace a decision-making process concerning defence issues, from both a geopolitical and economic perspective, were met with grey areas, where the lines between economic, political and military interests intersect. Linkages between all areas were as frequent as illusive.

[114] Interview with Celso Amorim, Minister of Defence of Brazil – 15/05/2013, Brasília, Brazil.

But in terms of the economic rationale for the strategic importance of the South Atlantic, the case of Brazilian-Senegalese interactions, as described above, is illustrative of intense public and private interactions. Such proximity was only possible due to an increased use of every public instrument available to promote and incite such kind of relations. This example is reflexive of a two-level process. On one hand, (1) CAMEX rose to a supervision position of every major governmental support program towards Africa, with particular emphasis on trade promotion, keen on bringing order and expand the existing roaster of initiatives. More importantly, as evidenced by the data provided, government-oriented financial and trade initiatives came to follow sub-regional lines along the South Atlantic in terms of Africa. On the other hand, (2) Brazilian private companies willingly followed its country's lead and took advantage of the facilities made available during this period. Their internationalisation towards the continent and the use of multiple credit lines for that purpose comprises additional corroboration. The national defence industry, in particular, found considerable opportunities for growth by narrowing its focus and concentrating on the same countries targeted by Brazilian authorities.

However, despite these developments, two caveats impair the uncontested centrality of economic interests amidst the country's decision-making towards the South Atlantic. First, economic opportunities are often associated with long-term prospects, both in terms of feasibility and profitability. But in this case, it is evident the economy did not figure high amidst official discourse and planning during the first years of Brazil's South Atlantic forays. Instead, its importance only surged after 2011 with Dilma Rousseff already in office and following new attempts to centralise and coordinate the country's foreign economic policy. Likewise, in 2006 the defence industry was not yet in a position to look outwards, much less to Africa. Its influence over Brazilian strategic calculations was limited or prospective at best.

Secondly, even if "clear existential threats arise from (…) economic issues, they do so because of their impact on other sectors rather than their impact within the economic sector itself" (Buzan et al., 1998: 105). In other words, developments in the economic realm are more likely to influence outcomes in other domains rather than constituting a security problem *per se* and comprising leitmotivs for defence cooperation initiatives. In fact, throughout this period, Brazilian trade interests in the

South Atlantic were never cut off from the remaining national policies and could not be dissociated from a wider strategic agenda:

> "*I would say, from my point of view as Minister of Defence, maybe for having passed through the Ministry of Foreign Relations, I think that the fact of us exporting, the most important thing to me is the strategic side, is having a strategic relation with those countries. (...) My vision is more strategic than commercial. Naturally, one feeds the other. But for me, trade should be seen as a means of strategy, rather than strategy as a means of trade. If I could sum up well enough.*"[115]

This leads to conclude that, even if increasing in later years, economy and trade considerations were subdued by wider geopolitical concerns. The latter elements can be regarded as more influential in the early stages of Brazil's reconnection with South Atlantic dynamics and of continuing relevance in the later years. The predominance of the surrounding geopolitical context is synthesised by Celso Amorim, who points to the concrete causes for increasing Brazil's defence cooperation footprint in the South Atlantic:

> "*You have got threats, like piracy, like drug trafficking, eventually terrorism, and you have got contrary actions to these [threats], all this creating a geopolitical framework in which we have to have a greater presence, because there is no use in getting there and saying, 'I don't want NATO to be here'*".[116]

Following this rationale, two factors can be distinguished. On one hand, (1) perceptions of threats, whether associated with the country's newfound resources or originated in deep historical suspicions of external powers, were interpreted as warnings to Brazil's interests and credibility as a pivot leader to the formative region. Such understanding heightened the urgency to increase its presence and position itself as an aggregating regional pole. On the other hand, (2) the envisioned formation of a

[115] Interview with Celso Amorim, Minister of Defence of Brazil – 15/05/2013, Brasilia, Brazil.

[116] Ibid.

South Atlantic around a reenergised ZOPACAS, benefited from a thematic South-South contextualisation that not only reinforced the forum's *raison d'être* amidst a demanding part of the international community but also opened new areas to extend its range of action, and therefore gain added visibility as a grouping in-the-making. More importantly, it provided an overarching framework to begin providing defence cooperation initiatives to African partners under a collective format. It is thus possible to understand Brazil's stated vision for the South Atlantic as primarily driven by the sensitivity to security developments in its maritime boundaries and contingent to its overall international agenda. Meanwhile the expansion of a transatlantic economic agenda played a secondary role but assumed a larger and instrumental purpose from Dilma Rousseff's inauguration onwards. This interpretation helps to devise a hierarchy of the drivers that fuelled the defence cooperation drive while better apprehending and explaining Brazil's national preference to look eastwards.

The case made in this chapter highlights the permeability of Brazilian policymakers to outside factors and cross-sectional issues, when regarding the South Atlantic. It also provides a self-reinforcing geopolitical narrative that explains both Brazil's initiatives in this area and the reactions to developments that affect it, through a spill-over dynamic. Such emphasis on geopolitical traits posits that Brazil's decision-making was considerably reactive to external developments and subjacent to foreign policy dictums. The original hypothesis is deemed confirmed, albeit if with an adjustment in terms of acknowledging how economic interests came to assume a greater significance in a later stage.

However, the account here presented does not take into consideration the positions and perceptions of the other involved parts, i.e. African states in the South Atlantic. Although Brazil retained an undisputed leading role throughout this process, it leads to question if the same type of conclusions can be drawn from an African point of view. The following chapter focuses on three cases studies in order to ascertain such a query.

Chapter V

Tacit bargaining: material factors vs. social factors

With the scope of Brazilian motivations towards the South Atlantic defined, it is important to provide a complementary view that reflects the other side of this equation, namely, the interests of African countries. Faced with continuing security problems, both ashore and inland, the continent often warranted the focus, and sometimes even intervention, of multiple external players over the course of its contemporary history (Taylor & Williams, 2004; Taylor, 2010). But even though "African countries in their individual and collective capacities are increasingly active, assertive and confident players on the world stage", "little attention is being paid to [their] actual and potential bargaining strategies and strategic capabilities" (Vickers, 2013: 675). Indeed, when faced with a wide array of possible external partners for cooperation, vying amongst each other for increased influence and regional insertion, African countries do not necessarily remain passive and can be motivated to bargain and seek out specific incentives in order to sort the lot of outside assistance at their disposal (United Nations, Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2010: 37). Such kind of exchanges can dispense with formalisation in order to take place and instead rely on consecutive patterns of behaviour as a means to achieve the desired cooperative *status quo*. The bargaining process may therefore assume a tacit format and become complementary to the central relation without necessarily equating to formally binding outcomes.

The same tenets apply to the specific case of defence cooperation. Even though it falls far from a zero-sum game and recipient countries frequently juggle one partner against the other, it is generated an expectation of an additional 'carrot'/promise/incentive in return for the decision between one offer of cooperation to the detriment of alternative ones (cf. Schelling, 1960). If defence cooperation relations with each Africa country are taken as individual units of analysis, it must be uncovered what kind of additional incentives, be that more materially-based or socially-informed, played a part in consonance with the provision of external defence expertise. In other words, the respective trade-off, if ever was any, throughout the conception and development of such relations needs to be specified.

In this context, pinpointing potential linkages between defence interests and other issue areas amidst Brazilian-African relations requires casting a wider net of additional elements that may have contributed to pave the way for the targeted cooperation drive. I contend that a set of material resources played a larger role than social factors towards that end. While portraying bilateral dealings in an alternative but wholesome format, this chapter seeks to draw out tacit bargaining traits through which Angola, Namibia and South Africa engaged with Brazil as a privileged defence partner in the South Atlantic.

V.1 Material factors

The two following sub-sections uncover which particular material element assumed a tacit bargaining chip role in conjunction with Brazilian defence overtures during the same period. Countries that gain the most are expected to also offer the most according to their respective material capabilities. The provision of tangible commitments can pave the way for results in different issue areas whenever deemed of equal or similar worth to recipient countries. Two sub-sets of dynamics are identified and analysed in greater depth, namely the level of support at a multilateral level and the provision of technical-scientific cooperation, between Brazil and the three indicated case-studies.

V.1.1 Multilateral support

Traditional notions of defence cooperation tend to exult the connections with international high-politics. The providers of this kind of cooperation often seek "political advantage in exchange for military aid. It obligates by implication, the recipient towards the giver. The latter expects the former to abstain from a political course, which might put in jeopardy the continuation of military aid. Military aid is really here in the nature of a bribe" (Morgenthau, 1962: 303). The disbursement of cooperation can therefore generate expectations of alignment or, at the very least, close consultation in sensitive political issues. As already demonstrated in the literature, international platforms come across as the ideal stages for such trading interactions (e.g. Lundborg, 1998; Dreher et al., 2008; Costa & Baccarini, 2014). Indeed, international "regimes deserve greater attention as forums for bargaining rather than primarily as

institutions that aid monitoring and enforcement" (Fearon, 1998: 298) given that material benefits can be handed out in exchange for a more or less favourable posture towards a specific issue. But the inverse rationale also holds true. If a recipient country possesses a considerable alternative 'supply' of cooperation partners at its disposal, it can, *ceteris paribus*, request additional benefits in exchange for the formalisation of a given relationship. That can take the form, for instance, of similar voting behaviour at such venues.

But in order to assess such *quid pro quo*, it is important to first point out how high up political contacts at a bilateral level reached during the indicated timeframe, as a precursory step to the eventual translation into the multilateral domain. Seeking a common measurable indicator, voting records at the UNGA – totalling 1291 resolutions put to a roll-call vote during the 50th through the 67th (1995 through 2012) – take centre stage and are compiled for the first time with regards to Brazil, Angola, Namibia and South Africa, both bilaterally and collectively as members of ZOPACAS. The following analysis expects levels of high-politics coordination and consultation to have visibly increased during the period in which greater bilateral defence initiatives also started taking place.

V.1.1.1 Angola

Angola's position amidst Brazil's foreign policy towards Africa has remained central over the years, as indicated in Chapter I. Benefiting from the coincidence between the end of the country's civil war in 2002 and the new political cycle in 2003, political contacts soon increased. Lula da Silva himself visited Luanda in 2003 and 2007, followed by Dilma Rousseff in 2011. More importantly, President José Eduardo dos Santos visited Brazil in 2005 and 2010, at which point he officialised a Strategic Partnership between the two countries, in recognition that "Brazil and Angola's relation is defined by understanding, comprehension, solidarity and by the frequent convergence over issues in the international agenda" (Silva, 2010a). Despite the considerable ambivalence of the 'strategic partnership' concept (Oliveira & Lessa, 2013), such a formal declaration represented a new landmark in bilateral relations that entitled ample cooperation in international organisations with a particular focus on the UN. More so when considered together with a previous mechanism of political consultations already

signed in 2007 (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2007: 1; Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010: 5, 6). As expressed by José Eduardo dos Santos, Brazil and Angola sought to "reaffirm the intention to exchange information by means of regular consultations, under the already signed memorandum, as well to foresee a strategic partnership in key areas of the current international context" (2010).

Relations between Brazil and Angola are also traditionally linked to the privileged high-level contacts established within the fold of CPLP. Over the years, those connections have often translated into mutual support on multiples levels, ranging from candidacies to leadership positions in multilateral organisations or even for non-permanent seats at the UNSC (e.g. Miyamoto, 2009). The latest period comprised no exception:

> "*Beyond the general cooperation agreement that covers almost everything – without it, we can't do anything – we also have the memorandum of understanding on political consultations that allows us to jointly support in international forums, the exchange of ministerial diplomatic visits. For example, Angola is applying for a UNSC non-permanent seat and Brazil supports it. It is within this framework of political consultations. Much like we have supported in terms of human rights, Brazil for the Human Rights Council, also requested support for its candidacy. So, within the scope of this memorandum, this mechanism is what facilitates and regulates all principles and forms of support*."[117]

Bearing in mind this framework, the expectation over the level of proximity between both countries' positions at the UNGA would be considerably high during the later years of the bilateral relation.

[117] Interview with Esmeralda Mendonça, Head of South America Department, Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of External Relations of Angola – Luanda, 22/05/2014.

Figure XVII - UNGA convergence Brazil-Angola (1995-2012)



Source: Sanches & Seabra, 2015 / systematised by the author

But as evidenced by Figure XVII, Brazilian-Angolan voting record exhibited high numbers over the years in a systematic fashion. In 1995, at the start of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's first term, both countries exhibited a convergence of 88%. Starting in the following year, they attained consistent high levels of convergence above 90%, while reaching a peak of 98% in 2009. However, despite these fluctuations, it is important to note that they only occur within the higher-10% scale. In that sense, the period corresponding to the PT governments in Brazil did not warrant any particular boost to this pattern of voting and reflects only minimal degrees of variation.

V.1.1.2 Namibia

Bilateral relations with Namibia received similar degrees of investment by Brazilian authorities with political contacts also increasing, as reflected in the mutual visits by the respective authorities. Lula da Silva's foreign policy impetus towards Africa quickly found echo upon his visit to Windhoek in 2003, where his intentions were made clear: "we want to revamp our relations with Africa, [which is] one of the main priorities of the Brazilian foreign policy, and, in that context, with Namibia itself" (Silva, 2003e). Subsequently, Namibia opened an embassy in Brazil later that year. Moreover, President Sam Nujoma visited Brazil in 2004 while Brazilian Vice-President

José Alencar attended the inauguration ceremonies of Hifikepunye Pohamba in 2005. The latter, in turn, paid a state visit to Brazil in 2009.

