_ISCSP
INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE
CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS E POLÍTICAS
UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA

U LISBOA | UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA

Beyond the Security Drama

Rethinking Humanitarian Scenes within a More Critical Approach

Lucien Vilhalva de Campos

Orientador: Prof. Doutor Marcos Farias Ferreira

Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Relações Internacionais

Lisboa
2021

WWW.ISCSP.ULISBOA.PT

VALORIZAMOS PESSOAS

_ISCSP
INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE
CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS E POLÍTICAS
UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA

U LISBOA | UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA

Beyond the Security Drama: Rethinking Humanitarian Scenes within a More Critical Approach

Lucien Vilhalva de Campos

Orientador: Prof. Doutor Marcos Farias Ferreira

Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Relações Internacionais

Júri

Presidente:

- Doutor António Costa de Albuquerque de Sousa Lara, Professor Catedrático e membro do Conselho Científico do Instituto de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa

Vogais:

- Doutor Fernando Rui de Sousa Campos, Professor Associado Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias;
- Doutora Maria de Fátima Calça Amante, Professora Associada Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa;
- Doutora Maria João Militão Ferreira de Sousa Pereira, Professora Associada Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa;
- Doutor Marcos Farias Ferreira, Professor Auxiliar com Agregação Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa, orientador;
- Doutora Daniela Rute Santos Nascimento, Professor Auxiliar Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra;
- Doutora Maria Francisca Alves Ramos de Gil Saraiva, Professora Auxiliar Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa;

Lisboa
2021

Acknowledgments

Writing this dissertation has taken me long, exhausting and stressful work hours that would not have been possible without the support of those people around me who believed in my potential. For this reason I am grateful to everyone who has given me the gift of their time or support from the beginning of my studies in international relations. I would like to thank my parents, Solange and Claudino, for their love, encouraging and understanding in dealing with this painful distance we have been facing since 2014. They have always motivated me to use my knowledge and educational background not only to recognize my privileged status as a white hetero male, but also to fight against the injustices and make a significant contribution to sociopolitical developments. Indeed, without their help during the course of my education, this dissertation would have never been possible.

My love also goes to my beautiful wife Sophia, who makes my life even better no matter what happens. I thank her and her family, Petra, Ralf and Elisa End, for being always there for me. Their hospitality, fondness, care, trust, patience and compassion have made me feel way more confident to finish my PhD. I definitely carry their support with me now, and I will be forever grateful to them. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Marcos Farias Ferreira, who has been sharing his knowledge by providing me with careful comments since 2015, when he gave me lectures in the specialization course of Crisis and Humanitarian Action at the University of Lisbon. Therefore, for all his guidance throughout these years, I am very appreciative.

I offer my deepest gratitude to Prof. Fernando Campos, who was my Master's thesis supervisor and granted me interesting advises to find my way through this study. Special thanks must go to the Professors Raquel Freitas and Francisca Saraiva, who, along with Prof. Fernando Campos, appraised my early research interests. I am also indebted to the Maria Isabel de Castro Lima, my former English Professor at the University of Southern Santa Catarina, who patiently revised my English. I acknowledge all the benefits gained from the discussions and exchanges they have given me along the way. My gratitude goes to Prof. Marc Ziegele, who gave me the opportunity to develop a research stay as visiting fellow at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf. This unique opportunity means a major turning point for my academic career. It is an enormous privilege to learn from and write with him.

I wish to thank my relatives and friends who I left in Brazil, in particular my grandmother Lina, my aunts Ana Neris, Cleide, Jussara, Marina, Zilá and Eliane, my uncles Adão, Armando, Beto, Newton, Thedy and Ramires, my cousins Elizandra and Everton, and my beloved friends Camila B., Cristiano, Daniel, Elissa, Ligiane, Paola, Sthefano and Willian. I am sure this vast ocean that separates us means nothing compared to our years of friendship. I would also like to thank some of my friends living in Portugal, specially Fabiane, Francisco, Julinho, Mirella, Murilo, Philip and Rafael. I am glad that I shared with all of you the best of my memories of this wonderful city of seven hills called Lisbon.

My deepest gratitude to my friends in Africa, particularly Edmilson, Josivaldo and Mikas. I hope I will visit them soon. And last, but not least, my warm thanks to the people who, along with my wife and her family, made Germany my new *Heimat*, particularly Abraham, Ali, Alwina, Fred, Alexandros and Zena, Simon and Alina. I thank you for the pleasurable moments that we spend together, for the distraction and for reminding me that there is life outside the university.

Abstract

Associating both the subject and object of this study with the dramaturgical world, *Beyond the Security Drama* aims to critically contextualize discourses, rhetoric, characters, behaviors, roles, performative capacities, choices, and decisions of constitutive actors of what is here defined as the political theater of international relations. Within this political theater, I argue that its constitutive actors play humanitarian scenes, with a restricted club of them performing on the stage and manifesting a dramaturgical language of security which is involved by particular discourses of Other and constructions of threats.

Whereas the latter can create dramatic impacts in the humanitarian scenes, some keywords and key concepts become security labels as the performers attempt to convince the audience to take action in favor to their self-centered interests and the preservation of their own form of existence. These discourses are reproduced on the political stage, and they play a fundamental role in the universe of the theater and the collective imagination of the audience. Manifesting a dramaturgical language of security, the restricted club of performers create what is called the security drama, which does not only materialize the historical power dynamics within the political theater, but discloses a set of characters, behaviors, and performative capacities in and around the humanitarian scenes. Language, choices and decisions made by the performers are parameters that prescribe the security drama, but they might also be useful for a reflexive interpretation of the audience to rethink security.

In critically exploring the concept of security and its dramaturgical language, this dissertation involves itself with one setting of analysis and four defining actors: the knowledge (what must be properly spoken on the political stage), the performers (the ones able to speak), the audience (spectators in the auditorium able to listen and eventually speak by emancipatory means), the victims of the drama (the excluded groups located outside the theater; unable to listen and to be listened) and the intermediate actors (independent channels of communication playing an activist role due to their ability to encourage enough of the audience to achieve its emancipatory aspirations). Although all of these four actors are examined, the audience and its constitutive multiple publics come to considered the most fundamental sphere of analysis in the course of the following dissertation.

It is about subjectively analyzing the security drama that the combination of praxeological and historical-sociological methods enable me to consider multiple publics in the audience as sources that develop immanent possibilities for change; towards a more dialogic relationship with the performers characterized by a less securitized narrative. These immanent possibilities of changing the course of the security drama are expected to include what I call the ‘excluded realities,’ i.e., the ‘forgotten worlds’ of the victims of the drama existing outside the theater and marginalized by the leading roles on the stage. To sustain this assumption, the dissertation is committed with praxeology, history, and sociology. These methods foreground my critical theorizing of IR, and they also enlighten my preference for stressing a couple of contributions of desecuritization undertaken by free and emancipated multiple publics of the Western audience.

Desecuritization is best described in the following study as political and social expressions carried out by free people (multiple publics of the audience) having emancipatory aspirations that would, among other things, call for the move of securitized humanitarian issues back to the normal haggling of politics. Therefore, aiming to set the audience and the excluded groups free from what I call dystopian security drama, I highlight some desecuritizing moves as immanent possibilities for enough of the Western audience to rethink the humanitarian scenes played by American, European and Israeli leading roles.

As the study demonstrates, most of desecuritizing moves identified in these three humanitarian scenes can still be found at the micro level of collective actions undertaken by a few Western civil society groups. Indeed, these collective actions belong to what I refer to as an emancipatory project, and they must be further stimulated, because only a renewed thinking of human emancipation followed by activism can make enough of the audience to acknowledge that the victims of the security drama should never be feared, threatened, or labeled.

Keywords: Security drama, humanitarian scenes, performers, dramaturgical language, audience, desecuritizing moves, human emancipation.

Resumo versão estendida

Associando tanto o tema quanto o objeto de estudo da presente dissertação com o mundo dramatúrgico, *Além do Drama da Segurança* pretende contextualizar criticamente os discursos, a natureza, os papéis e as capacidades performativas dos atores constituintes do que se chama de teatro político das relações internacionais. Dentro deste teatro político, argumenta-se que seus atores constituintes representam cenas humanitárias, com um clube restrito de atores no palco que manifesta uma linguagem dramatúrgica de segurança internacional de acordo com discursos que facilitam ações e práticas, definem o possível e o impossível, e constroem noções de ameaças existenciais e de um inimigo a ser combatido.

Discursos particulares do Outro e construções de ameaças existenciais moldam o comportamento dos atores no palco, fazendo com que eles atuem de um jeito e não de outro, privilegiando algumas questões em detrimento de outras, adquirindo vários desiquilíbrios no teatro político. Tendo em vista que estes discursos podem criar impactos dramáticos nas cenas humanitárias, conceitos-chave se tornam sub-rótulos de segurança enquanto os atores tentam convencer o público a aceitar medidas securitizadoras. Estes sub-rótulos de segurança são produzidos e reproduzidos através de uma linguagem dramatúrgica, e desempenham papéis centrais no universo das relações internacionais e na imaginação coletiva do público. Estabelecendo um tal de 'regime da verdade' que corresponde somente as intenções de um grupo de atores em particular, e não ao bem comum, a securitização molda o nosso pensar sobre a forma que enxergamos o teatro e o comportamento dos atores.

Certamente, o drama da segurança não materializa somente as dinâmicas de poder dentro do teatro político como também revela um conjunto de personagens complexos em torno das cenas humanitárias. Portanto, retórica, comportamento e intenções governamentais são consequências deste drama que trabalha em prol daqueles que detêm o poder da manipulação. Sustentado por uma linguagem dramatúrgica e sub-rótulos de segurança, o drama da segurança é aqui descrito como distópico, pois ele viabiliza o exercício de medidas extraordinárias que são responsáveis por exacerbar o sofrimento humano, como se estas medidas fossem as únicas alternativas disponíveis para manter a sobrevivência dos atores no palco e do público nas tribunas.

Dentro deste drama, os atores protagonistas clamam pelo direito de tomar qualquer medida necessária para remover as ameaças que eles mesmos criaram. Ações repressivas e práticas intervencionistas que intensificam o sofrimento humano das vítimas deste drama se tornam justificáveis (até mesmo sob a luz do direito internacional), sempre em nome da segurança dos atores mais poderosos e que se encontram em posições mais privilegiadas. Este processo viabilizador de medidas extraordinárias dá-se por garantido através de fatores históricos, religiosos, sociais, econômicos e políticos explorados no decorrer deste estudo.

Ao explorar-se o conceito de segurança e sua linguagem dramatúrgica que envolve o humanitarismo, o estudo destaca um cenário de análise e quatro atores definidores: o conhecimento (o que deve ser adequadamente falado no palco), os artistas/ou atores securitizadores (aqueles que detêm o poder da fala), o público (grupos da sociedade civil Ocidental que podem ouvir e eventualmente falar através de meios emancipatórios), os grupos marginalizados (as vítimas do drama da segurança impedidas de ouvir e ser ouvidas) e, por fim, os atores intermediários (os canais independentes de comunicação que desempenham um papel crucial devido às suas habilidades ativistas que podem ajudar boa parte do público a alcançar desejáveis aspirações emancipatórias). Além disso, com o auxílio do método praxeológico e do método histórico-sociológico pode-se correlacionar o cenário de análise com os atores definidores, assim identificando o exercício desta correlação como condição fundamental para a construção de identidades dentro e fora do teatro político.

O processo de construção de identidades envolve um pensamento coletivo sobre as ameaças que determinados objetos (sejam povos, religiões, gêneros, pensamentos, ideologias, cor da pele e entre outros) podem causar à sobrevivência dos artistas Ocidentais e seus respectivos públicos. No século XI, por exemplo, o drama da segurança pôde ser encontrado no discurso sobre as cruzadas. No século XIV, o discurso do Outro se destinou à expansão e colonização europeia. No século XVI na caça às bruxas, e no século XVIII no escravismo. Já antes e no decorrer da Segunda Guerra Mundial, o drama ganhou contornos nazistas. No período da Guerra Fria, o discurso se concentrou no combate ao comunismo. No século XXI, presenciam-se dramas que incluem o terrorismo e os fluxos migratórios. Em todos estes dramas, sem exceção, artistas Ocidentais criaram narrativas sobre o Outro a ser combatido.

Ao compreender que a percepção de alvos faz parte da construção discursiva de ameaças, o público deve se ater à condução de um debate focado na desconstrução destes discursos, visando à eliminação da falsa relação entre o bem contra o mal, explorado neste estudo através da dicotomia entre Eu-Outro. Pensando nisso que sugere-se, então, contribuições de dessecuritização que visam libertar tanto o público Ocidental quanto os grupos marginalizados deste distópico drama da segurança. Conforme o estudo demonstra, a maioria dos movimentos de dessecuritização se encontra num nível micro de ações coletivas realizadas por grupos da sociedade civil. São movimentos que se refletem em ações e expressões artísticas que contestam as questões securitizadas pelos principais atores no palco.

Para o necessário progresso e aumento dos movimentos de dessecuritização, duas simples estratégias devem ser seguidas pelo público. A primeira é objetivista, que consiste na tentativa de advertir o resto da sociedade por meio de um debate democrático sobre os perigos causados pelo drama. Assim, o resgate do passado, sublinhando o que a história tem para contar, se faz muito importante. Com isso, a proteção da memória histórica também desempenha um papel relevante. Já a segunda estratégia é construtivista, em que se busca compreender o por que alvos se tornam ameaças. As sociedades civis devem compreender como operam os discursos de segurança, identificando suas principais características, refletindo tanto numa simples análise sobre a reprodução por parte dos atores securitizadores de alguns conceitos vagos que fazem referência à categorização de migrantes como ameaças quanto à utilização de doutrinas 'universais' que, apesar de reforçarem uma 'humanidade em comum', acabam por fortalecer medidas de securitização.

Utilizando dessas duas simples estratégias dentro de um diálogo mais aberto entre espectadores nas tribunas é que retórica, decisões e discursos reproduzidos nas cenas humanitárias do teatro politico podem ser contestados de modo que eles sejam re-politizados numa revigorada esfera pública com intensa participação popular. Isto significa que os discursos revelados pelos atores protagonistas no palco devem ser discutidos pelo público dentro de uma *normal politics* em busca de uma nova consciência social em relação aos problemas humanitários. Tal consciência seria dificilmente manipulada por manobras que tendem lidar com certos alvos através da violência, militarização, repressão e exclusão.

Buscando refletir e repensar sobre cenas humanitárias por intermédio de uma abordagem mais crítica, o seguinte estudo se divide em três seções e sete capítulos. A seção de abertura introduz o processo de teorização de minha abordagem crítica, destacando, sobretudo, um argumento reflexivo e crítico à teoria (neo)realista das relações internacionais. Os dois capítulos que compõem a seção de abertura são destinados à desconstrução dos conceitos, sistemas e regras relacionadas ao tema (o drama da segurança) e ao objeto de análise (cenas humanitárias).

A segunda seção da dissertação pretende desmascarar a linguagem dramatúrgica da segurança. Os dois capítulos que dão corpo à segunda seção descrevem como as ameaças são construídas por discursos e práticas, além de aprofundarem a ideia de dessecuritização, definindo as condições necessárias para a devida execução dos seus movimentos. Já a seção final e última parte do estudo explora os três contextos humanitários dos quais estão a ocorrer em regiões Ocidentais, particularmente nos Estados Unidos, Europa e Israel. Cada um dos três capítulos discorre sobre uma cena humanitária em específico (a saber: a crise ao longo da fronteira entre os Estados Unidos e México, o contexto migratório na Europa e o teatro Americano-Israelense). Obviamente, estas três últimas cenas destacam a importância dos movimentos de dessecuritização que visam remover os assuntos humanitários para fora deste mecanismo de ameaça e defesa chamado securitização.

Estes movimentos de dessecuritização explorados no decorrer da seção final se configuram em ações coletivas das quais pertencem a um desejável projeto emancipatório que deve ser ainda mais estimulado, pois somente a emancipação humana seria capaz de fazer com que o público (sobretudo as sociedades civis Ocidentais) reconheça que as vítimas deste drama nunca devem ser temidas ou rotuladas. Dito isto, o questionamento das políticas de exclusão gerenciadas por discursos particulares do Outro deve ocorrer através da mobilização de esforços para uma maior participação popular, abrindo um solo fértil para a cultivação de uma consciência humanitária mais crítica. É seguindo o caminho da dessecuritização de questões humanitárias que talvez será possível desenvolver – num futuro não tão distante – uma sociedade Ocidental política e emancipada.

Palavras-chave: drama da segurança, artistas, cenas humanitárias, linguagem dramatúrgica, dessecuritização, público, emancipação humana.

The Board of the Drama

LIGHTS GO DOWN AND THE CURTAINS OPEN

Introduction to the theater, drama and scenes 14

Research question and objectives 21

Defining the actors (the cast) 22

The methods 28

The structure 35

ACT 1: OPENING PLOT

Theoretical argument 42

Scene 1. Operative concepts, systems and rules 49

1.1. Security, human security and terrorism 52

1.2. Humanitarianism and the law 57

1.3. Emancipation and desecuritization 61

Scene 2. Sphere of analysis 66

2.1. A focus on multiple publics and everyday politics 69

2.2. Post-positivism and the regime of truth 73

2.3. How does then the audience unmask reality? 77

ACT 2: EXPOSITORY SCENES

In the name of security: the unmasking of the dramaturgical language 81

Scene 3. History, security discourses and practices: how threats are constructed 88

3.1. A brief overview of modern history 93

3.2. Post-Cold War considerations 107

3.3. Dichotomy, performative capacities and surveillance within a politics of insecurity 119

Scene 4. Desecuritization: what is required for the audience to meet its needs? 132

4.1. Knowing its role in the drama *139*

4.2. Claiming for the return of normal politics *146*

4.3. Working with the activist media *156*

ACT 3: THE 'ANTI-CLIMAX' OF THE SECURITY DRAMA

Desecuritizing moves: critical directions to a deconstructed theater? 163

Scene 5. The crisis along the US-Mexico border 168

5.1. For less saviorism and more medical care, signs of goodwill and cooperation *171*

5.2. Paths to take against children in cages, deportations and double standards *181*

Scene 6. The migration issue in Europe 190

6.1. We Watch the Med: fulfilling duties of solidarity *198*

6.2. From refugee strikers to an imaginary Farlandia *206*

Scene 7. About the American-Israeli theater 214

7.1. New forms of connections and new kinds of peacemakers *220*

7.2. Banquets amid the rubble and the reconstruction of the humanitarian scene *227*

LIGHTS OFF AND THE CURTAINS CLOSE

Concluding remarks 233

Annex: Selected photos of desecuritizing moves 244

Bibliography 254

Webliography 274

Abbreviations

CASE Collective – Critical Approaches to Security in Europe

CFP – Combatants for Peace

Covid-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019

CSS – Critical Security Studies

EU – European Union

ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

IR – International Relations

JVP – Jewish Voice for Peace

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations

OCHA – The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PA – Palestinian National Authority

PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organization

RAICES – Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services

R2P – Responsibility to Protect

S&R – Search and Rescue

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US/USA – United States of America

LIGHTS GO DOWN AND THE CURTAINS OPEN

Introduction to the theater, drama and scenes

This dissertation argues that security drama is what the most powerful states do. Obviously, defining discourses, rhetoric, characters, behaviors, roles, performative capacities, choices, and decisions of powerful states as characteristics of a security drama is not new within the academia. Evan Medeiros, for example, used the term security drama to investigate the theater of East Asia and the unfolding geopolitical drama in regards to the responses of US allies and security partners to what he determined as China's rise[1]. Nonetheless, unlike Medeiros' work, which offered a specific site of security drama, this dissertation expands this dramaturgical notion to include different contexts of human suffering in the Western world. Besides, the theatrical metaphor about the international structure that this dissertation brings into light might, in some ways, remind Erving Goffman's theory of dramaturgical action, which is an interesting assessment imported from sociology that has so far received little attention within the IR academic community.

Goffman's theory of dramaturgical action conceptualizes actions in a cultural environment as performers engaged in 'manipulative presentations' of 'Self' and framing who are, at the same time, constrained by the script and the consistency requirement of their roles (Schimmelfennig, 2002). In this reading, Jef Huysmans contends that "(…) politics emerges in the spectacle as a drama which meaning is conferred through evoking crisis situations, emergencies, rituals and political myths" (2006, p. 72-73). This spectacle takes place in what is here defined as the political theater of IR. In Anna Leander's description of the theater, "the nature of the international forms the stage, the nature of actors comprises the cast, and the performative role of discourse and language is the script" (2011, p. 296). Taking Goffman's dramaturgical view as an example, which allows us to reduce events to staged theatrical performances, the issue of security can be seen as a certain magic formula. State authorities present themselves as the guarantors and safeguards of security, attempting to induce the general feeling that their steps are correct and legitimate, as they are taken in the interest of "security" (Krčál, 2017).

1 See Medeiros, Evan (2009) – The New Security Drama in East Asia – The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners to China's Rise. *Naval War College Review*, v.62, n4, pp. 38-52.

Following this line of thought, within the walls of the political theater, as Erving Goffman convincingly comes to summarize, "(…) we find a team of performers who cooperate to present to an audience a given definition of the situation" (in Schimmelfennig, 2002, p. 423). In the meantime, the great majority of the spectators who compose the audience is not aware of how the enactment of security through emergencies, crisis, rituals and myths evoked by the performers on the stage can be harmful to the marginalized groups located outside the theater. These marginalized groups are the victims of the drama. They are people who, as Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss assert, "(…) are overlooked and affected by routine treatment as inconsequential objects, passive and not valuable subjects" (2018, p. 9).

The spectacle is defined as a drama comprised by humanitarian scenes, which are described as spaces where the cast (actors like states, elites, media, international organizations, and civil societies) share a network of ideas, rules, doctrines, concepts, discourses, and practices about security-related issues. Nonetheless, these political spaces also offer us practical contents to understand that interests and identities are socially and politically constructed with a manipulative relationship between the performers (states) and audience (society), whereby the former convinces the latter to prioritize some issues over others, thus making these issues the central focus of securitization. This drama causes troubles and suffering in the humanitarian scenes, where security discourses create perceptions of threats, and the Other to be defeated. While performing the humanitarian scenes, the leading roles might also dress themselves on a 'superhero suit,' spreading out 'dramatized' speeches as if they are the solution to defeat the Other that they have created.

Humanitarian scenes are basically performed on front stages and backstage. Properly speaking, these stages refer to places where interactions between the cast and the observers take place. The goal of the cast is to bring about the sensation that their performance fulfills and maintains certain norms. The drama is dictated by a performance that plays out on the stage and that is aimed at presenting and strengthening the required situational definition and (re)producing a certain discourse (Krčál, 2017). In Christiana Spens' explanation, "this performance aspect might be served as a tool to both objectify and dehumanize the Other for political purposes" (2014, p. 52). This performance remains unchangeable over time, once the audience does not realize how dystopian and harmful is the drama.

It is worth classifying the subject of the study as a dystopian drama played on the political stage. In simple terms, contrary to a utopia's unflinching progressivism, a dystopia reflects an unyielding and regressive vision of politics. In this view, a cornucopia of easily instrumentalized fears drives an expansionary logic of security which ultimately colonizes all aspects of social life (Van Rythoven, 2017). This considered, the politics comes to be read as effectively dystopian in both power and scope, leading to what is increasingly described as the securitization of everything (Barnett, 2015; Van Rythoven, 2017). This occurs because, as Mark Salter contends, "the characters in the drama must use information to convince the audience of a particular story. The setting of a performance communicates the ground-rules for who may speak, what may be said, and what is heard" (2008, p. 329).

Knowing that information is something empowering, the performers manipulate knowledge to their own favor. Thus, to dismantle this kind of manipulation of knowledge, I suggest an increased participation of enough of the audience in the humanitarian scenes in the way that the information transmitted by the performers would become a matter of contestation. As Mark Salter reminds, "when Shakespeare was staged, groundlings, who had paid admission and sat in the stalls below the stage, were able to speak and even throw food at the actors" (2008, p. 329). This reveals a particular interactive relationship between performers-audience. Salter contends that "(…) in addition to an awareness about the tropes, metaphor, plots and devices that were embedded in the process of securitization, dramaturgical analysis directs our attention to a discursive relationship of actor-audience" (2008, p. 329).

To introduce a sort of "Shakespearean model" of a more inclusive language into the performers-audience relationship, this dissertation begins with classifying the humanitarian scenes as settings of the security drama involved by two factors: the construction of a Self-Other dichotomy, and what I call the receptive mode of the audience. These factors exist due to the manipulation of the knowledge through the creation of biased information for the security narrative. So, having in mind Robert Cox's words that "knowledge is something that can be put to work through action" (1981, p. 126), I believe that knowledge is put to work through speech-act models aimed at securitizing questions related to human suffering. As if the leading roles produce the knowledge for the narrative and information, putting it to work through security utterances to legitimate their self-centered interests.

Security rhetoric can be used to, according to Jef Huysmans' explanation, "(…) dramatize a policy question that may help in moving the issue up the list of policy priorities. While being moved up on the priority list, the nature of the policy issues might have seriously changed" (2006, p. 26). This might lead us to rethink the role played by a dramaturgical language. Through a critical understanding regarding the security utterances originated from this dramaturgical language, one can understand how the security drama works and sustains itself. In this way, I intend to go even beyond, arguing that the advent of new forms of colonialism and imperialism are consequences of the dramaturgical language that creates threats and referent objects. Domination is no longer reliant to military conquest, but rather to security utterances held by a restricted club of performers on the political stage.

Domination reliant to security utterances rather than military conquest is often established by what Charles Call defines as "paternalistic characters" (2008, p. 1500) that obfuscate the West's political role in the contemporary condition of the political theater. In playing paternalistic characters, the leading roles manifest an ahistoric behavior. In Charles Call's words, "paternalistic characters omit the long history of colonialism and exploitation in the impoverishment and poor governance of many societies today considered fragile or failing" (2008, p. 1500). The actors performing these characters are the same ones that, as Call reminds, "have created the system of nation-states, often drawing the borders of states themselves, extracting valuable resources, and fostering colonial institutions with powerful legacies" (2008, p. 1500). For Call, these characters "(…) propped up post-colonial leaders, providing them with arms, and undermining the emergence of plural and society groups that might have diminished poverty, warfare and weak institutions" (2008, p. 1500).

These characters can easily be applied to fields of securitization studies, such as counter-terrorism and migration, where securitizing elites face the task of heavily emphasizing threats in order that they might pursue their preferred strategies and implement corresponding policies (Zimmermann, 2017). Given that humanitarian scenes embody oppressive characters like these, it is important to highlight that the course of humanitarian questions is driven to particular directions closely associated with the excessive use of force. For this reason that I find myself intrigued by two factors: 1) how humanitarian scenes let themselves be driven into a dystopian drama; and 2) how performers act on the stage to safeguard interests.

The study shows that the political theater was created by a slow but progressive constitution of Western-led customs and rules that, according to Jürgen Habermas' argument, "(…) expressed in terms of creating a constant acknowledgment of human rights that initially were marked by a lower level institutionalization of international law" (in Moore, 2013, p. 928). Nonetheless, these customs and rules require a critical understanding on their nature of time and space. In more general terms, they could easily serve as foundation for evoking crisis, emergencies, rituals and myths through discourses that constructed what Branwen G. Jones calls "(…) privileged and a genealogically 'useful past,' a past that excludes unwanted elements, vestiges, and narratives" (2006, p. 8). A critical understanding of these customs and rules is crucial for, as argued by Jones, "(…) restoring narrative that would include vestiges from beyond the confines of powerful states" (2006, p. 8).

In interpreting international customs and rules as potential sources of security discourses produced and reproduced by the most powerful actors playing their humanitarian scenes, the dissertation highlights how important the role played by security utterances is not only for the evolution of the international law and of the modern political theater, but also for our understandings about what humanitarianism represents, to whom it was actually given and to whom it works. All of this comes together in the exercise I decided to determine as 'rethinking humanitarian scenes.' Described by Ken Booth as "a practice of resistance through strategic and tactical political action based on immanent critique," (2007, p. 112) human emancipation is depicted here as the key to rethinking the humanitarian scenes. Carrying out this argument, the study stresses an emancipatory project that includes the victims of the security drama. This project provides immanent possibilities for collective actions aimed at protecting those exposed to the power dynamics of the theater.

Michael Barnett convincingly summarizes that "any discussion of international order and governance involves important considerations of power dynamics," (2010, p. 11) and the humanitarian scenes are no exception. Power dynamics exist, as Barnett contends, "(...) in all social relationships and the question is not whether power dynamics exist, but rather the forms of power that exist, the mechanisms which power dynamics operate, and the effects they provide" (2010, p. 11). In this study, power dynamics is depicted in forms of leading roles convincing the audience to safeguard self-centered interests by creating threat-danger conceptions.

Such an analysis of power is suggestive in many ways, and it makes clear that the security drama is not new. The manipulative role played by the performers and the receptive role played by the audience are not new either. This analysis of power also suggests that humanitarianism – as the key element to reduce human suffering – was never put into action when it could jeopardize the self-centered interests of the most powerful performers, or change the power dynamics within the theater. As Martha Finnemore indicates, "humanitarians were sometimes able to mount considerable pressure on policymakers and elites to act contrary to stated geostrategic interests" (2003, p. 65). But she also says that "humanitarian claims succeed in creating new interests and reasons for states to act where none had existed" (2003, p. 65).

In unmasking the security drama, the study is focused on those who in the current political theater are the cause of insecurity and on those who are the victims of insecurity. Therefore, I find myself motivated to turn back into history, so new methodological paths, such as praxeology and historical sociology, can be taken for granted. By making human suffering the central prism through which the drama is observed, it is worth investigating some reasonable alternatives and immanent possibilities to set the audience free from security discourses that, ironically, cause insecurity. These alternatives can be found in desecuritizing moves undertaken by a range of social, political, cultural and artistic expressions.

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde explain that "the ultimate locus of securityness is social than technical" (1998, p. 40). That is why I try to open up spaces for going beyond the security drama and critically revising the aspects of discursive humanitarianism as they evolved over the last years. The aim of the dissertation is, therefore, neither to stand on non-interventionary practices nor on interventionary practices. Focused on readings about security discourses of Other and international construction of threats, the study is more conducted upon how these phenomenons jeopardize humanitarian scenes. Despite the fact that desecuritization leads to non-interventionary approaches, the main point is to suggest desecuritizing moves as belonging to an emancipatory project that rethinks the categorical conceptions of security. As one may observe, what the dissertation attempts to do is to establish a renewed humanitarian knowledge by means of counter-argumentation and different kinds of expressions, so it will be more difficult for enough of the audience to be involved by exclusionary practices coming from the stage.

The desecuritization moves suggested here could be seen as the movement of a securitized issue from what Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen call "the threat-danger modality of security to the logics of politics, where compromise, solutions, debate and open dialogue is made possible to a much larger extent" (2009, p. 216). Buzan and Hansen suggest that "it is crucial that desecuritization is contextualized and that it is replaced by the possibility of politicization" (2009, p. 217). Carrying out this idea, I claim for an ability to counter-securitization, developing the critical perspective that some humanitarian issues can be jointly discussed at the theater by following a less manipulative performers-audience relationship.

Having in mind Ken Booth's statement, which says that "our times demand radical change, but the discipline of international relations has rarely been a place to look for progressive thinking," (2007, p. 26) it is imperative, thereby, to enable new forms of political society. For this, I suggest new forms of dialogic communities within the audience that should be constructed by notions based on non-violent means of interconnection. These non-violent means – which are explored as desecuritizing contributions undertaken by emancipated spectators – would not only improve the relationship between different realities and identities living together, but would also transform the relationship between performers and audience with a renewed and inclusive language. This said, the contributions of desecuritization explored in the course of this study are involved in a emancipatory project based on the ideal of a dialogic political community suggested by Andrew Linklater.

For Andrew Linklater, "only through critical dialogue can excluded groups begin to enjoy equal membership of the communities to which they belong" (1998, p. 95). Linklater is also convinced that "the key purposes of dialogue is to widen social parameters, thus making it possible for individuals to expand the realm of admissible disagreements which political communities often suppressed in the name of the totalizing project" (1998, p. 95). Therefore, a dialogic community involves what Linklater considers as "(…) the pledge not to sacrifice unassimilated Otherness on the alter of a unified public. It requires the willingness to actively empower rather than simply tolerate Otherness" (1998, p. 96). That is why rethinking humanitarian scenes means to be engaged in advancing immanent possibilities for change with a more dialogic way of thinking the dynamics of the theater. This also means to 'raise our hands' and ask if what is spoken on the stage brings positive outcomes.