But Namibia also retained its share of priority for Brazil in terms of discussions in international forums. In 2005, for instance, a Brazilian delegation composed by Ambassadors Leda Lúcia Camargo and Gilberto Saboya visited Windhoek and met with President Pohamba, amidst wider efforts to shore up support for an overall UNSC reform (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Embaixada na Namíbia, 2009: 6). Following similar inroads with other African countries, a mechanism of political consultations was then signed in 2008 with the express mention of increasing consultations and exchange information over multilateral issues, within the UN universe (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2008: 1). Afterwards, in September, Lula and Pohamba met at the side-lines of the 63rd UNGA in New York, seeking to initiate a closer political dialogue. From a Namibian point of view, this series of frequent contacts brought a level of formalisation to a natural evolution in bilateral relations:

> "*What happens with that* [formal] *understanding is that whenever we needed Brazil's support, we would approach them, and they would respond.* (…) *So that makes it very much easy, whether it is at home, whether it is at the UN and any other organisation. That helps you to consult.* (…) *We have a culture of consulting on what's your* [Brazil's] *opinion on this, how do you see it, can you share with us what your region is talking, saying about this issue*".[118]

Given the expressed desire to exchange information over issues of common interests in international forums, convergence at the UNGA would be expected to significantly increase after the signing of such a formal mechanism.

[118] Interview with Marco Hausiku, Deputy-Prime Minister of Namibia – Windhoek, 06/05/2014.

Figure XVIII - UNGA convergence Brazil-Namibia (1995-2012)



Source: Sanches & Seabra, 2015 / systematised by the author

As presented in Figure XVIII, convergence between Brazil and Namibia started at a higher percentage (93%) in 1995, when compared to Angola, but followed a similar upward trend from 1996 onwards. In 2010, it even reached 97%, the highest during this period of analysis. But over the 17-year period, it is still possible to observe a similar pattern of sustained convergence that despite including an interchangeable variation between 95% and 96% in the last seven years recorded, nonetheless preceded the PT governments' mandate.

V.1.1.3 South Africa

Relations between Brazil and South Africa followed a different path than the rest of the African continent. The leadership position that the latter professes to exert in Africa consistently warranted a higher degree of importance from Brazilian authorities, which, invariably, translated itself into an increased number of presidential visits. Lula da Silva managed to visit South Africa a total of three times (2003, 2007 and 2010) during his two terms while Dilma Rousseff visited twice (2011 and 2013). In turn, South African President Jacob Zuma paid an official visit to Brazil in 2009 as Joint Cooperation Commission meetings took place routinely (2003, 2004, 2010 and 2013), with the purpose of expanding the bilateral agenda.

Additionally, and as if compensating the inexistence of a specific formal mechanism of political consultations similar to those agreed with Angola and Namibia, Brazilian-South African consultations benefited from two particular initiatives that extrapolated into other domains and filled the years without bilateral contacts, namely the IBSA and BRICS forums. Since their respective inception in 2003 and 2009, both arenas have come to share a commitment to the UN as the universal multilateral organisation of choice while at the same time demanding a more adequate representation in its multiple bodies (e.g. Stuenkel, 2014; Stuenkel 2015). Their main target, however, is centred on reform of the UNSC. The fact that both Brazil and South Africa simultaneously held non-permanent seats throughout 2011 – together with fellow non-permanent member India and resident permanent members Russia and China –, was heralded as the new pinnacle of cooperation in such high-level arenas. An analysis of Brazil's voting behaviour at the UNSC, however, shows little deviations from previous patterns (Uziel, 2012). Moreover, the overall cohesion of BRICS was hardly considered a breakthrough (Oliveira et al., 2015).[119] Given such a limited experience in time, voting records at the UNGA allow for a better and more accurate depiction of the expected levels of convergence between Brazil and South Africa as well as of their respective evolution over time.

[119] The fact that South Africa voted in favour of Resolution 1973 (2011) authorising an international intervention in Libya, unlike its fellow BRICS countries that abstained, constitutes the most visible example of non-coincident voting during that period.

Figure XIX - UNGA convergence Brazil-South Africa (1995-2012)



Source: Sanches & Seabra, 2015 / systematised by the author

As shown in Figure XIX, strong convergence at the UNGA between Brazil and South Africa can also be observed. More visibly, in a similar vein as with Namibia, it should also be noted that such voting records never go below 90% during the period of analysis, while reaching a minimum of 90% in 2001 and a maximum of 98% in 2010. But again, not only is the voting behaviour remarkably consistent over the years but it is also not possible to pinpoint the origin of such converging pattern to 2003 alone, as such strong results can be traced back to previous years instead.

When taking the three cases into account, three common threads can be highlighted. First, high levels of convergence are indeed observed between Brazil and three indicated countries with a positive evolution over the years. A less evident example of this trend can be found in the case of divergent voting (i.e. cases where Brazil voted 'Yes' or 'No', and the other countries voted diametrically opposed and did not abstain). If between 1995 and 2002, there were a total of seven resolutions in which Brazil's position did not equate, even if partially, to one or all of its partners, in

the following ten years that number decreased to only two resolutions in which such divergence occurred.[120]

Secondly, while still acknowledging the visible convergence obtained, the specific period between 2003 and 2012 came to witness only shared marginal gains. In all three cases, voting convergence essentially remained or fluctuated within the 90% threshold. Such relative immutability in bilateral voting patterns with Angola, Namibia and South Africa can also be found in terms of ZOPACAS, when considering its UNGA cohesion as a potential regional voting block:

Figure XX - UNGA cohesion (CI, annual mean) in ZOPACAS (1995-2012)



Source: Sanches & Seabra, 2015 / systematised by the author

[120] Between 1995 and 2002 divergent voting occurred seven times with regards to R/50/11 of 5 November 1995 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; Namibia voted 'No'), R/52/40C of 3 December 1997 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; South Africa voted 'No'), R/53/77G of 6 December 1998 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; Angola and Namibia voted 'No'), R/53/143 of 4 December 1998 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; Angola voted 'No'), R/54/179 of 6 December 1999 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; Angola voted 'No'), R/55/107 of 3 December 2000 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; South Africa voted 'No'), and R/57/230 of 5 December 2002 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; South Africa voted 'No'). Between 2003 and 2012, such divergence only occurred four times with regards to R/58/195 of 22 December 2003 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; South Africa voted 'No'), R/66/1A of 16 September 2011 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; Angola, Namibia and South Africa voted 'No') and R/66/195 (Brazil voted 'Yes'; South Africa voted 'No').

Figure XXI- UNGA cohesion (CII, annual mean) in ZOPACAS, (1995-2012)



Source: Sanches & Seabra, 2015 / systematised by the author

Figure XXII - UNGA cohesion (AI, annual mean) in ZOPACAS (1995-2012)



Source: Sanches & Seabra, 2015 / systematised by the author

Figure XXIII - UNGA defection ratio (DR, annual mean) in ZOPACAS (1995-2012)



Source: Sanches & Seabra, 2015 / systematised by the author

As reflected in all four figures, high levels of cohesion can be observed within a loose collective grouping as ZOPACAS, with every formula adopted providing similar confirmations. The simultaneous use of CI and CII displays only minor differences, with insignificant impact on the reported cohesion. In fact, CI only shows higher variation spikes precisely because of the relative weight attributed to abstentions. Regardless, the values obtained consistently remain above the >80 tier, as also shown by the use of AI as an extra validating measure. Hence, the same trend observed with individual countries is also confirmed in a collective format. Moreover, the adding of DI as an alternative layer of contrast further corroborates the strength of the evidenced results, with low defection ratio numbers inversely corresponding to years of higher cohesion.[121]

These results help to further substantiate a third overall assessment, namely that the origins of this voting pattern throughout the years, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, defy customary political narratives. Indeed, even if representing lower percentages, the numbers reached during President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's mandates indicate that significant common ground was already achieved with African

[121] Numerical results of both UNGA convergence and cohesion are provided in greater detail in Annex II.

countries in that period. Rather than an unequivocal cohesion growth from 2003 onwards, it is instead visible a significant upward trend from 1996 onwards. In other words, strong UNGA convergence is not an exclusive product of interactions fomented by Lula da Siva and Dilma Rousseff's governments and can be traced back to previous political cycles. The government at the time was, in turn, connoted with preferably siding in international stages with 'Western/Northern' positions instead of 'Southern' ones. This calls into question the assumption of envisioned linkages between greater defence cooperation ties and increased multilateral consultations and alignment in international forums.

V.1.2 Technical-scientific cooperation

Transference of technology has been deemed a staple of many Third World countries' claims towards reducing asymmetries and securing a more accelerated development of their own. In this case, two particular areas of expertise warrant specific interest for African countries, namely those concerning with mapping and delimitation of maritime shores, on one hand, and hardware defence technology, on the other hand. The former is inherently associated with the opportunities granted under Article 76 of UNCLOS, which incites seaside countries to explore the opportunities of expanding their continental shelves and, by association, the area and resources under their sovereign control. The technical capabilities required to carry out such undertaking, however, are often inaccessible to many countries, which must then rely on external assistance (Figuerôa, 2014: 252; Cook & Carleton, 2000). Developing countries also tend to seek out and diversify partnerships that might allow cutting back on the dependence from external supply and development chains of the necessary equipment to each country's security sector. In these cases, the political dimension associated with arms collaboration is inescapable and often falls within wider partnerships, either crossing through different spectrums of cooperation or becoming subject to domestic constrains (cf. Moravcsik, 1993b).

With this context in mind, the following sub-section focuses on ascertaining if Brazil played any meaningful role as a provider of such specific cooperation on both domains, deemed by African countries as a priority, and thus held as crucial amidst the evolution of each respective defence cooperation partnership.

V.1.2.1 Angola

The case of Angola comprises the most recent example of Brazil's attempt to provide technical know-how on defence-related issues across the Atlantic. After a protracted the civil war that crippled its infrastructures, the country's security apparatus required ample reform in order to face a new national and regional scenario. In that sense, the 2007 Presidential Directive for the Re-edification of the Angolan Armed Forces indicated several countries that Angola should engage with the purpose of establishing technical-military cooperation initiatives and thus obtain valuable outside assistance. Among other countries listed, Brazil was mentioned as a potential partner (Angola, Presidência da República, 2007: 29).

Within these restructuring efforts, Angola's maritime domains warranted specific concern. With a shoreline totalling 1.600 km, the lack of definition of maritime boundaries with neighbouring countries and the weight of offshore oil reserves on national revenues, Angola found itself with poor naval capabilities and few legal assurances over the full extent of its maritime sovereignty. Recognising the latter factor's relevance, the *Comissão Interministerial para a Delimitação e Demarcação dos Espaços Marítimos de Angola* (CIDDEMA – Inter-ministerial Commission for the Delimitation and Demarcation of Maritime Spaces of Angola) was created in 2006, with the Ministry of National Defence acting as its main coordinator.[122] The central goal of CIDDEMA consisted in carrying out the *Projecto de Extensão da Plataforma Continental de Angola* (PEPCA – Project of the Continental Shelf Submission of Angola). However, even though the first exploratory contacts in this area started in 2004 (Figuerôa, 2014: 254), Brazil was not the sole external actor involved. Following discussions in 2010, on February 2011 Angola signed a memorandum of understanding with Portugal that foresaw the exchange of experiences and consultation with the *Estrutura de Missão para a Extensão da Plataforma Continental* (Portuguese Task Group for the Extension of the Continental Shelf) (Bernardino, 2013: 385-387).

[122] The other members of the Inter-ministerial Commission include the Ministry of Petroleum; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Interior; the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights; the Ministry of Transport; the Ministry of Fisheries; the Ministry of Geology and Mines; the Ministry of Environment; the Ministry of Energy and Water; the Secretary of State for Legal and Judicial Affairs of the President; the Chief of the General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces; and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of SONANGOL, EP.

But the original interest in Brazil remained. After the signing in 2010 of the Strategic Partnership and the accompanying Defence Cooperation Agreement, new developments began to occur. Two months afterwards, Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim met with his Angolan Defence and Justice counterparts, Cândido Van-Dúnem and Guilhermina Prata, respectively, to formally discuss maritime delimitation issues. In the following year, during the 2011 LAAD exhibition in Rio de Janeiro, Nelson Jobim and Cândido Van-Dúnem signed a Technical Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the framework of the Survey and Extension of the Angolan Continental Shelf.

The purpose of this agreement was tripartite: to provide assistance over the delimitation of Angola's continental shelf; to help identify untapped natural resources in the surrounding oceanic area for future exploration; and to train Angolan specialists in Brazilian institutions. The first two goals were entrusted to EMGEPRON, who then sub-contracted Brazilian consultancy company *Mar, Ambiente, Geologica e Serviços Lda.* (MAG) to carry out the technical coordination and execution of PEPCA as well as the interpretation of the data obtained. Simultaneously, 4 post-graduated positions in Geology and Maritime Geophysics at *Universidade Federal Fluminense* were made available for Angolan officials while a series of training seminars were organised in Angola, with the purpose of capacitating CIDDEMA's staff. With the bulk of the work finished in 2012, Angola was able to file its formal submission to the CLCS, the following year (Angola, 2013).