Research question and objectives

Given the fact that the security drama manifests itself in a dystopian scenario with constitutive discourses articulated by performers playing predetermined roles in the political theater, how is it possible for enough of the audience to participate in the humanitarian scenes through a more interactive approach, whereby all the issues, challenges and odds could be dealt in a less securitized way?

To answer more effectively to this research question, this study aims to trace one general and four specific objectives.

First of all, the study seeks to understand why calling for a more critical approach is indispensable for the audience to further stimulate contributions of desecuritization of humanitarian issues, which would possibly lead the audience to participate in the humanitarian scenes in a more interactive mode with the performers.

Then, as the first specific objective, the dissertation traces how security discourses emerge, advancing a historical-sociological account that shows the processes which speech-acts and security practices are historically produced and reproduced on the political stage of the theater.

The second specific objective is to introduce an explanation of how perceptions of threats are constructed by examining who is allowed to 'do' and 'speak' about humanitarianism successfully.

By unmasking the dramaturgical language of security, the study aims to provide directions and contributions that can possibly desecuritize the security measures that shape the terrain of the humanitarian scenes.

The last specific objective is to identify if there is a clear line of delimitation between the interests of the actors in the theater and human life.

Defining the actors (the cast)

Knowing that the subject (the security drama) and the object of study (humanitarian scenes) are performed within the political theater of international relations (the international system, or as some IR critical scholars usually call the international structure), it is a matter of great importance for this dissertation to define the four comprising actors. The performers on the stage are the first actor to be described. Obviously, they reveal to be states-as-actors who are pictured through the image of political artists performing on the stage. These artists are statesmen and women, policymakers, political leaders, and privileged members of elites capable of both speaking and making decisions concerning the issues of great priority for them to discuss on the stage, preferentially through security terms.

Anna Leander firmly highlights that "attention to casting is a break with the many approaches of IR" (2011, p. 299). Attention to casting is for Leander "(…) a break with the accounts assuming that the actors of IR are anthropomorphized states and /or institutions" (2011, p. 299). The cast, in her view, "may be composed of the rich, powerful males acting on behalf of the institutions that we study in international relations. But it may also include the poor and marginalized people who we exclude from accounts" (2011, p. 299). Either way, Leander is convinced that "the cast is composed of real identifiable people (and institutions) with names, a position, a past, and an identity" (2011, p. 300). This said, the performers are divided into hierarchical positions composed by the leading roles, guests, and secondary roles. This hierarchy is portrayed as the leading roles (Western countries, specially the United States and Western European states) upholding dominant discourses.

These are powerful actors whose appropriate discourses for their own purposes. Besides, they do not merely consume the concepts and doctrines of international politics, they actually produce these concepts (Kuus, 2010). In the meantime, the marginal actors – the rest of the countries (secondary roles) and international organizations (special guests) – find themselves in a peripheral position of servitude before the dominant security narratives of the center. The center reveals to be what Buzan, Waever and de Wilde call "(…) the part of the emerging standard civilization based on democracy and open-market economy" (1998, p. 153). This standard civilization is sustained by what Noora Kotilainen defined as "(…) the interventionist ethos of the Western lead humanitarian world politics" (2016, p. 122).

Within this scenario, the international organizations, such as the United Nations and others alike, are nothing but the reproduction of the leading role's interests. They perform as special guests because they are called to participate in the humanitarian scenes whenever the center wants. Most of the time, they stay on the backstage, performing on the stage in specific moments, always under control of the center. Although they are constitutive actors comprised by norms and contingent discourse seeking to pursue normative purposes to solve a set of existing challenges of the political theater, they often tend to reflect the preferences of the center. Following a more realist view, I must recognize that, despite having good intentions to promote peace, the guests tend to be reliant to the center.

Borrowing John Mearsheimer's description about the guests, they are "by-products" (2001, p. 64) of the leading roles' self-interested behavior. Institutions can develop purposive actions on the stage, either by performing arbitrary roles, or constraining activity and shaping expectations. However, they are highly depended on a configuration of the political theater, which is, for Mearsheimer, "the consequence of great-power international security competition, and not the result of states acting together to organize peace and emancipation" (2001, pp. 64). On the other hand, secondary roles comprise the periphery. They are performers that face what Barry Buzan described as "a double bind" (in Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 153). Given that the leading roles make part of the emerging standard civilization, the secondary roles should, as Buzan convincingly argues, "(…) either accept this (therefore opening themselves to the center), or reject it (by consequently facing exclusion from the highest rank of states and risking to become less of a state in the eyes of international society)" (Idem, 1998, pp. 153-154).

The secondary roles are also susceptible to become a threat to the center, and this depends on the leading roles' interpretations of danger. Yet in this reading, threat perceptions and danger interpretations of the Other do not depend on what David Campbell calls the "incidence of 'objective' factors for its veracity" (1992, p. 2). For Campbell, "the site of threat perceptions is the way modes of representation are crystallized around referents marked as dangers and threatening" (1992, p. 2). Considering that the center is at what Leander refers to as "the heart of practices," (2011, p. 301) it might, as Kotilainen argues, "(…) determine how we, the Western citizens, see the humanitarian modus operandi" (2011, p. 301) of the theater.

In this line of thought, secondary roles can at any moment be targeted as something threatening, the Other/evil to be defeated on the stage. This depends on the leading roles' willingness to use security utterances on behalf of interpretations of dangers. Thierry Balzacq argues that "the basic idea of the speech-act theory is simply impressed: statements do more than describe a given reality and, as such, cannot be judged as false or true" (2011, p. 1). Balzacq adds that "utterances realize a specific action; they 'do' things, and they are 'performatives' and subject to truth and falsity tests" (2011, p. 1). As Mark Salter alleges, "securitization is an iterative, political process between speaker and audience" (2008, p. 321). Within this iterative process, security language might play a substantial role that determines perceptions and interpretations of the Other, establishing a given 'reality' where the audience is led to absorb what is said on the political stage and align with it.

As Thierry Balzacq contends, "a strategic action of language operates on the political stage at the level of persuasion, and it uses various artifacts (particularly metaphors, emotions, feelings, stereotypes, gestures, silence, and even lies) in order to reach its goals" (2011, p. 2). In Balzacq's words, "the speech-act seeks to establish universal principles of security language and communication, values that are to be functional whatever the context, culture and relative power of the actors" (2011, p. 2). What is more, in a sociological view that emphasizes the mutual relationship between performers and audience, Debord argues that "reality emerges within the political spectacle, presenting itself a vast inaccessible reality that can never be questioned" (2002, p. 4). Within this political spectacle, Debord believes that "alienation is the essence and support of society" (2002, p. 17).

The second actor of the theater is precisely the audience, which is comprised by the spectators in the auditorium. These spectators are civil society groups and ordinary citizens. More than that, the spectators are here considered the source to rethink the humanitarian scenes and perhaps change the course of the drama. This could only happen whether enough of us acknowledged that securitized issues related to humanitarianism ought to be brought to what is described the normal haggling of politics. For this, we should recognize that humanitarianism became what Noora Kotilainen comes to define as "(...) the influential ideology, central to Western public and political life, significantly impacting our apprehension of the global world of peoples surrounding us and our own status in this world" (2016, p. 123).

In doing so, we, the spectators of the security drama, would get rid of what Debord describes as the "illusions of the spectacle," (2002, p. 17) consequently becoming more aware of our submission to the performers, redefining ourselves from within. We are part of the spectacle that is intended to create a detailed picture for us, whereas the leading roles present themselves as the 'good guys,' the 'superheroes' in a ritual promoting the security by dictating the rules and facing the 'bad guys' that reject the system. For Christiana Spens, the "narratives are already in place, and political dramas and conflicts can be explained through them" (2014, p. 57). For Spens, "because so many people are aware of these rituals, and deeply entrenched ideas and themes, the audience is likely to be receptive to them" (2014, p. 58). Crudely put, the 'good guys' could only do this by assuming that the audience is receptive and participant in a common practice of ethical commitments (Frost, 2009).

Thierry Balzacq says that "the audience is best described as being often poised in a receptive mode" (2011, p. 2). Having this in mind, we can presume that enough of spectators must become more engaged in learning about their place in the theater by developing a reflexive thinking to set them free from alienation. To get rid of the receptive mode, a more critical understanding about this complex spectacle/security drama is the first and necessary step we must consider. More importantly, critical understanding is the precondition for enough of spectators in the audience to become what Guy Debord brilliantly defined as "'dialecticians,' putting our thought into practice in order to defeat oppression" (2002, p. 18).

Moreover, and speaking of oppression, the third actor of the political theater is the victims of the security drama, the ones existing outside the theater, relegated to a marginal position compared to the audience. The victims of the security drama are considered the communities and those people who often suffer from two kinds of repression: the repressions imposed by a barbaric authority (the majority of them secondary roles that are often regarded as threats/Other to the center), and the other repression imposed by securitizing moves carried out by the Western leading roles while performing the humanitarian scenes[2].

2 The victims of the drama are oppressed in their own homeland as well as neglected by Western performers and part of the audience when they knock the closed doors of the political theater asking for help. In such a dystopian drama (as the system is here defined), the victims are at immediate risk, either at home or abroad. They can be the victims of campaigns of extermination in troubled zones, and also the ones who are refused to receive comfort and safety in Western lands. Either way, the victims of the security drama represent the fact that both totalitarianism and human suffering are inescapable conditions of the political theater of international relations.

Pursuant to Michael Barnett's argument, "these people are the victims of those who control the means of violence" (2010, p. 130). Kotilainen contends that "the ideal victims are most often presented in the bodies of weak and innocent children, and of women, or they are habitually presented as crowds of civilian population, depicted as somewhat passive and innocent" (2016, p. 158). Kotilainen also reminds that "the suffering victims usually are not presented as singularly virtuous, but as coincidental victims, who happened to be in harm's way" (2016, p. 158). Thereby, the importance of the victims for this study can be explained by George Orwell synoptic vision of the world, with its rising tide of totalitarianism whose ways he intuited so thoroughly, which alerted him to the necessity of extreme efforts (Stone, 2016).

What is crucial for the audience to look at the victims as singularly virtuous is to recognize that the security drama – due to its totalitarian feature disguised as the security promise to protect the West from the Other – generates human suffering. Having this in mind, I argue that it falls to us, the audience, to provide the victims opportunities for them to be listened. For this, we should consider the immanent possibilities for change. In doing so, we would become less receptive and more dialecticians. Yet in this reading, one of the actors in the theater that can help the audience to achieve this goal is the intermediate actors. Unlike the mainstream media that perform on the backstage by helping the leading roles to 'get ready' for the spectacle, the intermediate actors are composed by independent channels of civil society's groups playing an activist role in and outside the theater.

The intermediate actors have a close relationship either with the audience and the victims of the drama. Their activist role complement that of exposing the repressive outcomes of securitization. Within this context, information technology also plays an important role as the intermediate actors use their networks and communicative practices to spread out their activist message. These actors constitute the multiple publics working for social change, having an emancipatory agenda fulfilled by desecuritizing claims of the issues comprising the humanitarian modus operandi of the theater. During this dissertation we can observe that intermediate actors produce causality effect, which is interestingly considered by Noora Kotilainen as "(…) a positive and technology-driven belief of the humanitarian political power of atrocity images in the context of politics and their potency in furthering the humanitarian project, making the world a less violent place" (2016, p. 133).

Moreover, it is extremely important to highlight that the objects, technologies, and images that intermediate actors bring into light means what Anna Leander comes to refer to as "(…) the crystallization of the past struggles over symbolic power/social hierarchies they embody and perpetuate" (2011, p. 302). Thus, they become part of what Leander considers "the 'structuring structure' that reproduces social reality" (2011, p. 302). Over the last three decades, for example, the proliferation and convergence of networked and information technologies helped to generate a renaissance of new modes of communication, redefining people's engagement with media. This changing landscape created opportunities for expression and interaction, specially among activists, artists and other political and cultural groups around the world who have found new media to be inexpensive, powerful tools for gaining visibility and voice, presenting alternative or marginal views (Lievrouw, 2011).

The spectators of the audience that in the past were merely consumers of the mainstream media are now participants, with a number of activists creating small presses and alternative newspapers to mobilize and recruit more spectators for their causes. These opportunities became easier for an activist media to organize and coordinate thanks to the internet (Cammaerts, 2015). In this connection, the activist media develop, as argued by Noora Kotilainen, "(…) more effective ways of visually communicating the agony of others, in the attempt to raise the awareness of the spectators awareness" (2016, p. 134). In her opinion, "their diverse historical manifestations are often reiterated also in relevant research" (2016, p. 134). The intermediate actors have the ability to introduce themselves in a struggle to best represent the victims as singularly virtuous. By using the media to dive into the sociological context, intermediate actors depict the social divisions in their efforts to encourage the Western audience to act in favor to desecuritization.

The big corporate and mainstream media still exist in the political theater of international relations, and they play a crucial role in the backstage. Yet, I intend to focus my analysis on the promotion of the alternative and independent channels of communication that can contribute to a new emancipated and vibrant public sphere. These are active actors and vehicles that circulate inside and outside the theater, providing a more interactive relationship with the audience and the victims of the drama. The expansion of the edges of media, and how this helps to build forms of desecuritization are considerations that are here examined.

The methods

We all know that the use of methods is implied in different sub-fields of international relations theory. We also know that both scholars and students engage in discussing about the effectiveness of different methods that influence scholarly debates. Concerning this study, security studies lie at the heart of inquiry, but contrary to the standard methods surrounding this sub-field of IR and exclusively focused on quantitative analysis of war, strategy and tactics, and formal modeling accounts of balance of power and alliances, I explore two critical methods: the praxeological and historical-sociological. These are alternative methods that were chosen due to the fact that they can best provide critical analyses on the construction of the knowledge resulting from the political decisions undertaken by the performers while playing the security drama on the stage of the political theater.

Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil assert that "standard scientific methods maximize all sorts of important values, such as logical coherence and rigor, however they do a poor job when it comes to the decisive purpose of human cognition: the efficient and efficacious production of useful knowledge" (2009, p. 702). Then, the bottom line of alternative methods is that, in dealing with the drama, one might face challenging situations that include assumptions of objectivity and subjectivity, and conceptions of language and knowledge that are not efficiently explained by quantitative methods and formal modeling accounts.

Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans come into the argument that "the literature foregrounds debates on critical methods turns attention to what remains at best secondary" (2013, p. 8). They say that "this literature indicates that methodology is a question of thinking epistemology, ontology, theory and empirical developments altogether, rather than doing epistemology or mediating the gap between theory and empiric" (2013, p. 8). Ken Booth also comes to allege that the methods of critical theorizing means to "1) stand outside the status quo, 2) identify the oppressions within existing structures and processes, and 3) develop the resources for change. Critical methods consist of both a theoretical commitment and a political orientation" (2007, p. 39). In aiming to highlight epistemology and mediate the gap between theory and empiric, I choose praxeology and historical-sociology as the methods of my critical theorizing, mostly because they give rise to a greater plea for pluralism that goes beyond the traditional analyses of power in the political theater.

The methodology of the study goes beyond the traditional view of looking at the political theater through objective lenses wherein the leading roles struggle for their own survival on the stage. Both praxeology and historical-sociology look at the constitutive security discourses as the sources of the forms of dialogue into the manipulative relationship between performers and audience. In this connection, the critical methodology is to be judged by its contribution to sociology, whereby praxeology would also play a fundamental role. Pursuant to Andrew Linklater, "praxeology is concerned with reflecting on the moral resources in existing social arrangements which political actors could harness for radical purposes" (1998, p. 5). Linklater highlights that "praxeology is preoccupied not with formal issues and traditional analyses of war, strategy and tactics, but with revealing that new forms of political community are immanent within existing forms of social life" (1998, p. 5). Praxeology is, then, anticipated by moral reserves.

The praxeological method emerged in reaction to quantitative (statistical) and formal modeling methods of analysis that exclude other realities. Standard methods do not count in their models of analysis about IR and sub-fields other realities and social arrangements defined here as forgotten worlds. The methods used in (neo)realist approaches, for example, depict the political theater in an isomorphic way with the audience homogeneously bounded. On the other hand, praxeology is a counter-argument on behalf of the new forms of political community able to include the forgotten worlds existing outside the theater.

Praxeological commitments underlying the theorizing of international relations culminate in two imperatives. Firstly, to abandon the paradigm of rational choice, together with its formalism, and adopt a more critical perspective that sheds light on patterns of activities that have been situated in space and time. Secondly, to leave behind overtly abstract models of international systems – specially objectivism and positivism – by embracing the logic of enactment[3] (Auth, 2005). Both imperatives can be found according to the development of this study.

3 Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans use the term of 'enactment' instead of 'constitution.' In their opinion, enactment "(…) keeps the fragility of the entities in focus, while constitution tends only to emphasize stabilization" (2013, p. 9). They also say that "the notion of enactment has been introduced in methodological literature to allow objects and subjects to change over time, enable their identity to be fragile, and allow them to differ from site to site, so it will be possible to make and remake worlds, identities and things in a fragile, continuously changing way" (2013, p. 9). This term is crucial in this study, mainly when it comes to observe the creation of knowledge through particular discursive ways, the behavior and performances of the speakers, and the level of acceptance of the listeners.

Praxeology also explains the means by which spectators could transcend existing conditions of the theater through emancipation and reflexivity. In this reading, one should also take as an example the Kantian praxeology, which Andrew Linklater appointed as "(…) offering an empowering vision of the future possibilities in the expectation that emancipation could eventually play a transformative role by delegitimating existing (and oppressive) structures and by steering human collective action to new political objectives" (1998, p. 37). So, in considering the Kantian praxeology as a foundation of emancipation, Linklater takes into account "how the collective actions could best respond to the new historical opportunities to secure the gradual transformation of oppressive structures" (1998, p. 37).

The methods of critical theorizing in this study are, as indicated by Inanna Hamati-Ataya, "(…) committed to bridging the gap between theory and empiric, between sociological and philosophical analysis" (2013, p. 677). For Hamati-Ataya, "emancipation as an end therefore constitutes the link between the cognitive and praxeological aspects of reflexivity" (2013, p. 677). Being reflexive by nature, praxeology in international relations study reveals the crucial question of human consciousness as agent for social change. Its aspects of reflexivity offer a direct confrontation with paradigms that privilege the powerful states, and the consequent skewed practices of inclusion and exclusion (Payne & Samhat, 2004). This might be suitable with what Friedrichs and Kratochwil referred to as "pragmatism, which highlights the interdependence of meaning and social structure, compatible with constructivist accounts of knowledge production" (2009, p. 713).

Compatible with reflexive sociology, pragmatism invites us to pursue a more interdisciplinary analysis concerning the security utterances followed by practices undertaken on the stage and that are constantly capable of promoting challenging situations in the political theater. By encouraging interdisciplinarity, experimentation and dialogue among perspectives, Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi say that "pragmatism invites IR to take disciplinary boundaries 'less seriously,' engaging in a kind of eclectic inquiry which puts a premium on creativity, reflexivity and imagination" (2009, p. 2). Once pragmatism considers human knowledge as being oriented to the idea of reconstruction and emancipation, they argue that "(...) for a critical methodology is left no other need but that of rising challenges of public engagement in a turbulent global society" (2009, p. 2).

Considering that the praxeological method is not only reflexive by nature but also compatible with pragmatism, this could lead us therefore to establish what Inanna Hamati-Ataya calls "(…) an alternative research program able to produce a different knowledge of world politics" (2013, p. 670). Hamati-Ataya is convinced that, "apart from the specific context that defines IR as socio-historically field of cognitive production, there is nothing more unique than the intellectual emergence of reflexivity within its literature" (2013, p. 670). Having this in mind, an alternative method such as praxeology must 'turn or bend back,' understanding how the politics of dialogue is conceived, raising questions about the legitimation of knowledge, the barriers to communication within power relations, and the potential means in which critical discourses may be strengthened (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011).

Praxeology as a method of critical theorizing can also mean that time, space, and language are important aspects. Past things and events – along with the perception of performers and their translation into meaningful security narratives – have formed the basis upon which some important dispositions and identities have evolved and not others (Auth, 2005). This reading turns on what Nicholas Onuf decided to call as "memory and its spatial dimension" (2013, p. 91). By making a metaphor out of this issue, Onuf reminds that "the spatial extension of the infant's world depends on an imaginative capacity to discover a range of bodies that speak to and for each other, sometimes by mimicry, and sometimes by playing" (2013, p. 91). Bringing this metaphor into the international relations framework, Onuf says that "the memory is crucial for a coherent past and the projection of a plausible future" (2013, p. 93). Additionally, he argues that "we fit all our jumbled memories into a conventional format; and no format is more conventional than the story. We order our memories about ourselves and others from beginning to the end of story" (2013, p. 93).

This could also be consistent with the assumption that performers have somehow generated a societal milieu over time, not only through rational actions, but through some context-bound activities and dynamics processes of interaction unfolding from them. Rhetoric, behavior, language and decisions cannot only be understood from within the confines of their own field. As a consequence, for this specific field it has itself been embedded in a larger historical-sociological formation (Auth, 2005) that, following Inanna Hamati-Ataya's view, "(…) analyzes the conditions that make the social world an objectively given order" (2013, p. 675).

Historical-sociological method follows praxeology since it questions the rationale for exclusive focus on the state and suggests that security might have other referent subjects. Of course, the traditional focus on the state has not disappeared, but the discussion of security has expanded beyond military issues to take account of other issues in the context of an expansion of core values to include welfare and identity. Such an expansion encompasses both regional and global identities, from society groups, and ultimately to the human being (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006). Pursuant to Andrew Linklater, "in more recent times, students of IR have called for large-scale historical-sociological method of international politics, and several works have demonstrated what this field could contribute to the broader project of historical sociology" (2007, p. 145). He believes that "the sociology of states-system's now occupies a more central place in IR study than ever before" (2007, p. 145).

The historical-sociological method reveals basic tempocentric biases widely held in mainstream IR more generally, and neorealism in particular, which claims that world politics is repetitive and that international politics has always been a realm of competition between political units. Domestic aspects or identities of states cannot affect the international realm of politics because states and political units behave similarly in the world system. Yet, historical-sociology shows that the presence of 'unlike' units under anarchy can perhaps take precedence over the existence of 'like units' (Pula & Stivachtis, 2017). For this to happen, there was a reasonable impact of historical-sociological method on some critical works, whereby social processes involved in the production of knowledge could be objectivated.

In attempting to objectivate the social processes that subtend the production of knowledge, Inanna Hamati-Ataya points out that "one should understand that history and sociology of science can provide us the means to objectivate the way security utterances affect not only the emergence of specific concepts and modes of theorizing, but also methodologies throughout history" (2013, p. 687). By carrying out this argument further, she contends that "one cannot remain oblivious to how these same factor shape our current knowledge/praxis" (2013, p. 687). For this reason, it is imperative to return to social theory, so the knowledge of history and sociology will become a variable content and an important tool to rethink humanitarian scenes. Without this return to social theory, Hamati-Ataya believes that "reflexivity would remain empty and not validated by future generations of scholars" (2013, p. 687).

As George Lawson asserts, “previously neglected by scholars (at least compared with the influence of economics, political science, and political theory) sociology has become increasingly influential over the past decade or so” (2006, p. 398). However, Lawson also argues that “it is surprising that historical-sociology received little attention from the IR community” (2006, p. 398). In his words, “such an omission is even more striking given that the central concern of historical sociology (e.g. the processes involved in larger-scale changes) seems well suited to examining the complexities of the contemporary world politics” (2006, p. 398). This is because, contrary to the realist approach, historical-sociology allows what John Hobson calls “considerable space for non-state forces” (1998, p. 285).

Historical-sociology focuses on what Alvin Gouldner defined as “the spectators who can pursue their own projects in the course of their everyday lives; and as ways of avoiding dependence on the domination of the state through patterns of ‘mutual’ and ‘self-help’” (in Layton, 2006, p. 10). In focusing on this kind of people (here characterized as the ‘critical mass’ of the audience), higher levels of popular participation and new forms of civic engagement and social change could be created within multiple publics in the audience. George Lawson points out that “historical-sociology aims to work alongside – and perhaps even to underpin – processes in larger-scale changes” (2006, p. 398). Pursuant to Lawson, “it is just through this method that the major trends, casual patterns, and analytical properties of the contemporary world affairs can be unpacked, surveyed and explained” (2006, p. 398).

As the study demonstrates, all the social changes described here allude to have one thing in common: each of them, in one way or another, empowers people to exercise freedoms – including freedoms either to guide their private lives or to participate in public life. Emancipative values are the inspirational source of their human empowerment process (Welzel, 2013). For George Lawson, “the transformation of social, economic, and political orders under modernity is the principal turf of the historical-sociological method” (2006, p. 399). This means accepting that, as he describes, “the contemporary conditions are inherited from the past, and that they constrain and enable the action of people in the present day” (2006, p. 399). He concludes that “this understanding runs counter to the tendencies of the traditional theories of IR to truncate the study of international politics by reifying the social processes and social facts as timeless analytical entities” (2006, p. 399).

Historical sociologists also appeal to Weber in order to observe the political theater through a dramatic historical narrative comprised by conflicts and struggles among performers, audience and excluded people. The dramatic historical narrative is promoted by security language, discourses and practices that derived from the privileged status of the performers. In accordance with John Hobson's point of view, "just as Karl Marx criticized the liberal assumption that capitalism is natural, so Weberian historical sociologists have demonstrated how the modern state is not a natural production of a liberal social contract" (1998, p. 287). In Hobson's words, the modern state was "(…) forged in the heat of battle and warfare; (…) and the anarchic system of states should not be regarded as natural" (1998, p. 287).

World history and historical sociology exercised a degree of influence over certain theoretical approaches to IR study. Historical-sociology, as a method of critical theorizing IR, is traced back to the belief that it was possible to improve human condition by unmaking and remaking human institutions (Pula & Stivachtis, 2017). John Hobson comes to indicate again that "(…) of the various forms that the international system has taken down through the millennia, the modern system of sovereignty is unique" (1998, p. 287). In his words, "it is its appearance as natural (reified in Waltzian neorealism) that needs to be problematized" (1998, p. 287). This reading can only be achieved if we take for granted the postulate of IR as social constructions, i.e., the realities that the theater constructed for us.

Pursuant to George Lawson, "this also allows historical-sociology to take its place among other critical paradigms that often seek to push the discipline away from the narrow conception of rationalism," which is, for Lawson, "a limited view of social structure, and a concomitant failure to see the logic of institutions" (2006, p. 416). In this reading, history is not only imperative in itself, but also what John Hobson considers as "a means of problematizing and critically exploring the origins of the modern domestic and international institutions and practices" (1998, p. 286). Both praxeology and historical sociology are, according to George Lawson's argument, "parts of an open conversation that recognizes the relative autonomy of different disciplines such as history, sociology, social and political science." For Lawson, "this conversation also establishes a common ground able to unite them" (2006, p. 416). These are alternative methods and paths for us to follow towards the critical and reflexive understanding of the theater of international relations.

The structure

The study is divided into three sections (each one named by specific theatrical terms) and seven chapters called 'scenes.' Composed by two scenes, the first section is called 'Opening Plot,' and it introduces the most important concepts of the study. Broadly speaking, the 'Opening Plot' aims to demonstrate how the general (and in some way abstract) concepts, systems and rules that exist in the political theater are analyzed through the critical lenses of the proposed methods. Carrying out a critical argument that seeks to, as Richard Ashley identifies, "(…) provoke a discussion, not destroy an alleged enemy," (1984, p. 229) the 'Opening Plot' stresses the process of theorizing a critical argument by showing its differences from the realist theory.

The argument aims to open up what Robert Cox described as "the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world" (1981, p. 128). By taking such a possibility into account, my theoretical efforts are directed to prevent wearing what Ken Booth decided to describe as "the 'mask' of science," (2007, p. 175) in the way that I would look at the political theater just as it is. The students and scholars who wear this mask, as Ken Booth says, "(…) tend to describe their own reality through ethnocentric, class, and masculinist eyes, albeit tempered by academic values and methods" (2007, p. 175). Therefore, taking seriously Booth's statement that "theorists in glass houses must not throw stones," (2007, p. 175) my argument explores three claims.

First of all, the actors are socially constructed and products of complex historical processes that include social, political, material and ideational dimensions. Second, knowledge is enacted and can be reconstructed through practices that create shared social understandings. This process endows knowledge with identities and interests which are not given or unchanging, but contingent. Third, politics is not static and unchanging, and its structures are not determining, once they are socially constructed (Krause, 1998). In essence, one of the differences between these three critical claims and the traditional approaches based on state-centric notions consist of the focus on accounting for changing the course of the drama. While (neo)realists believe in the continuity of patterns and events, I contest the nature of some important concepts, arguing that international security, for instance, is neither universal nor positive, but reliant to referent targets and particular objects. This critique about security could be used by an emancipated audience to change the course of the drama.

Considering security as a source of deconstruction, the first scene of the 'Opening Plot' cautiously observes that securitization – that is, the practice to which performers securitize an issue in accordance with a dramaturgical language – depends on the enactment of two sub-labels of security: human security and terrorism. I intend to explain that these sub-labels are notions developed and managed by Western leading roles for their own benefit while playing the security drama, and performing the humanitarian scenes, more precisely. They are presented here as sub-labels of international security because they are made to have a sort of 'universal character' and serve as hegemonic techniques that enable power and preserve the interests of the leading roles on the stage. These are called 'universalistic' conceptions designed to serve forms and practices of exclusion in the theater.

The first scene of the study aims to deconstruct these conceptions. Concerning the human security concept, its supporters claim for a shift from state security to the security of the people. However, their claims did not represent, as contended by Ken Booth, "(…) a significant shift which governments embraced in practice, even when some of them proudly added this notion to their declaratory policies" (2007, p. 322). Additionally, Jef Huysmans reminds us that "human rights, humanitarian law and categorizations of basic human needs are central to the rationale of human security. National security, on the other hand, is tied to the use of military institution and the externalization of policing" (2006, p. 4). For Huysmans, "this does not imply that human security and national security always exist as two discrete domains of (in)security" (2006, p. 4). This considered, the first chapter aims to demonstrate that notions of human security have also acquired what Jef Huysmans considers as "the same political techniques of national security, once states began to frame human security in their policy questions in logics of survival, thus mobilizing a 'politics of fear', at least from the perspectives of securitizing moves" (2006, p.5).

Following the same tendency, the terrorism is an interesting insight because the securitizing actors placed other issues in its security realm, mainly humanitarian questions such as forced migration. This supports my argument that securitization is a narrow policy structure that obscures other important issues and challenges. This is a matter of discussion not solely in the first section but also throughout the study. Humanitarian issues turn out to be securitized not only when the word "security" is spoken on the stage, but also when "terrorism" is spoken.

Other two crucial topics addressed in the first scene of the study are the concept of humanitarianism and the international law system. In making a connection between these two topics, I describe humanitarianism as an instrument used to shape security utterances. These utterances determine the behavior of the performers, and they give rise to security practices that could even be compatible with the international law. Moreover, it is not intended to present international law merely as a set of contracts between sovereign states. What is assumed is that humanitarianism, operating as instrument of discourse under the auspices of some legal justifications for actions, is managed as an important device for securitization and militarization through the unnecessary use of force against vulnerable groups.

Nicholas Onuf also indicates that "the constructivist emphasis on international rules leads us to a consideration of the ways that states usually justify their choices and consequently to the place of ethics in IR" (2013, p. 34). Thereby, it is intended to highlight in the first scene that the use of humanitarianism for justifying securitization might bring negative consequences to the humanitarian scenes, in particular the exacerbation of human suffering. And following this reading, the last two topics presented in the first chapter are human emancipation and desecuritization. The deconstruction and reconstruction of emancipation through local forms of desecuritization is one of the main concerns of the study. According to Andrew Linklater, "the emancipatory meta-narratives construct artificial realities which were then deployed for the purpose of freeing others" (1998, p. 63). What is problematic, however, is that these meta-narratives had the effect of serving the status-quo, the surveillance and political dominance of hegemonic forces.