But the desire for Brazilian expertise was not limited to maritime issues. As the bilateral relation intensified after 2010, particular focus was also granted to the creation of a local defence industry in Angola, as an integral part of the wider defence cooperation drive with Brazil. The Defence Cooperation Agreement included in its dispositions the possible "implementation and development of programs and application projects of defence technology, with the possibility of participation by strategic military and civilian entities" as well as the "conduction of scientific research and experimental construction work for the creation and production of weaponry and military technics" (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010: 3). Subsequently, in 2013, the topic warranted a specific declaration of intent by the Ministers of Defence of both countries, who recognised such a goal of a local defence industry sector as a "factor of development and generator of employment, as well as

of reduction of the Angolan Armed Forces foreign dependence on the acquisition of equipment and logistical means" (Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, 2013).[123] When in Luanda, Celso Amorim summed up the rationale behind Brazil's contributions in these areas:

> "*It is important to highlight that Defence is a cornerstone of a strategic partnership. Countries that get along, should also mutually contribute to their defence capacity. In our case, beyond the agreement that already exists, there is a new opportunity which is to cooperate in the area of defence industries, and that has taken up important time out of our proceedings.* (…) *Of course that selling* [defence equipment] *is not a sin and it is good. But* [only if it is done] *with the purpose of fomenting investment, partnerships, for the production of defence products here in Angola. That is the meaning of our cooperation*" (Agência Lusa, 2013).

In this particular case, it is possible to conclude for a bilateral dynamic, in which the demand for technical expertise comprised not only the linchpin element but also the driving force behind a wider local interest regarding Brazilian defence cooperation.

V.1.2.2 Namibia

The consistent interest of Namibia in the Brazilian supply of military equipment was indicated in Chapter III and IV. The sale and donation of navy vessels, in particular, provided Namibian forces with long-awaited means for the surveillance and protection of its maritime borders. Likewise, more recent deals to acquire military vehicles heralded new business opportunities for the Brazilian defence industry. But both instances did not merit a specific focus on developing local industrial capabilities in this area. Instead, they constituted mere commercial transactions with no accessory impact. The disbursement of Brazilian technical expertise, on the other hand, played a greater role and can be traced back to the early days of Namibia's independence.

[123] The 2014 naval purchases described in Chapter III, Section III.4.4, comprised the most visible results of such focus on building up local industrial structures in Angola.

On September 13th 1991, Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello became the first Latin American and non-African Head of State to land in Windhoek, with trade prospects at the top of the agenda (Estado de S. Paulo, 1991; The Namibian, 1991). But Collor's brief visit also included the discussion of a possible bilateral protocol on maritime cooperation, aimed at "exchanging experiences and information over the protection of maritime and fishing resources" (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1991). Underlined in this formula, was the first indication of Namibia's interest in Brazilian assistance towards designing and developing its future Navy forces. Accordingly, on March 3rd 1994, following the visit by Brazilian frigate *Niterói F-40* to the Namibian port of Walvis Bay, an agreement pertaining naval cooperation was signed.

The embedded dispositions were considerably straightforward: to help design Namibia's Naval Wing from scratch by primarily relying on training opportunities in Brazilian military institutions, with the first openings scheduled to start 6 months after the signing. The bulk of the financial cost of the program was to be shouldered by Brazil. On the other hand, the list of goods and services to be provided by the Brazilian Navy was also self-evident of the ambition attached to the proposed partnership, including the establishment of safer maritime routes for coastal navigation, the supply of appropriated vessels to the Naval Wing's necessities and the planning and development of adequate logistical infrastructures. But more importantly, the agreement also foresaw the organisation of a maritime patrol service to protect national interests, with a particular focus on the "preservation of living resources and mineral resources in the continental shelf", the execution of a hydrographical survey of Namibian shores and associated economic potential as well as delimitation of Namibia's territorial waters and assistance on international negotiations towards setting its maritime border (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1994). In order to better structure these intentions, the *Missão Naval Brasileira na Namíbia* (MNBN – Brazilian Naval Mission to Namibia) was formally launched the following May.

Explanations for Namibia's original interest on Brazil's technical expertise focus on the match between the former's operational demand and the latter's supply capabilities at the time. As Deputy-Prime Minister Marco Hausiku recalls:

> "*The best country that understood our problem and responded to our interest was Brazil.* (…) *Namibia first approached Brazil and Brazil responded positively.* (…) *In terms of that* [technical maritime expertise]*, it is important you have mentioned Brazil assisting us because you need to have capacity to do this type of jobs and they have, no doubt about it*".[124]

Then-Permanent Secretary for Namibia's Ministry of Defence, Erastus Negonga further justified choosing Brazil because the two countries not only shared the same waters and were geographically situated on the same latitude, but also because Brazil was supposedly "one of the traditional leaders in naval science throughout the world, and it ha[d] one of the oldest navies in the world with highly technological equipment and facilities" (Dzinesa & Martin, 2005: 215).

Meanwhile, from a Brazilian point of view, to help Namibia in this area was to prospectively help Brazil's future legal case before international competent authorities and ascertain its own control over both its nearby shores and corresponding untapped natural riches. Such an agenda, however, required a modicum of physical presence. In that sense, regular visits by Brazilian vessels followed. Two months after the signing of the 1994 agreement, Brazilian oceanographic vessel *Antares – H40* paid a good-will visit to Walvis Bay. Afterwards, between March and June 1997, hydrographical vessel *Sirius – H21* went ahead and carried out the maritime survey of the Walvis Bay Port, free of charge. The work carried out led to the publication by the Brazilian Navy's *Diretoria de Hidrografia e Navegação* (DHN – Directorate for Hydrography and Navigation) of 'Nautical Chart n° 3931 – Approaches to Walvis Bay'.

The next step came in 2002, when EMGEPRON contracted with both the Namibian Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and the Namibian Ministry of Defence the survey of the country's continental shelf. Drawing from Brazil's acquired experience with its own LEPLAC, the operation was executed from April to August 2004, while also sub-contracted to MAG consultancy services. The information gathered comprised the bulk of Namibia's submission before the CLCS on May 2009 (Namibia, 2009). The reasoning that sustained this specific form of cooperation over the years, however, surpassed the mere strategic-military domain. The existence of

[124] Interview with Marco Hausiku, Deputy-Prime Minister of Namibia – Windhoek, 06/05/2014.

diamond mines, oil, and gas reserves as well as vast fishing grounds in Namibian waters also fuelled the country's interest in choosing Brazil as a partner for this specific area. In that sense:

> "[Cooperation with Brazil] *was done in the context of the Law of the Sea, it was not really a defence activity; it was done under the Law of the Sea. We value South-South cooperation, so the Brazilians had the capacity, the competence, the knowledge and they were able to map our continental shelf, so that we could make a submission to claim whatever we wanted to claim.* [But] *you must understand that defence does not stand alone* (…) *you have to link to the whole economic interest, its not something you can just deal in isolation*".[125]

Such a specific joint endeavour came to be presented as an example of what both countries were able to achieve, while based on an original defence arrangement. Even though its roots can be traced back to previous political cycles in Brazil, it contributed to cement the overall relation with Namibia and open up further discussions on related issues.

V.1.2.3 South Africa

The case of Brazilian-South African relations in terms of technical-scientific cooperation contrasts in relation to both Angola and Namibia, on two levels. For one, transference of expertise on maritime issues was never an item in the bilateral agenda, due to South Africa's autonomous know-how and capabilities. In fact, South Africa carried out its own Extended Continental Shelf Claim Project, regarding the continental shelf around the South African mainland and its island territories, Marion and Prince Edward Islands, without external assistance and succeeded in submitting the case to the CLCS in 2009 (South Africa, 2009).[126] Hence, South Africa ran

[125] Interview with Nahas Angulas, Minister of Defence of Namibia – Windhoek, 07/05/2014.

[126] The project was led by Petroleum Agency SA and included the Department of Minerals and Energy; the Department of Foreign Affairs; the Council for Geoscience; the South African Navy, the Hydrographic Office; the Department of Environmental Affairs; the Department of Science and Technology, and the South African Maritime Safety Authority.

contrary to neighbouring countries, where Brazil's transference of specific knowledge played a larger role.

Secondly, discussions over possible defence industrial cooperation took place under very different assumptions than those carried out with the remaining continent. Given the pre-1994 context, in which South Africa found itself internationally isolated and the target of multiple sanctions, considerable incentives were given to the development of indigenous capability and expertise that could support a sizeable defence industrial complex of its own (Dunne, 2006). Any potential external partnership was required to contribute with an additional benefit for South Africa and not just amount to a mere commercial transaction. Accordingly, Brazil and South Africa focused on the development of common industrial-military solutions that could draw from the full extent of their respective defence industries expertise:

> "*This is not a buyer-seller relationship that we have with Brazil, because with Russia, with China, with the U.S., with India, with Pakistan, Korea, all these countries, we produce basically enough for our own needs and requirements and we want to export. But the other countries are in the exactly same situation, they want to export and they expect us to buy. It's a catch 22 situation: they produce and want to sell to us; we produce and want to sell to them. But we have evolved above that, or beyond that. We are now out of the box, we are now in certain areas,* [in which] *we have niche technologies, specifically in the missile environment*".[127]

In this context, the design and production of the air-to-air missile A-DARTER, estimated at a cost of US$130 million, became the flagship project of the bilateral partnership. Benefiting from the framework established by the general Technical Cooperation Agreement signed in 2000, both countries began to explore opportunities to collaborate in this area. The visit by Brazilian Minister of Defence José Viegas Filho to South Africa in 2003 to sign the bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement triggered the deal:

[127] Interview with Shalk McDuling, Director for International Legal Instruments, Department of Defence of South Africa – Pretoria, 18/06/2014.

> "*We* [South Africa] *approached them. Because at that stage, South Africa had the need to develop such a product,* [but] *we didn't have the full funding available. So we were looking for a partner outside of the country, to fund off the project, the development program. So we approached them, they were keen. Then eventually, at the ministerial level, there was a defence agreement between South Africa and Brazil in 2003. We attached what we called a supplementary arrangement to that* [defence agreement]*,*[128] *which basically allowed us to engage in talks on the specific missile technology and the specific program*".[129]

Subsequently, the Brazilian Air Force, represented by the *Comissão Coordenadora do Programa de Aeronave de Combate* (COPAC – Coordinating Commission for the Combat Aircraft Program) and the *Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia Aeroespacial* (DCTA – Department of Science and Aerospace Technology), entered into negotiations with South African weapons procurement agency ARMSCOR and defence company Denel Dynamics to explore the possibility of a joint missile program. A final contract was signed three years later between all parties, with three particularities in its content. Firstly, the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation provided a considerable portion of the Brazilian funding and was made an integral part of the project with the purpose of ensuring that the transference of technology worked both ways. Secondly, COPAC set up a permanent representation in Pretoria to accompany closely the expected production and train Brazilian engineers in missile technology. Thirdly, only in 2008 did Brazilian defence companies Mectron, Avibras and Optron Electrônica officially joined the project, thus filling the private sector slot foreseen for the Brazilian side.

The addition of the latter element, however, was not achieved without acrimony. When considering that "collaborative projects are market-sharing cartels, in which shares of research funding, production, and sales are carefully negotiated", a single rationale holds true: "if firms gain from a cartel, they will seek to join it; if they lose, they will oppose it" (Moravcsik, 1993b: 132). In that sense:

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[128] This agreement formally consisted in the Supplementary Arrangement between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Republic of South Africa concerning General Provisions to the Joint Research, Development, Certification and Technology Transfer Regarding an Air-to-Air Missile, signed on December 14th 2006.

[129] Interview with Product Manager, Denel Dynamics – Centurion, 29/05/2014.

> "*There's a bit more resistance from the industry in Brazil and it is do with the fact, the way they see it, is seldom money that could have potentially gone to them* [and] *is now flowing into the border for South Africa, if you understand what I'm saying. They believe that even if they cannot do this type of missile, maybe the money could be used for other type of area where they could have been receiving more money, there's a bit of resistance.* (…) *The remaining industry players are saying, 'you know what, you as the Brazilian Air Force should look after your own industry instead of spending money outside of the country'*".[130]

But despite these local protests, Brazilian authorities did not backtrack and stuck with their South African counterparts. In fact, while overlooking delays in the initial development schedule, both countries managed to maintain a similar level of commitment and investment over the years, while attempting to replicate the joint efforts into other fronts.[131] For example, citing the A-DARTER as an example, DCTA signed a memorandum of understanding with the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in 2012 to foment increased cooperation over radar, radio and electronic warfare technology.[132]

On the other hand, Brazilian-South African interactions at this level also started to be framed by mutual multilateral frameworks, specifically the Science and Technology Subgroup within the IBSA Defence Working Group, in terms of how to best take advantage of the lessons learned with such a bilateral initiative. But for South Africa, the crux remained with the desired exchange of technology that originated the first contacts in the first place:

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[130] Ibid.

[131] Signalling confidence in the expected outcome, in December 2013, the Brazilian *Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos* (FINEP – Funding Authority for Studies and Projects) authorised an additional US$ 18 million for the fourth stage of development of the project.

[132] Three other examples of private overtures are worth mentioning. In 2004, Denel signed a exploratory agreement with EMGEPRON, for the possible co-production of ammunitions. Likewise, in 2007, Brazilian ammunitions company IMBEL signed a protocol of intent with South African Ripple Effect Weapon Systems to explore the development of a joint grenade-launcher. In the same year, Eurocopter's Brazilian subsidiary, Helibras, and South African ATE – Advanced Technology and Engineering signed a technical cooperation agreement concerning their helicopter program activities. All three deals, however, never came to fruition or produced any practical outcomes.

> "*The science and technology of defence cooperation is showing itself to be very promising, promising to an extent that it has the potential to actually elevate all three* [IBSA] *countries to a level that is even comparable to Europe and Asia.* (…) *What we will be interested is to make sure there is exchange of expertise in that sphere and that would mean doing a lot of joint projects together. And we know there will be issues about intellectual property and those can be sorted out, but the strategic objective is to make sure what South Africa develops, as far as technology, is the position to share with its partners and when vice-versa happens to a partner, a partner can share it with us and we can actually exchange that expertise.* (…) [However], *sometimes countries, what they have bilaterally, they want to keep it bilaterally*".[133]

That helps to explain how Brazil and South Africa have come to explore greater industrial defence ties within the trilateral discussions of the IBSA defence group without actually advancing on any particular new project or without opening up the structure of the A-DARTER's development itself. This specific joint endeavour remained at the core of the overall defence relationship over the last decade and was responsible for inciting greater contacts between the two countries in this domain.