For this, my argument is not typified according to grand narratives of universal emancipation. It is rather focused on desecuritizing contributions provided by high levels of participation of the audience when it comes to discussing the humanitarian scenes. I also argue that desecuritization is manifested in collective actions based on social, political and artistic expressions that aim to, as Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue, "shift humanitarian issues out of emergency mode and bring into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (1998, p.4) This instrument that deconstructs and reconstructs emancipation leads us to explore the capability of the audience for reducing human suffering. This is what the second scene investigates by taking the audience as the main sphere of analysis.

The second scene is also focused on everyday politics, by taking into account the possibilities for the audience to educate itself and deal with local and regional challenges, particularly the ones related to the human suffering caused by the use of force. For this matter, a quest for a post-positivist epistemological analysis that challenges mainstream international relations approaches is promoted, so that a humanist science focused on everyday politics might avoid what Nicholas Onuf described as "the view that ends up reducing the social world to mental states, and social construction to the diffusion of ideas" (2013, p. 35). Properly speaking, such a quest for a post-positivist analysis means to adopt social lenses that characterize my argument as a dependent approach from other social theories.

As the second scene intends to reveal, post-positivism comes to redefine politics by sociological terms. I prefer to highlight this redefinition of politics by borrowing two levels of analysis proposed by Thierry Balzacq. These levels are focused on 1) the positions of power of those actors who promote the security drama, and 2) on the language they use to facilitate the mobilization of the audience. Simply put, once the second chapter focuses on the incorporation of the civil society actors in light of epistemological observations aimed at understanding their role in the drama, it is possible to penetrate more deeply into the relationship between performers and audience, so that one will recognize that the difference among cultures, beliefs and principles should never be feared or labeled. As a matter of fact, my theoretical argument ends up choosing sides, apparently the one of the audience.

Moreover, the main goal of my argument is to contest the knowledge that enacts a correspondent truth which is created to reinforce the dominance and power of the leading roles performing the drama. Indeed, it is intended to explore this regime of truth, which is built according to what the leading roles – in their privileged status on the stage – suppose the world politics is, having a direct impact on the enactment process of the reality. Observing reality and truth from this viewpoint, I claim for a deconstruction of this regime. To achieve this objective, the Western audience must look at the political theater through a reflexive position, recognizing its place in the drama and drawing attention to the fact that it is possible for them to produce knowledge that can set them free from a correspondent reality and a regime of truth which safeguards power ambitions of a restricted club of performers. This is how the second scene puts an end to the 'Opening Plot.'

The second section is called ‘Expository Scenes’ and it is intended to unmask what I describe the dramaturgical language of security. For this matter, the third scene explores how threats are constructed by discourses and practices. In this scene, I argue that the security utterances and speech-acts coming from the stage can make the audience to think and act in some ways and not others, privileging some issues over others. Thereby, rhetoric, behavior and decisions made in the political theater become consequences of a dramaturgical language that produces the regime of truth that corresponds the ambitions of a privileged group of actors. This dramaturgical language fosters the enactment of characters, activities and practices, defining what is possible and impossible to be done in the humanitarian scenes.

The third scene of the study points out that speech-acts, articulated pursuant to a dramaturgical language, are designed to create threat perceptions. This is because the articulation of political discourses and security utterances is usually followed by an emphasis on the phenomenon that I call Self-Other dichotomy. This dichotomy is mediated by the perception of targets, shared and communicated between and by political leaders and elites. This seems to be a historical procedure of the security drama, and it occurs by religious, ideological, political and economic factors. Consequently, the third scene recalls history, bringing out emblematic moments of international relations that enacted the knowledge concerning threats and a correspondent regime of truth and reality that came to establish a particular Other/enemy to be defeated. Insofar as it is an existing phenomenon of the political theater, the Self-Other dichotomy will continue to increase human suffering as long as enough of the spectators of the Western audience remain believing that they are in danger, and that only securitization can maintain their survival.

When it comes to examining how threats are constructed through a dramaturgical language of security, Mark Salter contends that “we must consider who may speak, what may be spoken, and what is heard” (2008, p. 323). By pushing a theatrical metaphor, I intend to define threats as dramatized practices, since they are created to play a fundamental role in the universe of our collective imagination. Managed to justify the self-centered interests of the elites and states, threat discourses acquire a dramaturgical grammar that plays with feelings and beliefs, creating commotion. This could only be done through a security language that reinforces the notion that securitization is the only way to keep the state alive.

Unmasking this language also means to disrupt the belief on the political myths and discourses that privilege some issues over others, and that benefit some actors by excluding others. Once the leading roles are mostly Western countries, their security language reveals to be supported by what Branwen G. Jones refers to as "(…) self-confidence, whereby the enactment of the 'barbaric' Other (whose existence is different) is at the limit or even beyond of our comprehension" (2006, p. 8). This confidence is manifested, according to Jones, "(…) in IR's fearful apprehension of religious specter," (2006, p. 8) or against the victims of the security drama who find themselves in vulnerable situations. This said, the fourth chapter of the 'Expository Scenes' provides a reflexive account concerning what is needed for the audience to discuss the myths and discourses in a less securitized fashion.

Recognizing that this language does not contribute for a more inclusive relationship between performers and audience, this study claims for open dialogues and public debates aimed at reducing the consequences of the Self-Other dichotomy. These open dialogues and debates could be manifested in desecuritizing moves developed by collective actions of contestation and counter-argumentation. For this, the audience must be willing to acknowledge that securitized issues referring to human suffering should return to the normal haggling of politics, in ways that an increased popular participation in political decisions and practices could also remove the belief that excluded actors are always considered a security problem. If exclusionary discourses and practices are to be questioned through desecuritizing moves, an emancipated audience could open up a fertile ground for a new awareness in relation to critical security studies and humanitarian thinking, more specifically.

Such an awareness concerning critical security and humanitarian thinking is brought into light in the course of the final section, which is called 'The Anti-Climax of the Drama.' In this section, I intend to put the theory into practice. All the concepts introduced in the two previous sections are then explored by what I described as the 'anti-climax' of the security drama, which highlights the humanitarian scenes in Western countries. The scenes number five, six and seven aim to underscore that humanitarian contexts are fertile grounds for power structures that facilitate and encourage oppressive practices undertaken by the performers due to their securitizing moves. It is wise to argue, therefore, that within the drama, the humanitarian scenes explored in this section enable the performers to grip on power.

This scenario does not emerge all of sudden. Indeed, it is related to decisions and choices undertaken on the stage. So, aiming to explore some desecuritizing moves undertaken at the micro level of collective actions coming from an emancipated audience, the most important topic of the anti-climax consists of, firstly, assuming the perspective that most of the factors that cause vulnerabilities and tensions in the political theater are embedded in the oppressing structures of power. For this, the historical-sociological and praxeological methods are useful to help enough of the spectators in the audience to join the 'critical mass' and grasp that leading roles interfered in the internal affairs of secondary roles, leading to a vicious cycle of instabilities and vulnerabilities in and outside the theater.

Nevertheless, all of this comes together with exclusionary discourses based on a language that overlooks human dignity, e.g. putting children in cages and letting migrants die at high sea. That is why the security drama surrounding the humanitarian scenes in the USA, Europe and Israel are considered here as serious dangers for the future of the theater. The fifth scene (more precisely the crisis along the US-Mexico border), the sixth (the migration context in Europe) and the seventh (the American-Israeli theater) reinforce what it is theoretically expressed in the two previous acts. These three last chapters of the study underscore the necessity of moving some humanitarian issues, in particular forced migration, out of the traditional and threat-defense mechanism called securitization.

The last three scenes also reflect my deepest interests on humanitarian contexts and humanitarianism, which are fertile fields of research and critique. For this and other personal reasons, I feel compelled to contribute for a better and broader critical understanding of these interesting fields. A more critical approach about the political theater of IR, coupled with praxeological and historical-sociological methods, can contribute to a socialized gaze that not only takes emancipation for granted, but also overcomes the omissions and biases of traditional security views. I believe, therefore, that comparing and associating the subject and object of this dissertation with the dramaturgical world means both to reinforce a critical thinking about international relations and provide a stimulus for the audience to resist oppression through human emancipation, empowerment and activism.

ACT 1: OPENING PLOT

Theoretical argument

Over the past two decades, many alternative approaches to international relations challenged what is defined by Stephen Walt as "(...) the basic realist account of the security problem, and specially its conclusion that competition and insecurity are inevitable conditions for sovereign states coexisting in anarchy" (2010, p. 8). The interesting point of these alternative approaches is that, as Walt argues, "(…) they accept the conception that anarchy might encourage competition between states, however conclude that the picture of restless security competition often portrayed by realism is, at best, incomplete and, at worst, dangerously self-fulfilling" (2010, p. 8). Additionally, Alexander Wendt points out that "(…) the argument of alternative approaches to IR is that the society tends to act towards objects on the basis of the meanings that the states have found for them" (1995, p. 135).

The audience is affected by the political arrangements established on the stage. This means that societies tend to act and react on the basis of the political and security meanings of some objects and subjects created by the leading roles. In this reading, Richard Ashley looks at the international structure as "(…) the absence of a central agency of rule," (1995, p. 95) in terms of the what he comes to define as the "(...) presence of a group of sovereign centers of decisions presiding over their domestic societies, charged with the responsibility of deciding, legitimating and administering policy therein" (1995, p. 95) and the meanings of the objects that they create. Considering this, the main question raised by alternative approaches is about what purposes the structure and meanings are constructed.

What differentiates critical theory, besides the fact that its approaches range from modernist to post-structural forms, is the commitment to the cause of challenging the naturalness of the existing world order and the acceptability of its dominant relations and practices of power (Duvall & Varadarajan, 2003). My argument follows this premise, providing a critique on the leading roles' abilities to manipulate the relationship with the audience. More than that, my argument goes beyond the basic realist accounts of the political theater in the attempt to confront and disrupt the dominant narratives of security by means of desecuritization.

According to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde's explanation, "realism adopts traditional conceptions that are generally objectivist. It sees the state as the given, an eternal form of unit" (1998, pp. 203). They also believe that realism "(…) considers interests as objective, and it presents rules concerning the behavior of states that take on something close to natural science status, such as balance of power and arms race theory" (1998, pp. 203). On the other hand, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde sustained an IR critical theory that "(…) views the system in constructivist terms" (1998, p. 204). If a restricted group of states dominate the system, they are convinced that "(…) this is a feat of power politics repressing other dimensions of reality that could replace the states if an emancipatory praxis empowered others human subjectivities than those that dominate at present" (1998, p. 204).

Realism and its variant theories provide general descriptions of the political theater, focused only on the political stage where the security arrangements are made. In accordance with Alexander Wendt, "(neo)realism sees the world as having a 'competitive' international security system that states identify negatively with each other's security so that ego's gain is seen as alter's loss" (1995, p. 137). For Wendt, "(…) negative identification under anarchy constitutes the system of 'realist' power politics: risk-averse states that infer intentions from capabilities and worry about the relative gains and losses" (1995, p. 137). The problem is that looking at the theater solely through narrow lenses, we are to be convinced to accept it as what Wendt describes as "(…) a constant Hobbesian war of all against all, whereby collective actions undertaken by civil societies are quite impossible in this system because each actor must constantly fear being stabbed in the back" (1995, p. 137).

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde observe that "(…) the social world does not exhibit any iron laws, then all regularities could be broken" (1998, p. 204). For Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, "the two main tasks of critical theory is to show that narrow lenses could be broken, and expose how logics came to be considered as 'necessary' when, in fact, they revealed to be contingent" (1998, p. 204). Richard Ashley contends that "realism joins modes of historicism in denying the historical significance of practice, the moment when individuals enter with greater or lesser degrees of consciousness into the making of their world" (1984, p. 258). For any (neo)realist, multiple publics are, as Ashley indicates, "mere supports for the social processes that produce the logics by which they serve it" (1984, p. 258).

Properly speaking, the audience is reduced to what Richard Ashley calls "idealized *homo oeconomicus*, able to carry out, but never to reflect critically on, the limited rational logic that the system demands of them" (1984, p. 258). On the other hand, critical theory provides ways to understand and make sense of the IR as always a contingent production of contested power, not a natural order of structure of power. Hence, a more critical approach undergirds practical political resistance to the production and reproduction of 'empire,' in that any inordinate concentration of power is seen as not desirable (Duvall & Varadarajan, 2003). It provokes, then, a critique against the realist view of a predetermined world of insecurity, considering it a tendentious and implausible reading of the theater that creates transhistorical and generalizable casual claims capable of explaining a small number of 'big things' by replicating existing power dynamics.

IR critical theory gives priority to 'small things' that are 'outside' the traditional analysis of power dynamics, i.e., the possibilities for the audience to undertake collective actions as a mode of resistance to oppressions and exclusions within and beyond the political theater. Giving priority to 'small things' also means to recognize that, as Alexander Wendt points out, "distribution of power is less important, and collective actions are more possible, even though still subject to free riding because sovereign states continue to be egoists" (1995, p. 137). Carrying out this argument further, and despite the fact that the word 'critical' can even be managed in a much broader array of approaches, the main object of my theoretical argument is the concern for those people 'outside' the traditional structures of power. At the heart of my argument lies the critique that includes those who have historically been neglected and excluded from the humanitarian discussions on the political stage.

Indeed, the attempt to dismantle dominant security narratives opens up a necessary space for the voices of those marginalized to be heard; all of this in a discipline (IR critical theory) and a subfield (critical security studies) that prioritize questions about the construction of threats followed by the use of force. For this matter, a critical argument must be that which presents a more three-dimensional world politics containing the powerful but other actors as well (Fierke, 2010). Although the term 'critical' might wrongly connote negative, not a positive, reconstructive, or policy-relevant project that can be dismissed without further reflection, this is not what international relations critical theory is all about (Krause, 1998).

Ken Booth, for example, says that "immanent critique begins with the notion that the critical theorist stands within time and a historical context, rather than outside as an objective observer, as assumed by traditional problem-solving theories" (in Fierke, 2010, p. 16). In Booth's argument, "(…) the critical theorist should create a distance from his or her historical context to explore its origins, development and potential for change" (Idem, 2010, p. 16) For this, it is imperative to play with both political and social theories in order to better understand our place and role in the political theater, which are, as defined by Richard Ashley, "(…) always precarious, and always in jeopardy of fragmenting in a relation of antagonism among the actors" (1995, p. 95). Considering this, theorists should develop arguments to mitigate this definition on behalf of the audience and the victims of the drama.

Simply bringing together a range of critical perspectives, the theorist makes the challenges to orthodoxy more clear, and signals that critical theory is more than a passing fad obsession of a few scholars. Taking this into account, it is important to acknowledge that one of the fundamental goals of IR critical theory is not make the states and the societies care about concepts such as 'rights,' 'duties' and 'obligations', and neither are its scholars naively committed to replace realism and its variants with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace (Krause, 1998). The critical theory is essentially committed to making spectators rethink about the way they look at the political theater. As one should note, the early expressions of this critical thought emerged with Robert Cox, when he brilliantly developed a distinction between the problem-solving theory and IR critical approach.

For Robert Cox, "problem-solving theory takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action" (1981, p. 128). Contrarily, IR critical theory is in Cox's words "(…) critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the system, asking how that order came about" (1981, p. 129). Following this line of thought, whereas problem-solving theory serves to manage specific issues within the existing sociopolitical order, then reinforcing the status-quo, the purpose of critical theory is to question it and provide a hermeneutic that uncovers the 'immanent' resources for change in the social arrangements (Terrenas, 2015). Cox also believes that critical theory, in recognizing the role of past in constructing the present, treats the present order as dynamic (Duvall & Varadarajan, 2003).

Viewing theory as mere problem-solving preserves the objective circumstances and timeless quality of the international system as we find it (Payne & Samhat, 2004). Robert Cox summarizes that "IR critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions, social and power relations for granted, but rather calls them into question by being concerned with their origins" (1981, p. 129). IR critical theory, in Cox's view, "(…) also asks how and whether institutions, social and power relation might be in the process of changing" (1981, p. 129). In Cox's schema, the problem-solving theories serve the interests of states, which are comfortable within a 'given order.' They are based on an ideological bias, given the fact that they accept the prevailing order of the world system as their own framework by working to ensure the smooth functioning of the order itself (Duvall & Varadarajan, 2003).

In light of this fact, Robert Cox anticipates his challenge to problem-solving theories alleging that "(…) IR critical theory is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action" (1981, p. 129). All of this comes together with the conclusion that, for critical theory as its offshoot, theory and practice are intertwined. In this connection, the theorist does not observe the world objectively, but rather he/she is situated in a historical context and responding to a set of historically specific circumstances (Fierke, 2010). Any kind of IR critical argument should understand Cox's schema to recognize the contingency of both the social life and the audience's place in the theater as the security drama is being played on the stage. IR critical argument should also draw attention to the perspective that social orders and human knowledge of multiple publics are historically constituted and subject to accurate reflection and reconstruction (Payne & Samhat, 2004).

Being critical does not only mean taking a position on behalf of a broader social. Apparently, being critical also encompasses a deeper degree of awareness about the manipulative relationship between performers and audience. For this, my argument claims for a more critical audience, not in doing away with the restricted club of performers on the stage (as if that could be possible), but, as suggested by Anthony Burke, "in questioning their politics of identity and Otherness, their narratives, discourses, practices of history, responsibility and Self" (2007, p. 81). However, to question the politics of the leading roles, I must identify and contest the (neo)realist deficiencies, so this will also help me to tell real stories that deal with the security drama through a less securitized narrative.

To achieve this purpose, my critical approach must be definitely engaged in a demystification of the past and present of international relations. It is important, first and foremost, to confront the multiple threats articulated by security discourses and utterances unveiled by the performers. Notwithstanding their different methods, assumptions and conceptions, the majority of the IR critical scholars sustain the demystification of the past and present of the political theater. David Boucher emphasizes that "critical scholars have a number of things in common: they take the postulates and conclusions of 'conventional' IR as social constructions, questioning their validity and efficacy" (2009, p. 6). As Boucher adds, "(…) critical scholars emphasize the contingency of the realities that the states have constructed for their societies" (2009, p. 6). He also argues the fact that critical scholars "contend that far from universal principles (most importantly, those that underpin (neo)realism), things could be, and have been, very different" (2009, p. 6).

More than taking an emancipatory project for the Western society for granted, my argument also embraces a post-structuralist idea that can be summed up as one of unmasking the relations of dominance in the world system, making possible for free societies to create a space for desecuritization by means of a politics of resistance (Duvall & Varadarajan, 2003). Things in common between critical theorists who believe in the audience as the most important source for the transformation of the political theater through emancipation, and those who are focused in questioning the structure, meanings and practices of the theater, allow me to produce a theoretical argument held by a sociological and historical sensitivity that avoids looking at the political theater through objective and ahistorical lenses, once it would make me fall into what I would call the 'trap' of reflexive individualism.

For Michael Barnett, "whereas once social science departments were committed to enhancing the 'public good,' scholars became increasingly autistic, removed from the world around them, and part of a sheltered community" (2010, p. 216). Thus, the occasional calls for what Barnett defined as "usable knowledge" were what he summarized as "a lost in a discipline that became theory and methods-mad, when academics had a remarkable capacity for translating disengagement into a 'heroic,' 'self-justificatory' rhetoric that legitimated intellectual narcissism" (2010, p. 216). Aiming to avoid this, my theoretical argument manifests a wider inquiry around the natures of epistemology and pedagogy while pursuing an activist agenda.

This agenda could somehow be inspired by the classical liberal nature of Alexis de Tocqueville and the socialist revolutionary ideas of Karl Marx; or perhaps the fascinating social studies of Max Weber. These intellectuals debated about the social forces of the 19th century, raising a range of questions concerning sociology, philosophy, politics and economy. They have also provided substantial critical conceptions about imperialism and nationalism. More important, my activist agenda could also seek inspiration in Antonio Gramsci's political and social theory, which explained how civil societies could be an important toll for counter-hegemonic transformation. My activist agenda is, however, inspired by the recent critical intellectual figures of social and political thought, like Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. A special attention to other IR critical scholars such as Andrew Linklater, Alexander Wendt, Barry Buzan, Didier Bigo, James Der Derian, Jef Huysmans, Ken Booth, Ole Waever and Thierry Balzacq is also given.

Due to its large literature originated from a diverse group of social and political theorists, IR critical scholarship is not that clear when it comes to locate itself. However, my theoretical argument focuses on those scholars willing to offer an inclusive debate about the nature of the security drama and its constitutive characters and discourses. Some of them do not even categorize their work as 'critical', but in some ways they provide high quality research able to expand our understandings of international relations by serving broader causes. I understand my argument as a reasonable alternative, a critical complement in contrast to the international relations mainstream theories of (neo)realist and neoliberalism.

Despite their different perspectives, all the critical scholars sustaining my argument have been argued about a duty to pursue their scholarship in ways that could serve broader causes. They argue for the need to reshape our understanding of IR by politically conducting engaged work that involves multiple publics, incorporating not simply the powerful, but also the audience, i.e. the everyday movements and citizens (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011). Rethinking the humanitarian scenes within a more critical approach means precisely to observe, question and reflect about the limits of the everyday movements and citizens. It also means to develop a perspective that challenges our understandings concerning the political theater and its operative concepts, systems and customs. Then, notions that see the theater only as a positive thing can be reformulated to meet the needs of desecuritization.

Scene 1. Operative concepts, systems and rules

In the last years, IR critical theorists have mounted what Stephen Walt described as "(...) a more fundamental challenge to the realist explanation of the origins of international insecurity. Broadly speaking, they argue that there is no necessary connection between anarchy and insecurity" (2010, p. 9). According to IR critical theorists, insecurity exists due to what Walt calls as "(…) a realist discourse that convinces populations to pursue securitization" (2010, p. 9). As Walt highlights, "different results would occur whether actors" (here described as performers and spectators in the audience) "(…) spoke, wrote and thought about the international security notions and practices in a new way" (2010, p. 9).

Carrying out this critical view further, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen indicated, for example, that "poststructuralism was highly critical of the way that (neo)realism had adopted a state-centric military conception of security without problematizing the historical, normative and political implications that were embedded in this concept" (2009, p. 218). In accordance with the definition drafted by James Der Derian, "poststructuralism is a semio-critical activity, ever searching for and seeking to dismantle the empirico-rational positions where power fixes meaning" (2009, p. 44). Crudely speaking, Der Derian argues that "(…) poststructuralism criticizes the language, rhetoric, narrative and grammar undertaken by states and that make up an array of ambiguous and determinate signifying practices" (2009, p. 44).

Yet in his definition, James Der Derian comes into the conclusion that "it is the heterological nature of their security discourses that dominant powers, in a demonstrative and hegemonic act, always dream of fixing, reducing, subjecting to a single, monological meaning" (2009, p. 44). This view brings into light a way of looking at the international structure by challenging what comes to be accepted as 'truth' and 'meaning.' Such a view also calls into question how certain accepted facts and beliefs usually work to reinforce the dominance and power of particular actors within the structure (Morrow, 2017). James Der Derian alleges that "poststructuralists seem always aware of – and indeed always irritating others by demonstrating – the stickiness of the web of meaning" (2009, p. 44). Poststructuralists believe, therefore, that the meaning of security is created by those that preferred to militarize issues, so they could impose their will to defend their self-centered interests.

Following this reading, security comes to be seen as a predetermined and static conception because performers decided to do so, by thinking, speaking, behaving, performing, operating and acting about security in some ways and not in others. In doing so, performers have established a collective security complex marked by what Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde determined as "distinctive regional patterns, shaped by the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity" (1998, p. 198). Within this complex, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde appointed that "(…) the security perceptions and concerns of a set of state are extremely interlinked that most of their securitized problems are unlikely to be resolved (or perhaps to overcome) apart from one another" (1998, p. 198).

In this complex, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever also appeared to be convinced that "security means a type of politics in which specified developments are socially constructed threats that have an existential quality to cover values (and/or assets) of human collectivities, and consequently leading to a call for emergency measures" (in Adiong, 2009, p. 3). As long as this security complex exists, James Der Derian truly believes that "no border would be impermeable, no sovereignty absolute, and no audience without its internal Other, and then security itself is predicated upon the insecurity of all values" (2009, p. 204). As a consequence, securitization comes to be defined as a political priority, a kind of 'permission' to break the normal rules of politics by using excessive force, taking executive powers and imposing secrecy (Adiong, 2009). The spectators in the audience seem convinced this is a natural and given complex, and they do not reflect about the fact that, once performers are in a complex like this, it is because their decisions made it that way.

This complex creates a security dilemma, whereby, following Alexander Wendt's explanation, "(…) we assume that states in their state of nature face a 'stag hunt,' acquiring 'selfish' identities and interests. As a result, self-help emerges as an institution, not as a constitutive feature of anarchy" (1995, p. 139). To better explore this security complex, a critical argument is required to understand that, as Wendt appointed, "(…) security dilemmas are neither given by anarchy nor nature" (1995, p. 139). After established, the dilemma is very hard to disappear. What is particularly interesting to observe is that the relations of amity and enmity within this security complex help the leading roles to promote a regime of truth that legitimizes securitization is a given, natural and positive mechanism.

Considering this intersubjective knowledge that constitutes what I call the political theater of international relations, this first chapter intends to rethink the way the spectators of the audience are driven to look at the existing and operative concepts, systems and rules of the political theater. For this matter, the main challenge is to critically investigate the leading roles' tendency for the creation and articulation of concepts and rules surrounding the universe of the theater to reinforce securitizing aspirations and to safeguard their self-centered interests. Simply put, this tendency is what keeps the security dilemma functioning.

Insofar as securitization is the successful process within the security complex which turns a problem into a security issue, hence resulting in the transformation of how to deal with it (Adiong, 2009), the concepts, systems and customs that are closely associated with security might be appropriated as crucial tools for the performers to accomplish what Alexander Wendt brilliantly defined as "their own exogenous interests" (1999, p. 304). Having an impoverished conception of these concepts, systems and rules, the performers may decide to use them as what Wendt compared with "(…) a 'hat' they try on before and during the spectacle for their own reasons, a 'hat' that they would take off, without hesitation, as soon as the costs outweigh the benefits" (1999, p. 305). Performing on the stage, and playing the main role in the humanitarian scenes, the leading roles take into account a certain language that, as indicated by Jef Huysmans, "(…) does not merely mobilize a 'given mindset,' but a structure of meaning that is internal to the language itself" (2006, p. 24).

Human security, terrorism, humanitarianism and emancipation, for example, are concepts created or adjusted by language, following a structure of meaning aimed at shaping the public opinion on support for securitization. However, what if we, the audience, leave what Der Derian calls "the desire for mastery to the insecure, and instead, imagine a new and more open dialogue on security – not in the pursuit of a Utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is – other than us?" (2009, p. 151). Pursuant to Der Derian's words, "any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept" (2009, p. 151). This considered, I do not look for alternative concepts of security, but I try to grasp how security can be dangerous and that we must do something based on emancipatory forms of civic engagement. This would be possible by contesting the reality that is already out there manifested in oppressive forms of securitization.

1.1. Security, human security and terrorism

To begin with rethinking the concept of security, one should have in mind that its meaning has been produced in order to give a credible answer to the challenge of defining what world politics is all about from the particular viewpoint of the threat posed to the sovereign state by the use of excessive military force by other states (Terrenas, 2015). This considered, the chapter aims to argue that security could be understood by observing the language developed by performers that intend to turn referent objects into existential threats. This language is often put into practice by discourses of danger aimed at convincing the audience that extraordinary measures (such as secrecy and the excessive use of force) are the only solutions to propagate abstract notions, such as individual and global security.

Pursuant to Ole Waever, "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance 'itself' is the act" (1995, p. 52). For Waever, "by uttering security, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, hence claiming a special right to put into practice whatever means are necessary to block it" (1995, p. 52). To clarify this assumption, examples of how refugees and immigrants are presented as a security problem can be brought into light. For Jef Huysmans, "the security question resembles traditional understandings of national security. Refugees and immigrants are deemed as threats to a political regime and its sovereign claims, and they could be framed as a cultural threat" (2006, p. 20). We amplify, then, our fears against those who do not belong to our culture.

Jef Huysmans also adds the fact that "refugees and immigrants are interpreted as representative of a competing civilization whose values and everyday manners risk undermining Western civilization" (2006, p. 20). He adds, however, that "the physical life of citizens and the sovereignty of the state are not threatened" (2006, p. 20). Contrarily, it is what he defines as "(…) a pre-supposed cultural homogeneity of Western societies that is challenged by the immigrants" (2006, p. 20). Everything or everyone that can harm the cultural homogeneity comes to be deemed as a security problem. For this reason that security must be grasped as an all-inclusive content that cannot only be related to classical military threats (as the realists believe), but to any category that includes social organization. This also leads us to look at security as a concept that manifests what Waever calls "(…) the holistic program for the incorporation of the society and its development" (1995, p. 47).

Critical theorists open up the political space to the (re)articulation of what security meant, and the concomitant rise of alternative answers to old queries concerning its politics: who is to be secured, from what, and by which means? Whereas this notion refers to the expansion of the security agenda to encompass new security threats (beyond conventional threat of military force), the deepening of security stresses the perspective that the sovereign is no longer the only legitimate referent object to be secured (Terrenas, 2015). Security continued to refer to states, as the realist theory assumes, but the difference is that the concept is now broadened to all other realms concerning the human needs. As it is explored throughout this study, while state-representatives began to securitize non-traditional issues outside the military sphere (e.g., migrants), other liberal voices have also decided to introduce new topics to the security conception, hence opening up a space for conceptions that I would rather call 'sub-labels of security,' such as human security and terrorism.

Bearing in mind that security is a 'speech-act' with particular political implications (Hansen, 2012), its language and utilization will always be considered a matter of choice capable of engaging certain practices as responses. For example, performers sometimes do not necessarily refer migrants as military threats, but they produce discourses of danger by labeling them with security terms. Ironically, Jef Huysmans alleges that "the people in danger are not the citizens of the sovereign state that produces the discourse, but rather the people fearing starvation or persecution on the basis of race, religion or political opinion" (2006, p. 20). In this sense, security is a matter of bargaining, whereby the leading roles on the stage successfully convince a non-emancipated audience to accept labels that allow them to put into practice extraordinary measures to defeat a newly created Other.

Throughout this dissertation, however, the deconstruction of the classical concept of security is explored by ways of a critique that is not only against the (neo)realist military notions, but against the growing of a liberal literature on human security studies. For Ole Waever, "security is a label used by states when they need (or they want) to claim a special state right and duty to appeal and use all means necessary to hinder the particular development that allegedly threatens its interests" (in Hansen, 2012, p. 537). For the human security concept, therefore, both its application and meaning happen to be attached to this aforesaid notion of label because of one fundamental reason: its growing political instrumentalization.

The human security conception was developed by liberal peace theorists in the aftermath of the Cold War. At the beginning, its actual meaning consisted of considering the human being rather than the sovereign state as victim of insecurity. Morten Bøås and Kathleen Jennings said that "the human security prioritized as understanding of how individuals cope with insecurity and conflict and how this actually affects relationships between the individuals and communities, the state, and non-state actors" (2005, p. 389). Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note that human security attracted some criticism as it came to be attached as a policy instrument of traditional security discourses unveiled on the political stage.

Considering human security as an unwieldy policy instrument, giving no sense of priority, Ken Booth believes that "(…) it is vague conceptually, with no analytical purchase; it is difficult (if not impossible) to measure due to the fact that it is too expansive in its meaning" (2007, p. 322). Booth also contends that "this policy instrument had not resulted in a real shift in the political focus from states as the primary security referent to states as local agents of emancipation" (2007, p. 322). Pursuant to Booth's conclusion, "human security has not had a strong impact, nor is it likely to without radical changes in the way sovereign states behave" (2007, p. 322). Given that the grounds for optimism are limited, Booth highlights that "we must be patient about the timescales for the influence of a new principle to grow. Until now, human security has hardly dented business-as-usual" (2007, p. 322).