The three countries analysed in this sub-section evidence a similar strategic design regarding the extraction of concessions in the form of technical-scientific expertise, which would otherwise be unattainable to their own security sectors and national capabilities during the same time period in question.

V.2. Social factors

The two following sub-sections concentrate on immaterial explanations for the willingness of African countries in engaging with Brazil in joint defence overtures. Following Schoppa's position, I argue that, "changes in material power alone are sometimes not sufficient to shift bargaining outcomes" and that it may be required to add social factors to the equation in order to understand a country's behaviour (1999:

[133] Interview with Bereng Mtimkulu, Chief Director for Defence International Affairs, Department of Defence of South Africa – Pretoria, 17/06/2014.

338-339). It can then be expected that the recipient country will favour those partners that lean on such relational traits before engaging more deeply in any cooperative endeavours, given that they provide additional assurances over the donor's legitimacy and long-term reliability. Bargaining outcomes thus becomes an expression of a social construction between both parts. Two sub-sets of dynamics are identified and analysed in greater depth, namely the impact of procedural norms from common multilateral institutions in which Brazil and these three countries participate, as well as the influence of trust generated by elites and past events amidst the relational process.

V.2.1 Procedural norms

International regimes provide additional measures of legitimacy to any envisioned cooperation by providing a common multilateral framework based on rules and expectations. By expanding on Schoppa's research (1998: 314-315), it is assumed that a state that views a partner as playing within the rules of the game as set out in an international regime, will respond to the latter's initiatives in a different way than a state that perceives its partner as a rival in violation of a regional or international set of norms. In that sense, "states may generate institutions in identifiable issue areas that affect their behaviour and foster cooperation, even if short-term interests would dictate deviation" (Levy et al., 1995: 271). That, however, requires some delimitation of what can be deemed a regime, given their traditional broad definition "as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner, 1983: 2).

In order to avoid the issue of "paper regimes" or "dead-weight regimes", with little if any practical relevance in international affairs, it must be observable a level of formalisation and a degree of convergence of expectations between the respective parties (Levy et al., 1995: 272). This implies considering initiatives whose rules, norms and procedures in the defence domain, triggered or instilled further bilateral contacts of their own. In other words, regimes that foresee regular contacts and exchange of information as well as specific forms of direct defence interactions such as joint exercises need to be considered. The next sub-section focuses on the cases of the ASA summits, CPLP, IBSA and ZOPACAS, according to the direct participation

of each of the three countries analysed as well as their potential relevance for the respective relationship with Brazil.

V.2.1.1 Angola

The international regime with most direct impact for Brazilian-Angolan relations can be found in CPLP. Despite its organic emphasis on common linguistic, historical and cultural traits and the fact that it is primarily considered value and language-based and not a geographically-delimited organisation *per se*, it gradually came to increase its focus on defence issues since it was created back in 1996. In reaction to the frequent crises in Guinea-Bissau and the need to adopt a common position on matters of conflict and peace (e.g. MacQueen, 2003), an initial Agreement for the Globalisation of the Technical-Military Cooperation was signed in 1999. Afterwards, in 2006, a Protocol for Cooperation in Defence Among the Portuguese-Speaking Countries was adopted with the purpose of exploring a possible common policy of cooperation on defence matters, that entailed greater sharing of information and the development of joint military capabilities. To that end, a series of permanent structures such as the *Secretariado Permanente para os Assuntos de Defesa* (SPAD – Permanent Secretariat for Defence Issues) and regular high-level meetings were instituted. However, it is important to note that even though the "CPLP has adopted legal instruments to become a security actor, it still operates under a strict intergovernmental and non-supranational basis" (Tavares & Bernardino, 2011: 625; cf. Bernardino & Leal, 2011). Expectations over any collective action in this area were therefore toned down, as Celso Amorim recognised:

> "*Obviously, it would be practically impossible to speak of a common defence between the countries of the CPLP, which doesn't stop us from cooperating and reaching conclusions on how to cooperate for the defence of each country of the CPLP*" (Amorim, 2014a).

The most visible token of cooperation has consisted in the military exercises FELINO, conducted since 2000 with the purpose of exchanging experiences and

information between the different Armed Forces.[134] In this context, both Brazil and Angola routinely contributed with participants. For instance, during the last organisation in Angola in 2010, Brazil contributed with 21 military officials, while Angola sent another 20 to Brazil in 2013 (Bernardino, 2013: 599). Likewise, the different CPLP Navies established a semi-regular series of symposiums to discuss naval organisational issues amongst each other. The second edition took place in Luanda in 2010 while the third occurred in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. Through such kind of initiatives, CPLP managed to establish a modicum of structure in transatlantic contacts, while ultimately playing a part in driving Angolan-Brazilian bilateral relations in the defence domain:

> "*CPLP is a relatively recent mechanism,* [it was created] *in 1996, it is not fully developed, but it has a couple of interesting forums: meetings of Ministers of Defence and the* [Armed Forces] *Chiefs of Staff, the navies have their own, and the FELINO exercises that derive from the Chiefs of Staff meetings.* (…) *But CPLP helped. The only meaningful exercises in practice are the FELINO. So I believe that CPLP helped to promote* [Brazilian defence cooperation with Angola]*, probably not with the intensity that we would like, but CPLP is a legitimate forum. [Moreover] the partnership is more intense between [both] navies, precisely because of the forum of the CPLP navies' commanders*".[135]

This common participation is, in turn, further highlighted when considered in the backdrop of the developments that led to the formalisation of the 2010 Strategic Partnership, as José Eduardo dos Santos puts it:

> "*In the framework of the regional organisations in which our countries are inserted, we have adopted a policy of peaceful cooperation, based upon democratic values and on open economies turned to development. Such policy is followed by our two countries, it is also the spirit that had presided over our*

[134] They have occurred in 2000 (Portugal), 2001 (Portugal), 2002 (Brazil), 2003 (Mozambique), 2004 (Angola), 2005 (Cape Verde), 2006 (Brazil), 2007 (Sao Tomé and Principe), 2008 (Portugal), 2009 (Mozambique), 2010 (Angola), 2011 (Angola) and 2013 (Brazil).

[135] Interview with Coronel Gerson Freitas, Defence Attaché, Embassy of Brazil in Angola – Luanda, 16/05/2014.

cooperation within the framework of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP)" (Santos, 2011).

A second international regime where Brazil and Angola have also crossed paths concerns ZOPACAS. In this case, and following the institutional hibernation since the last ministerial meeting in Buenos Aires in 1999, Angola contributed to the revitalisation process. That led to the spearheading of a series of low-key meetings between mid-level officials, which began to take place in early 2007. The first gathering occurred in March in New York and focused on economic cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation. A second workshop was held a month later in Montevideo and dealt with combating and preventing crime, peacekeeping operations and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Finally, in May, a third workshop was held in Buenos Aires with maritime issues high on the agenda, including the sustainable use of maritime genetic resources, and fighting illegal fishing. The cumulative results of these meetings provided enough common ground to then convene the VI Ministerial Meeting in Luanda in June 2007. But more importantly, the meeting's proceedings allowed ZOPACAS to venture into an expanded South-South agenda, as indicated in Chapter IV.

Reflecting an initial detachment from these developments, however, the Brazilian delegation to Luanda was not lead by a cabinet member but rather by Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti. Such an option signalled a cautious engagement with the ambition attached to the occasion. Still, as seen from Luanda, Brazil's underlined support was deemed unwavering:

"*Brazil supported* [the Angolan presidency of ZOPACAS]. *Given the relations that Brazil and Angola have, it would have never been any different. In fact, it suited Brazil that it was Angola, a country with which maintained excellent friendly relations, to assume the presidency. We always received that support and that token of solidarity by Brazil, even now in this period of transition of the presidency from Angola to Uruguay*". [136]

[136] Interview with Margarida Izata, Director for the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of External Relations of Angola – Luanda, 22/05/2014.

In other words, Brazil played a backstage role during this initial stage, while testing the waters in terms of African interest and avoiding compromising previous gains in terms of Brazilian public profile, won across the continent during the first years of Lula da Silva's government. Such caution, however, changed as the revitalisation of ZOPACAS progressed. When the time came for the VII Meeting in Montevideo in 2013, Brazil was already publically using ZOPACAS as a platform for increased interactions with Angola, including inciting similar high-level participation at the defence level:

> "*In fact, in Latin America today, Brazil is the main promoter of ZOPACAS. There was certain reluctance, shall we say, from Uruguay – possibly due to internal difficulties from the country – and it was with great financial support from Brazil, who even made available an* [Air Force] *plane for delegates from African countries, that we were able to organise the VII meeting in Uruguay.* (…) *For the meeting in Uruguay, the* [Angolan] *delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Minister* [Georges] *Chicoti and the Minister of National Defence* [João Lourenço]*, also under the invitation of Brazil, given that Brazil would also be attending at that level. And there was the need for the two ministers to talk a bit more in the area of defence*". [137]

Both regimes, CPLP and ZOPACAS, can thus be considered to have constituted two useful arenas for the increase of contacts between Brazil and Angola, with their respective defence sub-configurations allowing for an exchange of information and increased contacts that ultimately incited and substantiated the bilateral partnership.

V.2.1.2 Namibia

The multilateral options for Brazilian-Namibian interactions during this period were inherently tied to the escalation of South-South discourse as a priority in

[137]Ibid.

transatlantic dealings. In that sense, the pinnacle of such kind of cooperation between both shores of the Atlantic resided in the organisation of the Africa-South America summits already alluded to in Chapter I. Despite a wide-ranging agenda focused on multiple sectorial cooperation initiatives, every different meeting (Abuja in 2006, Nueva Esparta in 2009, and Malabo in 2013) managed to include political-security considerations among the items up to discussion, while emphasising the adoption of "measures to encourage confidence and cooperation in the fields of defence and security, as the best means to warrant stability, security, democracy, human rights and comprehensive development" (ASA, 2009: 19).

Towards that end, the implementation plan for 2013-2016 foresaw closer contacts and consultations on security matters of mutual interest, including with third party institutions such as the AU Peace and Security Council or the UNPBC, as well as joint initiatives to exchange information and experiences (ASA, 2013b). In that sense, both Brazil and Namibia came to participate in a workshop over South-South Cooperation on arms control and dual use technologies, on June 2013 in Buenos Aires, that focused on such issues as national control systems on small and light weapons; management of security forces arsenals; international transfers of arms; national systems on sensitive exports control; national control mechanisms on chemical substances; nuclear materials security; and schemes of cooperation on training for the detection of illicit traffic (ASA, 2013c). Although practical outcomes did not emerge from these discussions, Namibian authorities did not question the on-going legitimacy of this mechanism's proceedings and opted instead to highlight its long-term potential:

> "*I was in Malabo* [for the III ASA summit]. (…) *This type of platforms, they are not quick, the results are not quickly seen but they create an atmosphere of acceptance amongst the leaders, amongst the people. Those who meet, they create awareness of what is happening in different countries, they create awareness of what is happening in the world and they also create awareness of what specific leaders and specific countries are saying about what is happening in the world and that is why they are so important. In the long run, it will grow,*

I'm telling you it will grow into a level that will be formalised. Maybe not now, but in the long run it will come to be".[138]

However, from a Namibian point of view, a different international regime played an even larger role in terms of framing relations with Brazil, namely ZOPACAS. Such a political preference is best explained by ZOPACAS's own original conception. Since the forum was created in 1986, the issue of South African occupation of Namibia was consistently brought up as a rallying point for the participating members who advocated the end to the presence of the Apartheid regime followed by local self-determination.[139] Accordingly, when Namibia became independent, it promptly acceded to the forum and started participating in its meetings and activities. Despite its hibernation over the years, with consequences in terms of irregularity of meetings and lack of institutional visibility, Namibia's original interest remained:

"*To us, this is a living institution, we did not believe that it could die just like that.* (…) *These types of institutions have the characteristics of not showing exactly what is happening but members they know, they contact, they have got structures through which they communicate.* (…) *So the general public will think nothing is working but things are working*".[140]

The legitimacy attributed to ZOPACAS is considered proportional to the inclusion of Namibia's own national interests and concerns amidst the forum's reach. Inasmuch as it focuses on providing multilateral solutions and regulations over, for example, maritime and environmental issues, Namibia finds it useful to abide by the disposition of such a multilateral option and maintain its participation. The country's representation to the VIII Ministerial Meeting in 2013 reflected this approach:

[138] Interview with Marco Hausiku, Deputy-Prime Minister of Namibia – Windhoek, 06/05/2014.

[139] As stated in the constitutive UNGA Resolution 41/11, the "independence of Namibia and the elimination of the racist regime of Apartheid are conditions essential to guaranteeing the peace and security of the South Atlantic" (United Nations General Assembly, 1986).

[140] Interview with Marco Hausiku, Deputy-Prime Minister of Namibia – Windhoek, 06/05/2014.

"*I went with the Deputy-Minister of Defence to the ZOPACAS meeting* [in Montevideo, 2013]. *So ZOPACAS discussed a lot of things, but primarily how to safeguard our coast, including issues of piracy, how also to safeguard ours coasts in terms of environment, to ensure that the ecosystem is protected. That's why there was a declaration that it was passed, that ensured that we are going to cooperate in terms of capacity-building, in terms of measuring the ecosystem on our coasts, in terms of safety and security at our coast. And also to train our people in issues related to seas coast management.* (…) *It was their initiative* [Brazil's], *even their participation, we can see that they participated at the high-level, both Foreign Affairs, Defence and so forth…and you can see the number of people that attended, you could see they were very serious with the ZOPACAS issue.* (…) *I think the more frequency, the more meetings are made aware, we are going to have a lot interest from Africa, specially because they will benefit from capacity-building, they will benefit from environmental protection and so on*".[141]

However, Namibia's ZOPACAS membership is even more significant when considering official perceptions that point to its centrality amidst the bilateral defence partnership with Brazil. By professing a political rationale in tune with wider foreign policy goals and by focusing on issue areas already foreseen under previous agreements with Brazil, ZOPACAS was elevated to a keystone position. In the words of Namibian Minister of Defence Nahas Angulas:

"*Cooperation with Brazil on the defence area is based on two concepts. One, South-South cooperation. We value the work with people who have gone through the experience we are going, who know something about the challenges of development and we want to work with them so that they have a possibility to understand our own problems. The second one is that we share the Atlantic Ocean with Brazil and we have developed the concept of the South Atlantic Ocean Zone of Peace. So we start from those two concepts, South-South cooperation and South Atlantic Zone of Peace*".[142]

[141] Interview with Peya Mushelenga, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Namibia – Windhoek, 12/05/2014.

[142] Interview with Nahas Angulas, Minister of Defence of Namibia – Windhoek, 07/05/2014.

In the framework of Brazilian-Namibian relations, both the ASA summits and ZOPACAS regimes were deemed by Namibia as important elements of the debate over revamped transatlantic relations between South America and Africa. Still, whereas the former's contribution to security and defence matters was more reduced, the rationale behind the latter was elevated to new heights of national priority, in tune with growing concerns over maritime security issues.

V.2.1.3 South Africa

Amidst the set of multilateral formations in which Brazil and South Africa jointly participate, the IBSA Dialogue forum holds particular relevance for this analysis.[143] Its original reasoning of bringing together three emerging powers that craved fairer international representation would appear to indicate a greater focus on a political and economic agenda, rather than one centred on defence-related issues. And indeed, IBSA "echoes previous experiences of South–South cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrating more willingness to draft an economic agenda than to compromise on security issues" (Flemes & Vaz, 2014: 13). But that did not impede exploratory contacts in the defence domain, based on the group's geographic favourable context:

> "*As every cooperation initiative, it* [IBSA] *has an intra-group dimension and an extra-group dimension. Extra-group dimension is the IBSA fund, intra-group dimension are the different cooperation activities, and in that regard, yes, it was noticed the interest of the Armed Forces in coming together. And truth be told, given that the three countries don't habit the same continent and are distant neighbours, they are all connected by sea but very distant, there is no geopolitical difficulty, no present threat. So those are all factors that greatly facilitate* [this kind of cooperation]".[144]

[143] Even though the range of BRICS surpasses the South Atlantic scenario and has no foreseeable defence cooperation initiatives in its midst, its influence was also felt in the Brazilian-South African partnership. For instance, as stated in the official communiqué of the inaugural meeting of the bilateral Joint Defence Committee in 2013, that occasion should "be seen against the backdrop of the strengthening the South/South cooperation and within the context of South Africa joining the BRICS Group" (South Africa, Department of Defence, 2013).

[144] Interview with Brazilian diplomat.

Accordingly, the already mentioned Defence Working Group was created. The first discussions in this area emerged in 2005 in South Africa but only generated an official working group in 2008, after which meetings were held regularly afterwards (2009, 2011, 2013). The agenda included such items as the promotion of maritime and air safety, cooperation in defence production, trade and joint marketing, coordination among the defence research institutions, cooperation in training sector and regular annual trilateral dialogue. These goals were, in turn, translated into such initiatives as two sailing regattas organised in South Africa (2005) and India (2007), a Map Exercise on UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009), and an IBSA Table Top Exercise on UN Peacekeeping Operations in New Delhi (2013). But the pinnacle of IBSA cooperation efforts in this domain consisted in the IBSAMAR exercises. With four editions carried out (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), always along the South African coastline, the exercises came to evidence the commitment of the three countries in seeking out interoperability and mutual understanding between their respective navies. More importantly, the Brazilian-South African relationship also benefited from the inherent symbolism attached to such a regular naval exercise:

> "*South Africa and Brazil, our relationships started with the first ATLASUR exercises, which is obviously with Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. That's been the basis of regular relation, even if was not just Brazil and South Africa, it was the interfacing there.* (…) *When IBSAMAR started, we had been operating with* [the Brazilian] *navy for fourteen years. When IBSAMAR started, it was not a showstopper; we* [already] *had experience together.* (…) *The first IBSAMAR was held off South Africa, under the command of a SA officer* [and so on, in the following years]. (…) *IBSAMAR is more symbolical* [than ATLASUR]*, there are no fault lines between Brazil and South Africa, there are no fault lines between India and South Africa. It's juts common purpose, to actually work together. The navies are making things happen*".[145]

Likewise, exchange of information within this group also contributed to enhance the Brazilian-South African partnership on the defence industrial level. By

[145] Interview with Rear Admiral Rusty Higgs, South African Navy Chief of Staff – Pretoria, 12/06/2014.

relying on such regular contacts, both countries were able to further explore and intensify this niche of cooperation:

> "*One thing that contributes to this* [the A-DARTER project] *is the IBSA drive. There's a defence subcommittee* (…) *the work done in the subcommittee helps to support the relationship between Brazil and SA*".[146]

Participation in ZOPACAS, however, enlisted less interest from a South African perspective. After the dismiss of Apartheid, South Africa joined the forum in 1994 and even hosted the IV Ministerial Meeting in Somerset West, where joint positions were adopted on transatlantic drug trafficking, the protection of the maritime environment and illegal fishing (United Nations General Assembly, 1996). Moreover, South African officials actively participated in the Luanda Ministerial Meeting in order to encourage the initial stages of the revitalisation process and thus ensure "that the Zone becomes a strong foundation for South-South solidarity in our fight for peace, sustainable development and democracy" (Pahad, 2007). That token of support, however, soon elapsed and the interest attributed to such a forum was downgraded, despite Brazil's efforts to draw a stronger South African reengagement with this particular arena:

> "*It's really confusing.* [South Africa's participation in ZOPACAS] *is not as intense as Brazil would like. I really don't understand, that is an issue I haven't been able to clear out. (...) There is no hidden interest from Brazil behind ZOPACAS, 'let's do ZOPACAS because I want'...it's just to improve relations, to increase exchanges,* [but] *South Africa does not take the* [next] *step forward with regards to that. The first time I saw South Africa mention ZOPACAS was in the meeting between the ministers but that's just because my minister* [Celso Amorim] *brought it up.* (…) *In terms of defence, everything is great, but regarding the political level I'm not sure if there is that interest. The enthusiasm is not the same. South Africa doesn't take the* [next] *step forward*".[147]

[146] Interview with Product Manager, Denel Dynamics – Centurion, 29/05/2014.

[147] Interview with Captain Ralph Dias Costa, Defence and Naval Attaché, Embassy of Brazil in South Africa – Pretoria, 29/04/2014.

Such perceptions that South Africa was reluctant in engaging more closely with ZOPACAS stems from two factors. On one hand, IBSA was considered a greater priority in terms of multilateral forums that dealt with nearby maritime areas, especially after having succeeded in establishing the IBSAMAR exercises. On the other hand, the scarcity of resources available and the dual geographic position of South Africa, in-between the Atlantic and the Indic Oceans, forced it to curtail its investment in other regional mechanism with less direct impact for its security interests. In that sense, from a local perspective, Brazil emerged as a useful actor that could informally represent South Africa in ZOPACAS, without requiring an oversized commitment:

> "*Brazil, in our engagements in the IBSA, does mention ZOPACAS. Brazil is of the view that is a good mechanism. We have been attending some of the meetings of that group. Of course, we want to be able to have access to information about what's happening so that we better prepare ourselves. So it is up really to any individual country, what its interests are going to be.* (…) [But] *sometimes you have to realise that South Africa can't do everything that it wishes to do.* (…) *We cannot spend too much of our resources looking too much to the South Atlantic. But Brazil as a partner, we would rely on Brazil to a greater extent because, you see, what's the value of a friendship, if you can't have your friends assist you when you need them? So, whatever way we are not able to reach, we will rely on the tight relationships we have. And Brazil is a very reliable partner, as far as South Africa is concerned.* (…) [Regarding ZOPACAS] *we are not in the position to devote too many resources because our main priority is here, on the southern waters. We would rely on the Brazilians because they know the institutional make-up of ZOPACAS, what its aims are and how it works better, and if all of that can be of benefit to South Africa and to IBSA, all the good*".[148]

The institutional context of IBSA, and more specifically, the work carried out within its inner initiatives, can be considered as relevant in sustaining the bilateral side of the equation between Brazil and South Africa. Inversely, and contrary to the

[148] Interview with Bereng Mtimkulu, Chief Director for Defence International Affairs, Department of Defence of South Africa – Pretoria, 17/06/2014.

other two countries analysed, ZOPACAS assumed only a secondary role, in a direct reflection of South Africa's dual geographic positioning and subsequent strategic interests spread throughout a wider oceanic area.

When considering the three countries analysed in this sub-section, it is evident that each came to participate, with varying degrees of involvement, in multiple international regimes where Brazil had an equal invested interest, all the while abiding by collective rules, procedures and initiatives. This subsequently triggered in every case important consequences for each bilateral defence relation, both in terms of further contacts and new joint activities.

V.2.2 Trust

Interstate relations comprise frequent arenas for the application of trust as a direct reflection of an intangible trait that can reduce the risk and uncertainly over the execution of measures while, simultaneously, producing the necessary conditions for the expansion of ties. To put it differently, trusting relationships among countries may develop when leaders enact policies that delegate control over their national interests based on the conviction that their respective counterparts are trustworthy (Hoffman, 2002: 377). In this context, the preferences of statesman and elites can help to influence the associated decisions. These preferences may either reflect their own domestic position, international contingencies and demands, or even "individual policy preferences about the issues in question, perhaps stemming from idiosyncratic 'first-image' factors like past political history or personal idealism" (Moravcsik, 1993a: 30).

Despite these delimitations, it is important to note that even though "trust manifests itself in the form [that] cooperation takes", "identifying trusting forms of cooperation requires indicators that are sensitive to its particular features" (Hoffman, 2002: 376). If the choice of partnering with Brazil in the defence domain is considered a discretion-granting measure over outcomes previously controlled by African states alone, then either (1) demonstrating that the authorities responsible for enacting such policies believed their counterparts to be trustworthy or (2) highlighting how sets of rules provided actors with varying degrees of decision-making latitude,

can prove instrumental in such kind of analyses. I pinpoint moments where incidences of trust, generated by past-shared experiences or by individuals – be that at the highest-level positions or in more direct contact with the specific reality on the ground – could have contributed to the development of each respective partnership with Brazil.

V.2.2.1 Angola

The most important factor that is claimed to corroborate Brazil's intentions towards Angola consists in the former's recognition of the latter's independence on November 11th 1975, ahead of the remaining international community. In a context where Brazil's African policy was still perceived as abiding to ties with Portugal and the defence of its remaining colonies in the continent, the Brazilian decision comprised both a significant break and a risk, due to the fluidity of the situation on the ground between the different factions vying for power (Pinheiro, 2007; Maro da Silva, 2008). Moreover, it defied a delicate equilibrium between civilian and military authorities in Brazil, which helps to explain the bundled aftermath as well as the hesitant bilateral relation afterwards. In the words of Ambassador Ovídio de Mello, at the time in charge of the Brazilian representation in Luanda:

> "*Brazil had wanted to arrive first to Luanda, had wanted to be the first to recognise, had sold to Angola, with exceptional willingness, the uniforms for the joint police created by the Nakuru agreements, had sent to Angola representatives from its shipyards to sell fishing boats, but after the Independence, now that the Brazilian Embassy was already set up, while the other ones would take months to install, Itamaraty seemed apathetic even to trade with Angola.* (…) [Still]*, in the conditions that Brazil lived under the authoritarian regime, the recognition of Angola, made under harsh difficulties, in my opinion, comes across as the most fearless gesture by the Brazilian foreign policy in all times*" (Mello, 2009: 137; 147).

The symbolism of the moment endured over the years as the central hallmark of bilateral relations and was brought back by Brazilian authorities as a sufficient

leitmotif for the increase of bilateral relations during the PT governments. Nearly every high-level speech by either Lula da Silva or Dilma Rousseff with regards to Angola, made explicit mention to the trust-building trait associated to such a past event, seeking to capitalise on the merits of the decision and further substantiate their political effort of reengagement:

> "*Maybe that is one of the happiest ironies of our common history: initially connected by oppression* [and] *far from one another for over a century, we found each other again on that heroic day of November 11th 1975. Having been the first country to recognise the Angolan independence comprised, undoubtedly, the finest page of Brazilian diplomacy in our relations with the African continent*" (Silva, 2003c).

> "*I was in Angola, in 2003, to personally express Brazil's determination in collaborating in such an undertaking* [the post-war reconstruction]. *I wanted to renew an alliance that goes back to the historical Brazilian decision of being the first country to hoist its flag in an independent Luanda. That gesture of confidence endured against the long years of uncertainty and civil war*" (Silva, 2005).

> "*In 1975, Brazil was the first country to recognise the independence of Angola. Today, we are reaffirming that bet*" (Silva, 2007).