This study does not intend to overlook this concept. On the contrary, I believe that human security can eventually be rethought and renewed by the 'critical mass' in the audience. In advancing a reflexive thinking, the audience should learn from the instrumentalization of this conception, accepting its return as a sort of 'ethical challenge' that revises the consequences of the performers' actions. Its meaning that takes the individuals as the 'victims' of insecurity is perceptible in the desecuritizing moves here suggested. Though the difficulty of fixing a solid definition of human security (mostly because of its vague understandings), this study aims to relate this concept with forms of resistance and activism carried out by spectators against the politics of securitization and its structure. Without relating its meaning with forms of resistance and activism, the human security conception will continue to be considered an ineffective sub-label in many ways; a tool used by a restricted club playing the drama, providing no significant change in the humanitarian scenes.

On the one hand, human security embodies a number of liberal assumptions which reinforced a liberal agenda. On the other hand, it contains a potential for questioning and rethinking the classical concept of security. IR liberal approaches frequently ask how security is to be provided to societies, given the failure of states. More critical analyses, in turn, look to the historical context of the international system, and the assumptions underpinning it, to the processes in which the system is constituted, and human security is produced and reproduced (Fierke, 2010). Coupled with the critique that looks to the historical context of the political theater, the critical analyses on security also emphasize how general and vague-defined comes to be the meaning of terrorism. One possible and interesting analysis to this emphasis is the focus on the existing politics of fear between the actors of the theater.

As one can observe during this study, emergencies and threats are created within a register of fear. Even the most technical of discourses and practices, if related to security, they are taken on their special resonance as a consequence of their close association with fear. This is what intends to make them recognizable as security practices in the first place (Williams, 2011). As the human security conception, the application of terrorism also reveals to be general and vague, opening up a space for discursive practices that operate hand-in-hand with performers' strategic labeling of identities within the fields of security and defense. My argument is not intended to indicate that terrorism does not exist, nor that terrorism should not be a matter of concern to the leading roles on the political stage. Rather, my argument sustains the reading that performers vacillated as they establish a politics of fear out of terrorism, with identities risking to be framed as existential threats.

In aiming to reinforce their national security and defense, leading roles often tend to mislead terrorism as they use this vague conception through discursive practices to regulate behaviors and shape the imagination of the spectators in the audience. Consequently, they happen to frame identities (such as immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers) under the terrorism umbrella, and this can also be qualified a 'sub-label' of security. As Jef Huysmans pointed out, "migration issues came to be considered a policy framework focused on dangers to society. For example, the Europeanization of migration and asylum policy was implicated in the production of this consideration" (2006, p. 68). As he reminds, "the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement connected immigration with terrorism" (2006, p. 68).

This process is not given or predetermined. It was constructed based on fear, an instrument which, far from being part of the existential condition of the system, has been more powerful and effective by structures of modern politics (Williams, 2011). Much of the Western policy thinking and rhetoric around the migration issues is associated with terrorism. As Jef Huysmans believes, “this places the regulation of migration in an institutional framework that intrinsically deals with the protection of internal security” (2006, p. 68). Within this context, non-Western people can be portrayed as incompatible with modern nation-statehood and as the deviant Other of Western audience. Considering this – and knowing that Western states are often represented as the key to modernity – policy thinking and rhetoric that associate migration with terrorism tend to reinforce stereotypes that define the non-Western people to be unfit for modernity (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009).

The institutionalization of human security and migration as terrorism is widely understood and debated throughout this study. This served, for example, as the key notion for the Bush administration in the legitimization of strategies in the fields of defense, international development and national security – mainly the war on terror launched by after September 11. Human security and terrorism are ‘sub-labels’ of security that cannot be disassociated from the Western powers military doctrines, diplomatic options, and economic choices (Nay, 2013). Such institutionalization of these ‘sub-labels’ of security is what Jef Huysmans calls “a structural effect of a multiplicity of practices and the process which includes multiple actors of the international system, such as governments, organizations, media, etc” (2006, p. 69). These important actors (performers, guests and backstage helpers) do not only guide policy but also shape the political imagination of the audience by misleading the original question of terrorism and human security.

The theater’s uniform opposition to terrorism and human security is dependent on its open-endedness, the degree to which it allows sovereign states to claim for ‘human security’ or to fill the category of ‘terrorist’ with one’s preferred adversary (Koskenniemi, 2004). As one can observe in the course of this dissertation, the ‘sub-labels’ could eventually be described as what Noam Chomsky considered as “(…) ideological inventions used to legitimize policy frameworks and to strengthen supremacy in a hegemonic world order that ultimately benefits the self-centered interests of those who rule over domestic politics” (in Nay, 2013, p. 332).

1.2. Humanitarianism and the law

Aiming to define what humanitarianism means, Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss reminded the 1819 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, which cited that "humanitarian means 'having regard to the interests of humanity or the humankind at large; relating to, or advocating, or practicing humanity or human action.' Likewise, humanitarianism consists of actions to improve well-being or welfare" (2018, p. 4). Nonetheless, when it takes the form of practicing humanity in the political theater, politics and power arrangements can be involved. Hoffman and Weiss assert that "politics is concerned with power, and it asks the question of who gets what, when, how, and why. In the context of humanitarianism, politics is inquired into who gets what type of assistance, when, how, and why" (2018, p. 5).

For the purposes of this study, humanitarianism is understood as a political discourse within the security drama. This discourse is embedded in a powerful narrative that emphasizes the respect either for security or humanity, but also prioritizes some issues over others. Underpinned by international norms, systems and rules that spur the performers to be engaged in security actions in complex emergencies worldwide, humanitarianism might easily take the form of a biased political discourse, once it decides 1) who gets the assistance, 2) when interventionary practices and securitizing measures should be undertaken, 3) how civilians and belligerents are to be regarded, and 4) why some issues and crises are prioritized over others.

Humanitarianism is something subordinated to the performers on the stage, hence restraining alternative forms at the level of the audience. A necessary call for a new humanitarianism comes from a society claiming for a less securitized order of the system, which is the key for developing emancipation as a liberalizing function for everyone. Humanitarianism rethought means in reality to promote life and freedom through the granting of rights and protection for those who are often suffering from securitization of humanitarian issues and contexts (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). As long as the meaning and application of humanitarianism belong only to the performers on the stage and their struggle for power, the commitments to justice and dignity inscribed in the international law will continue to fail. Humanitarianism is believed to be reborn under audience's guidance. If not, this conception will remain exclusive and attached to the security of states, constituting a problem, not a solution. Humanitarianism is so far an exclusive source of securitization.

As a political discourse, humanitarianism can involve the constitutive patterning of political subjects, establishing levels of agency that speak to specific geopolitical constructions of identity and action. Understanding humanitarianism as a political discourse means to focus on its conceptual architecture and how it can be linked to social logics and practices inscribed within specific discourses. This reveals the existence of a connection between discourses of humanitarianism and forms of securitization within the international system (Moore, 2013). Following Stephen Krasner' line of thought, "the securitization and its companion discourses of humanitarianism turn out to be no more than the historical evolution of forms of encroachment on sovereignty" (in Gozzi, 2017, p. 201), For Krasner, "their role is to drive Westphalian sovereignty deeper into crises, hence once more revealing their nature as an embodiment of organized hypocrisy" (Idem, 2017, p. 201). What is interesting to observe is that discourses of humanitarianism presented in this study could be compatible with international rules and law.

For the critical security approaches presented throughout the study, securitizing measures promoted by discourses of humanitarianism suggest they are either legal or illegal depending on one's understanding of how international law is constructed, changed, and represented. Ian Hurd comes into the conclusion that "no amount of debate over law (or most recent cases) will resolve its status; it is both legal and illegal at the same time" (2011, p. 293). In this reading, my theoretical argument does not attempt to discuss whether securitizing measures undertaken under the auspices of humanitarian discourses and invoked by sub-labels of security like human security and terrorism are legal or illegal, but it attempts to expose that rules might be broken or interpreted by different viewpoints. This is because rules were made and used by performers, and they do not set out a coherent standard that carefully distinguishes lawful and unlawful behaviors and performative capacities in the theater.

Law always had a geopolitical dimension, framed through dominant discourses of geopolitical enmity within international politics. That is why international law is understood here in terms of a historical-sociological method, instead of being comprehended as an impartial set of rules responsible for the regulation of the conditions of international life (Moore, 2013). In looking at the law in terms of a historical-sociological method, it will be quite difficult for me to analyze the law without being what Onuf calls "an intuitive constructivist" (2013, p. 34).

According to Nicholas Onuf, "the constructivist emphasis on rules leads to a consideration of the ways that states justify their choices and decisions, and consequently to the place of ethics in IR" (2013, p. 34). As convincingly argued by James Der Derian, "this emphasis sees good as well as bad, in a state of constant tension" (2009, p. 300). In this reading, the innate nature of humans for sociability offered what he calls "(...) the germ for an international society, but for this to be nurtured and protected, diplomacy and international rules and law were supposed to mitigate the excesses of states pursuing interests" (2009, p. 300).

However, the problem is that, as firmly explained by Andrew Linklater, "the international law could not eliminate the tragic conflict and tensions between the different kinds of moralities within the system of IR. Deep divisions between incommensurable ethical world-views lead to tensions" (1998, p. 58). When this assertion in considered, then the interpretation of law, along with a rethought humanitarianism within an emancipated audience, can open a public space for desecuritizing measures able to challenge the traditional criteria that distinguish who gets the assistance and how victims are to be treated. Once a public space – that is marked by contributions of desecuritization carried out fundamentally by a higher number of spectators – is able to flourish, the political theater will witness a strong capacity of the audience in developing a more dialogic and inclusive language according to a less securitized collaboration with the performers.

This public space could only be possible to emerge if the audience uses the law and humanitarianism in organized collective actions against suffering and pain. In this matter, Natan Sznaider comes to suggest Foucault's account of modernity by highlighting the importance of what he calls "humanitarian movements in modern societies and significance of bottom-up struggles for freedom from militarization against top down impositions of discipline and control" (in Linklater, 2007, p. 200). Pursuant to Andrew Linklater, "the Sznaider's suggestion is complementary in many ways – by arguing that the Western society no longer celebrates public acts against forms of violence" (2007, p. 200). For Linklater, "Sznaider relies on higher levels behind the scenes (to prisons and asylums, in a Foucauldian sense), stressing that 'civilizing' traits do not lay 'decivilizing processes' to rest" (2007, p. 200). While the audience relies on the institutionalization of concepts and rules made on the stage, violence and suffering will still be present in the theater.

If a more critical approach dislodges the focus on the universal dimensions of humanitarianism, then it is also important to rethink about the ways in which international law itself can be seen as a spatial ordering of specific traditions in jurisprudence (Moore, 2013). Throughout this dissertation it is argued that the international system, as long as it is comprised by states sharing perspectives that whatever conception they acquire on the absolutes of international law, the one thing that they seem to agree upon is that they are indeed "absolutes" and, as such, call for total commitment or rejection (Koskenniemi, 2004).

Since the creation of the UN, for example (when the international law came to be reinforced in the political theater), the states accepted that the system would be hegemonic in style and structure, though the euphemism 'collective security' was preferred (Simpson, 2004). Every rule and custom that came after automatically belonged to this structure, reflecting a hegemonic logic that gives little attention to bottom-up struggles against securitization and use of force. That is why concepts, normative systems and rules must be deconstructed; because they were produced and reproduced by the same actors who decided to establish a hegemonic structure, controlling the production of knowledge and information, and then manipulating the audience under security utterances. For this purpose, it is also worthwhile to ask how can the spectators in the audience recognize that leading roles often appeal the law, humanitarianism and the reason of humanity as ways to justify the logic of power? Should we continue to allow performers to label migrants as 'terrorist,' and manage military power to silence voices and close the doors of the theater?

It is incumbent upon us, the audience, to provide mechanisms of contestation and counter-argumentation. We must develop new forms of humanitarianism through activism. As one may observe, desecuritization is the key of contestation against the hegemonic structure of the political theater. With drama, the leading roles attempt to convince the spectators by means of humanitarian, legal, and security utterances to accept that they have what Ole Waever refers to as "(…) the right to handle the problems with extraordinary measures by breaking the normal political rules of the spectacle" (1998, p. 80). In the meantime, humanitarianism and law, without being attached to desecuritizing moves provided by the audience, will continue to be hegemonic. Rethinking these issues means to interpret them as dystopia, usual impositions of special interests in the garb of general ones (Koskenniemi, 2004).

1.3. Emancipation and desecuritization

The most recent attempt to map critical security studies overlays the previous intellectual and temporal mappings with distinctions between different critical approaches indicated via a set of geographical metaphors or 'schools' (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Throughout this dissertation I address three schools of critical security studies, the first school highlights human emancipation, the second broadens the conception of security to the politics of desecuritization, and the third dives into Foucault's works by adopting a sort of doubtful account of reality. By building a bridge between these three schools of critical security studies, I first introduce the Welsh School, also known as the Aberystwyth School.

The Aberystwyth School can be best described as the first generation that, in Ole Waever's explanation, "(…) avoids seeing the world through the eyes of the state as implied by using the concept of national security as key category" (2004, p. 6). The scholars of the Aberystwyth School, such as Ken Booth, Richard Wyn Jones and Nicholas Wheeler believe that, as contended by Waever, "(…) the sovereign state is often the problem as much as the solution" (2004, p. 6). For this reason, Waever contends that "(…) the aim of the research has to be defined in relation to human beings" (2004, p. 6). Booth and Wyn Jones had self-consciously developed a brand of critical security studies that challenged the definition of security purely in terms of military threats to the state, and instead linked the study of security to the expansive goal of human emancipation (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014).

The best way for the Aberystwyth School to conceptualize security was through a critical analysis defined in terms of human emancipation and tied with the audience rather than with the leading roles. For Ken Booth, "the critical theory of security attempts to open up rather than close down how security is conceived, exploring a 'common humanity' rather than national sovereignty, and emancipation rather than power" (2007, p. 109). For Booth, "in seeking to transcend realism, it is not the 'meaning of security' that is the challenge facing us, but the 'politics of meaning'" (2007, p. 109). In this connection, IR and security must be seen in the context of post-Enlightenment thought due to its application of human reason to the project of emancipation. Indeed, the societies were challenged by the great thinkers of the Enlightenment to know themselves and the world they live in, and to apply that knowledge to free themselves from tyranny (Brown & Ainsley, 2005).

The main vector of the progressive alternative provided by Aberystwyth School is emancipation, which described the removal of structural barriers that impede general participation in political affairs. The deepening of what security means becomes, therefore, evident again. Simply put, security is about far more than mere survival; security is about the ability to either enjoy the political agency and to make choices (Abu-Zahra, Leech & MacNeil, 2016). The work of those associated with the Aberystwyth (or Welsh) School adopts a normative approach to the study of security, one that questions the primacy of state security and instead seeks to ascertain the conditions for achieving individual security from the broader threats to poverty, political oppression, and environmental degradation, as well as violence and conflict (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). However, in attempting to move beyond the realist-liberal debate, the critical security studies continued to draw its core concept of emancipation from the same intellectual traditions that rest profoundly on sexist, Eurocentric and racist assumptions[4] (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006).

Considering that the critical security studies drawn emancipation from the same intellectual traditions of the Enlightenment thinkers, this led to what Hynek and Chandler identified as "(…) the exhaustion of the emancipatory impetus of the Aberystwyth School in ways that the space for critical advocacy and collaboration between academics, think tanks and organizations has diminished since the early of 2000s" (2013, p. 48). The figures of Aberystwyth, at a moment of reorientation of the Western foreign policy-making, and the removal of barriers to a new hegemonic discourse of liberalism came to serve, as Hynek and Chandler contend, "(...) not the counter-hegemonic forces but rather the hegemonic ones" (2013, p. 48). In any case, this study takes Aberystwyth into account because it avoids looking at the theater through the eyes of the performers, and it considers emancipation as the key for the struggle against oppression. Emancipation can develop what Ken Booth describes as "political programmes for a better world marked by meanings of liberty, progress, pursuing equality, and the perfectibility of humanity" (2007, p. 111).

4 Kant, one of the favorite philosophers of the first generation, observed that 'humanity achieves its greatest perfection with the White race.' This generates difficulties for the analysis of the security relations (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006). We may not regard Kantian philosophy as a matter of merely contingent personal prejudice. Indeed, sexism and racism were endemic features of the philosophical discourse of his era and of the belief systems, the social practices, and institutions that formed the historical context of this discourse (Kleingeld, 2019). We should not ignore Kant's own racism and sexism, but ask how that racism and sexism shaped his philosophical theories to make them male and white-biased, and how a revisionist approach reoriented by a commitment to race and gender equity can be restructured to deal with racist and a patriarchal system (Mills, 2018).

Although some of the Aberystwyth scholars happened to serve hegemonic forces, I argue that their approaches were quite right in identifying the Western audience as source of change because of its abilities to struggle for freedom. However, a complementary approach was needed to contest securitization; an approach that puts into practice emancipation through collective actions, with the purpose of calling attention for a desirable move of securitized issues out of the emergency mode established by the performers and their security discourses. This approach, where the emancipation of the audience enables desecuritization, was taken into account by scholars of the so-called Copenhagen School.

Scholars associated with the Copenhagen School, specially Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, originally proposed the concept of 'securitization' as a means towards developing a new analytical approach to the study of security. Here the focus shifts on to analysis of the consequences that follow from invoking the concept of security, more particularly in relation to non-military issues or sectors (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Ole Waever, for instance, has launched a reinvigorated approach of security focused on the outcomes of moving issues out of the security spectrum by emancipatory means. Waever's concept of desecuritization became a popular one, which somehow refers to a rearticulation of the performers-audience relationship. In keeping with the emancipatory roots of Aberystwyth, Waever and the personalities of the Copenhagen School can be useful sources when it comes to establishing a more inclusive, equitable and dialogic relationship between performers and audience, providing a sort a 'de-romanticized' view of human emancipation according to local expressions of desecuritization.

The Copenhagen School, due to its critique to securitization, is the key approach for rethinking humanitarian scenes in the West. Forced migration and militarization in humanitarian contexts are discussed by Copenhagen authors as issues that must be brought back by the audience into an ordinary public sphere of the political theater. According to Ole Waever's argument, "the Copenhagen School in security studies is built around securitization" (2004, p. 8). In security discourse, Waever believes that "(…) an issue is presented as posing a threat to a designated referent object/target (traditionally, but not necessarily a state), whereby the designation of the threat as existential might justify the use of extraordinary measures to handle it" (2004, p. 8). What is at stake is a critical view that is shared across the schools.

Following Waever's line of thought, it is possible to argues that securitization means that security is the key to legitimizing the use of force, which he believes that "(…) opens the way for the states to mobilize or take special power (for example, using conscription, secrecy, and other means only legitimate when dealing with security matters)" (2004, p. 9). As he concludes, "security means the outcome of a move that takes politics beyond the established norms of the political game, thus framing prioritized issues above what is known as the normal politics" (2004, p. 9). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde believe that "security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing" (1998, p. 4). In their opinion, "it is better to aim for desecuritization: the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (1998, p. 4).

What is fundamental to grasp is that, insofar as the Aberystwyth School describes security as the means that 'politics-in-general' becomes equitable and inclusive by emancipation, the Copenhagen School sees security as representing the threshold between the 'politics-as-usual' and the 'excessive anti-politics' of extraordinary and emergency measures (Abu-Zahra, Leech & MacNeil, 2016). In addition, the third school of CSS is the so-called Paris School. Those associated with this school, particularly Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans, concentrated on the question of how security professionals and bureaucracies 'do' security: how security practices are conducted across a range of different contexts, and often in ways that diminish any supposed distinction between internal (policing) and external (military) security (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Although its scholars are more focused on Foucauldian accounts of surveillance and political order, the Paris School still sees emancipation as an alternative to overcome oppression.

Furthermore, like some other non-traditional approaches to security, the Paris School treats security as a social construction as opposed to an objective reality. What is different and new to their analysis is what they understand by security. Whilst the Copenhagen School, for example, theorizes that security is what is done with it (or better, security is what it does), Bigo argues that what is done with it (how security is practiced) determines security (Floyd, 2006). Instead of transforming any security discourse into a 'performative' speech act, Bigo argues that "it is necessary to understand how discourses are often forged as forms of justification of the everyday practices that enact governmentality of fear and unease" (2014, p. 211).

All of Bigo's works are informed by the same assumption, specially that there is a merger of 'internal' and 'external' security into a 'field of security,' where the border between the two ceases to exist. The end of bipolarity and the rise of the European Union, for instance, means for Didier Bigo the contribution to the undoing of this distinction. Yet in this line of thought, the lapse of the more traditional threats to security have left both internal and external security agents desperate for a *reason d'être* (Floyd, 2006). Didier Bigo emphasizes that border controls, for example, "(...) operate in at least three different social universes which are intermingled with the process of controlling borders, however distinct in terms of the patrimony of dispositions of each profession involved" (2014, p. 211). These different social universes are, as Bigo points out, "(…) the military-strategic field, internal security field, and global cyber-surveillance social universe" (2014, p. 211).

This analysis is important for this study, and it is further explored when it comes to observe the migration issue in Europe. In the course of the sixth scene, more precisely, Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans' arguments, the two main personalities of the Paris School, help us to grasp that security is a deliberate process of securitization and insecuritization of the borders, identities and the conception of orders. Even more implicitly: security means a lowering of the level of acceptability of the Other; an attempt at insecuritization of daily life by the security professionals, along with the increase in the strengths of police potential for action (Floyd, 2006). All of this comes together in my efforts to propose a work-oriented agenda that includes the shared principles of these three critical schools of security studies.

Even though these three schools have different emphases, it is possible to identify a series of key concepts that are shared across these schools. In addition to human emancipation, some of the concepts are 'broadening,' which relates to the move away from a narrow focus on the military sector to analysis of issues in other sectors; 'deepening,' which relates to the idea that the state is not the only referent object of security; 'normative,' which takes a stance on what should or ought to be analyzed, achieved, and secured; and 'post-positivism,' which rejects the idea that observes the natural and social world in the same way (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). The next chapters address these three schools and their shared conceptions, always acknowledging that emancipation and desecuritization can change the course of the drama through bottom-up struggles against oppression.

Scene 2. Sphere of analysis

Claudia Aradau argues that "the exceptional politics of securitization turns into a dangerous undertaking for democracy and peace; so as the proliferation of existential threats risks extending extraordinary measures and exceptional circumstances to normality" (2004, p. 6). In this context, Aradau is convinced that "desecuritization becomes an ethical-political choice which refuses to let democratic politics slip into exceptional politics" (2004, p. 6). In her view, "desecuritization becomes a matter of different speech-acts, which one could privilege depending on external, pragmatic criteria, on 'how much attention we want to capture for an issue'" (2004, p. 6). Thus, the question is whether we are willing to contest securitization and its exceptional measures that cause harms and suffering to the voiceless.

Before answering this question, a critical perspective that embodies the Western audience as the sphere of analysis must be raised. As previously explored in the introduction of the study, the audience is understood as the Western civil societies; social organizations occupying the auditorium, in particular the space between the entrance and the stage of the theater, where spectators can, as Robert Layton argues, "(…) coordinate their management of resources and activities" (2006, p. 3). More importantly, the audience is, in reality, a Western definition that, borrowing John Keane's words, "(…) is not universal in any simple sense" (2003, p. 39). Bearing this idea in mind, Keane is truly convinced that "(…) the plural understandings of civil society within the modern West should be considered as 'one particular approach,' rather than a universal language". For him, "the universal language is thought to be synonymous with a world history which leads triumphantly to the silencing or even annihilation of other, 'residual' definitions of social order" (2003, p. 39).

The audience can support or oppose the performers on the stage, depending on its emancipatory aspirations and the level of popular participation of the spectators in contributions of desecuritization. In the same time that it is not universal, but rather local and particular, I argue that the Western audience might be strong enough to counterbalance the performers in case a high number of spectators are willing to promote a 'de-romanticized' notion of emancipation, engaging themselves in local expressions of desecuritization that would create what Lilie Chouliaraki calls "the cosmopolitan connectivity with sufferers outside" (2006, p. 199).

One major insight that informs this cosmopolitan connectivity is the fact that the Western audience finds itself in a democratic structure, whereby the spectators are supposed to be free to promote their political aims. This means that the theater – although dominated by oppressive forms of securitization – still has the proper preconditions for the audience to put into practice collective actions aimed at dismantling or reducing the impact of the security discourses and their dubious instruments of securitization. Then, due to its democratic values and principles, the theater gives the opportunity for the audience to become what Thomas Keenan convincingly called as "(…) a latent body politic, going beyond a communitarian commitment that cares only for those people like 'us,' and making a difference in the life of the distant sufferer" (in Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 200).

It is also understood that without a persuaded and manipulated Western audience, securitization is not possible. The construction of a security-attached problem occurs due to what Thierry Balzacq, who by many is seen as member of the Copenhagen and Paris School, defines as "strategic action of discourse that operates at the level of persuasion by using various artifacts (such as metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence, and even lies)" (2005, p. 172). For Balzacq, "securitization is perlocutionary, the consequential effects or sequels aimed at evoking the deepest feelings, beliefs, thoughts and actions of the target audience" (2005, p. 172). As he firmly concludes, "(…) this characterization might be summed up by Jürgen Habermas in the following – 'to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something'" (2005, p. 175).

Indeed, Habermas' assumption helps us to understand that a dramaturgical language came to establish a security mode of exclusion in the political theater. That is why I claim for a Western audience that goes beyond a communitarian commitment, promoting what was appointed by Andrew Linklater as "(…) resistance to modes of exclusion that values the expansion of the boundaries of dialogic forms of the human life" (1998, p. 109). Linklater, who is seen by many as member of Aberystwyth and Copenhagen School, argues that "dialogue is the preferred means which the society should decide whether systems of exclusion are justified" (1998, p. 109). In the humanitarian scenes presented here, for example, I consider dialogue as forms of collective achievement in the way that 'reflexive spectators' belonging to a 'critical mass' are led to become aware of the strategic action of discourses.

The body of international relations critical ideas assumes, according to Ken Booth's analysis, "(…) that the answers to the fundamental questions concerning politics and sociology are not only to be discovered by science, but also by ethical reasoning conducted through dialogue" (2007, p. 38). For Booth, "equality reveals to be the foundational perspective of this way of thinking" (2007, p. 38). More important, this way of thinking does not exist on the stage. It rather exists in civil associations in which, pursuant to Robert Layton's statement, "(…) have some autonomy to manage resources and coordinate action, and therefore have the potential to advance their members' political interests in dialogue with governments and elites" (2006, p. 16). Carrying this perspective further, this study proposes a central concern about how enough of the spectators in the Western audience, in developing dialogue at a macro level, facilitates the rethinking of humanitarian scenes.

Having in mind that critical theory is best understood by interdisciplinary analyses, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen contend that the "major advantage of this is both inclusive (allowing for all potential participants to join) and located at a rather deep analytical, conceptual level that is facilitated by dialogue" (2009, p. 257). An emancipated audience that is engaged in promoting dialogue in different forms of desecuritization is, and borrowing John Keane's definition, "an untrammeled good" (2003, p. 63). This is because an emancipated audience, as Keane contends, "(…) harbors all kinds of citizens groups, social movements, and other individuals who engage in dialogue, debate, confrontation, and negotiation with each other, governmental actors and the business world" (2003, p. 63). In humanitarian scenes, dialogue means what Chouliaraki calls "the moral cause of suffering visible and audible, bringing altogether in a space of solidarity" (2006, p. 205).

As long as an audience is able to flourish through forms of education, dialogue and activism, collective actions against the oppressive practices of exclusion in the humanitarian scenes can be promoted. An audience focused on dialogues and actions could be able to provide more opportunities for the victims to be listened. It is the Western audience – mostly because of its privileged status compared to the victims of the drama – that can give voice to the voiceless. This dynamic implies, however, one question that should be considered: is enough of the audience interested on using desecuritization as an emancipatory mechanism to rethink humanitarian scenes? The examples depicted here show that desecuritization is an attractive tool.

2.1. A focus on multiple publics and everyday politics

Much of the content of international relations, past and present, is the outcome of continuous struggle over the reproduction of power dynamics and capitalist social relations. If we assume this reproduction, then we exclude from our account the multiple publics, that is, the human agency and the historical process we attempt to recover as the basis of the social world (Rosenberg, 1994). In this matter, it is worthwhile to assume the hypothesis proposed by George Lawson, who is truly convinced that "(..) in a world where everyday politics is becoming internationalized, and the international is becoming a subsequently thick political space, engagements with multiple publics should be included in empirical study of IR" (2008, p. 28). Lawson interestingly comes into the argument that "in today's world, engagements within the multiple publics accounts that constitute international politics should be a necessary feature of any public academic enterprise" (2008, p. 28).

The sociologist Alvin Gouldner defined the Western audience as having "multiple publics, a medium that people can pursue their own projects in the course of their everyday lives; as potential ways of avoiding dependence on the domination of the sovereign state in accordance with important patterns of mutual and self-help" (in Layton, 2006, p. 10). Considering this characterization, the multiple publics of the Western audience might operate as what Jan Scholte refers to as "a check against oppression and exclusion" (1999, p. 28). They can provide what for Scholte means "contributions to material welfare, civic education, public discussion, as well as transparent, accountable, legitimate governance that help to counter arbitrary inequalities and exclusions in society" (1999, p. 28). Multiple publics do not produce these benefits automatically. They need to, as Scholte argues, "(…) develop adequate capacities in terms of human, material and ideational resources" (1999, p. 28).

Critical theory is the academic enterprise that best provides us with many ways to address the immanent possibilities for the audience to avoid dependence on the domination of the performers. But even so, IR critical approaches still seem limited when it comes to mobilizing multiple publics to higher levels of civic engagement, political action and dialogue. Critical approaches address potential capacities, but the audience remains under-resourced, largely receptive rather than active, potential than actual. For this reason that George Lawson claims for a "(…) more public IR that produces, and is produced by, grounded research" (2008, p. 28).

Despite the fact that the Copenhagen School appeals to an audience, Thierry Balzacq reminds us that "(…) its framework somehow ignores that audience" (2005, p. 177). Balzacq says that the Copenhagen School singles out three units of analysis: "the referent object/target (what is the object of securitization?); the securitizing actor (who speaks security?), and the functional actors (those whose activities have significant effects on security making)" (2005, p. 177). In his viewpoint, "not incorporating the audience is a failure which makes it difficult to address the fundamental question of what are the proportionate casual weight of audience and the contextual factors in securitization debate" (2005, p. 177). Ole Waever, for example, believes that it is possible to speak with a level of authority without being authorized to speak, once authority is not essential for desecuritization. But even so, it turns out that it is a difficult task for the audience to break securitization.

George Lawson claims, therefore, that theorists should "(…) spend less time in the ivory tower and more time engaging with the multiple publics that make up the panorama of world politics" (2008, p. 28). That is why this dissertation introduces collective actions established by a small but emancipated audience and that have the purpose of avoiding submission by giving voice to marginalized actors. Though at a micro level, these collective actions carried out by some multiple publics of the audience are worthy of consideration, inasmuch as they allow me to get closer to a "critical mass" and its active and actual political role for changing the course of the security drama. These collective actions are desecuritizing moves explored in the last section, and they reveal to be a slow process taking place in the popular politics of everyday lives, articulated by social movements and groups of civil society. These movements and groups are multiple publics that somehow attempt to overcome the dystopian features of the drama, such as submission, fear and violence.

Everyday politics are the environments where multiple publics (independent social movements) operate within and beyond the world system. These movements embody advocacy networks, including those who advocate less securitized solutions to humanitarian problems (Kaldor, 2003). When it comes to dealing with humanitarian scenes, the focus on everyday politics reflects a demand for inclusion of multiple publics in discussions where they have never been allowed to participate. This is explored by Aberystwyth School theorists due to their emphasis on the possibility of penetration of multiple publics in the security debate.

As Ken Booth summarizes, “only if multiple publics, collectively, learn and practice cosmopolitan norms, (re)animated by the goal of inventing an egalitarian world order, could we have rational hope in a reconstructed future” (2007, p. 28). According to George Lawson, “the focus on multiple publics and everyday politics carries out the prospect of opening up fertile turf in security studies” (2008, p. 29). This happens because of what he refers to as the “multiple publics’ capacity to weave together a number of disparate trends in IR discipline, not least the turn towards the individual subject in normative IR and a renewed interest in ideas of community and society” (2008, p. 29). The focus on multiple publics can also expand involvement in the auditorium. Highlighting their collective actions and expressions of desecuritization through civic activism, multiple publics might, as Jan Scholte indicates, “(…) attract larger followings and higher profiles” (1999, p. 33). In Scholte’s point of view, “a greater emphasis upon outreach initiatives to the general public help to advance the promise of civil society in respect of civic education” (1999, p. 33).

What is also particularly interesting to highlight is that when we focus on everyday politics, the term emancipation also offers a discourse that frames parallel concerns about the ability to control the circumstances which spectators live, and about the substantive empowerment of citizens. But the problem is that Western states seized upon this universal emancipatory language as evidence for the victory of existing democracies, spreading liberal ideas that contributed to the collapse of non-Western societies (Kaldor, 2003). Considering this problem, emancipation is something that should firstly be empowered locally by multiple publics of Western society, so that a radical democratization of the theater can be flourished. For this, a reconstructed conception of emancipation must be the one that, as Claudia Aradau convincingly suggests, “(…) tackles the concept of democratic politics and the problem of an authority claiming a voice for emancipation” (2004, p. 10).

All this considered, I broadly divide my critique in two levels of analysis. The first consists of the state-as-actor, where I criticize the power position of those actors promoting the drama by following a set of beliefs, desires, attributes or principles of action. My criticism is that states appropriate concepts and meanings to establish identities and guide their behavior. The critical argument is also concerned with the performative capacities of the states to silence voices in the audience, given that it is their intention to keep the system operating under their auspices.

In the level of the act, I emphasize Thierry Balzacq's words when he analyses "the language used by the state-as-actor to perform a given act – the grammatical and syntactical rules of the language" (2005, p. 178). Given the fact that this level is contextual, Balzacq draws attention to the heuristic artifacts that states manage to establish what he calls "(…) the proper circumstances that facilitate the mobilization (not to say manipulation) of the society and peripheral countries – the analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions, stereotypes" (2005, pp. 179). Any IR critical approach based on multiple publics should also consider that the concept of emancipation might serve as an artifact used by state, and then seized on a security language of domination. In recognizing that human emancipation belongs to the audience, not to discourses unveiled on the stage, I concentrate my analysis into the relationship between performers-audience in ways that securitized issues can be a matter of contestation in the spectators' everyday lives.

By concentrating my theoretical argument in these two levels of analysis, I draw attention for the new kinds of civic engagements of some multiple publics that are supported by new forms of education, pedagogy and dialogue. For this, we must understand that in everyday life, we, the Western audience, are convinced to accept exceptional measures that are often oppressive and racist. Thus, understanding this scenario is not merely helpful for discussions of social and political sciences, but necessary to critically investigate all the contributions securitization makes to the perpetuation of violence beyond the security drama. It is important for us to consider that advancing a more critical approach about the political theater of international relations means to seek for what Andrew Linklater referred to as "levels of comprehensiveness and reflectiveness that focus on actors in everyday life, on the multiple publics committed to promote inclusive principles" (1998, p. 115).

One of the most important claims of my critical argument is that of promoting what George Lawson defines as "public IR, which represents a step away from cloistered scholasticism towards a more concerted engagement with multiple publics that constitute everyday politics" (2008, p. 34). Due to its focus on the everyday politics, Lawson says that a "public IR joins part of a wider opening in the social sciences, moving toward public sociology." For him, "this means the return of a closer relationship between academic work and political activism in the process of opening dialogue with multiple publics that constitute world politics" (2008, p. 34).

2.2. Post-positivism and the regime of truth

Whether securitization is linked with institutional authority or with regimes of power/knowledge, Claudia Aradau argues that "desecuritization needs to tackle this issue and penetrate institutionally" (2004, p. 9). For her, "the security professionals' institutional knowledge about threats and the technological means to deal with such makes them impermeable to the criticism of amateurs such as NGOs, associations, churches, spokesmen and *ad hoc* organizations" (2004, p. 9). This is because the security institutional knowledge regarding the existential threats goes beyond the understandings of the multiple publics, disabling them to collectively mobilize for desecuritization at a macro level. Considering this, the dissertation describes the enactment of the security institutional knowledge as the regime of truth; a regime that must be emphasized and investigated by critically exploring and examining its epistemological nature, sources, capacities and limitations.

The regime of truth is, in fact, the setting of analysis of this dissertation, which is studied by means of an epistemological dimension. In social scientific disciplines, critical theories that take multiple publics as the main sphere of analysis come to be associated with an interest in knowledge (Lezaun, 2002). In this regard, whereas classical definitions (which are highly supported by a positivist epistemology) presupposed the existence of a state, a contemporary concept (based on a critical epistemology that challenges the regime of truth) could be described as a move away from from state-centered approaches in a societal sense – more concerned with individual empowerment and personal autonomy (Kaldor, 2003).

The classical and positivist epistemology which assumes a value-free nature of knowledge is here put into doubt. What comes to be challenged is the positivist epistemology that presumes a political theater existing independently from human reason. Simply put, positivism transfers the methods of natural sciences to social sciences, separating the subject from the object, so that the theory will be able to describe and prescribe the performative capacities of the actors on the stage. The positivism embodied in the (neo)realist figures of Kaplan and Waltz, for example, enforced what Nicholas Onuf refers to as "(...) the unity of nature and society by endorsing it, and also ratified the Comtean compact dividing nature and organizing science into levels, raising the stakes on a theoretical rigor" (2013, p. 206).

The view that the social sciences could be studied in the same way as the natural sciences is often termed 'positivism,' and positivists draw a sharp distinction between positive and normative theory (Brown & Ainsley, 2005). While the positive theory explains how the political theater operates in a value-free way, the normative theory offers value-based perspectives about what the theater ought to be like, or how the theater ought to operate. Properly speaking, the positive theory reflects at the disciplinary level what Der Derian refers to as "(…) the continuing domination of philosophical realism (from its logical positivist to rational choice forms), which upholds the purest, most parsimonious statement, that express a thought or reflect an event" (2009, p. 194). At the level of common sense, says Der Derian, "positivists suggest a natural preference for conceptual rigor and clarity" (2009, p. 194).

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen also contend that most IR realist and liberalist approaches have followed what they call "the positivist route, combining in what Keohane coned as 'rationalism,' while critical constructivists, poststructuralists and most feminists have opted for a post-positivist, 'reflectivist' approach" (2009, p. 35). What these post-positivist writers have in common is their rejection of the epistemological stance of rational choice theory, along with the rejection of a foundationalist account of the world system, which knowledge is grounded by the correspondence of theory to a knowable reality (Brown & Ainsley, 2005). Also, Der Derian asserts that "post-positivists take seriously the radical linguistic assault on foundationalist philosophy stated by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who once said that 'everything that can be put into words can be put clearly'" (2009, p. 194).

Post-positivists interpret positivism as reflecting what James Der Derian refers to as "(…) the residue of a particularistic sign posed as a universal discourse, longing for simpler times expressed in simpler terms" (2009, p. 194). Post-positivists share the assumption that the international relations are not composed of discrete entities or events that could merely be observed in their 'objective reality' by actors who are outside of it and can survey it through a panoptic gaze. It is not possible to 'see,' 'put into words clearly,' and make sense of events in the international relations without (implicit or explicit) recourse to theoretical categories and assumptions (Duvall & Varadarajan, 2003). By asking for whom and for what purposes theory is or is not relevant, post-positivists find themselves in agreement with Robert Cox's saying of "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (1981, p. 128).

Furthermore, due to the fact that positivism cannot account for structural changes, inasmuch as collective actions and desecuritizing moves coming from the audience (which are different from the facts of nature) are not taken into consideration, post-positivism classifies the regime of truth as ahistoric. As one can observe during this study, the regime of truth is produced and reproduced in an objective world that overlooks a significant part of empirical reality. According to positivist analyses that sustain the regime of truth, the audience and the victims of the security drama are located in the border of their theoretical framework. As a result, contributions of desecuritization and emancipation, which are guided by human subjectivity in the practice of everyday life, and that can impact (or transform) the course of the drama, cannot be conceptualized and consequently comprehended.

For instance, Ken Booth comes to challenge "the knowledge-claims of naturalism as opposed to positivism as such" (2007, p. 193). Booth points out that "to reject naturalism does not means to reject science, but rather to recognize limitations when science engages with the social world" (2007, p. 193). As firmly argued by Booth, "critical theory considers the study of human society to be different from that of the physical world" (2007, p. 94). Put another way, I truly believe that if one look at the audience and its multiple publics as very much alike to the 'natural' and 'physical' world, then one will not have only an objective (and perhaps a deficient) view about politics, but will also endorse the rationalist conception that language and practices could only be determined by the main state-as-actors of the political theater. In accordance with Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen's analysis, for this kind of state-centered approaches, for example, "(…) the excessive use of force is the central concern, the threats are the primary ones, and the politics is engaged with radical dangers and the adoption of emergency measures" (2009, p. 21).

The regime of truth stems from this positivist way of looking at the political theater, whereby the audience and its multiple publics are not recognized at all. The truth is produced and reproduced in the theater according to a particular and correspondent reality coming from the ones playing the leading roles. What these leading roles suppose the theater is has a direct impact on the enactment process of the truth. Therefore, by aiming to deconstruct the regime of truth, this study sees the theater through a post-positivist and reflexive position that acknowledges the place of the audience and the knowledge that it can produce.

In addition to this, and according to the argument provided by Ken Booth that "accessing the real world in the social world is not amenable to the same methods as those involved in accessing the natural world," (2007, p. 246) I argue that the political theater is not given, natural, or predetermined, and that knowledge and truth cannot solely be subjected to the performers' reality. What my critical argument intends to demonstrate is that we should be more engaged in a demystification of the past and present of the political theater by acknowledging that human agency is capable of shaping and reshaping the social structures, as well as rethinking and redefining the challenges and problems related to the humanitarian scenes.

One should also understand that post-positivism bears what Inanna Hamati-Ataya defines as "(…) a social-intellectual process aiming to confront its statements on the subjective experience, conscious and unconscious, of the human being and human groups, with the objective factors determining their existence" (2013, p. 9). Post-positivism explores, and borrowing Hamati-Ataya argument, "(…) the historical alternatives to structures of power, and values turn out to be facts if translated into reality by the historical practice" (2013, p. 9). Due to its focus on everyday politics, post-positivism can explain how multiple publics in the audience could best educate themselves and deal with local challenges. Carrying out this kind of epistemology means to go beyond the drama and rethink the humanitarian scenes through social lenses focused on spectators' everyday life in the way that IR theory could be considered a dependent discipline from other social theories.

In contesting the regime of truth, post-positivism provides a redefinition of politics through sociological terms that do not lead the security drama, as well observed by Thierry Balzacq, "(…) towards an 'objective reality'" (2005, p. 181). On the contrary, redefining politics means to look at security as what Balzacq refers to as "(…) an agency in itself to the extent that the drama conveys a self-referential practice instantiated by discourses on existential threats that empower political elites to take extraordinary measures that increase human suffering" (2005, p. 181). Through these lenses, the knowledge about threats does not always represent the existence of a real threat. For James Der Derian, "post-positivism does not seek to claim that there is no truth, no values, no threats, no reality" (2009, p. 194). It refutes what he calls as "(…) the claims that there is an external being, a supreme epistemology and theory that proves the existence of a truth independent of its representation" (2009, p. 194).

2.3. How does then the audience unmask reality?

According to Jef Huysmans' line of thought, "language has both the capacity to integrate events in a wider network of meanings and to mobilize certain expectations and reactions to an event" (2006, p. 8). For Huysmans, "the constitutive power of language does not depend on influencing perceptions, but follows from the fact that words and discourses carry particular connotations and historical meanings that they invest in social reality" (2006, p. 8). In addition to explore the language of security through a particular reference to the grammar, labels and sub-labels, the dissertation also attempts to associate this language with the construction of reality, observing whether discourses surrounding the communicative performers-audience relationship correspond to the events 'out there,' the reality of the theater itself.

Actors in international affairs seek to have their actions interpreted in ethical terms. Governments have the duty to present and explain what they are doing as something 'good' by making the ethical case to their own audience (Frost, 2009). I take as an example the humanitarian scenes described in the last section, where the US government, the European Union and Israel often attempt to make the case in their words and discourses that their practices are ethically acceptable to their audiences. Bearing this in mind, the study also investigates the fundamental role played by language in the security domain, and how this language might discursively frame certain actions as being ethically relevant to security, privileging some issues over others as the representatives of what performers call 'reality.'

Nicholas Onuf firmly contends that "the strong version of constructivism fosters a sensitivity to language as doing" (2013, p. 33). In aiming to unmask the language of play in the security drama, I am, thereby, committed to foster a disposition by using theatrical metaphors to understand the universe of international relations. The deployment of theatrical tropes is for Nicholas Onuf something that "(..) helps us to understand a world that (neo)realists claim merely to observe" (2013, p. 33). Onuf explains that "(…) as the theater creates a world of simplicity, which an audience responds with little awareness, so too does the (neo)realist rhetoric of struggle for power, violence and fear" (2013, p. 33). In his conclusion, "the language of play emphasizes its role in representing the world, in mimicking it" (2013, p. 33). Meanwhile, we are convinced to believe in the reality created for us.

To make this clearer, I demonstrate that a non-emancipated audience, such as the Western one, has been doing the same job since the modern structure of the political theater was established. This job is quite simple: to accept the things that performers often claim to exist, i.e. the 'reality' they tell on the stage. Moreover, at heart of this reading lies what Jef Huysmans decided to identify as "performative and generic understandings of language" (2006, p. 24). Huysmans argues that "utterances are not only seen by the audience to be representing an extra-discursive reality. They are making that reality intelligible in a particular way – in a security way" (2006, p. 24). The main outcome of these performative and generic understandings of the audience about the security language is what James Der Derian calls as the "specialization of power, with the spectacle coming to speak for all forms of power" (2009, pp. 46-47), becoming the representation of a dystopian theater itself, where all other expressions coming from the auditorium are automatically banned.

When the performers say that immigrants and refugees represent a major security problem, this statement does not have the same status as saying that apples fall from trees. While saying that something happened without human intervention can be considered a simple description, saying that immigrants and refugees are threats to security could be seen as what Jef Huysmans defines as "(…) an intervention in a contested process, in the way that the definition of immigrants and refugees is a problem at stake" (2006, p. 33). Labeling people as security problems means for Huysmans "(…) to perform a modulation of a policy question in a political context rather than describing a situation that happened naturally" (2006, p. 24).

According to Thierry Balzacq's observation, "there is no security problem except through the language game. How reality and problems seem to be 'out there' is exclusively contingent on how states linguistically depict them" (2005, p. 181). Balzacq comes into the conclusion that "it is not theoretically useful, nor is it empirically credible, to hold that what we say concerning a security issue would determine its essence" (2005, p. 181). Not everything that is said by the performers should shape the audience's perception of reality. Not everything coming from the political stage should be accepted without contestation. While the audience does not realize that security language plays a fundamental role in the construction of theater's reality, the leading roles continue to pursue securitizing moves. As a consequence, we continue to assume that the leading roles have a high ethical standing.

Governments count on their control of the conventional media to manipulate the audience into accepting their appraisals. In doing so, they can also prevent criticism from reaching the ears of the audience they are addressing (Frost, 2009). In this connection, the construction of truth and establishment of a correspondent reality demand either the manipulation and alienation of the multiple publics. Yet in this reading, and due to the fact that they stand on a privileged status, the leading roles engage themselves in making reality with their positioned conceptions about the political theater. Within this process, security language plays a representational, dramaturgical, and more importantly, performative role.

Any emancipatory project aimed at unmaking the language game of security has to make sense to dismantle such a manipulative relationship between performers and audience. The possibility to challenge what is constructed as dangerous and what is constructed as being 'our' reality must be created. For that, the emancipatory project aimed at unmaking the language game of security becomes a process of what Claudia Aradau calls "(…) rethinking the relation between subjects of security, imagining localized, less exclusionary and violent forms of social interaction" (2004, p. 13). Therefore, this emancipatory project highlights what Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett define as "the critical role of social learning, which can be described as an active process of redefinition (or a reinterpretation) of reality – what people consider real, possible and desirable – on the basis of new casual knowledge" (1998, p. 43).

For instance, Jef Huysmans points out that "governments of Western countries let migration emerge as a danger for domestic stability for the purpose of mobilizing political support" (2006, p. 32). In this connection, applying policing routines and knowledge in migration policies is for Huysmans "(…) not simply a practice of managing migration. It also reproduces perceptions of what political relations and political communities are and should be" (2006, p. 32). What is problematic is the audience's lack of contestation, resistance and counter-arguments that relies on mainstream discourses that reproduce what Huysmans calls as "the state as the highest form of political community, whereby the protection of citizens of a state prevails over protecting nationals from another state who suffer from famine, malnutrition, and political persecution" (2006, p. 33). In his view, "this tends to reproduce a concept of the political grounded in Hobbesian social contract and Weber's notion of the state having the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence" (2006, p. 33).

In this respect, social learning, as indicated by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "(…) is more than adaptation or simple learning. Social learning is the capacity and motivation of social actors to manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities" (1998, pp. 43-44). This dissertation aims to demonstrate that the social learning could be developed by contributions of desecuritization promoted by multiple publics. Though undertaken at micro levels, these moves may help us to rethink humanitarian scenes, as well as to transmit critical understandings about security to our next generations. As one may already observe, I defend the thesis that the audience is the answer to unmask the language game of security. It is for this reason that the argument of this dissertation designates multiple publics as the sphere of analysis.

In some way, one could associate social learning with Paulo Freire's educational approach. At some point of the study I highlight the fact that Freire believed that education, in the broadest sense, is eminently political because it offers the audience conditions for self-reflection, a self-managed life, and critical agency. Freire's educational approach provides a critical pedagogy that connects learning to social change; it is a project and provocation that challenges spectators to critically engage with the world, so they could act on it (Giroux, 2010). As a matter of fact, it is important to recognize that far from being a mere analytical perspective and praxis limited to the philosophy of education, Freire's approach can also be useful for the purposes of this dissertation when it comes to develop a work-oriented agenda that includes principles of local emancipation followed by practices and contributions of desecuritization within multiple publics of the audience.

Andrew Linklater contends that "the normative task of critical theory is to defend the ideal of communities of discourse; the sociological dimension of critical inquiry ought to investigate the forms of social learning which are capable of turning new ideals into reality" (1998, p. 142). For Linklater, "the praxeological function of critical theory means to reflect on the moral and political resources that can be exploited to make progress towards a dialogic community" (1998, p. 142). About this, Paulo Freire can contribute to the progress of a dialogic community due to his pedagogy that helped learners become aware of the forces that have ruled their lives and shaped their consciousness. Freire's pedagogy through social learning helps the society to unmask reality by being engaged in a culture of questioning (Giroux, 2010).

ACT TWO: EXPOSITORY SCENES

In the name of security: the unmasking of the dramaturgical language

As already observed, knowledge and law can be variable contents and fundamental tools to rethink humanitarian scenes. In the political theater, knowledge and law are mostly related to security utterances and discourses of war and peace, and their effectiveness depends on the continuous struggle of power dynamics between the performers on the stage. In this context, the law can be sometimes neglected by a restricted club of performers managing a specialized language of security for self-interested reasons. The consequence of this process is the paternalistic characters modeling humanitarian scenes, giving rise to a drama riddled with practices of securitization that contribute to a dystopian scenario.

This drama is problematic since it represents a new regime of power. Managed by discourses of Other, this new regime of power failed to problematize the role of historical global relations in the production of vulnerable states, as well as in the production of fear and want. The discourses localized agency in the international community, in the way that a restricted club of performers came to take the role of fixing the problems of insecurity. But the resulting practices carried out by these performers had the potential to reproduce historical relationships of power in the international politics (Fierke, 2010). In a Hobbesian state of nature, the security utterances and discourses of Other unveiled by states cast them as the guardian or custodian of values, the only alternative for the resolution of central problems that surround modern politics (Krause, 1998).

The dramaturgical language involved in security discourses of Other is particularly defined by Andrew Linklater as a “reference to the differences between one’s own civilized ways and others savage practices” (2015, p. 41). For Linklater, “it was once legitimate to use a language that is now a sharp reminder of the discredited colonial age” (2015, p. 41). But not all of this security language completely departed IR. Pursuant to Linklater, “the principles that developed in one civilization continue to shape world politics, suggesting that the international order has outgrown the West, however it has not outgrown the Western civilization” (2015, p. 42).

Andrew Linklater continues his argument by saying that "(…) the dominance of the West has meant that powerful societies have not come under sustained pressure to construct an international order that does justice to different cultures and/or civilizations" (2015, p. 42). The next two chapters of the expository scenes critically explore how this scenario came about. For this, this section is interested in understanding the civilizing process that took place in the theater. This civilizing process privileged the Western identities in the audience that came to be considered civilized, while other identities were relegated outside the theater, once they were considered potential threats that should be removed. Throughout this second section, this process comes to be analyzed by four levels.

The first level of analysis consist of the critique against the traditional/orthodox conceptions of security. Traditional or orthodox conceptions tend to see security competition and power-maximization as Stephen Walt defines as "(…) 'hard-wired' into any system of the world order where central authority is lacking in ways that intentions cannot be foreseen, and states acquire significant capacity to harm one another" (2010, p. 9). Within this context, the leading roles are seen as the primary locus of security and authority. For Richard Ashley, "as an instance of orthodoxy, (neo)realism does just that" (1984, p. 284). In Ashley's words, "(neo)realism is on the side of the dominant state-as-actors, developing a system of euphemisms, acceptable ways of thinking the natural and social world" (1984, p. 284).

The problem with these traditional conceptions is that they leave aside questions concerning how (and under what circumstances, or with what consequences) identity groups in the society emerge and differentiate themselves. Traditional conceptions ignore the consequences of the rhetorical choice for the construction of existential threats, who or what is threatened, by whom, and in what manner (Krause, 1998). Properly speaking, Buzan and Hansen contend that "the rhetorical choice for the construction of threats also discursive" (2009, p. 143). They come into the argument that "to constitute something as threatening means to invoke discourses of danger, hence situating that something as of a particular importance to the threatened Self" (2009, p. 143). Without examining the consequences of such rhetorical choice, traditional conceptions commit scientific discourse to what Richard Ashley calls the "actor model of reality – the 'Self' by which science is incapable of questioning its ends, but can only advise it as to the efficiency of means" (1984, p. 253).

On the other hand, IR critical readings bring out some observations about the construction of threats, i.e. the analysis upon the construction of objects/targets of security (Krause, 1998), and an appraisal of possibilities for identity groups (e.g. multiple publics) to transform humanitarian scenes. Providing a critique against the traditional/orthodox conceptions of security, the expository scenes explain that the dramaturgical language spoken by a restricted club of performers on the stage makes part of what Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen identified as the "security politics articulated by the construction of a radically different, the inferior and threatening Other, but also, since identity is always relational, of the Self" (2009, p. 143).

Speaking of relational, the second level of analysis of the expository scenes captures what is called the Self-Other dichotomy. At first, this analysis criticizes the spatial categories of traditional security studies, e.g. Third World, great powers, and failed states. These categories are typically conceived in non-relational terms, mostly as separate and discrete (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006). Any reading of security studies conceived in these terms should be considered inadequate, once it reinforces a Self-Other dichotomy that is, by definition, selective. As one might observe, we live in a theater where the performers create a regime of truth that make us believe that existential threats and identities arise naturally; we are convinced to be living in a theater marked by a predetermined system where the locus of security is under the auspices of the leading roles. If we continue to look at the theater only through these lenses, without criticizing its selective nature and the relational categories, then it will be difficult to relief human suffering, and impossible for enough the audience to transform humanitarian scenes by means of desecuritization.

Throughout this second level of analysis, one may observe that the Self-Other dichotomy was made to achieve one fundamental goal: to meet the needs of the performers for establishing discourses that constitute the regime of truth. In this constitutive process, speech-acts play an important role for the continuity of the Western-led mission to civilize the theater. In the analysis of this process, we may understand that dichotomy (Self-Other), doctrine (R2P), and practices (humanitarian intervention and securitization) operate on behalf of the drama. Morten Bøås and Kathleen Jennings pointed out that "the use of dichotomy, doctrine and practices are inherently political, and based primarily on Western perceptions of security and interests based on terms of power" (2007, p. 475).

Through the use of dichotomy, doctrine, and practices, Western performers can label secondary roles and the victims of the security drama as the Other, and they are perceived to be threats in case their existence jeopardizes the Western self-centered interests. In considering security according to this reading, one may observe a bi-dimensional political theater comprised by a harmful and oppressive dichotomy that establishes a civilized West as the 'Self,' 'guardian of values' and 'superior,' and the non-Western side as the 'Other,' 'threatening,' and 'failed.' In Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen's line of thought, "the focus on the constitution of the Other can broaden the scope of orthodoxy IR and security analysis in that poststructuralists argued that security policies are directed not only against external Others" (2009, p. 143). In their view, "security policies are against internal Others as these are commonly located in different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender, or locale" (2009, p. 143).

The third level of analysis concerns the securitization moves undertaken by the restricted club of performers and that reinforce the West as the Self and civilized. Regarding this third level, one should recognize that security is not necessarily subjective. As argued by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, "there are socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized, though those limits can be changed" (1998, p. 39). This means that my analysis is interested in what Buzan, Waever and de Wilde refer to as "successful instances of securitization – i.e. the cases which most of the society follows the 'securitizing lead,' creating a social, intersubjective constitution of a referent object on a mass scale" (1998, p. 39). Moreover, what is interesting to observe about this level of analysis by now is that issues can be securitized due to the leading roles' ability to inter-subjectively create notions of existential threats. In order for this to happen, the issue should be framed under the securitizing structure according to three basic steps.

The first step is the perception of an object/or target. The second step concerns the process of naming the object as an existential threat. The last and third step is the acceptation of the object as an existential threat by the audience. These three steps define what Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert call "intersubjective and socially constructed securitization" (2011, p. 66). Securitizing an issue following this steps manifests what they refer to as "(…) a specific way of transforming it into a policy problem – a specific type of policy problem, a security problem. Uttering security means to move a particular development into a specific area" (2011, p. 66).

Following this reasoning, the fourth level of analysis explored throughout this expository scenes consists of historicity. As Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen contend, “telling the story concerning the gradual evolution of ‘security’ from the present vantage point makes it possible to conceive a conversation” (2009, p. 262). As highlighted by Buzan and Hansen, “one may believe, in accordance with Foucault’s genealogical thought, that history means history of the present where the past is constructed and reconstructed as the present changes” (2009, p. 262). For this, I investigate historicity of discourses about humanitarianism and its association with security. This is because I cannot tell the story about the evolution of security without considering the awareness of the language and metaphors embedded into security discourses. This directs my attention to the role of the performers in the creation of knowledge and the level of acceptance of the audience over securitization.

This fourth level of analysis can also be useful to grasp that securitization is, as appointed by Mark Salter, “made for political gain or from fear” (2008, p. 329). Therefore, the historicity of the relationship between performers and audience is fundamental in the process of understanding securitization. Salter points out that “securitizing moves follow an internal grammar that is determined not simply by internal rules (invocation of an emergency or exception to normal politics), but to a common, social grammar (i.e. the universe of tropes, images, metaphors, histories that can be invoked)” (2008, p. 329). As the next two chapters demonstrate, securitizing moves occur within what Mark Salter defined as “the universe of the audience imagination” (2008, p. 330). It is not simply a power relationship, but what Salter defined as “a knowledge-authority game” (2008, p. 330), which is played by leading roles assuming a dramaturgical role and seeking to convince their audience. In this game, decisions and choices are made for achieving security aims.

In investigating the historicity of discourses about humanitarianism and security that shape the relationship between performers and audience, one can note that distinct definitions of what means to be human and humanitarian have been the source of a whole lot of world (dis)order, particularly if one think that imperial and apartheid systems were built upon the depravity of racially constructed notions of civilization (Weinert, 2015). Through this critical reading, we can conclude that speech-acts performed by the leading roles illustrate fragmented notions of humanitarianism that promote a set of exclusionary practices in the humanitarian scenes.

Beyond promoting exclusionary practices, speech-acts are by and large involved in a dramaturgical language of security that ultimately plays with feelings and creates commotion in the audience[5]. A dramaturgical analysis of security highlights that, as Mark Salter explains, "the setting of a securitizing move is predetermined by the performers and their roles, the rules of the discourse permissible within that space (scene), and the expectations of the audience" (2008, p. 328). What is particularly interesting to note is that this analysis might lead us to investigate how and why Western identities came to be considered civilized, while the non-Western identities were meant to be seen as threatening evils. In Salter's words, "when one push the theatrical metaphor, one might be able to classify the different types of securitizing moves in which all share through similar conventions, narratives, characters, and tropes" (2008, p. 328). For him, "(…) the use of a specialized language suggests meanings that both speakers and audience share" (2008, p. 328).

As Nicholas Onuf alleges, "language is one vehicle for the coding, storing, communicating and acting on information, which is, by itself, limitless, weightless, infinitely manipulable and timeless" (2013, p. 208). As information makers, the performers deploy what Onuf describes as "(…) the cognitive capacities to form institutions and control the flow of events, even events about which they do not have information" (2013, p. 208). Following this assumption, Ole Waever reminds that "security issues are developments that threaten the sovereignty of a state in a rapid fashion, and deprive it of the capacity to manage by itself" (1995, p. 51). As a result, Waever identifies "(…) an undercutting of the political order, once the threat must be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort" (1995, p. 51). For Waever, "this means that, in naming a certain development a security issue through the use of a specialized language, a special right is claimed, one that will be defined by the states and their constitutive political and economic elites" (1995, p. 51).

---

5 During this expository scenes, the understanding of the security language as dramaturgical stems from an analysis based on the three schools of CSS that regards language as framed in traditional notions of security and in a false narrative of common humanity. In the political theater of IR, this language is adopted by the performers to convince their audience to accept securitizing measures followed by interventionary practices to save the lives of those who suffer the oppressive practices undertaken by non-Western authoritarian regimes. What is more, this language might also be adapted to convince the audience to accept oppressive migration policies under nationalist discourses of maintaining the survival of the state by keeping the costumes and culture alive. More importantly, in both cases, the dramaturgical language reveals itself in the recognition of the Other, the evil/enemy to be removed. As a matter of fact, and as it is intended to show in the course of the dissertation, in attempting to complete their enterprise of defeating a created Other/evil and make their audience or perhaps rest of humankind feel safe again, it is somehow allowed for the 'good performers' to become a greater evil.

At this point, desecuritization becomes necessary, once it manifests a different ontological view of politics by reflecting on the moral worth of Others. Simply put, desecuritization is worth engaging because it zooms in one of the main questions of political life in the international relations: should the states treat some prioritized security problems as matters of danger and exceptionality, or are these prioritized problems worthy of this labeling, or better dealt with one conceive of them in less fearful and securitized terms? (Hansen, 2012). To answer this question, the next two chapters propose the idea of making human centered on processes of emancipation through a reflection on the moral worth of Others and a recognition of society as autonomous and independent actor and strongly resistant against all forms of oppression, violence and securitization (Weinert, 2015).

This comes together in exploring the three mentioned generations of critical security studies, whose consider the stage of an issue involving human suffering being lifted above normal politics as a dramatized process of great priority. According to Ole Waever's explanation, "power holders might eventually try to use the instrument of securitization to gain control over it, which means that something is considered a security problem when elites declare it to be so" (1995, p. 51). He suggests desecuritization, which "(…) further implies moving from a positive to a negative agenda, where dynamics of securitization cannot be captured so long as one proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized" (1995, p. 51). For Waever, "international security is articulated from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by statesmen or women, policymakers and political and economic elites that comprise the body of the government" (1995, p. 53). Conclusively, he says that "this could be analyzed if one give up the assumption that security is, necessarily, a positive phenomenon" (1995, p. 53)

A range of 'how questions' could be posed when it comes to unmasking the dramaturgical language of security. How can a more critical approach help multiple publics to better understand the theater? How can the audience respond against the excessive use of force that cause and exacerbate suffering? By now, even though Utopian, one little observation remains. The dangers of securitization should lead multiple publics to higher senses of solidarity, so the political theater of IR can be marked by what Hedley Bull called as "the recognition of a common human interest among governments in maintaining itself" (in Weinert, 2015, p. 95).