> "*Our cooperation goes way back: since the heroic day of November 11th 1975, Brazil has given its contribution to the national effort of sovereignty, development, and democracy-building in this country. We want to continue down that road*" (Rousseff, 2011a)

However, the same emphasis cannot be found from an Angolan point of view. Discursively-speaking, when taking into consideration President José Eduardo dos Santos's available remarks concerning Brazil during the same period of analysis, such an event is outright omitted and never mentioned as anyway decisive for the current

state of relations (Santos, 2010; Santos, 2011). This does not necessarily translate into a denegation of its possible influence over the years. In this kind of situations, the "absence of such statements is not enough to indicate that policy-makers do not trust one another" (Hoffman, 2002: 376). Still, it signals different levels of importance attributed by both countries' authorities and an inherent dissociation over the political evaluation over its practical effects.

Meanwhile, the issue of presidential diplomacy, specifically centred on Lula da Silva, can be brought up as a possible generator of bilateral confidence. Often defined by the resort to direct negotiations between national presidents whenever a crucial decision has to be made or a critical conflict solved (Malamud, 2005), this trend of evident personal engagement by Brazilian key actors produced several concrete results in recent years, including making "foreign policy more subject to the whims of presidents" (Cason & Power, 2009: 139). In that sense, Lula da Silva's role in the revamping of relations with Angola is often pointed as responsible for bilateral progress in recent years. In fact, change in office in Brasília is not considered to have altered Brazil's stance in Angola in any meaningful way, for "what changed in Africa [with Dilma Rousseff]? Nothing. Lula is still here (…) Lula delivers".[149] Since leaving office, he returned in his personal capacity to Luanda in 2011 and 2014, while maintaining regular meetings with high-level Angolan authorities.

A third attempt of assessing the degree of bilateral trust can be based on rules indicators. Whenever two countries formalise a given relation by means of a written agreement, they can choose to either allow for more latitude or more restriction on the established procedures. Accordingly, "all things being equal, rules that provide actors the most leeway indicate trusting relationships" (Hoffman, 2002: 391). But in stark contrast with any other defence cooperation agreement signed during this period and already compared in Chapter III, the agreement signed in 2010 between Brazil and Angola included an additional provision. Under Article 11 concerning the application of national law, it was stated that, "the visiting part must respect the legislation and rules of the institutions from the host part" (Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2010: 6). A case could be made that by deeming necessary such kind of regulation on a relation presumed to be amicable enough to warrant cooperation in

[149] Interview with Brazilian businessmen – Luanda, 23/05/2014.

defence-related issues, that mechanism consists more of a "statute-oriented" agreement instead of a more loose "framework-oriented" one. The consequences of this distinction reside in the different tokens of trust attributed to each modality, which then implies calling into the question the trustworthiness of both parties over the success of this particular outcome.

However, general inferences concerning either the impact of previous historic events on present day dealings, the specific role of close presidential efforts or the underlined intention of extra-regulated formal agreements can only provide tentative clues. A more conclusive assessment over how Angola perceived Brazil as sufficiently trustworthy is difficult to reach without more concrete data, much less when regarding the defence domain.

V.2.2.2 Namibia

Ideal conditions for the intensification of ties between Brazil and Namibia can be traced back to the latter's pre-independence days, where the role of the South West Africa People Organisation's (SWAPO) historic leader, Sam Nujoma, is frequently highlighted. Lula da Silva made sure to stress on a number of occasions how he met with Sam Nujoma in Brazil before taking office and held regular contacts afterwards:

> "*I vividly recall our conversations during the 1980s, when I could identify in the then-SWAPO leader the same aspirations that have always been at the centre of my political concerns*" (Silva, 2003d).

> "*He is an old companion in the fight against discrimination, for the promotion of social and racial equality, for freedom and justice in our countries. He is also an old acquaintance of Brazil, where he has been numerous times, before becoming President of Namibia in 1990*" (Silva, 2004).[150]

[150] But even though the existence of PT's prior ties with SWAPO is acknowledged, it is debatable the extent and depth of those previous relations given that PT never seriously prioritised Africa in its internal foreign policy agenda until Lula da Silva's election in 2002 (Bellucci, 2010: 35-36; cf. Almeida, 2003: 87-102).

Until the late 1960's, Brazil followed a policy of "conscious pragmatism" towards Apartheid-ruled South Africa that implied a relative interest in fruitful bilateral relations with South Africa due to the economic potential that such a market represented amidst the African context. But as overall international condemnation increased and the former Portuguese colonies gained their independence after 1974, Brazil became more vocal in several international arenas while contemplating "Namibia's issue as another way of expressing its distancing policy towards Pretoria" (Penna Filho, 2008: 204; 265).

Any intended changes in tone and in action, however, were contingent on a fragile equilibrium between the Itamaraty and the Armed Forces, given the latter's lingering oversight during the final stages of Brazil's military regime. The issue of Namibia comprised no exception. As Brazil expressed greater engagement with on-going international negotiation efforts, it began to entertain the possibility of contributing military personnel to a potential UN transition mission for Namibia, in anticipation of yet another possible truce on the ground. By August 1982, the UN Secretary General even went as far as to extend a formal invitation to Brazil, which was welcomed by both Itamaraty and other civilian authorities (Folha de S. Paulo, 1982a; Folha de S. Paulo 1982b; Jornal do Brasil, 1982). But other officials did not share the same willingness, as the military branches made publically clear.[151]

Turf frictions notwithstanding, Itamaraty continued on pursuing the Namibian cause. For example, in 1984, Brazilian diplomats discretely organised a weeklong training workshop on mineral and fishing policies for a group of SWAPO representatives (including now-former President Hifikepunye Pohamba) in Rio de Janeiro.[152] On the other hand, Itamaraty started working more closely with a number of multilateral initiatives, as international pressure over South Africa increased.[153] But the most intense involvement came on November 1986, when Brazilian Minister of

[151] At one point, Itamaraty's inclinations towards having Brazil participate in an eventual international mission were even labelled as "rushed decisions" that lacked "good sense and opportunity" and therefore compromised the military's primary national security purpose (Folha de S. Paulo, 1982c)

[152] Interview with Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto, Sub-Secretary General of Policy III, Ministry of External Relations of Brazil – Brasília, 24/06/2013.

[153] In 1988, for instance, Brazil became an observer of the United Nations Council for Namibia while it kept on contributing regularly to the Nationhood Program for Namibia, the United Nations Institute for Namibia, the United Nations Fund for Namibia and, afterwards, to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (International Labour Office, 1990: 80).

External Relations Roberto Abreu Sodré met personally with Sam Nujoma in Luanda, in order to reiterate Brazil's support for SWAPO's struggle. That meeting would then pave the way for Nujoma's own trip to Brazil on March 13th of the following year.

At the time, President José Sarney chose to grant him a full official audience with the purpose of reinforcing Brazil's recognition of SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people. Moreover, initial inquiries were made over the possibility of some Brazilian cooperation expertise down the line, thus paving the way for a more formal request once Namibia's independence had been achieved (Netto, 1987). Lastly, and in order to accompany more closely developments in terms of UN involvement, a representation office was opened in Windhoek in 1988 as a precursor to a full-embassy post. But amidst these consecutive developments, the privileged interactions between SWAPO and PT still held considered influence:

> "[Personal relationships] *helped not quite a lot,* [but on] *a lot of things.* (…) *I mention President Lula because there are sometimes important relations people-to-people and our struggle was based on a labour-type of movement. The majority of our leaders were ordinary workers, you see, we had to go from the railway to go and fight and to become presidents…and of course we were friends of all labour movements and Lula was one of the labour movement leaders. Of course when he became president, the cooperation, not that it became stronger, it was more open in terms of consultation.*"[154]

These previous dealings were, in turn, considered instrumental by Namibian authorities as they ended up producing effects on the development of the defence cooperation relation:

> "*When Lula was there* [in office]*, he was very keen on Brazilian-African relation. President Lula, he was really keen on this and we started from there.* (…) *Eventually, to have something happen, an individual has to take a decision.*

[154] Interview with Marco Hausiku, Deputy-Prime Minister of Namibia – Windhoek, 06/05/2014.

> [For example] *when mister* [Celso] *Amorim was here, we discussed a lot of issues, especially in the maritime domain, and he was keen to assist, to help*".[155]

From a Namibian perspective, the underlined assessment indicates that previously established contacts in both a pre- and post-independence context as well as Brazil's previous involvement in the country's self-determination struggle incited a generally favourable political context, conducive to greater bilateral relations. In turn, this allowed sustaining a trustful environment between all parties, with direct benefits in terms of increased contacts in the defence domain.

V.2.2.3 South Africa

Within the Brazilian-South African partnership, it is possible to find particular emphasis on the role played by key officials over the years. In particular, the influence of successive Brazilian Ministers of Defence in triggering or unblocking progress towards a deeper defence cooperation relation is often lauded as crucial. As previously mentioned, the visit by Minister José Viegas Filho was considered the main catalyst for the inception of the A-DARTER program (cf. Silva, 2011: 68-70). However, after the signing of the overall defence cooperation agreement, direct contacts cooled off and many of the activities foreseen in 2003, including the organisation of a regular Joint Defence Committee was indefinitely postponed. Only after high-level changes in office back in Brazil, new developments started taking place:

> "*During Minister Jobim's time, it* [the bilateral relation] *slowly started to unfold and open up, and the Brazilians, they became interested. Until last year* [2013]*, when we had the first committee meeting, which was a tense affair, because nobody knew exactly what to expect from one another. But after the meeting, things unfolded and we trusted one another, it was the old classic*

[155] Interview with Nahas Angulas, Minister of Defence of Namibia – Windhoek, 07/05/2014.

> *confidence-building measure and that was established, things were opening up and we started understanding one another*".[156]

During this low profile period, the work carried out by Brazilian officials, entrusted with daily management of the defence cooperation relation, became an important component of Brazilian-South African relations. In particular, the choice of defence attachés assigned to Pretoria helped to lay the ground for further contacts with local authorities and overcome the obstacles derived from different socio-historical backgrounds:

> "*Our snag with Brazil is the Portuguese* [language] (…) *that has slowed things a bit. Admiral* [José Carlos] *Mathias was probably one of the most effective military diplomats here, from 2002 to 2005, he was on top of English, and his personality, you have to have the personality, the ability to operate here* (…) *the guys on top of English, make it easy for collaboration.*"[157]

But claims of mutual trust can be best evidenced in the context of a technicality that emerged from the delay in formalising the relationship, under the 2003 agreement. As an international legal mechanism, such framework required both parties' ratification in order to enter into force and thus legally bind the two countries. In the case of Brazil, ratification responsibilities fell on Congress while in South Africa such task was left to the Presidency, after a series of administrative steps. At one point, however, both countries realised that neither had completed the necessary formalities and that the contacts and exchanges already under way were taking place without the necessary legal support:

> "*I tabled* [the defence cooperation agreement] *in parliament, just to tick off the action, I sent in 2006 a note to notify them, to inform* [the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation] *DIRCO that I had*

[156] Interview with Shalk McDuling, Director for International Legal Instruments, Department of Defence of South Africa – Pretoria, 18/06/2014.

[157] Interview with Rear Admiral Rusty Higgs, South African Navy Chief of Staff – Pretoria, 12/06/2014.

tabled in parliament and they must now send a verbal note to the Brazilians, saying 'we [the Department of Defence] *have done this and, you know, in terms of our constitutional dispensation, we have fulfilled all the responsibilities'.* [However] *That became an issue in 2011, because DIRCO never informed the Brazilians, they never informed them* (…) *in French they call it a faux pas. In 2011, Brazil amended its domestic security* [regime, with implications on], *article 5* [of the defence agreement]*, regarding the protection of sensitive information. So obviously, we had to amend the existing defence cooperation agreement because of the changed dispensation in Brazil. So they sent us a requirement saying 'listen, we amended article 5, reads as follows'. So I said, 'OK fine, let's just do the amendment' and Brazil came back, 'yes but you know, actually this never entered into force'. So I went back to DIRCO and they realised the mistake: 'heavens, we have never done this, sorry, big problem, but the agreement never went into force'. So I said, 'it's not that easy, in terms of international law, it's not that easy. We, from the South African side, we have been acting in accordance to that agreement, as if the agreement had entered into force, so on that basis, we feel that the Brazilian side is bound by that agreement'* [as well]*. We were bounded. We regarded ourselves bounded by the agreement for so many years, since 2003*'.[158]

Regardless of the administrative hurdle, South African authorities still regarded the agreement as compulsory and swiftly proceeded to move forward with the required formalities, so that Brazil could, in turn, finish up its own process. The recognition that such a formal instrument was central for both countries interests drove all invested actors to adopt a blind eye on a clear irregularity and trust that neither part would take the opportunity to retract from the arrangement agreed upon ten years before:

"*For the sake of the relationship and because it is a very important relationship, we are not going and say 'oh now, it's a big problem, the defence cooperation never entered into force', because we need that agreement to be in force, as the backbone of our relationship.* (…) *But the Brazilians also realise*

[158] Interview with Shalk McDuling, Director for International Legal Instruments, Department of Defence of South Africa – Pretoria, 18/06/2014.

> *they could have also send back a note, to say to us 'we have gone through the process, we have tabled through parliament and for us, we now comply with everything'. The fact that DIRCO made a mistake, is 50% our mistake and* [50%] *the Brazilians.* (…) [During the Joint Defence Committee meeting] *the* [former Defence Attaché to South Africa] *admiral [Mathias] never made any reference to the invalid agreement. They regard it as binding; we regard it as binding.* (…) *I've told Admiral Mathias, 'Admiral this is what I'm doing, be aware of the fact that within the next two to three months, we are going to send you a note, signed by our minister and authorised by the president to say, yes we have amended the agreement in accordance with your security requirements in Brazil'. And he* [Admiral Mathias] *was happy, like, 'fine, fantastic, we are really happy with this, 100%, we are so happy that it can now go away and that you are complying with our security regulations'.* (…) *The Brazilians have been acting accordingly; we have been acting accordingly. So for all intents and purposes, despite the deficiency, we are now bounded by the agreement. And this is how we approached: because of the slight domestic inefficiency, it's not going to serve any purpose to jeopardise the whole relationship. The whole bilateral relationship would be jeopardised because this agreement never entered into force. And the amazing* [thing] *is that we have been spending money! We have been spending money on the relationship, based on this agreement that we signed*".[159]

This specific episode serves to demonstrate how a sizeable level of confidence between both parts prevented the unfolding of an agreement deemed vital for the success of the bilateral defence cooperation. As interests converged and as key officials acknowledged the opportunities behind the partnership that were still to be accomplished, new developments started to occur and the process was driven to fruition.

This sub-section focused on uncovering evidences of trust that could have further substantiate relations between Brazil and the respective African countries. That goal was possible to achieve with regards to Namibia and South Africa, where previously established contacts or the action of key officials played a part amidst

[159] Ibid.

transatlantic dealings. The case of Angola, however, does not allow for a similar confident assessment due to the scarcity of reliable data.

V.3 Chapter summary

The issue of African agency has gained new emphasis in recent years as part of a trend that recognises African states as capable enough to influence and dictate the terms of inter-state relations inasmuch as any other established or rising power (e.g. Brown & Harman, 2013; Corkin, 2013). In that context, being able to extract incentives and/or promises amidst a bargaining process reinforces such rationale. Drawing from the analysis above presented, it is possible to pinpoint several instances where traits of such a tacit bargaining can be observed.

The case of South Africa and the defence industrial partnership structured with Brazil around the A-DARTER missile comprises a case in point. Despite the medium-term expectations of a commonly usable military product, as a key interviewee pointed out, complains from Brazil's own defence industry over the investment in such a bi-national project were never entirely subdued. All things being equal, in cases where defence firms are natural competitors for the same export markets, classic supply/demand rules would expect a breakdown of the project from the inside out (Moravcsik, 1993b: 133-134). However, the opposite occurred as Brazil defied internal pressures. This political decision to endure with the project can be seen as a Brazilian acknowledgment of the reputational costs associated with retracting from the original endeavour. But it also signals the Brazilian recognition of the importance attributed by South Africa to such an initiative as a generator of the wider defence partnership.

Likewise, Namibia's insistence on completing the survey and delimitation of its shores and EEZ, as first agreed with Brazil back in 1994, points to a similar behaviour. The fact that such an operation was concluded after the start of Lula da Silva's first term allowed to finally addressed Namibia's most immediate concern and subsequently incite the defence partnership to evolve into other areas. Lastly, the same kind of dynamic is visible in the use of CPLP interactions by Angola as a springboard for a greater bilateral cooperation with Brazil. By first abiding to collective naval activities under the organisation's defence configuration, Angola was

able to explore increased cooperation in this domain with Brazil alone. These episodes serve to demonstrate how instead of accepting one-size-fits-all agreements and remain bystanders when outside powers arrive, offering their support, African countries drove a bargaining towards using formats or raising issues that they deemed more relevant or pressing for their own national interests.

Observing more closely the two hypotheses raised as well as each set of sub-dimensions, it is possible to draw the following conclusions. Firstly, there was no significant evidence that any kind of particular trade-off took place on the multilateral spectrum between Brazil and the three indicated African countries. Using UNGA voting data can warrant criticism (e.g. Dixon, 1981; Kennedy, 2006) but it nonetheless comprises a useful instrument to carry out long-range analysis of international voting behaviour, in an arena where countries are free to express their position as they see fit on a range of multiple areas. But as the results above presented show, voting convergence did not significantly increase during the decade of PT governments in Brazil, as it would be originally expected given the tighter defence cooperation relations with Angola, Namibia and South Africa. Small bursts of common voting were noticed in specific years, with Brazilian-Namibian exhibiting a more consistent increase of convergence. Still, in each case, the showcased trend did not match the more thorough engagement in transatlantic defence initiatives made during both Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff's period in office. Instead, it followed a pattern that can be traced back to previous political cycles. Hence, the development of defence cooperation ties was not necessarily associated with this particular bargaining chip and remained isolated from high-politics considerations.

Secondly, the provision of technical-scientific cooperation proved central for the consolidation and expansion of the partnerships analysed. Even though each case attests for its own specificities, both in time and in scope, all three countries exhibit a similar weight attributed to the supply of this kind of expertise and all three countries considered it a key element in their dealings with Brazil. Defence relations with Namibia and South Africa, for instance, clearly evolved at the same pace as the technical projects with Brazil came to fruition whereas Angola perceived support for its own local needs as a *sine qua non* for an overall defence understanding. Whether focused on the willingness to foment local defence industry complexes, provide maritime delimitation technology and capabilities, or embark on joint design and

production of military hardware, this specific kind of cooperation paved the road for wider initiatives in the defence domain. Inherently, it 'sweetened the pot' of available Brazilian cooperation.

Thirdly, previous or simultaneous interactions within different international regimes that encompass a regional context of common interest enabled the pooling of resources as well the sharing of experiences and sensitive information between all parts. More importantly, all three African countries recognised the contribution of the ASA summits, CPLP, IBSA and ZOPACAS in triggering subsequent defence-related initiatives on a national level. The Angolan case, for one, shows how the escalation of Brazilian support for the revitalisation of ZOPACAS came to be considered key in relations between the two countries, while fomenting further defence exchanges. Often enough, though, one multilateral solution prevailed over the other. For example, even though ZOPACAS incited far less interest, South Africa compensated by leaning on the work carried out under IBSA. Inversely, despite the ASA summits tenuous record on defence issues, Namibia came to perceive the ZOPACAS Brazilian-led push as a more useful opportunity to bring up and discuss its own strategic concerns. This, in turn, demonstrates that by engaging multilaterally, these countries collected dividends bilaterally, as it provided them with an additional assurance in terms of how Brazil would proceed in this area.

Fourthly, the issue of trust can prove a difficult element to verify and adequately confirm as meaningful in this kind of relations. Lack of more concrete data with regards to Angola, for instance, leaves the question open over its actual influence in the process of advancing increased defence contacts. However, not being able to corroborate such a claim does not necessarily equate to the non-inexistence or non-influence of trustful traits in this particular case. Rather, it only substantiates a need for further research. Still, when identifiable in the other two countries, collected evidence does point to sizeable degrees of trust garnered over the years, which not only helped to maintain the overall relation but also allowed circumventing unexpected hurdles. Whether falling back on privileged political party connections, as was the case with Namibia, or benefiting from key interlocutors, as it happened in South Africa, both cases highlight an incrementally slow process in which the gains sowed in previous years were reaped and used in later stages of the relation with Brazil.

When taking these conclusions into account, the main hypothesis can be considered only partially confirmed, thus demonstrating that material factors do not necessarily hold the balance of these specific bargaining processes in absolute terms. Immaterial dimensions of bilateral and multilateral relations should instead complement explanations for the choice of partners by African states.

Conclusion

The context for Brazilian-African relations changed considerably between 2003 and 2014. Previous attempts to reach out to the continent comprised only occasional bursts of engagement, without enough political cohesiveness to sustain long-term prospects. Support for a lingering Portuguese presence in Africa further compromised any envisioned appeal across the continent. When taking this background into consideration, the contrast with the long-term efforts sought out during the PT governments becomes noticeable. By promoting a common South-South agenda, inciting economic and trade opportunities, and expanding development assistance flows towards Africa, Brazil was able to turn a new page. The simultaneous increase on all three areas substantiated the notion of a cross-governmental push by Brazilian authorities, aimed at effectively expanding ties with African countries. As demonstrated in Chapter I, the official rhetoric broadcasted during Lula da Silva's two terms matched the results obtained. And despite increased economic woes and a bleaker outlook during Dilma Rousseff's first government, the capitalisation of previous dividends allowed Brazilian officials to maintain a narrative of continuity until the end of her first term, in 2014.

But amidst general analyses of Brazilian-African relations, defence cooperation ties never warranted any specific focus. Such a research gap becomes visible when confronted with Brazil's employment of resources based on traditional military assets, as part of the country's dealings with the continent. More importantly, such cooperation features expanded in recent years while enshrined by a wider agenda of strategic imperatives, driving Brazil towards the South Atlantic. The existence of more materialistic goals behind Brazil's approach towards Africa than what was previouslly perceived, can thus be underscored.

At its core, defence cooperation initiatives were construed as stepping-stones towards greater regional connections, in which Brazil vied to consolidate its emerging leadership. The use of a regional security complex framework, as laid out in Chapter II, allows to highlight the role of pivot countries in advancing such kind of regional dynamics. Moreover, the evident securitisation emphasis of the Brazilian official narrative towards the South Atlantic surfaced in reflexion of a consistent agenda,

aimed at fuelling concerns over common security risks, both within and outside of the area. These leitmotifs, in turn, warranted a redefinition of multilateral relations, preferably structured around a reenergised ZOPACAS. However, such a vision of what the nearby maritime area ought to become, remained a Brazilian ideal-type scenario. Envisioned community-related projects were not necessarily accepted on equal terms or with corresponding interest by remaining countries. Instead, Brazilian defence cooperation initiatives made more inroads on the bilateral domain, whether in terms of high-level contacts, formal cooperation agreements, military training, equipment sales and donations, or exercises and good-will visits. Chapter III provided the first systematic analysis of this reality and showcased its exponential growth throughout the indicated timeframe.

Meanwhile, it is possible to deconstruct the country's reasoning for engaging in such kind of endeavours. This thesis compared two competing but not mutually exclusive hypotheses in Chapter IV, with the purpose of ascertaining the weight of geopolitical or economic factors amidst the Brazilian decision-making process. The latter factors found substantial ground in a later period. As new business opportunities for the national defence industry emerged and as the different structures of the Brazilian government pursued a more holistic approach towards Africa, the economic focus became more centred on South Atlantic countries. However, confirming initial expectations, geopolitical considerations proved more decisive in triggering and sustaining defence cooperation initiatives. That was evident on two accounts. On one hand, the impact of threat perceptions instilled by both Northern and non-state actors, generated awareness in Brazil over the country's vulnerability and dependence on external support, in order to cope with such potential security challenges. On the other hand, the foreign policy emphasis on the goals of international redistribution and recognition granted the country with an official thread that justified exploring renewed multilateral options, under a South-South aegis. To provide defence cooperation opportunities in the South Atlantic thus equated to both a reaction to external developments and a mobilisation of its foreign policy options. Given how such a dynamic of externally based elements unfolded in a spill-over form, the main proposed hypothesis is considered fully validated.

Often regarded as secondary actors in international relations, African states also find sustentation in this analysis as influencing players in their own right. Once

the agency of these countries is recognised and their perceptions of the world are acknowledged, it becomes easier to identify both continuities and discontinuities in their external behaviour (Nel, 2010: 952). When faced with a plethora of potential partners, such countries are able to extract concessions, recur to multilateral instruments or express preference for issues that they deem more in tune with their own national agendas. Following such premises, Chapter V sampled three South Atlantic countries, namely Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. It then contrasted the role of material and social factors in a bid to unpack the reasoning for choosing Brazil as a defence partner and not other available alternatives. The former elements exhibited ambivalent results. Although Brazilian technical-scientific cooperation was considered central amidst each bilateral relation, no significant evidence of a trade-off was found in a shared multilateral platform such as the UNGA. Inversely, and despite the lack of conclusive data over Angola, the abidance by rules and initiatives from common international regimes and the degrees of trust garnered over the years proved more consensual than initially anticipated. The verification that all three countries deemed both material and immaterial factors as relevant in their selection of foreign partners implies an adjustment to the original proposed hypothesis and, at best, only its partial confirmation.

The operationalisation of extensive interviews with key officials and original data resulted in the following main findings. Firstly, Brazil's rekindled defence interest beyond its maritime borders from 2003-onwards can be primarily understood as a reactive process in the face of international contingencies. These external developments represented both perils and opportunities for further Brazilian engagement. But they also evidence how the planning and execution of national priorities is permeable to the country's immediate surroundings, while driven by multiple internal actors with different policy tools at their disposal. In other words, it casts a new light on Brazilian decision-making dynamics, with regards to both the development of the national defence sector and its projection abroad.

Secondly, instead of accepting one-size-fits-all cooperation agreements, African states may drive a non-formal bargaining and obtain additional benefits. The acknowledgement of this reality holds particular significance for Brazilian insertions in the continent. Inasmuch as Africa is frequently but wrongly perceived as a single unitary actor, South Atlantic countries hold considerable political, economic and

strategic differences amongst each other. Their followership or subscription of Brazilian endeavours is therefore neither pre-determined nor automatic, which helps to explain occasional mismatched expectations. But it also helps to understand how Brazil tailored its approach and capitalised on its assets according to each envisioned partner, in order to try and secure successful outcomes.

Finally, this thesis posits that the research focus in Brazilian-African studies is too exclusively centred on previous vectors of analysis. That can lead different scopes of the transatlantic relation to be overlooked. Reframing the debate in order to include defence cooperation initiatives and their evolution over recent years allows to grasp how Brazil used its resources towards influencing security outcomes in the South Atlantic. In other words, unpacking Brazilian-African interactions in a wholesome fashion requires acknowledging that Brazilian defence concerns were matched with an active and increased cooperation with African countries in terms of developing their local capabilities, so that Brazil's own interests were reflexively assured.

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Annex I

List of interviews

The dataset of interviews targeted 69 individuals and vied for a geographic scope that included Angola (7), Brazil (38), Cape Verde (1), Namibia (10), Portugal (3), and South Africa (10). Details concerning identification, office held at the time of the interview, date and location of the interview, length, and methods of recording are presented and organised by country and, subsequently, by date of interview.