Scene 3. History, security discourses and practices: how threats are constructed

This chapter manages the historical-sociological method in order to understand how security discourses are repeatedly used in the humanitarian scenes for purposes of hegemony and crystallization of power relations. In all of the emblematic moments exposed here, security discourses were appropriated, reproduced and spread out in attempting to achieve these purposes. For this reason that – and prior to a critical analysis concerning the drama – this chapter explores how these discourses and narratives are produced, for what purpose they are appropriated, and why they are spread out to the audience. To explore these questions, we should look at security through historical, reflexive and critical lenses.

When we define humanitarianism, we do so constitutively; and this is not to say that words mean what we choose them to mean, but to critically acknowledge how humanitarian discourses constitute forms of knowledge about the capacity of international law within IR. The tendency to universalize is implicit within the construction of the category of humanitarianism itself (Moore, 2013). For Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, "a constitutive observation of humanitarianism must take into account the social construction of reality and how discourse and action facilitate and constrain activity" (2008, p. 41). Through this observation, Barnett and Weiss believe that "(…) we can determine how the possible and impossible become defined, and what is regarded normal and natural" (2008, p. 41).

Carrying out this observation further, it is possible to understand that, as Barnett and Weiss contend, "discourses make it possible to think and act in some ways and not others, privileging some actors and disempower others" (2008, p. 41). That is to say, security language manifests differential and highly unbalanced effects. Likewise, enacted by discourses, humanitarianism should be seen as having constitutive effects capable of creating a false collective interest on humanity[6].

6 The unmasking of the constitutive effect of humanitarianism reveals to be a relevant exercise. In spite of the fact that the interests of social, political or economic groupings (elites) may be adduced in liberal rights discourses on humanitarianism (as if they represent the interests of society as a whole), they could be formulated solely as individual interests (Heinze, 2003). It is also important to understand that – in order to uphold power and abuse the powerless – leaders, policymakers and elites create security discourses by managing humanitarianism to achieve the popular support. Only by creating a false collective interest on humanity that securitizing actors are able to perform their roles successfully.

Moreover, humanitarianism is to be understood by means of an interpretative optic, insofar as it is associated with a discursive conceptualization of threat and identity. Humanitarianism and its underlying discourses that create a false idea of a collective interest on humanity also lead us to rethink about what we know concerning the fundamental role of power in the international law. As Ian Hurd firmly alleges, "rhetoric, recent behavior, and the apparent intentions of states are all resources for interpreting how sovereign states perceive their duties and obligations, and then for learning what the rules are" (2011, p. 307). He argues that "this carries out its own dilemma: when legality reveals to be a function than treaties, then, in what ways are treaties constraining or relevant?" (2011, p. 307).

Having this dilemma in mind, this second chapter interprets the international law by assuming two positions, whereby securitization could be made legal or illegal depending on the leading roles' needs. The first position is what Gustavo Gozzi describes as "the legitimation of practices" (2017, p. 189). For him, this position is "(…) grounded on concepts so broad and vague as that of humanity, and on fictitious assumptions as that of the human community was a right that can be invoked by any state in pursuing its own interests or in affirming its own power" (2017, p. 189). Through the legitimation of practices that, as Gozzi argues, "(…) multiple violations could be ignored if they did threaten to undermine states' interests" (2017, p. 189). These fictitious assumptions of a human community derive from Kantian claims that good actions on behalf of humanity, regardless the consequences, establish a sort of moral duty to be taken by states while performing the drama.

As it is intended to be shown about the security drama, the powerful actors can manipulate their security language spreading out to the audience a set of fictitious assumptions of human community for their own gain. Many liberal authors, for example, designate Kantian claims as the foundation for humanitarian intervention. Only a few of them, like J. L. Holzgrefe, highlighted that "far from possessing an imperfect duty of humanitarian intervention, Kant believed that states have also a perfect duty of non-intervention" (2003, p. 27). Holzgrefe also reminds that "Kant believed that states have also an obligation to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs for the same reason that we, individuals, must respect each other's autonomy" (2003, p. 28). In any case, Kant is often remembered when it comes to promote the idea that the West respects humanity by having obligations to others.

Speaking of ‘legitimation of practices’ grounded on broad and vague concepts that create what I define a false collective interest on humankind within the theater, the second position taken by this second chapter to interpret international law is the performers’ freedom to choose. Ian Hurd contends that “(…) it is natural that a government will sometimes take the view that what it thinks should be done in any particular case is acceptable under the international law” (2011, p. 308). As he adds, “the freedom to choose among interpretations of the law gives rise to a sea of self-serving claims, and to unending academic debate” (2011, p. 308).

Trying to not reproduce this unending academic debate, this chapter believes that discourses of humanitarianism exclusively unveiled by performers are intended to follow securitization and interventionary practices that do not make the theater more secure. Instead, such discourses have been making the theater over into a tightly oppressive regime and a dystopian scenario embedded in a liberal democratic system where imperialist purposes tend to prevail. In this line of though, I argue that the performers’ freedom to choose among interpretations of rules and law operates on behalf of a restricted group, not a universal one. The security language is at service to self-interested policies and legitimated within a larger normative system. Law is used exclusively on the political stage by a security language and a specialized grammar which, as firmly highlighted by James Der Derian, “(…) make up an array of ambiguous and indeterminate signifying practices” (2009, p. 44).

Without a higher level of participation of the audience in the processes of decisions about humanitarian issues, humanitarianism will continue to face a permanent lack of political will that consequently neglects arrangements to relief human suffering. Although international law was able to a certain extent defy the governance and exploitation of hegemonic powers due to the slow and gradual recognition of individuals, groups, and social movements as entities under protection since the 18th century, human suffering and tensions between the different actors continued to exacerbate in the political theater of international relations. Michael Barnett explains that “this is because the modern roots of humanitarianism and international law are located in the West” (2008, p. 241). Although their values have universal appeal, or might have become universal as a consequence of interactions and cross-cultural dialogue, Barnett says that “the history of humanitarianism reflects the tensions that exist between the West and non-Western countries” (2008, p. 241).

After assuming these two positions of interpretation of the law (the legitimation of practices followed by the freedom to choose), there is nothing but to agree with the assumption that the humanitarianism's defining traits are what Michael Barnett describes as "(…) the attempt to spread values and practices of the international community to places where they are either absent or dormant" (2008, p. 241). The problem is that humanitarianism operates in the name of a supposed international community as it crossed non-Western boundaries to transform societies, always carrying out the false idea of removing the causes of suffering. Considering such a critical argument, I suppose that humanitarianism finds itself on the terrain of the tension between the universal and particular. This tension between these two antagonists factors is associated with the construction of threats.

As Bull and other English School of international relations theorists have argued, the most powerful states usually fulfill a managerial role within the world system, underpinned by a special set of rights and prerogatives owing to their status as great powers. This necessarily entails a form of hierarchy within the international scene (Clapton, 2014). This hierarchy can be portrayed as providing the best scenario for leading roles to develop an abusive and manipulative relationship with the secondary roles on the political stage and with audience in the auditorium. This hierarchical representations can take shape through binary oppositions, such as the West and non-West world, which are, in the ultimate analysis, based on exclusionary practices that reinforce power, knowledge and authority on the stage.

The tenets of this political realism fit neatly within the sovereign state system. Supported by Thomas Hobbes' conception of sovereignty as supreme authority, and Niccolo Machiavelli's emphasis on the sovereign amassing power to realize his interests, state behavior is – and ought to be – driven by pursuing the state's own interest, which demands acting on the basis of relative power, not ethical ideals (Seybolt, 2010). Yet in this reading, Ian Hurd comes into the conclusion that "states tend to invoke the international law in a variety of settings to explain and justify their behavior to the audience, and to criticize, exclude and embarrass their opponents" (2011, p. 309). Therefore, in closing this argument, and borrowing Hurd's words in relation to this matter, "(…) the instrumental use of the law appears to be inseparable from the law itself, and its political use must not be understood as an aberration or a misuse; but as an inevitable result of striving for power" (2011, p. 309).

Concerning the performers-audience relationship, more specifically, Nicholas Onuf contended that “hierarchy is positioned or arranged, where the audience stands in relations of subordination” (2013, p. 99). This structure privileges a hierarchical position to the point that performers can convince the audience that the word ‘we’ should be used as an important collective object to be secured from a created Other/enemy. In this regard, securitization of some important issues related to the humanitarian scenes, such as migration, refugee flows and asylum, is primarily connected to the creation of what Jef Huysmans decided to call the “(…) Western internal security field that securitization of cultural identity is subordinated to the protection of public order, welfare and safety” (2006, p. 118).

This security field exacerbates in a political order where strident nationalism is resurgent, with political parties that vilify migrants gaining ground. Governments convince civil societies that, once viewed themselves as settler societies, to no longer consider the incorporation of migrants as fundamental to nation building. It is, then, becoming clear that individuals without access to a privileged category of citizenship are individuals without human rights (Larking, 2018). This draws attention to the questions of how and for what purposes leading roles articulate a security drama characterized by the creation of existential threats and prioritization of issues over others, thus making these existential threats and prioritized issues the main focus of security discourses and narratives of humanitarianism.

As one can observe throughout this chapter, the leading roles performing the humanitarian scenes felt the necessity to prioritize what Michael Barnett comes to describe as “the language of obligations and rights drafted by arguments in favor of securitization” (2010, p. 9). In this way, Barnett asserts that “the humanitarian order, almost by definition, divided the world between those who were too weak to help themselves and those who had a civilizing mission, a given ‘responsibility’ to save them” (2010, p. 9). The next sub-chapters depict the modern history of the theater according to a Self-Other dichotomy that gives shape to what becomes viewed as a security drama, whereby the leading roles dress themselves on a ‘superhero suit’ to speak a security language that hides power interests by spreading out discourses of obligations and rights. This language uncovering interests makes it looks like the restricted club of performers is comprised by ‘good guys’ saving those who are too weak, fragile and failed, while the theater remains exclusive.

3.1. A brief overview of modern history

IR scholars have long given threat perception a central role in theories of war, deterrence and compellence, alliances, and conflict resolution. Yet, at the core of theories of balance of power was a largely unexamined concept of threat; and it was solely in the last decades that IR historical sociologists have begun to look more seriously at intention as a source of threat, which would be independent of military capabilities (Stein, 2013). Since then, critical theorists have decided to dive into the analysis of modern history to explore the construction of threat as perception and misperception. Asking how discourses are able to define something or someone as threatening and what their intentions suggest, critical theorists were increasingly engaged on what Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen identified as "expanding security beyond the military sector and the use of force, seeing international security as inextricably tied to a dynamic of threats, dangers and urgency" (2009, p. 10).

Within the security debates, critics often confuse such an analysis by assuming that social construction of threats is equivalent to fabrication (which means, if threats are constructed they do not really exist). However, to call a threat a social construction means, for instance, not to deny that nuclear weapons exist or that they could kill millions (Fierke, 2010). The critical reading about IR history means rather to questioning the fact that non-Western identities are often considered as threats and enemies in virtue of a discursive process mediated by the perception of particular targets. Aiming to acquire public support, appropriated discourses and security utterances are shared and communicated by leaders, policymakers and/or elites. Through the analysis of this discursive process, critical theorists observe the political theater as a socially constructed structure based on a private-public relation among political leaders and members of elites. This private-public relation is intended to securitize issues and targets to safeguard self-centered interests.

Throughout the modern history, leading roles often produced security discourses mediated by the perception of targets, thus reproducing biased knowledge and information capable of creating high levels of commotion in the audience. This is an intentional tactic, once the leading roles are well aware that commotion prompts an audience to build what Thierry Balzacq considers as "a coherent network of implications (such as feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) concerning the critical vulnerability of a referent object/target" (2011, p. 3).

Perhaps the main point of IR critical scholarship in the analysis of modern history inquires into how perceptions of referent objects are constructed on the stage. A structural realist would likely find this question odd, because threats in a self-help system arise from the material capabilities of possible opponents. For IR critical scholars, however, the world of perceptions, threats and emotions is supremely a constructed one, involving history, culture, communication, ideologies and related factors (Krause, 1998). Bearing this in mind, the critical engagement to expand the understanding of security provides the potential for formulating questions about the processes of change, including how perceptions and threats are in many cases determined, and how the use of force is created (Fierke, 2010). Apparently, these processes of change depend on the demands that the political theater offers at the moment, and how the leading roles are willing to turn these demands into collective emotions in accordance with their perceptions of threat.

When it comes to involving history, one should note, for example, that European nations (except the Turkish and Eastern ones) have established social welfare as a fundamental condition of their identity throughout the last three centuries. But this process has eventually increased collective beliefs on the threats that migrants could pose to European security. This means that Western European identities were drawn upon historical narratives of exclusion, and constantly adapted to respond the geopolitical circumstances of the theater. For this to happen, leaders and elites were engaged to strength discourses in which represented the state as a 'community of interests' or a 'specific common house,' giving rise to concepts like citizenship and nationalism. Within this narrative, citizenship and nationalism were created to be the primary identity of European states, while political leaders, policymakers and elites were making sure that imperialist and colonialist practices would become an international norm in their dealings with the secondary roles.

In relation to this matter, and giving a practical example about it, it is important to consider how the fall of Ottoman Empire made it an easy prey for European states to take it apart. It is no surprise that the Ottomans were always a threat to European identity. Gustavo Gozzi reminds us that "in its heyday, the Ottomans had conquered half of Hungary, in 1526, and encamped just outside the gates of Vienna, in 1529" (2017, p. 193). But by the second half of the 19th century, as argues Gozzi, the "Ottomans no longer struck any fear in the European powers" (2017, p. 193).

According to Gustavo Gozzi's explanation, "the Ottomans' weakness made them an easy prey, with the European states setting out to take them apart, while the high concepts of justice and humanity were deployed to complete the enterprise" (2017, p. 193). For the European thought of that period, it was necessary to thrive to be considered a sovereign state. The Ottomans were falling apart as a political body in disintegration due to problems in terms of moral and financial issues. That is when an appropriated discourse has taken place, that of the European concert, which settled foundations to authorize European intervention in Ottoman soil. George Lawson and Luca Tardelli argue that "the Concert of Europe explicitly linked domestic and international security – instability abroad threatens stability at home. This permitted interventions in cases when international unrest was seen as unsettling to domestic affairs" (2013, p. 193). The Concert of Europe was, in their view, "(…) a measure to preserve the balance of power, limiting forms of political expressions considered threatening to incumbent European elites" (2013, p. 193).

We all know that the Ottomans were falling apart, but the European influence has contributed to their disintegration. Gustavo Gozzi is convinced that "treaties through which the empire was broken up piece by piece can be interpreted as landmarks marking the stages in the gradual rise of the maxims of law" (2017, p. 193). Gozzi points out that "there was the Treaty of London (July 6, 1827) when Britain, France, and Russia jointly acted to free Greece from Turkish rule[7]," followed by what Gozzi reminds as "the famous Treaty of Paris, in March 30, 1856, when the European powers set up a tutelage of sorts over the empire"[8] (2017, p. 193). Indeed, this is the case where the focus is the process that objects in one set of relationships are given meaning as threatening. Therefore, the construction of the threat is emphasized as a product of representation; and far from being a purely external phenomenon, to which security agencies merely react, a potential threat is transformed into a fundamental security question through an active interventionary process (Fierke, 2010).

7 In this case, freeing Greece was not a demonstration of ensuring a 'common European house,' but rather it represented the fear from what a Greek rebellion would actually threaten the tranquility of Western European powers. This event follows the logic explained by George Lawson and Luca Tardelli about the Concert of Europe, that of "instability abroad threatens stability at home" (2013, p. 6).

8 Beyond ruthlessly settling their tutelage over a shattered Ottoman Empire, the European powers also blamed the Ottomans for their pride and obstinacy during the negotiations of the treaty. The Treaty of Paris has, among other things, established the Black Sea a neutral territory, forbidding Ottoman fortifications and presence of naval or military arsenal in order to diminish its influence over the region. See Argyll, George (2005) – *The Eastern Question: from Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Treaty of Berlin 1878, and to the Second Afghan War.* New York: Elibron Classics.

For a long period of time the Ottomans were considered a dangerous threat for the European identity. The Ottoman threat was not just a military opponent, but rather represented a culture that by all accounts occupied a most sinister corner within the European imagination – as brutal (perhaps libidinous) barbarian who had little or no regard for learning of the arts (Miranda-Reyes, 2015). What is, in fact, important to remind is that the political theater was at that time articulated and mediated by a colonial and imperial system in charge of the relations between the ones called 'civilized' leading roles and the 'barbarians' secondary roles. Meanwhile, George Lawson and Luca Tardelli argue that "humanitarianism and its constitutive security narratives were to become much starker with consequences for the development of intervention and use of force as a social practice" (2013, p. 7).

David Campbell also reminds that "the Indians were scorned and subjugated by the European settlers on a number of grounds" (1992, p. 165). However, the most prominent was what Campbell interestingly described as "the Hobbes-like claim that they are not industrious, neither have art, science, skill or faculty to use either the land or the commodities of it" (1992, pp. 166). The racist discourse has not only offered conditions for the self-protection and economic development of Western European countries in the 18th and 19th centuries, but has also appeared to be working alongside what George Lawson and Luca Tardelli refer to as "the maintenance of order in the core, and with the gradual transformation of economies and symbolic schemas in the periphery" (2013, p. 7). In the second half of the 19th century capitalism was settled under the umbrella of a strong colonial and imperial system as the main mode of production in the world. In this context, the European elites, having acquired political power in most industrial countries, felt secure and did not see themselves in struggle against the traditional institutions of the past (Larrain, 1989).

Economic inequality between the core and periphery increased. The industrialized performers continued to reproduce cultural and racial discourses of security on the stage. This was a period of economic progress in the Western Europe, whereas the theater was becoming even more dystopian, with leading roles oppressing and exploiting the colonies for the sake of their economic prosperity. As a result, industrialization was expected to be weaker in the periphery, once the core cemented control over the theater, not only by dominating the foreign capital and international trade, but also by upholding the power to speak of security.

Discourses of Other – working hand-in-hand with colonialism and the technical developments provided by industrialization – have helped Europeans to achieve economic developments that allowed them to, among other factors, improve their military capabilities and increase the production of armaments. All of this comes together with what Harry Hinsley defined as "(…) the discrepancy between the developed and undeveloped actors of world order" (1963, p. 264). For Hinsley, "this discrepancy was becoming acute, given that the world beyond Europe was shrinking with the enormous development of communications" (1963, p. 264). In Hinsley's conclusion, "all the possibilities of exploiting the undeveloped actors were vastly enlarged by the technical and organizational developments of industrialization accompanied with the establishment of capitalism" (1963, p. 264).

Yet in this period of world history, Martha Finnemore also promptly indicates that "most of the foreign offices of Europe were very much in the hands of aristocratic elites" (2003, p. 49-50). These people were educated enough to persuade the undeveloped world to consent with the possibilities of being exploited, first and foremost, just as economic agents of the capitalist mode of exploitation. The strong connection between the rise of industrialization and capitalism with the evolution of security discourses of Other must, therefore, be recognized. All the exploitation of valuable resources that caused human suffering in undeveloped parts of the world occurred due to the reproduction of discourses that supported practices of colonialism and capitalism, and the IR scholarship remains silent about that.

Since that time, Branwen Gruffydd Jones identifies that "the world order entailed the spread of Western forms of state, sovereignty, democracy, law and rights to peoples" (2006, p. 9). But Jones seems convinced that "the Western's legacy could also be the one of authoritarianism, theft, racism, massacre and genocide" (2006, p. 9). So, in relation to this matter, there are few treatments to a deeper IR empirical study concerning the humanitarian scenes played in the theater of that time, and that are closely associated with the colonial power dynamics. In this line of thought, it is important to underscore that the humanitarian scenes of that time were played out on what Gustavo Gozzi calls the "basis of racist stereotypes, with the assertion of an incompatibility between the core and periphery" (2017, p. 192). Telling both the colonial and racist side of the story has an important place here. In doing so, we can decolonize IR from the Western audience's way of thinking.

For Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, "the relationship between colonialism and humanitarianism is way more complicated than the reductionist conception that the latter was an outgrowth of a justification for imperialism" (2008, p. 22). Barnett and Weiss are convinced that "there is certainly some basis for that position." They reminded us the King Leopold of Belgium, "(…) who justified his genocidal exploitation of the Congo from 1885 to 1908 as advancing civilization and as a humanitarian project" (2008, p. 22). It could be true that appealing the reason of humanity is a way to justify the logic of power. Due to this logic, the theater until the end of the First World War can be described by a realist prescription outlined by Richard Ashley "as the period when statism avoided rules, norms, expectations, and principles of practices prior to or independent actors and their essential ends and capabilities" (1984, p. 345). For Ashley, "in the last analysis the world followed from the regularization and breakdown of expectations with vectoring of power and self-preserving interests among states-as-actors" (1984, p. 345).

According to Andrew Linklater's viewpoint, "as social welfare assumed greater importance in modern states, protectionism and greater international economic and political competition reached new levels" (2007, p. 100). Linklater believes that "economic nationalism led to the demise of large-scale immigration, and rivalries between states also increased after the decision in 1919 to close national frontiers" (2007, p. 100). As a result, the political theater became more inclusive to Western national cultures. For non-Western identities, however, the political theater of that period continued to be more exclusive due to tighter national controls concerning the admission of migrants, stateless, and refugees.

In the interwar period, when the shattering effect of the First World War led the European performers to a sort of state of prostration, the political theater faced what Harry Hinsley calls as "the shift in the criteria of power: from manpower and size of territory to industrial and scientific ability" (1963, p. 281). Hinsley reminds us that "(…) the possibilities of using power and making power effective were enlarged for those countries that possessed these abilities" (1963, p. 281). In relation to this short (but very important) period of the history of the political theater, Hinsley comes to argue that "(…) the consequence of the fact that the periphery and their vulnerable societies were so affected disproportionately by the shift in the criteria of power revealed to be more disturbing for the world order" (1963, p. 281-282).

Moreover, it was at this time that, as well reminded by Michael Barnett, "the international relations – as a distinct field of research – emerged in reaction to the horrors of the First World War" (2010, p. 215) Barnett indicates three general commitments of this new field of research: "try to manage the effects of anarchy, enhance the prospects of global governance and international cooperation, and, of course, reduce the chances of war" (2010, p. 215). Edward Hallett Carr's book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* described the instability and unbalance of power among the leading roles during this period. For Linklater, "Carr has assumed the fact that the struggles to make states correspond with nations have displaced minorities and encouraged total war" (2007, p. 151). In his view, "this made it necessary for the European states to create cosmopolitan moral and legal principles that provided a minimum of protection to the people in their own right" (2007, p. 151).

Published on the eve of the Second World War, Carr's book remarked that world politics was frankly Utopian, where wishing prevailed over thinking, generalization over observation, and little attempt was made at a more critical examination about existing facts or available means. Carr took it upon himself to diagnose the Utopian shortcomings and directed the field toward IR realist theory, which he argued was needed in light of the tumultuous situation in world politics (Schmidt, 1998). In accordance with Stephen Walt's argument, "Carr traced the security issue to the inevitable conflicts of power interests that arise between states possessing different resource endowments, economic systems, and political orders" (2010, p. 4). This considered, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* comes to be described by Waltz as a "(…) trenchant critique of the idealistic belief that international law, global opinion, and global institutions could eliminate conflict and insecurity between states within the political order of international relations" (2010, p. 4).

After joining the British delegation in the Versailles Peace Conference (1919), when thirty-two countries created the League of Nations, Carr criticized the United States' isolationism due to its absence in the League, suggesting that the political theater continued to be led by selfish interactions between self-regarding performers, with inequality of effective power and political disequilibrium taking place without precedents and in a wider scale. The revolution of technical knowledge and the development of public opinion by democratic means also gave carte blanche to government action, with totalitarian states becoming popular.

Following Carr's realist vein, it is possible to note that the leading roles, through discourses of Other, were increasingly creating what Nicholas Wheeler called "a legitimacy convenient to themselves, where theories of international morality or legitimacy become the product of dominant or group of nations" (2000, p. 6). Not surprisingly, security discourses of Other were unveiled by states in order to, as Wheeler adds, "espouse those moral principles that only serve their self-preserving interests" (2000, p. 6). The enactment of these discourses of Other throughout the interwar period are interpreted by what Michael Walzer identified as "the special creation of nationalist and religious movements which aim not only at the defeat, but also at the removal or elimination of an enemy" (2004, pp. 132-133). In the Second World War, for example, the propaganda in Nazi Germany had quite the same effect, focused on demonizing several kinds of Other/enemies.

The growth of totalitarian states and their irresponsible use of discourse and power manifested features of this short period, such as the rise of nationalism, which intensified the exclusionary characteristic of the political theater. A series of social, economic, political and geopolitical challenges – like the political tensions around Europe, the economic depression in the United States and the League of Nations' incapability to deal with the geopolitical framework – weakened the initiatives to negotiate conventions on warfare and human protection rules.

The exploitation of economic inequality, nationalism and general popular discontent caused by the rise of Nazism, Fascism, Stalinism and Franquism increased the geopolitical tensions and hostility in Europe and beyond. The League was unable to cope with the intensifying aggression of the Axis powers, having little success in sanctioning its own members and it was greatly weakened by the withdrawal of Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan in the lead-up to the Second World War (Davey, Borton & Foley, 2013). To remedy this problem, Carr has decided to follow the traditional way of using Kantian claims in order to promote the belief that powerful states are to respect 'humanity' by having moral obligations to others. To prevent a Third World War, Carr basically called attention for the need of foreign policy's principles moving further along the spectrum from exclusion to global inclusion. Pursuant to Andrew Linklater's argument, "E. H. Carr claimed for extending the boundaries of moral and political community in the world order, and ultimately enlarging sympathy and solidarity among the actors" (2007, p. 43).

In attempting to avoid a purely sterile realist theory, Carr claimed for what Andrew Linklater calls "the broadening of national policy, in the way that the British government, for example, should take into account the social welfare of Lille, Düsseldorf, Lodz, as well as the social welfare of Oldham or Jarrow" (2007, p. 68). According to Linklater's argument, "notwithstanding the critique of utopianism, Carr also thought that the extension of a 'global community' was a fundamental aim of an enlightened foreign policy" (2007, p. 68). As one may observe, well aware of the consequences of the rise of a modern structure within the world politics due to the globalization forces, Carr was convinced that planning arrangements among leading roles were necessary to ensure a global compromise, so the extension of citizenship could be carried out by all the actors of the theater.

What is problematic about Carr's planning arrangements is that the extension of a desirable 'global community' came to be ruled by the same restricted club of leading roles in the political theater, with a majority of Western performers that led by the United States continued to manage security discourses for the purpose of promoting new (yet old) practices of imperialism and colonialism through the globalization of market relations. After the Second World War, liberal capitalism gave to Carr's planning arrangements of a 'global community' a boost, in cases such as the strengthening of a European Economic Community and the creation of the United Nations. The outcomes of the Second World War led a Western-led international community to, as Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss indicate, "(…) work for a different future, though it is a gross mistake to see the resulting surge in institution building as the triumph of humanitarianism" (2008, p, 23).

A large-scale forced migration coming from undeveloped parts of the world, and rivalries among West and East increased. Indeed, there was a set of diverse and recognizably imperial arrangements that, in part, constituted the 'free world.' Put differently, the self-determination that the USA offered was conditional (either in Western Europe or in the non-European world), and shaped among other things by Orientalist and racist assumptions about the relative capacity of different peoples for self-government (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006). George Lawson and Luca Tardelli argue that "the Third World became immersed in superpower competition. This reminds Morgenthau, who stressed the need for the superpowers to prop up decolonized states given the weakness of indigenous governance structures" (2013, pp. 7-8).

In Lawson and Tardelli's words, "the provision of military and economic aid established ties of inequality, whereby the powerful states could exploit by either supplying or withdrawing aid, dramatically influencing local political developments" (2013, p. 8). Meanwhile, they also argue the fact that "local elites tended to invite external aid as a means by which to counter domestic rivals and implement development projects" (2013, p. 8). Given this scenario, as Lawson and Tardelli summarize, "(…) the Cold War meant a bipolar clash between two regimes of global intervention" (2013, p. 8). For the United States, for example, what happens within nations affected what occurred between them. Therefore, the character of foreign regimes would shape USA security language, with the American foreign policy to be rooted in 'idealpolitik as realpolitik' (Woolfson, 2012).

On the other hand, concerning the relationship between performers and audience, discourses of security continued to be apparent during the Cold War period as the enactment of the narrative of the Soviet side as the Other/evil/enemy seemed to be following the patterns of that historical American discourse which discriminated indigenous and African American peoples. The American construction of the Soviet threat was articulated according to a series of narratives closely associated with the nature of Soviet's totalitarianism and its global goals. Within this relationship, the American discourse was totally committed to spread out security-attached narratives aimed at convincing multiple publics in the audience about the dangers that the Soviet Union could pose to the survival of the West.

Within a few years, the United States moved from a robust wartime cooperation with the Soviets to comprehensive diagnosis of the nature of the Soviet threat and a programme of response. The nature of the diagnosis showed just how far USA international thought had traveled, as the threat from the Soviet Union was suddenly believed to endanger freedom at a global level (Woolfson, 2012). The American commitment to convince the audience about the Soviet threat has mostly served to preserve the ethical character of the West, underpinning the security claims that the West was a force for good in the international structure. The mass slaughters in the Soviet Union, for example, were interpreted in the West through narratives based on terms of Oriental despotism. The excesses of the Soviet Union regime served to reinforce the association of communism – actually a modern European ideology of progress – with the East (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006).

One can also take as an example the effort that was involved, both within American policy circles and in the multilateral arena, to construct the North Korean invasion of the South as a Moscow-led aggressive expansionism, not as an internecine struggle among Korean governments (Krause, 1998). The American discourse of Other regarding the Korean War has not solely convinced multiple publics that the use of force through securitization was a necessary measure, but it has also shown to other actors on the political stage (including the newly created United Nations) that the theater continued to be articulated by what Hedley Bull called "state's monopoly of legitimate violence, now disguised by a 'global community' that claimed the right to exercise force on an international scale" (2002, p. 258) As the symbol of 'global community,' the UN served as what Bull calls as "the agent of a group of states co-operating in the exercise of their right to resort to force" (2002, p. 259).

Interventions in parts of the world where superpower competition was intense have taken the form of multilateral coalitions in order to be legitimated. As international norms concerning conflicts became a subject of contention, the USA made sure that legitimate violence, which once was only committed by a sovereign state, would take the principle of multilateral intervention as part of its monopoly and competence. Meanwhile, the security discourses produced and reproduced on the stage aimed at reinforcing this idea had adopted the principle of human dignity intrinsic in the humanitarian pillars of the 1945 United Nations Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However their purposes were quite different: that of privileging military improvement, also preserving the profits of market relations, and more importantly, avoiding the expansion of a created threat.

During the Cold War, the American discourse asserted the universality of American values, suggesting that a threat to 'free' nations was a threat to US national security. The political innovation of the Truman Doctrine, for example, was to universalize the mission of American exceptionalism in attempting to create a grand strategy that represented a form of global anti-Communism (Woolfson, 2012). This durable ideological innovation dominated party political foreign-policy debate in the theater. Meanwhile, the Western audience became reliant to a great extent on this ideological innovation, which opened a fertile ground for critical theorists to acknowledge the notion that security discourses and practices gave rise to modes of power in the relationship between performers and audience.

Though the United Nations pushed the envelope further in the area of human rights through the promotion of a number of conventions dealing with narrower rights concerns, the possibility that this organization could intervene to respond to human rights violations was acted upon throughout the Cold War only when complex emergencies could jeopardize the Western interests due to the rise of a supposed communist expansion (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006). This was the cases of the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam War (1954-1975). Apart from that, human rights continued to be violated in Europe, America and Soviet Union, while the United Nations remained in a silent and limited mode.

All this considered, a more critical approach about this period should rely on these questions: how was the American or Western interest in opposing what was characterized as Soviet expansionism created? What kind of forces did it mobilize? How did the security language of nuclear deterrence operate as a form to tame these weapons, and exclude particular options for dealing with them? How do gendered formulations construct Others or sources of threats? (Krause, 1998). To better understand these questions, Alexander Wendt presumes that "(..) the probability that any given language will be realized depends on ideas and interests they constitute" (1999, p. 255). Wendt adds that "five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than a couple of North Korean ones because of the shared understandings that underpin them" (1999, p. 255). In his conclusion, "what gives meaning to the forces of destruction are the relations of destruction they are embedded," which are: "the shared ideas, whether cooperative or conflictual, which means that 'enemy' can be as much a role identity as 'friend'" (1999, p. 255). This constitutes the roles and behaviors that states interact.

In relation to the security drama in the Cold War, the analysis above could also be linked to what Edward Said refers to as "the process from which a Western cultural identity was constructed and destabilized through the historical experience of imperialism" (in Burke, 2007, p. 174). As Said suggests, "this process resulted in the crisis of modernism that was frozen in a contemplative irony for various reasons, of which one was the disturbing appearance of various Others" (Idem, 2007, p. 175). Thereby, Said turns back into history to describe this period by managing a post-positivist epistemology underpinned by the sociolinguistic construction of threats – associating it with articulations of both power and knowledge.

In the Cold War, the language and discourses of Other that determined the crisis of modernism were meant to maintain the balance of power and the relationships of nuclear deterrence that, as Hedley Bull indicates, "(…) would scarcely have been possible without the resolve of great powers, or combination of them, to issue threats and so create or intensify humanitarian crises" (2002, p. 203). Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen say that "dramatic events came in various forms, and they changed the relationships among the powerful states, as well as the academic paradigms used to understand those relationships" (2009, p. 55). The dramatic events are for Buzan and Hansen "(…) specific crises that became objects of study in their own right, but also changed existing understandings, relationships and practices in the wider strategic domain" (2009, p. 55). One of the main examples of this type can be represented by a critical reading of the 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis.

In Hedley Bull's explanation, "the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis owed its seriousness to the fact that, in the American view, the Soviet Union was failing to respect an established sphere of American influence" (2002, p. 203). About this matter, the documentary record drawn by Jutta Weldes shows that the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba was not necessarily understood as a threat to the White House. According to the documentary provided by Jutta Weldes, the discourse of Other and danger about this event in specific was constructed after an internal debate held by many points of choice for American decision-makers.

Jutta Weldes convincingly describes that "the American objection to the missiles in Cuba was not based on general claims concerning the existential threat that nuclear weapons might pose" (1999, p. 1). For Weldes, "the maintenance and legitimacy of the nuclear arsenal of the United States depended on avoiding the connection between nuclear weapons and concerns with threats to human life" (1999, p. 1). In this connection, Weldes indicates two factors that came to be attached to the missiles in Cuba. This first was "(…) the perception that the White House was having a serious foreign policy crisis" (1999, p. 2). The second was "(…) the fact that the American national interests were as based on a complex set of meanings that exceeded any physical facts about the detrimental effects of nuclear explosions[9]" (1999, p. 2).

---

9 In relation to the Othering characterization of Cuba, the American discourse did not arise from the actions of Cuba. The causes and significance of the abnormal relations between US and Cuba were related to the Soviet threat. By not acknowledging the Cuban role in the crisis, the US came to reproduce the Eurocentric idea that agency only resides in the great powers (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006).

The discourse depicting Cuba as 'a Soviet puppet' was the icing on the cake of the White House strategy to cover up its foreign policy crisis. This dramatic event also reflected the long history of US imperialism in the Latin American countries, where various enemies related to the Soviet threat were created. Put differently, this was a period marked by a "crisis of modernism" that buttressed the regime of power and exacerbated the Western perspective of politics and society. This perspective was extremely characterized by a negative representation of non-Western people, and originated from narratives, such as the 'Soviet puppet.' The consequence was the creation of new enemies (Cuba, North Korea and others) under the auspices of one Other (the Soviet Union). This also concentrated knowledge on the political stage, reproducing the traditional 'belief of superiority' underpinned by the notion that Western identity belonged to a highest civilization.

This 'belief of superiority' gave carte blanche for the Western leading roles to move forward on their projects of domination in the political, ideological, cultural and economic domains. The ending of the Cold War did throw some critical analytical assumptions into question. Most of IR critical authors had assumed a dichotomous struggle between East and West, and the USA' structural inability to move out of its demonization of the Soviet threat. While identities could be constituted through relations of difference, in reality the pressure to turn difference into a radical, threatening Otherness was overwhelming (Hansen, 2010).

When the leading roles had to perform the humanitarian scenes, even if they were moved by some the traces of human dignity and solidarity, they seemed not very interested to handle all the financial burdens of humanitarianism alone. The fact of allowing NGOs and UN specialized agencies to operate in a new and wider humanitarian space cannot be considered as a truthful demonstration of empathy and humanity for the victims of violence. In fact, the leading roles have decided to so because they were affected by the burdens that humanitarianism could represent. Beyond that, the theater was affected by the struggle between communism and capitalism that reinforced a Self-Other dichotomy. Whilst the Soviets (the so-called Other) revealed to be sensitive to Western principles that could harm its mode of governance, the United States (the Self) was not very comfortable with human protection rules that could constrain its liberal capitalism.

3.2. Post-Cold War considerations

With its focus on the security dilemma, states' survival, and military capability, IR realist theory was considered particularly apposite to the analysis of state behavior under the threat of nuclear warfare during the Cold War period. But the inability of realist scholars to predict the end of this period, as well as the changing reality of the strategic environment, meant that a number of IR scholars began to question the continuing relevance of realism, and traditional security studies, more generally (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). James Der Derian comes to remind us that "many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to consider the loss of bipolar stability and to argue the merits of multipolar over unipolar state-systems" (2009, p. 285). He observes, however, that "(…) although these perspectives on world order are a vital debate, they continue to be circumscribed by state-centric as well as realist interpretations of how power works" (2009, p. 286).

What is particularly important to note was the widening of the security's scope. As concern over military security becomes less pressing after the Cold War, so a wider conception of security has come to the fore. The security of individuals, where the denial of human rights, ill-treatment and persecution for reasons of gender or sexual orientation, the deprivations of famine and poverty, these were all factors which fall within the purview of the new security studies (Brown & Ainsley, 2005). In this reading, the ending of the Cold War era went hand-in-hand with challenges to the hegemony of the realist position in security studies, which paved the way for the emergence of more critical approaches (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). But not only critical approaches emerged after the Cold War. A liberal institutionalist theory gained force within the new order based on the security of individual.

Nonetheless, what is striking concerning this new order is the support it gives (or, perhaps, gave) to the idea that a universal liberal internationalist world could be possible. From the vantage point of 1989 it looked as if the history of ideological conflicts was coming to an end, and if the now dominant liberal capitalist states are unlikely to engage in violent conflict with each other, then it was not unreasonable to expect an era of relative peace and security would dawn (Brown & Ainsley, 2005). Instead, many conflicts worldwide and humanitarian scenes played out by Western performers persisted, with their number increasing, specially emergency complexes arising and that involved the issue of forced migration.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the UN Security Council proved itself willing to interpret the phrase ‘threats to the peace’ broadly, with most of Western members arguing on behalf of the doctrine of collective humanitarian intervention. As a consequence, the nature of resolutions passed by the Security Council on Kuwait, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor suggested that the Council was willing to treat the failure to guarantee what are called universal principles of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights,’ or even to protect civilian populations against humanitarian abuses, as either a symptom, or a cause, of threats to peace and international security (Orford, 2003). These resolutions passed by the UN Security Council have also entailed the emergence of a liberal discourse referring to the promotion and establishment of values and notions supported by the Western rule of law, and in charge of what came to be called the new world order.

Ian Hurd highlights that “state sovereignty became ‘contingent’ on governments providing a basic level of human rights protection to their people” (2011, p. 305). Consequently, Hurd indicates that “(…) the statehood itself is now dependent on acceptable state’s behavior, which means that the failure of a state to meet certain minimum standards comes to nullify its claims to noninterference” (2011, p. 305). Properly speaking, the West invented a new notion of sovereignty, called contingent (Hurd, 2011) or empirical (Barnett, 2010). Ian Hurd says that “this new kind of sovereignty may or may not involve the responsibility for outside states to intervene through the use of force; but it means that government in question has lost the protection entailed by sovereign statehood” (2011, p. 306). Take as example the legal framework, whereby the UN Security Council held the Tribunal of Nuremberg as a precedent in order to establish similar war crimes tribunals.

In simple terms, the Yugoslav tribunal and the Rwandan tribunal recognized the offenses of war crimes against humanity, and national leaders were pleaded guilty. Although these tribunals have had the ability to detain and try more than a small fraction of those engaged in atrocities, both have taken steps to implementing the Western rule of law in governing war crimes. As a matter of fact, these tribunals have slightly reduced the credibility gap between the promises of international law and the weakness of its application (Held, 2003). Nonetheless, and perhaps not surprisingly, none of these efforts to implement a desirable Western rule of law in the political theater were compelled by an unusual sentimentality.

With the end of the Cold War, for example, (neo)realists have anticipated that the tendency of the world order to encourage Selves and Others and pursue balancing strategies would mean that a phase of the US-led unipolarity could revert itself to a more complex multipolar order prone to great power conflicts (Harrison, 2004). However, in response, a liberal logic attributed to institutionalism has emerged to challenge the (neo)realist pessimist reading about the future. As Michael Barnett contends, "the West was considering a new liberal discourse on how to shield and protect communities and minorities from maltreatment due to a confluence of three factors" (2010, p. 84). Thus, the first factor is, for Barnett, "(…) that humanitarianism should be reflected in standards of a new (or so-called liberal) Western-led civilizing mission" (2010, p. 84). The second is "(…) that multilateral forums were the legitimate processes to handle humanitarianism; and, the third factor, that organizations should provide multiple burden-sharing mechanisms" (2010, p. 84).

Alexander Wendt alleges that "mainstream IR scholarship had largely accepted these two readings about the world order" (1999, p. 118). For Wendt, "the debate between (neo)realism and liberalism about the extent to which states were intended to pursue relative or absolute gains consisted of whether they were interested in security or wealth" (1999, p. 118). Wendt believes, therefore, that "(…) the question of whether states are capable of collective security depends on whether they are selfish or motivated to have collective interests" (1999, p. 118). Despite the disagreements between these two mainstream theories, Wendt says that "(…) they accept the rationalist premise that desire (i.e. national interest) causes sovereign states to act in certain ways" (1999, p. 118). Both theories take on a reproductive rather than a transformative notion of the logic of anarchy, with liberalism remaining committed to the assumption that states behave as rational actors (Harrison, 2004). The rationalist framework of both theories underestimated the scope for social change.

Both theories could explain the performances of the states-as-actors on the political stage after the Cold War. In the humanitarian scenes, more precisely, due to the confluence of the three considerations mentioned by Barnett, Western performers continued sensitive to the potential danger that forced migration might violate their national interests. The West appeared to be engaged in sharing the burdens of humanitarianism, but it also made sure that multilateralism was limited in scope and arranged around a Self and Other-system of politics.

The proponents of the liberal peace theory (most of them linked to the neoliberal economic theory, such as Michael W. Doyle[10], Robert O. Keohane and G. John Ikenberry[11]) began to argue on behalf of a modern category of practice called peacebuilding, whereby the UN should go deeper into domestic politics of states. Statebuilding became an indispensable component of liberal peace, which rapidly turned into an age of intervention. These liberal scholars whose followed a more classical and Kantian type seemed largely motivated by democratic and neoliberal values, specially when they emphasized the economic advantages of humanitarian interventions and multilateral cooperation aimed at promoting international peace through the development of human security discourses.

Andrew Linklater observes that Michael Doyle, for instance, contrasts what he considers "(…) the peaceful nature of supposed interliberal IR with the violence that liberal states usually managed in their dealings with illiberal regimes in undeveloped parts of the world" (2007, p. 77). According to Linklater, "what Doyle thinks is that liberal-social democratic states had a special responsibility for working out the implications of the enlightened concepts of national citizenship" (2007, pp. 77). The liberal-social democratic societies were led to comply with what Linklater defined as "(…) their moral and political principles, placing real constraints upon self-interests, and obliged to promote, whereby the circumstances permit, liberal-social democratic principles in other societies" (2007, pp. 77-78).

In a nutshell, the liberal peace theorists like Micheal Doyle stress that international peace and individual rights are best advanced through cosmopolitan frameworks whereby democratic and peaceful Western states take a leading responsibility for ensuring the interests of a 'common humanity' (Chandler, 2004). Following this reading, as tensions among the US and Russia receded in the post-Cold War period, liberal peace theorists took this phase of US-led unipolarity to address a sort of commitment over securitization through humanitarian intervention and civilian protection. For this to happen, the Western understandings of sovereignty should therefore become extremely contingent or empirical.

---

10 To acquire more information about the IR liberal theory, these following books best introduce its theoretical framework. See Doyle, Micheal & Sambanis, Nicholas (2006) – *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Doyle, Michael (1996) – *Empires*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

11 The same is suggested in John Ikenberry's books. See, for example, Ikenberry, John (2014) – *Power, Order and Change in World Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Political leaders and policymakers of Western states challenged the UN to consider sovereignty in a way that would respect the role of states and the protection of humanitarian law and human rights. Considering this context, the 6th UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that the classical conception of sovereignty could no longer be matched with the new order of the political theater, stating that sovereignty was more related to the state rather than people. Later, the 7th Secretary-General Kofi Annan also mentioned the term of two sovereignties, meaning the inclusion of a humanitarian (not to say securitized) imperative in cases of human suffering. Furthermore, the Rwanda's horrors led to the creation of the Human Development Report[12] drafted in 1994 by the UNDP. As indicated by Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss, "the Report basically critiqued that the concept of international security has for too long been interpreted narrowly" (2018, p. 99).

In 1999, NATO decided to use force to stop human rights violations in Kosovo – notwithstanding its ignoring of the international legal provisions of the UN Charter regime – galvanizing what Hoffman and Weiss described as the "political will to confront the issue" (2018, p. 99). Since then, Western leading roles started working towards what Hoffman and Weiss called as the "ending the culture of impunity, prosecuting leaders responsible for genocide, ethnic cleansing and other sorts of violations of humanitarian law" (2018, p. 99). As they note, "the September 1999 Security Council resolution 1265 is an example, insofar as the UN Security Council decided how peacekeeping mandates should be reframed to afford protection to endangered civilians in humanitarian contexts" (2018, p. 99).

Human security reemerged as vulnerable states – many of which were a product of decolonization and bloody intrastate war – began to proliferate. The old concept of security focused on conflict between sates was of minimal use for understanding this phenomenon. The concept of human security shifts attention away from states to individuals, emphasizing human rights, safety from violence, and sustainable development. This requires the transformation of entire societies into liberal democracies, which reinforced the idea that the West had a sort of 'God-blessed' responsibility to spread democracy worldwide (Fierke, 2010).

---

12 By asserting that people should be at the center of all development, the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report emerged with a meaningfully security agenda aimed at improving the concept of human security. The UNDP Report highlights how the vulnerability of individuals, mostly caused by indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, might pose a threat to global security.

Human security was popularized by the UN in the post-Cold War period, when a demand for international unity around humanitarian intervention was highlighted by Kofi Annan at the UN General Assemblies of 1999 and 2000. In addition to this, in September 2000, the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) would be established to address the moral, legal, operative and political questions involved in developing broader international support for a new framework legitimizing humanitarian intervention (Chandler, 2004). This Commission drafted a project that involved consultation with governments and representative bodies of Western-led global civil society (e.g. NGOs, academics and policy think tanks). Such a project resulted in the publication in December 2001 of a final report, which was famously called *The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)*.

The main point in the report was that states had a responsibility to protect their own citizens. This kind of obligation was deemed inherent in the concept of sovereignty, revived in the formation of the ICISS. When this obligation was not met, the state's claim to sovereign rights was diminished. In other words, when states could not or would not protect their citizens, the responsibility to protect shifted to the broader society of states (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006). Following this line of thought, one would have expect that at the end of the Cold War and with the collapse of one of its main ideological proponents, the claims of the Western members of the UN Security Council to provide a normative peace and a liberal ethos for order and development could be made good (Newman & Richmond, 2001).

In more general terms, the Western leading roles have succeeded in convincing a significant part of the Western audience to push to a greater extent a liberal and securitized agenda. Given the fact that their positions were not at stake, once the tensions with the East receded, the Western members of the Security Council have centered the discourse of international security on people rather than states. Even though the massive interventions in Somalia and Cambodia in 1992 had already presented anomalies in terms of statebuilding and democratization, the Western performers continued to perceive the need to reproduce discourses of sovereignty in matters of human security. The audience was led to believe that the liberal claims inherent in the security discourses were supposed to promote peace, but what came to be seen was the strategic maintenance of the status quo in the theater.

The R2P doctrine was adopted by the leading roles on the stage to represent the conviction that in cases whereby the secondary roles fail in fulfilling their security duties, the West would inherit that responsibility. While expanding the definition of humanitarianism through interventionary practices, this doctrine fails to get to the source/root of the problem. As one should observe, most of the humanitarian interventions after September 11 have neglected to interrogate the fundamental international inequality which is behind the problems in so-called 'failed states' and 'trouble zones' (Hehir, 2011). What was also problematic was that the Western audience did not challenge the assumptions driving R2P doctrine by claiming for substantial reform of the world order, once the political theater after the Cold War remained bureaucratic, pragmatic and exclusionary as its actors were attempting to establish contributions to international peace and security.

On the other hand, neorealists explained the collective interventions passed by the Security Council in the 1900s and 2000s as geostrategic, political and economic advantages of leading roles to be gained by intervening secondary roles. For the neorealists, the political theater continued to be articulated by traditional concerns of state security. As contended by Randall Schweller, "the world order post-Cold War appeared to be 'stable' because of the Western 'benign intentions,' and not because of the change in its structure" (1996, p. 121). In the early 1900s Schweller argues that "(…) theorists spoke of a new world order characterized by a Western cooperation because all of the developed states were satisfied powers" (1996, p. 121). Apparently, this scenario occurred due to the unipolar environment of that time, where the only remaining superpower decided to develop the rhetorical device of a new world order through which the West would be leading the way into a more just and humane international society of states (Newman & Richmond, 2001).

What was particularly problematic is that the state-centric version of international security did not disappear whatsoever. For the neorealists, though the US had been enjoying its protracted unipolar moment since the demise of the Soviet Union, the White House had not behaved as one expect a hegemonic or imperial actor to act. However, shortly after the September 11, the George Bush administration has made haste to make up for lost time in asserting the US and allies as the most active performers in a new war, almost a crusade, to extirpate the violent Islamic extremism (Gray, 2007). Once again the doctrine of R2P was taken for granted.

The state-centric version of security was intensified shortly after September 11 by Western-led coalitions that – supported by the liberal claims of R2P doctrine – prosecuted a handful of non-Western secondary roles who had committed some violations of human rights. What is little explored about this new war aimed at removing the new enemy called 'Islamic terrorism' is the fact that the military enterprises led by the United States and allies have also culminated in a range of bombings and blind air strikes against civilians and humanitarian structures. Additionally, R2P came to be seen, in practice, as limited only to targeting the governments or individuals whose best suited for the security utterances against terrorism. One should take as examples the Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other monarchies in the Persian Gulf, which were never target under the auspices of the doctrine of R2P as threats to the West, despite their violations of human rights and massive involvement with terrorism in the Middle East.

Working for Western discourses and practices of security, R2P now operates as a mechanism that serves domination. Interestingly, one of the factors that sustains the limitation and validation of R2P to those who best suited Western security interests continued to be that of the 'higher moral standard' of the Western-Self acting as superior to impose order and civilization on a morally inferior Other (Herring, 2008). This undermines the legitimacy of the argument that liberal theorists attempted to previously establish. R2P revealed to be a matter of framing that shifts according to what the Self is entitled to do with a newly created Other. In the post-Cold War, therefore, the constructed threat to the West came to be considered as what Michael Walzer defined "the infidel enemy, whose world leader was the United States and whose local representative was Israel" (2004, p. 133). Walzer contends that "once the new Other has been created, any of 'them' could be killed, men, women, children, combatants and noncombatants, ordinary folk" (2004, p. 133).

Based on threat-danger discourses of terrorism, and on a liberal doctrine limited to targeting a few weak secondary roles and individuals, insecurity turned out to be the rule rather than the exception in the theater. The dystopian regime of the drama exacerbated, with hostility, according to Michael Walzer's words, "becoming generalized and indiscriminate" (2006, p. 133) Meanwhile, the audience did not recognize that the leading roles had a past of encouraging terrorism by assisting and funding clients worldwide, like Pinochet (Chile) and Somoza (Nicaragua).

Indeed, the liberal notion of a Western-led international community inheriting the responsibility to protect people within and beyond the theater to establish peace and security revealed unsustainable. The performance of the actors in the humanitarian scenes also contained a number of fatal flaws. Whereas liberal peace theorists have fallen in the false illusion that humanitarian interventions promote democratic and universal values, (neo)realists have included such interventionary practices into what Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde refer to as "the securitization game" (1998, p. 22) played by a restricted club of leading roles. Involving world order activities, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue that "(…) the securitization game is perceived by the practitioners as concerning existential threats to their survival, and as emergency and extraordinary actions in the sense of suspending normal rules" (1998, p. 22).

There is nearly nothing new in the new world order of the theater, with the same restricted club of performers exploring security-attached terms and doctrines (e.g. human security, terrorism, and R2P) in their efforts to, as Andrew Linklater summarized, "disguise their self-interested motives and make their promotion more palatable" (2007, p. 78). There was no doubt that, in Linklater's words, "(…) encouraging other different societies to promote liberal-social democratic principles could, in the other hand, introduce a securitization game with risks of cultural imperialism, excessive use of force, instability and intervention" (2007, p. 78). The liberal peace discourse defended by liberal scholars to promote Western democratic values and principles (where the war is all but unthinkable) was impractical since it came to be misguided through traditional discourses of Other that continued to be perceived as instruments of Western foreign policies.

It is also worthwhile to consider that for the economic sector, the already mentioned securitization game underpinned by discourses of Other played an important role. Notably, groups of interests have begun to increase their combined and self-centered interests on war economy. Interventions in undeveloped parts of the world can be expensive affairs for governments, of course, but they can also represent a greater monetary and political gain for the economic elites ruling the 'military-complex,' 'labor,' and 'industry.' These Western elites have begun to perform the securitization game by attaching themselves to the 'body' of the leading roles on the stage in attempting to extend the profitable practices of war economy.

Their intentions were that of acquiring the foreign control of oil and arms industry, making use of local savings and local profits in order to re-invest and expand their industries abroad (Larrain, 1989). For this to happen, these groups of interests were strategically focused on regions and countries in the East and South (playing the secondary roles on the stage), several of which should become fragile enough as to grant them full access to royalties and licenses, so natural resources valuable in the market can be exploited. Besides, it is important to grasp that the incorporation of political and economic elites in the 'body' of the leading roles cannot be necessarily defined as an 'outgrowth' of capitalism. Rather than being a natural outcome of capitalism, as many IR scholars believe, the practices of war economy were able to flourish by virtue of the establishment of suitable conditions for cronyism through private-public partnerships of well-placed interests (Duncan & Coyne, 2013).

Take as an example the argument of Robert Gilpin, who said that "(…) a government may be conceived as a coalition of coalitions whose several of the objectives and interests result from the powers and bargaining among private-public partnerships which comprise the larger society and political elite" (in Ashley, 1984, p. 238). The ability of elites to persuade leaders and policymakers in drawing upon a language of security grants the justification of financing conflicts (or, perhaps, military interventions) a degree of credibility. Knowing that foreign policies are primarily determined by the interests of important members of ruling partnerships, R2P could eventually be a profitable enterprise to convince the audience to accept extraordinary measures through its dramaturgical vocabulary of democracy and human rights.

This is what happened after September 11, when discourses of saving lives were capable of convincing the audience to believe on the fact that intergovernmental military alliances of Western performers can decide whether and where to intervene. Within this scenario, the ambiguous discourse and character of R2P doctrine also designated either the UN Security Council or the military coalitions of Western performers as having the capacity and permission to intervene under humanitarian reasons. In his reading about R2P, Noam Chomsky contends that "this formulation takes the skeleton out of the closet. The area of its jurisdiction could solely be established unilaterally by the most powerful organization" (in Gozzi, 2017, p. 196). For Chomsky, "the NATO resolved that its field of activity after September 11 would include the Balkans and extend to Afghanistan and beyond" (Idem, 2017, p. 196).

In Alex Bellamy's viewpoint, the R2P could be considered a 'Trojan Horse' that legitimates Western intervention by its own terms. Following Bellamy's words, "the ICISS was quite right to be concerned about reducing the risks and dangers that sovereign states can abuse the humanitarian justifications to legitimate unjust wars" (2005, p. 53). Nonetheless, the ICISS should have paid more attention to what he considered as "(...) the danger that R2P language could be abused by the Western countries and their coalitions keen to avoid assuming any responsibility for their humanitarian violations and for saving some of the world's most vulnerable people" (2005, p. 53). Noam Chomsky believes that "the ICISS came to reserved the right of intervention for NATO, making it possible to resort to the doctrine of R2P as a meaningful weapon of imperial intervention at will" (in Gozzi, 2017, p. 196).

To complement this assumption, one should note that although sovereignty encompasses the possibility of legal intervention because, as firmly explained by Ian Hurd, "(…) the classical conception of sovereignty disappears at the extreme of government misbehavior, R2P is in the end a mere argument about the role of international laws" (2011, p. 307). Describing the exact moment when protections of sovereignty vanish from within, R2P could be best described as a doctrine that circulated in the theater as a political mechanism that safeguard economic and geopolitical interests. The security discourse to complete this doctrine was that of saving lives from a terrorist and barbaric Other.

Gustavo Gozzi argues that "R2P doctrine was a pass allowing the Western powers to impose their values and interests on the weaker states" (2017, p. 197). These weaker states were secondary roles (e.g., Cuba, Venezuela, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria, Vietnam and others) that, as Gozzi says, "have made the case that R2P serves the function of enabling the stronger states to assert their power interests against the weaker ones" (2017, p. 197). Gozzi takes as an example "(…) the military intervention to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1973 of 2011" (2017, p. 197). This case indicates that liberal discourses failed to problematize the role played by the historical global relations among actors in the formation of the world order. The liberal discourse localized agency in the Western community, which have taken on the role of fixing the problem of human insecurity. The resulting practices of this liberal process manifested the potential to reproduce historical relationships of power and increase suffering (Fierke, 2010).

Though softer than the imperial regimes of power that prevailed until the end of the Second World War, the liberal regime of the post-Cold War within and beyond the political theater continued to be articulated by what I named as the security drama riddled with traditional global structures, e.g. the unequal and exclusionary capitalist world economy and the (neo)imperialist practices of intervention dressed up by dramaturgical discourses of saving others lives. To achieve this understanding, it was necessary to turn back to world history and recognize that a Western self-confidence resulting from the paternalistic characters performed by the Western leading roles is responsible for reproducing power dynamics involved in what is best described as neocolonial and imperial practices. This contributed to a more dystopian drama, whereby the evocation of crisis, emergencies, rituals and myths are made for us, the audience, to believe in a superior Self against an inferior Other.

Turning back to history might be useful for the audience to acknowledge that a restricted club of Western leading roles always dictated the rules of (in)security. Eventually, the fact is that the United States and allies have organized under their sponsorship and protection what Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman call "(…) a neocolonial system of client states ruled by terror and serving the interests of a small local and foreign business and military elite" (in Herring, 2008, p. 209). Bearing this mind, one may note that the fundamental belief (or ideological pretense) is that, as argued by Chomsky and Herman, "(…) the Western-Self is totally dedicated to furthering the causes of democracy and human rights worldwide, although it may occasionally err in the pursuit of this objective" (Idem, 2008, p. 209).

For this purpose that critical reflections upon the consequences that arise from this secularist dependence between the Self and Other should be a matter of my concern. Only by understanding history and the critical reflections upon the Self-Other dichotomy that multiple publics of the audience could claim for political change and rethink humanitarian scenes in Western countries. Calling for change is a long-term procedure that could be done if we begin with the understanding that, as James Der Derian suggests, "(…) history can be used to call into question the realist portrayal of immaculate origins, essential identities, and deep structures in IR" (2009, p. 201). Pursuant to Der Derian, "this reveals the metaphorical and mythical beginnings of a supposedly uniform statecraft while producing, through interpretation, dissident practices that never 'figure' in the official story" (2009, p. 201).

3.3. Dichotomy, performative capacities and surveillance within a politics of insecurity

Carl Schmitt[13] convincingly expressed that the Self and Other dichotomy denotes the utmost degree of intensity concerning a friend and enemy distinction, a union or separation, an association or dissociation. This dichotomy depicts the relevance of 'political judgment' and 'geopolitical framing' to make sense our conceptions of the international order (Moore, 2013). In this sense, we can assume that each performer finds itself in what Carl Schmitt called "a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate its 'opponent's way of life,' and consequently must be repulsed or fought to preserve one's own form of existence" (2007, p. 27).

As previously observed, the post-Cold War period reveals the continued reliance on binary understandings of power and spatiality, that is to say, on notions of Self and Other, security and threat/danger, and freedom and oppression. More recently, the IR critical scholarship has foregrounded how the war on terror works with the same binaries (Kuus, 2010). This relation is once more apparent if we consider how the events of September 11 have provide a powerful framing for the way that security has been studied in the ensuing war on terror and how critical approaches have developed within this context (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014).

The mainstay of the continued reliance on binary understandings of power is what Schmitt designated as "the political sense of the world" (2007, p. 27). In simple terms, the political sense of the world consists of the way that powerful states address an Other/enemy, which is for Schmitt "treated as being evil and ugly, because every dichotomy draws upon other distinctions for support" (2007, p. 27). The Schmitt's political sense of the world turns out to be the essence of what I call the theater, thus serving as a potential vehicle for driving states' foreign policies.

---

13 Although his works remain both influential and controversial due to their association with Nazism, Carl Schmitt examined the nature of the "political" in the modern world, attracting the attention of philosophers and political theorists worldwide, including Giorgio Agamben, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Friedrich Hayek, Antonio Negri and others. Through a theological analysis of the Catholic pessimism, Carl Schmitt concludes that the political is reducible to the distinction among friend and enemy, the Self and Other. As Nicholas Onuf summarizes, "Schmitt claims that enemy is the stranger, the Other, someone who is in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, someone who mounts an existential threat to the state, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible" (2013, p. 154). In this sense, securitization is identified with the exceptional decision that constitutes enemies and brings into existence the logic of war. This Schmitt's vision of the political is the logic that characterizes the traditional security mindset (Trombetta, 2011). See Schmitt, Carl (2015) – *Der Begriff des Politischen* (korrigierte Aufl.). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot; and Derrida, Jacques (2005) – Absolute Hostility: the cause of philosophy and the spectre of the political. In. A. Derrida, Jacques (ed.), *Politics of Friendship* (3rd ed., pp. 37-112). London: Verso.

Moreover, Alexander Wendt argues that "in the constructivist reading of security, speech-acts produce and reproduce conceptions of Self and Other" (1999, p. 36). Despite the fact that egoistic states can transform the world order from a balance of power system to a collective security system, Wendt believes in "(…) the possibility that these states can learn how to cooperate while their egoistic identities remain constant" (1999, p. 37). This analysis brings into light two important interrelated factors. The first is that states decide to interact selfishly due to the cultural meanings they ascribe to the actions of others. The second is that their national interests cannot exist independently of a shared cultural context for actions. Thus, this leads to the perspective that national interests and egoistic identities of states are not given exogenously. Instead, they reflect cultural meanings that states internalized throughout the historical processes of socialization (Harrison, 2004).

In a political theater characterized by cultural meanings that sustain binaries and dichotomies, one might presume that performers acquire the ability to think self-consciously and manipulate the spectators in the audience about the behavior and practices they should adopt. All of this comes into light due to the performative capacities that, in accordance with Jef Huysmans' line of thought, "(…) might be generated in the act of speaking security" (2006, p. 24). These capacities depend on what Huysmans convincingly appoints as "(…) the use of security language that introduces a generic structure of cultural meaning with the purpose of organizing dispositions and social relations according to a self-consciously and rationality of security" (2006, p. 24). For him, "this structure of meanings functions as a set of conventions that sanction security-related practices" (2006, p. 25).