Table VIII - List of interviews

Interviewee	Position	Date/Location	Length	Record
Angola				
Coronel Gerson Freitas	Defence Attaché to Angola Embassy of Brazil	16/05/2014 Luanda, Angola	50m	Audio recording and notes
Renato Azevedo	Director-General Galp Energia Angola	16/05/2014 Luanda, Angola	44m	Audio recording and notes
Brigadier Manuel Correia de Barros	Deputy CEO Strategic Studies Centre of Angola	20/05/2014 Luanda, Angola	1h 02m	Audio recording and notes
Coronel Pedro Sozinho	Directorate of International Relations Ministry of Defence of Angola	21/05/2014 Luanda, Angola	-	Unrecorded
Margarida Izata	Director, Directorate of Multilateral Affairs Ministry of External	22/05/2014 Luanda, Angola	20m	Audio recording and notes

	Relations of Angola			
Esmeralda Mendonça	Head of South America Department Ministry of External Relations of Angola	22/05/2014 Luanda, Angola	23m	Audio recording and notes
-	Brazilian businessman	23/05/2014 Luanda, Angola	-	Unrecorded
Brazil				
Coronel Antoine Wardini	Defence Attaché to Brazil Embassy of Senegal	22/04/2013 Brasília, Brazil	-	Unrecorded
Major-General Daniel Mofokeng	Defence Attaché to Brazil Embassy of South Africa	26/04/2013 Brasília, Brazil	40m	Audio recording
Lieutenant-General António Lemos	Defence Attaché to Brazil Embassy of Angola	30/04/2013 Brasília, Brazil	-	Unrecorded
Daniel Pereira	Ambassador of Cape Verde to Brazil	06/05/2013 Brasília, Brazil	47m	Audio recording
General-Brigadier Chris Jemitola	Defence Attaché to Brazil Embassy of Nigeria	07/05/2013 Brasília, Brazil	-	Unrecorded
Vice-Admiral Edlander Santos	Director, Department of Staff, Teaching and Cooperation Ministry of Defence of	09/05/2013 Brasília, Brazil	35m	Audio recording

	Brazil			
Brigadier Euclides Gonçalves	Director, Department for Defence Products Ministry of Defence of Brazil	15/05/2013 Brasília, Brazil	15m	Audio recording
Captain Adalmir de Almedia	Department for Defence Products Ministry of Defence of Brazil	15/05/2013 Brasília, Brazil	-	Unrecorded
Celso Amorim	Minister of Defence of Brazil	15/05/2013 Brasília, Brazil	47m	Audio recording and notes
General Aderico Mattioli	Director, Department for Cataloguing Ministry of Defence of Brazil	15/05/2013 Brasília, Brazil	1h 33m	Audio recording and notes
Andrew di Simone	Corporate Affairs Vale	24/05/2013 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	1h 01m	Audio recording and notes
-	Foreign Trade Manager BNDES	24/05/2013 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	54m	Audio recording and notes
Admiral Walter da Silva	Administrative-Financial Director EMGEPRON	25/05/2013 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	35m	Audio recording
Thomaz Zannotto	Vice-president FIESP-COSCEX	28/05/2013 São Paulo, Brazil	35m	Audio recording
Anastácio	Director	28/05/2013	1h 10m	Audio

Katsanos	FIESP-COMDEFESA	São Paulo, Brazil		recording and notes
Vice-Admiral Carlos Pierantoni Gambôa	Executive Vice-President ABIMDE	29/05/2013 São Paulo, Brazil	37m	Audio recording
Paulo Lima	Manager for Bilateral Cooperation with PALOP and East Timor Brazilian Cooperation Agency	03/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	1h 04m	Audio recording and notes
-	Adviser, CAMEX-GTEX Africa Ministry of Development, Foreign Trade and Industry	05/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	44m	Audio recording and notes
Rubem Gama	Director, Department of Trade Promotion and Investments Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	06/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	55m	Audio recording and notes
Rodrigo Baena Soares	General-Coordinator for Defence Issues Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	10/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	40m	Audio recording
General Sérgio Etchegoyen	Director, Department-General for Personnel Brazilian Army	11/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	1h 10m	Audio recording
Marcia Westphalen	Manager APEX	11/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	1h 03m	Audio recording

Paulo André Lima	Coordinator for CPLP Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	12/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	57m	Audio recording
Admiral Carlos Augusto de Souza	Head of Strategic Affairs Ministry of Defence of Brazil	13/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	41m	Audio recording
Nelson Pellegrino	Parliamentarian, Chair of CREDN Chamber of Deputies	13/06/2015	12m	Interview by phone / Audio recording
Pedro Cardoso	Head of Division, Africa II Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	14/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	44m	Audio recording
Glivânia de Oliveira	Director, Department for International Organisations Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	17/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	1h 06m	Audio recording
-	Manager EMBRAER	17/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	30m	Audio recording
-	Brazilian diplomat Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	18/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	48m	Audio recording
André Baker	Head of Division, Africa I Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	20/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	59m	Audio recording

António Portugal	Consultant Camargo Corrêa	21/06/2013	-	Responses in written
Tatiana Prazeres	Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade	21/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	44m	Audio recording and notes
-	Manager Odebrecht	21/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	-	Unrecorded
-	Manager OAS	23/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	-	Unrecorded
Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto	Sub-secretary General for Policy III Ministry of External Relations of Brazil	24/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	59m	Audio recording and notes
-	Manager Andrade Gutierrez	25/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	-	Unrecorded
-	Manager ABDI	29/06/2013 Brasília, Brazil	37m	Audio recording
Nelson Jobim	Former-Minister of Defence of Brazil	13/10/2014 São Paulo, Brazil	1h 11m	Audio recording and notes
Cape Verde				
Jorge Tolentino	Minister of Defence of Cape Verde	18/12/2014 Lisbon, Portugal	18m	Audio recording and notes

Namibia				
Linda Scott	Deputy Director, Department of Multilateral Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Namibia	02/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	1h 10m	Audio recording
Captain Roberto de Assis	Defence Attaché to Namibia Embassy of Brazil	06/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	1h 05m	Audio recording and notes
Marco Hausiku	Deputy-Prime Minister of Namibia	06/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	46m	Audio recording
Nahas Angulas	Minister of Defence of Namibia	07/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	25m	Audio recording
Fernando Mello	Deputy-Head of Mission to Namibia Embassy of Brazil	08/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	1h 26m	Audio recording and notes
Simone-Daniele Manetti	Brazil Desk Officer, Department of Bilateral Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Namibia	09/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	1h	Audio recording
Peya Mushelenga	Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Namibia	12/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	20m	Audio recording
-	Brazilian businessman	12/05/2014 Windhoek,	-	Unrecorded

		Namibia		
Taarah Shaanika	CEO Namibian Chamber of Commerce and Industry	13/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	35m	Audio recording
Martin Davis	CFO HRT Africa	14/05/2014 Windhoek, Namibia	27m	Audio recording
Portugal				
Augusto Santos Silva	Former-Minister of Defence of Portugal	10/09/2013 Lisbon, Portugal	56m	Audio recording and notes
João Gomes Cravinho	Former-Secretary of State for Foreign Relations and Cooperation of Portugal	14/09/2013 Lisbon, Portugal	19m	Audio recording
Luis Amado	Former-Minister of Foreign Relations of Portugal	21/10/2013 Lisbon, Portugal	49m	Audio recording and notes
South Africa				
Captain Ralph Dias da Costa	Defence Attaché to South Africa Embassy of Brazil	29/04/2014 Pretoria, South Africa	1h 20m	Audio recording and notes
Carlos Alfonso Puente	Deputy-Head of Mission to South Africa Embassy of Brazil	30/04/2014 Pretoria, South Africa	57m	Audio recording and notes
-	Manager BNDES Africa	27/05/2014 Johannesburg, South Africa	38m	Audio recording

Coronel Valter Malta	Chief of GAC-AFS A-DARTER Joint Programme Team	29/05/2014 Centurion, South Africa	25m	Audio recording
-	Product Manager Denel Dynamics	29/05/2014 Centurion, South Africa	20m	Audio recording
Thando Nyawose	Sub-Director for MERCOSUL and Brazil Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa	04/06/2014 Pretoria, South Africa	27m	Audio recording
Johann Kellerman	Director for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa	11/06/2014	-	Responses in written
Rear Admiral Rusty Higgs	South African Navy Chief of Staff	12/06/ 2014 Pretoria, South Africa	1h 02m	Audio recording
Bereng Mtimkulu	Chef Director for Defence International Affairs Department of Defence of South Africa	17/06/2014 Pretoria, South Africa	1h 04m	Audio recording and notes
Shalk McDulling	Director for International Legal Instruments	18/06/2014 Pretoria, South	1h 10m	Audio recording and notes

	Department of Defence of South Africa	Africa		

Annex II

Convergence and cohesion results

Using Strezhnev and Voeten's database (2013), a total of 1291 UGA resolutions put to a roll-call vote during the fifty through the sixty-seventh sessions (1995 through 2012) were extracted for the purpose of this thesis. The numerical results for convergence between Brazil and Angola at the UNGA through 1995 to 2012 are presented in greater detail in Table IX.

Table IX - UNGA Convergence Brazil-Angola (1995-2012)

Year	Nr. of resolutions extracted	Nr. of resolutions with votes by both countries	Total voting agreement	Partial voting agreement	Opposite voting	Convergence $\frac{\left(f+\frac{1}{2}g\right)}{t} \times 100$
1995	79	34	26	8	0	88
1996	76	68	58	10	0	93
1997	70	47	41	6	0	94
1998	62	56	48	6	2	91
1999	68	65	55	9	1	92
2000	67	51	44	7	0	93
2001	67	59	50	9	0	92
2002	73	65	56	9	0	93
2003	74	64	52	12	0	91
2004	72	53	44	9	0	92
2005	74	34	28	6	0	91
2006	87	78	69	9	0	94
2007	77	49	42	7	0	93
2008	76	70	65	5	0	96
2009	65	62	60	2	0	98
2010	66	60	56	4	0	97
2011	68	55	50	4	1	95
2012	70	62	62	5	0	95

The numerical results for convergence between Brazil and Namibia at the UNGA through 1995 to 2012 are presented in Table X.

Table X - UNGA convergence Brazil-Namibia (1995-2012)

Year	Nr. of resolutions extracted	Nr. of resolutions with votes by both countries	Total voting agreement	Partial voting agreement	Opposite voting	Convergence $\frac{\left(f+\frac{1}{2}g\right)}{t} \times 100$
1995	79	49	36	12	1	93
1996	76	60	48	12	0	90
1997	70	67	57	10	0	93
1998	62	57	49	7	1	92
1999	68	67	56	11	0	92
2000	67	64	56	8	0	94
2001	67	60	51	9	0	93
2002	73	61	53	8	0	93
2003	74	71	61	10	0	93
2004	72	70	61	9	0	94
2005	74	72	63	9	0	94
2006	87	84	76	8	0	95
2007	77	68	63	5	0	96
2008	76	72	65	7	0	95
2009	65	60	54	6	0	95
2010	66	43	40	3	0	97
2011	68	62	62	3	1	96
2012	70	59	59	51	0	96

The numerical results for convergence between Brazil and South Africa at the UNGA through 1995 to 2012 are presented in Table XI.

Table XI - UNGA convergence Brazil-South Africa (1995-2012)

Year	Nr. of resolutions extracted	Nr. of resolutions with votes by both countries	Total voting agreement	Partial voting agreement	Opposite voting	Convergence $\frac{\left(f+\frac{1}{2}g\right)}{t} \times 100$
1995	79	78	72	6	0	96
1996	76	73	66	7	0	95
1997	70	68	61	6	1	94
1998	62	61	54	7	0	94
1999	68	66	56	10	0	92
2000	67	66	59	6	1	94
2001	67	63	50	13	0	90
2002	73	72	64	7	1	94
2003	74	70	60	9	1	92
2004	72	70	60	10	0	93
2005	74	72	65	7	0	95
2006	87	85	75	10	0	94
2007	77	76	69	7	0	95
2008	76	74	67	7	0	95
2009	65	64	59	5	0	96
2010	66	64	61	3	0	98
2011	68	63	58	3	2	94
2012	70	63	63	5	0	96

As elaborated in chapter I, four different measures were adopted with regards to calculations over ZOPACAS cohesion, with the purpose of providing additional

corroboration to the results obtained. Table XII presents the results reached with each specific measure.

Table XII - UNGA cohesion ZOPACAS (1995-2012)

Nr. of resolutions extracted	Year	Measures of cohesion			
		AI (Annual mean)	CI (Annual mean)	CII (Annual mean)	DR (Annual mean)
79	1995	0,95	85,86	83,78	9,84
76	1996	0,95	87,10	82,47	10,09
70	1997	0,96	88,48	86,25	8,47
62	1998	0,97	91,33	87,38	6,77
68	1999	0,96	89,55	86,02	7,74
67	2000	0,97	92,09	89,34	6,10
67	2001	0,97	90,77	89,06	6,39
73	2002	0,98	93,08	91,11	4,82
74	2003	0,97	92,95	91,33	5,16
72	2004	0,97	91,52	90,39	5,47
74	2005	0,97	90,63	89,56	6,12
87	2006	0,97	92,56	91,05	5,60
77	2007	0,97	91,71	88,55	6,30
76	2008	0,96	89,59	87,58	6,77
65	2009	0,97	92,91	89,28	6,11
66	2010	0,96	90,99	86,58	7,17
68	2011	0,97	90,63	86,44	6,78
70	2012	0,97	92,99	87,80	6,10