The study of the Self-Other dichotomy and performative capacities came onto the terrain of IR critical theory through poststructuralists scholars. Whereas the critical peace researches drafted by the Frankfurt School authors were visible in the early to mid-1980s, the influence of Habermas was gradually replaced by the thoughts of Foucault, specially on how the performative capacities resided in the structures and discourses about society (Hansen, 2010). Poststructuralists scholars dove into Foucauldian interpretation of a method of control that exists since the Westphalian system was established. Called 'police,' this method of control is inherent in the performative capacities of the states performing the drama, providing them the most suitable tools to control the range of intervention in people's life.

As such, the first technique of 'police' aimed at controlling people's life through notions of fear is surveillance. By expressing the view that there could be any circumstances that armed opposition to the Self may be legitimate, surveillance is a prospect that should not be discounted. After September 11, for example, any opposition to Western power, or even discussion of it, is being pushed into the delegitimizing and criminalizing category of terrorism (Herring, 2008). By creating a permanent environment of emergency (identifying who the society has to fear), the leading roles manage surveillance (through control) with the purpose of shaping a manipulative behavior to oversee the conduct of civil society.

The second technique of 'police' is language. Recapitulating Nicholas Onuf words, "language is but one vehicle for the coding, storing, communicating and acting on information, which is, by itself, limitless, weightless, infinitely manipulable and potentially timeless" (2013, p. 208). For Onuf, "Foucault was right about language, its uses and rules that might define we could say and still be heard" (2013, p. 202). Apparently, language implies exclusion within the theater, once power to speak is limited to a restricted club of performers. In this fashion, 'police' reveals to be a character of Western reasoning, which is, in a Foucauldian sense, a catastrophic one, mostly because of its sense that everyone should submit to Western language and discourse ethics. The Paris School helps us to recognize that 'police' is made by surveillance and the politics of speech and manipulation, which are preferable to the politics of the excessive and indiscriminate use of force.

Not surprisingly, the Paris School takes Foucault's writings as face value. In this connection, Bigo accepts Foucault's interpretation of the state by assuming that "(…) the state wants to take charge of individual security as well as widen the notion of public order" (in Floyd, 2006, p. 10). The state aims, in Bigo's observation, "(…) to realize the 'truth programme,' that it has been trying to assert for a long time with contract theories, but lacked the means to carry out" (Idem, 2006, p. 10). For Bigo, "control, surveillance and new knowledge in the social sciences reinforce the push towards maximizing security" (Idem, 2006, p. 10). For the purposes traced in this dissertation, one may observe that 'police' is related to articulation of power and manipulation of knowledge. It is imperative for us to understand that performative capacities of performers are shaped by 'police' and its techniques responsible for mobilizing extraordinary measures to achieve particular interests.

Having this in mind, and in the attempt to define the current scenario of the political theater, I decide to recall Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen's argument, when they emphasized that the order is "(…) about the construction of a radically different, strange, inferior and threatening Other, but it is also, given that identity is always relational, about the Self" (2009, p. 142). About the humanitarian scenes, Buzan and Hansen argue that "poststructuralists scholars also looked at humanitarianism and security as political discourses involved in a subjective world that can be assessed through a conception that practices and subjects are enacted" (2009, p. 142). This implies what they call as "(…) a significant turn in security thinking that states and identities are not stable and given entities" (2009, p. 143).

Jef Huysmans argues that "the construction of a threat could be an element of the politics of insecurity" (2006, p. 7). In his words, "the politics of insecurity consists in performing capacities that contest the use of security language in relation to certain events and developments" (2006, p. 7). This analysis is a fundamental topic of discussion in security debates because, as Huysmans notes, "it takes the politics of insecurity beyond the question of managing an existential threat and the nature and degree of the threat" (2006, p. 7). For Huysmans, "this reveals the importance of the language that is being used to either identify and account for an event for the modulation of insecurity domains" (2006, p. 7). The politics of insecurity drafted by Huysmans plays an important role within the security drama as language became a political instrument operating as a hegemonic tool managed by those who tend to securitize issues and problems for self-preserving interests.

In this manner, it is essential to consider Foucault's contention that history, and borrowing Andrew Linklater's argument, "(…) is not an upward journey towards universal freedom and reciprocity but rather a cyclical process which societies move from one form of domination to another" (2007, p. 139). He argues that "Foucault's point was that public spectacles of human cruelty have disappeared from 'more advanced' societies but modern discourses of power operate in more sinister ways" (2007, p. 139). He asks, then, "(…) whether the modern society of states has made progress in eliminating concrete harms, or whether the more powerful trends are towards more diffuse (and abstract) forms of harms and creation of new identities" (2007, p, 140). As Campbell asserts, "the answers must be directed at interpretations that make the world available for apprehension" (1992, p. 8).

As one could observe, the end of the Cold War did throw some critical analytical assumptions into question. Most (if not all) IR critical authors had assumed a dichotomous struggle between the East and West. Then, by studying the American discourses of danger within the politics of identity, David Campbell stressed the importance of the Other, arguing that while the state identity could in principle be enacted by relations of difference (Hansen, 2010). For Campbell, "danger is not an objective condition, neither exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat" (1992, p. 1). Campbell believes that "anything can be a risk; it all depends on how states interpret the danger, and then consider the event" (1992, p. 1). In his conclusion, "danger bears no essential (or perhaps necessary) relation to the actions or event from which it is said to derive" (1992, pp. 1-2).

The 1991 Gulf War, for example, revealed to be a proof of how a danger can be understood. In fact, the military action in this event conveniently served the self-centered interests of USA in the Middle East and the cost was relatively low. All at once, human rights violations had become an offense against ethical norms of the society of states, since the USA saw it in their interest to do something about it (Seybolt, 2010). Creating a threat through discourses of saving lives from barbarism proved to be the source of much American overconfidence. Besides, strategically speaking, this war revealed to be important to vindicate the efficacy of America's somewhat new way of war, favoring airborne bombardment keyed to the ability to deliver firepower with high levels of precision (Gray, 2007).

Jef Huysmans is convinced that "before an event can mobilize security policies and rhetoric, it needs to be strongly conceived of as a question of insecurity and this conception in fact needs to be sustained by discursively reiterating its threatening qualities" (2006, p. 7). Concerning the 1991 Gulf War, for instance, David Campbell also points out that "for many people Iraq obviously became a danger to the United States because nothing can be more real and less disputable than an invasion of one country by another" (1992, p. 2). However, according to Campbell's argument, "an event of this kind (and in particular one very distant from America) does not in and of itself constitute a danger, risk, or threat." (1992, p. 2). This leads us to agree with Jef Huysmans' argument, when he convincingly pointed out that "(…) insecurity and construction of threats are, indeed, not facts of nature, but rather always require that they are written and talked into existence" (2006, p. 7).

Despite having experienced some years of colonialism and occupation by imperial powers, Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss remind that Iraq, in the late 20th century, "(…) was a moderately wealthy and stable country. Though governed by monarchy or military dictatorship since its very inception, Iraqis fared reasonably well in socioeconomic terms" (2018, p. 139). Yet, the 1991 Gulf War took what they interestingly called "the heavy toll; when a United Nations report has suggested that Iraq was back in the stone age" (2018, p. 139). In Hoffman and Weiss' analysis, "sanctions against the Saddam's regime resulted in humanitarian crises. After the uprisings of the Kurds and Shiites (both encouraged by the US)[14], the regime has severely repressed and forcibly displaced populations" (2018, p. 139).

In Jef Huysmans' line of thought, "the humanitarian contexts are not constructed through policy reactions to a threat, but through security discourses of danger, or language games that re-frame an event into a condition of insecurity" (2006, p. 7). Concerning the Gulf War and the construction of the Iraqi-threat, the American discourse portraying Saddam Hussein as akin to Adolf Hitler had displayed a securitizing purpose to draw upon the script of the good war, while erasing the traumatic memory of Vietnam. The American security discourse was ultimately saturated with moral and ethical reasoning. The war was undertaken not only to safeguard the national interest (material resources, such as the free access to oil), but also in defense of a higher moral order (Hansen, 2010).

When political leaders – having the support of elites – attempt to asses a threat, they need to make a very complex world simpler. One example of that was when the President Bush famously said that Saddam was another Hitler. As a matter of fact, whoever Saddam was, it is quite impossible to suggest that he could be compared to Hitler, either in his intentions or his capabilities. The scope of his ambition or the numbers that he had killed cannot be compare to Hitler, nor did his relative military capabilities. After all, this simplified reasoning by analogy to develop a threat assessment is not uncommon (Stein, 2013). Security discourses that incorporate reasoning by analogy is made for us, the Western audience, to be convinced that an unquestionable and powerful leading role such as the US is engaged in a relentless defense of a higher moral order to protect us from the evil.

---

14 Though encouraged by the US, Kurds and Shiites received no assistance after the uprisings. As a result, Saddam's regime regained control, killing thousands of people, including twenty-thousand Kurds.

This moment is important for the study of humanitarianism and security, once the Western members of the UN Security Council began to address humanitarianism through a value-based narrative, disclosing the argument that securitization benefits national interests and the people of other states. The post-Cold War humanitarian enterprises in the Middle East, beginning with the 1991 Gulf War until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s, ensued the identity of the Self (Western) as, in accordance with Alexander Wendt's point of view, "a structure of knowledge, the totality of an individual's thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object" (1999, p. 230). Thereby, the Western-Self manifested itself as what Branwen Gruffydd Jones describes as "superior, privileged and threatened, but riddled with 'universal' values" (2006, p. 10). For Jones, "the twin of this Self continued to be the construction of the barbaric Other whose being is different. That is why we should disrupt this idea in the tale of our progress and civilization" (2006, p. 10).

After the Western-led interventionary practices in undeveloped countries during the 1900s and 2000s, Gustavo Gozzi reminds us that "one cannot consider that the discursive elements of the 'universalist' humanitarian paradigm have gone away from the international order" (2017, p. 194). Gozzi assumes that "these elements may be couched in a different kind of language and set in an internationalist scenario, then turning up in the contemporary doctrine of R2P" (2017, p. 194). For Gozzi, "the strategy of discourse devised in the second half of the 19th century – the one invoking the 'laws of humanity' as a way to dress up the Western values with a veneer of universality – has persisted into the present day in different forms" (2017, p. 194). Conclusively, he says that "all seem to share a common denominator, casting in a universal light what continues to be Western values" (2017, p. 194).

In the politics of insecurity identified by Huysmans, justifying securitization for humanitarian ends is not only an exercise in political rhetoric. It also entails an assessment of the type of justification used to convince us in a moral higher order. Within the politics of insecurity, powerful states do not aim at the triumph of cosmopolitanism. They want a world order of their own – an order governed. Moral justifications for democracy and humanitarian intervention are tinged with the preferences of individual states. In practical terms, this is a question of how humanitarian contexts generate and exacerbate from within, through particular self-centered interests and security discourses (Moore, 2013).

Language is a political activity developed by performative capacities operating simultaneously to the construction of identities, such as the Self and Other. Once performative capacities are able to create binary identities, one should take into consideration the empirical complexity of identity construction, observing the enactment of a Self and a radically different and threatening Other for degrees of difference and Otherness (Hansen, 2006). As previously indicated, the classical discourses of national security are involved by articulations of threats and dangers, either to construct self-identity or to distinguish the enemy. Evil, savage, inhumane, barbaric and dangerous are the most common terms applied to define degrees of Otherness. Since ancient times, emperors and rulers manage their performative capacities to convince the audience to legitimize their security aims by creating the Other, an enemy whose existence threatens the national Self.

Knowing that identity is a matter of construction that can give rise to a radical Otherness (i.e., a variety of non-selves and non-identities), Gustavo Gozzi argues that "the role of law in the use of force might also be seen as that of construction, contestation and instrumentalization" (2017, p. 196). In this regard, the legal constructions of war are for Gozzi entirely contingent, inasmuch as they change over time in history. Gozzi seems also convinced that "(…) the contents of legal constructions of war have been defended, attacked, and transformed through the relationships between the parties in conflict, i.e., between colonizers and colonized" (2017, p. 196). Such a contingent dynamic was also present in what Gozzi comes to consider as "the wake of September 11, and the instrumentalization of the distinction between what is considered justified war and non-war" (2017, p. 196).

Shaped in historical encounters, legal justifications of war are to be transformed in accordance with new discourses, but always embedded in a scenario marked by distinctions, dichotomy, paternalistic characters, and methods of 'police' played by performative capacities. Identities (the source of fear to be eliminated) might also change in time and space, insofar as they depend on the leading roles' perceptions of targets, from that of 'victim' or 'friend' to be protected, the enemy or savage, the stranger, or more recently, the terrorist to be defeated. The history of the theater, for example, discloses a range of narratives of different identities across the time. The narrative and practice in the 11th century were the Crusades. In the 14th century the overseas expansion and European colonization.

In the 16th century, however, the security narratives and practices were adapted to the witch-hunt. In the 18th century to the slave-trading. In today's world, for example, the narrative and practices that constitute what I here define the security drama were adapted to the terrorism. We should keep in mind that tracing the historicity of the politics of insecurity helps us to understand that identities are both historically and culturally enacted through narratives developed by performative capacities that ultimately reflect distinctions of the Self and Other. In acknowledging historicity, multiple publics will be able to grasp the mistakes of the past to prevent those in the future. Through historicity that we are able to understand why slave-trading and colonization were legitimated in the past, but then became illegitimate under the new rules of the international law. In today's world, some discourses and practices of terrorism are mistakes that could be fixed solely if we turn back to history to tackle them with emancipatory aspirations and critical thinking.

Following Jef Huysmans' way of thinking, "the events of September 11 are the prototypical security example of this, precisely because they were politicized as an exceptional and global threat to the Western world" (2006, p. 5). For Huysmans, "they led to a rhetoric of a war on terror, as well as to a large-scale use of military power" (2006, p. 5). Besides, Alexander Wendt argues that "(…) subjects and identities are conceptually dependent upon those ideas or structures that exist only 'in virtue of' them" (1998, p. 88). Terrorism does not exist apart from a security discourse that defines terrorism. For Wendt, "ordinary language bears this out: we do not say that security discourse causes terrorism, but they are relevant to the construction of terrorism, since without them there would not be terrorism" (1998, p. 88).

Before September 11, terrorism was regarded as a category of criminal activity. But then, it became an existential threat to the United States, insofar as the survival of American identity was seen to be at stake. The use of the word 'security' and the language of war constituted an emergency condition. Elites claimed the right to use whatever means are necessary to block the threat. In doing so, the rules that would constrain their actions were broken free (Fierke, 2010). Since then, the method of 'police' and its techniques have been justified in the name of security. Along with capitalism and industrialization, 'police' is convincingly defined by Anthony Giddens "as the chief determinant of modernity, once it centralizes control of all kinds of instruments of violence" (in Linklater, 1998, p. 148).

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen indicate that “critical security scholars were able to analyze the shift from a territorial, well-defined enemy during the Cold War to the terrorist who moves anonymously until the moment he/she strikes” (2009, p. 249). Therefore, the terrorist profile is for Buzan and Hansen “(…) intimately interwoven with the political discourses on security that are in place, thus seeking to identify the future threat” (2009, p. 249). In simple terms, the effect of profiling and surveillance establishes what Buzan and Hansen decided to characterize as “the ‘society of insecurity’, where each citizen is taught to be alert and on the lookout for some suspicious packages, activities and people” (2009, p. 249). When states determine people as threats, with bodies as the sources of danger, they create a security state whereby everyone should be under the ‘police’ of surveillance.

After increasing powers of arrest and centralizing the control of the instruments of violence through surveillance, it is also relevant to note that policymakers within military ranks were able to manipulate the rules to a limited extent, within a specific niche: when targeting dual-purpose objects[15]. Having a privileged position on the political stage, these policymakers held an ample lawful space in terms of brutality against combatants, so long as they are still in the war game. They conceal the humanitarian law of armed conflicts in a way that allows brutality (Beer, 2018). Civilians of non-Western countries (those who never had the chance to be listened) came to be the victims of this new practice.

A military conception of security would explain the bombings and blind air strikes against civilians and humanitarian structures as necessary procedures for achieving specific military purposes to defeat a dangerous enemy. This conception of security would also indicate us that policymakers within military ranks of leading roles are capable of manipulating the rules when it is militarily desirable; and no matter how strong the law seems to be, the leading roles will tend to overlook human protection rules when it comes to accomplish military purposes. The loss of thousands civilian lives in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, was never considered a failure for the leading roles on the stage. What actually mattered for them was avenging the few hundreds of Western victims of September 11.

15 Targeting dual-purpose poses a challenge to humanitarian issues, as innocent lives are likely to be sacrificed. This practice is one of the new changes in the patterns of war. Humanitarian rules limit the scope of war to military issues to prevent harms caused to civilians, but targeting dual-purpose invites us to revise the legal thinking, once objects of war serve both civilian and military purpose.

Throughout the war on terror, Western-led coalitions dismissed the law to allow brutality. The excessive and unnecessary use of force against the terrorist threat and civilian populations became customary as the intervenors recognized that they could employ advanced military technology to defeat terrorists without risking their lives. This drove the Western-led coalitions into what Nicholas Wheeler calls "a ruthlessly selfish mode of behavior" (2009, p. 249). According to Wheeler's observation about this matter, "(…) commanders, officers, and soldiers decided to employ advanced military technology than risking their own lives for the sake of strangers, those who inhabit a remote, far away and undeveloped community" (2009, p. 249).

In the meantime, the main goal for the Western performers was to present a foreign policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to its relevant audience. Thus, at the center of political activity was the construction of a link between policy and identity, making the two appear consistent with each other. This was put into practice when President G. Bush, in 2003, constructed Iraqi-Other as an identity split between two entities: Saddam's regime, who had committed atrocities on the one hand; and the oppressed Iraqi people longing for freedom (Hansen, 2006). It is well known that September 11 was designated to humiliate the most powerful state of the world. It is also known that President G. Bush turned against Al-Qaeda and those who gave it shelter. However, he inexplicably turned against Saddam Hussein as well. The most plausible explanation for this event is that of US' foreign policy was more likely to satisfy the public-private partnership ambitions, more focused to show the American power than to save lives and set the world free from terrorism.

The President G. Bush's foreign policy and security discourses were considered neoconservatives. To the extent that neoconservatism was a coherent philosophy, it involved a combination of causes normally associated with the left – overthrowing tyranny, easing humanitarian distress, and promoting democracy – and methods normally associated with the right, meaning resort to military force and distrust of international institutions and treaties (Freedman, 2008). Having inherited the same neoconservative reasoning from his father, the President G. Bush talked about the invasion in Iraq like a just war theorist. Michael Walzer emphasizes that "Bush's speeches and press conferences displayed an old American tendency, which was inherited from his father, to confuse just wars and crusades, as if a war could be just only when the forces of good are arrayed against the evil" (2004, p. 10).

Moreover, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde believe that “in the foreign policies of both Bush the elder and his son, external military intervention played a strong role in the wake of the wars against Iraq” (1998, p. 68). Their critical interpretation concerning this matter is that “the interest of outside powers in oil resources is likely to make this area one which continued great-power involvement could be guaranteed” (1998, p. 68). In the meantime, on the political stage, aiming to acquire the support of the Western audience, G. Bush’s policy of intervention was articulated by the discourse of the Iraqi-Other, an enemy performer comprised by murderers with weapons of mass destruction, and a savage government capable of spreading out terror and violence around the globe.

The enactment of the Iraqi-Other, as either terrorist or victim, relied upon the strengthening of the Western-Self as the superior, stronger, moral and civilized. Nonetheless, all the interrogation regarding how security discourses constituted the identity of the Western-Self as one of privileged difference to the terrorist non-West brought to light the transgression of civil rights that the West itself was argued to embody. This discursive position was brought out in the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo and in the clandestine programs of so-called extraordinary rendition through which suspected terrorists were believed to be transferred to some places suspected of using torture (Hansen, 2010). David Campbell and James Der Derian tackle this problem declaring that “the way that the Self-Other dichotomy in the spectacle meets the need of the states for discourses of danger to provide a new technology of truth” (in Krause, 1998, p. 320). Such a technology, in their viewpoint, “(...) is not only about who and what the society is, but also about who and what the society is not, and what and who the society has to fear” (Idem, 1998, p. 320).

The challenge posed is whether performers need enemies. The war on terror had a profound impact on security studies, when new threats were predetermined through signs of weakness and inferiority. The performative capacities of states establish a politics of insecurity, the ‘climax’ of the drama comprised by a dichotomy and the ‘police’ of surveillance. That is why this investigation must offer an ‘anti-climax,’ which is more focused on the everyday politics. The construction of threats through discourses of Other pushed its effects into a dystopian drama where the Western audience faces the exacerbation of suffering within (or close to) their national boundaries due to the deployment of securitizing moves.

My challenge is to provide an 'anti-climax' coming from an emancipated Western audience that understands such a complex structure of securitization, riddled with narratives portraying minorities as threats. The proposed 'anti-climax' consists of desecuritizing moves put into action by multiple publics in the audience, a 'critical mass' which grasps that, as indicated by Jef Huysmans, "it is far from clear that migrants are fixed into a threat to the cultural self-definition of the Western people" (2006, p. 64). Any spectator in the Western audience could be part of this 'critical mass,' as long as he/she acknowledges that the construction of threats within the political theater contributes for labeling migrants as terrorists, drawing into the implementation of undemocratic and extraordinary measures.

For now, we can have in mind Jef Huysmans' description of securitization, which "often follows from being an issue in wider policy developments that interconnect a range of policy questions by means of security language and the implementation of security procedures and instruments" (2006, p. 64). However, before providing examples of desecuritizing contributions that will compose the 'anti-climax' of the security drama, the fourth scene of the expository scenes explains the meanings of desecuritization and explores what is required for the audience to meet the desecuritizing needs. For this to happen, this third scene revealed to be important to understand that the construction of threats made by securitizing actors negatively impacts the life of those people living outside the theater who cannot be heard. This third chapter was fundamental to understand that performative capacities result in dichotomy and surveillance, where insecurity turned out to be the rule of a dystopian theater, with violence and suffering becoming generalized.

In the final analysis, David Campbell emphasizes that "the states foreign policy strategies of differentiation and Otherness center a conception of the Western-Self" (1992, p. 236). He also contends that "the boundaries of the West and identity are inscribed through concerns about differences within" (1992, p. 236). Put simply, in acknowledging this scenario, we might be able to investigate why the leading roles often tend to make sure that the Self-Other dichotomy is taken for granted in the construction of their security discourses. In this way, it is up to us, the audience, to recognize that the only long-term way to change this scenario is by developing the proper emancipatory tools to collectively reflect and contest what is often spoken and done on the political stage while the drama is performed.

Scene 4. Desecuritization: what is required for the audience to meet its needs?

After September 11, critical scholars engaged themselves in analyzing discourses that justified the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, assuming that the terrorist threat had no objective, material referent, but rather constituted a radical Other. For this, an emancipatory alternative world based on normative ideals was developed by the personalities of the Aberystwyth School. Although Nik Hynek and David Chandler criticized the fact that the "critical security studies failed in providing a genuine contestation upon real-world struggles," (2013, p. 50) the Aberystwyth (or Welsh) School was the first generation of CSS that questioned the orthodox and traditional perspectives of security developed by (neo)realism.

In keeping with a Coxian approach, critics of the traditional approach argue that this narrowly focused problem-solving approach has several weaknesses. Then, a primary objection to the traditional approach is that it is too narrowly focused on the military security states. In doing so, it paints a static picture of international life that claims to simply portray the world 'as it is,' but also makes a powerful political statement in assuming that fundamental changes in the nature of world politics are virtually impossible (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). The boom and expansion of this critique started with Booth, Wyn Jones and Nicholas Wheeler. Ken Booth, in particularly, defined the critical global theorizing by means of an emancipatory characteristic, where security issues should start with the voiceless.

Ken Booth contends that the "critical global theorizing seeks to construct a world politics that is not shackled by the chains of oppressive ideas and practices. It rather seeks to promote emancipation and freedom" (2007, p. 38). In his way of thinking, "critical security thought must go beyond concern with the techniques of survival, situating global political arrangements in ideas about the purposes of that survival" (2007, p. 38). Booth concludes that "security implies survival plus, and this means creating for human self-invention beyond merely existing" (2007, pp. 38-39). His emancipatory project is not necessarily bound to state strategies and foreign policies, but it can also be managed as a mechanism to support the oppressed people located outside the political theater, operating as a project of civil resistance against the oppressing structures of power on the political stage.

Ken Booth and other theorists of the Aberystwyth School offer an approach for the progress of the audience followed by an emphasis on common humanity. But (neo)realists and liberal authors continued to argue that it would make little sense to define a study as critical when it imposes Western understandings of emancipation. Properly speaking, the problem regarding Booth's critical thought is that the great majority of the agencies of emancipation are, as Hynek and Chandler point out "(…) Western states, institutions and a global civic culture, informed by the Western academic advocates of human emancipation who exchanged their allegiance to the sovereign state with one to the nascent world order" (2013, p. 47).

Additionally, Hynek and Chandler also believe that "from the beginning, CSS in Western academia posited the possibility that emancipatory theory could exist independently of an emancipatory subject" (2013, p. 48). They allege that "the issue around the emancipatory project is whether the oppressed and excluded people were able to overcome the challenges posited by the structures of power." (2013, p. 48). According to their argument, "Booth does not further address this issue. Booth considers the critical theorists as the most important thinkers of whom relies the intellectual responsibility to emancipate the rest of world" (2013, p. 48). Considering that this emancipatory project holds a Eurocentric basis, it is clear that human emancipation has become a form of imperialism. Critics of Western states find themselves in the position of ironically relying on Western forces for humanitarian interventions. Even when the actors of emancipation are not Westerners, they are conceived as the bearers of Western ideas (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006).

The emancipatory project drafted by the Aberystwyth School improved the critical thought about the security drama, however its emphases continued to show that the West was still the most powerful (the most prominently Self) who had the 'right' to claim for the logic of intervention and security. One should take as an example the harmful results of the Western-led intervention in Libya in 2011, when the discourse upon the emancipation of the people against the oppressive regime of Muammar Al-Qaddafi culminated in a more insecure state. By all means, it is no accident that the legacy of this intervention still affects Europe[16].

16 The intervention in Libya is an example that acts of emancipation undertaken by non-Westerners represent what Gozzi calls as "a pass allowing the Western powers to impose their values and interests on the weaker states" (2017, p. 197). The Western support (including the academic) on acts of emancipation in Libya served to achieve geopolitical interests than setting the country free from barbarism.

Nik Hynek and David Chandler also observe that “for many leading critical security scholars, work with leading Western powers and international institutions was the emancipatory way forward” (2013, p. 51). In addition, they remind that “the Aberystwyth School stalwart Nicholas Wheeler – famous for developing studies on theories of human solidarity – has firmly supported the policy-making for the R2P doctrine” (2013, p. 51). In this line of thought, Hynek and Chandler come into the conclusion that “there were few critical security academics who did not participate in policy advocacy of Western countries” (2013, p. 51). Wheeler, for example, helped to build up the foreign policy guidelines of the British Labor Party.

Interestingly, Wheeler’s solidarist theory of legitimating humanitarian intervention dives into English School perspectives in order to introduce a committed solidarism within the critical scholarship that would follow a minimum standard of common humanity. As Nicholas Wheeler argues, “solidarism is committed to upholding minimum standards of a ‘common humanity,’ placing the victims of human rights abuses at the center of any theoretical project” (2000, p. 38). Solidarism means, for Wheeler, to be “(…) committed to exploring how sovereign states and civil society might become more hospitable to the promotion of justice” (2000, p. 38). In effect, there is nothing wrong about Wheeler’s statement. I even agree with his notion of exploring how performers and audience might become more hospitable. But I also acknowledge that discourses of solidarism could easily be usurped by the powerful leading roles while playing the security drama.

In exploring the standards of a ‘common humanity’ provided by the solidarist idea, leading roles can take advantage of this to move forward with their securitizing aspirations under humanitarian credentials. What is problematic about discourses of solidarism is the location of agency. Rather than working on new mechanisms that would make the Western audience play an important role in the counter-hegemonic struggle, discourses of solidarism are focused on practices attached to a security language exclusively conducted on the stage. Through this angle, I might also agree with Stephen Walt’s argument, when he says that “while useful, none of the broad critiques of the (neo)realist perspectives on (in)security had delivered a fatal blow” (2010, p. 10). In Walt’s interpretation, “this is itself not surprising, because wars continue to occur and security competition still persists” (2010, p. 10). The claims for emancipation continued to locate agency on the stage.

The second generation, however, has sought to provide arguments not solely about emancipation, but also about discourse and identity issues. For Hynek and Chandler, "the boom in critical security studies was extended by the attempt to include other approaches" (2013, p. 52). While the first generation of CSS had paved the way by being what Hynek and Chandler call as "(…) parasitical on its relationship to policy-making, other non-traditional scholars have gravitated to the security area in the attempting to expand CSS through the critique of their assumptions" (2013, p. 52). Waever, Buzan and de Wilde expanded critical security studies by improving the perspectives of emancipation through desecuritizing contributions based on the role played by the audience in the political theater of IR.

The desecuritizing debate gave rise to greater nuance to the constructivist idea that securitization is a not objective condition, but rather an interesting outcome of a particular social process. The debate was intended to grow out of a critique of the (neo)realist emphasis on state security (Fierke, 2010). In this reading, Hynek and Chandler come into the conclusion that "(…) the successes of the policy-making assumptions provided by the Aberystwyth opened the door to a boom in security studies" (2013, p. 52). In their argument, "this was supported by the view that the understanding of the Western aspirations of 'emancipating' the Other should be deconstructed, or form the basis for taking the argument further" (2013, p. 52). Thus, Hynek and Chandler summarize that "these critics joined a fray, building CSS as a vibrant study area" (2013, p. 52). Given the theoretical problems of emancipation, the Copenhagen School broadened scope on studying securitization, framed as non-traditional security and ultimately becoming the byword for CSS.

For the second generation, security reveals to be a speech-act that begins with the perspective that saying something is doing something (Fierke, 2010). Caballero-Anthony and Ralf Emmers point out that "this process is only successful once the securitizing actor succeeds in using the language of security in order to convince the audience" (in Adiong, 2009, p. 7). In expanding the critical security thought by exploring the analyses of threat construction, the Copenhagen School promotes the 'bridge-building' with the first generation through a new kind of emancipation that should be encouraged within the multiple publics and that could be followed by activism, debates, demonstrations and art education, transferring agency to the auditorium, so the receptive mode of the audience can be broken.

The theorists of the Copenhagen School believe that discourses of threat are a constitutive measure of the object to be secured. They assume that identities, whether these are of states or societies, enact by relationships of affinity or enmity, also by including the relations among states. The separation between threat and object allows the rationalist scholarship to treat the object as a pre-given rational actor that bears a fixed bundle of self-preserving interests, and to derive a constellation of threats from this, prior to social interaction (Krause, 1998). Claiming that security is a speech-act, however, the Copenhagen School theorized the importance of emotion, passion, faith and feelings. Knowing that emotions play a substantial role in the enactment of identities, the theorizing of security according to emotional states does not means neglecting rationality, but explaining that rationality assumptions are intentionally employed in the dramaturgical language of security.

Islamic leaders of radical fringes, for instance, used networked technologies to speak according to a discourse of faith and dreams. If actions can be mobilized by divine, rather than worldly, communities, and if dreams can be an indication of attacks, the ontological, political and epistemological domain of security studies should be dramatically reconfigured (Hansen, 2010). For this reason that Ole Waever embraces the notion that "security is a concept with a history and connotations that cannot be escaped" (in Fierke, 2010, p. 7). Broadening the concept of security theorizing the importance of emotional states in the audience raises what Waever calls "(…) an unanswerable question of where to stop that is, securitization potentially relates to everything that is potentially threatened" (Idem, 2010, p. 7). In his analysis, "the alternatives are to examine how security is used, how to investigate it as a field of discursive practices, and how it typically works" (Idem, 2010, p. 7).

Through this angle, recognizing that securitization is reliant to the construction of existential threats and dangers from particular objects (or from the perception of targets), one might observe that performers end up using the necessary means to obstruct the threats they have created. Properly speaking, there is nothing in this analysis but a (neo)realist reading focused on state-centered solutions. This best represents how the conception of international security operates pursuant to a state-centric perspective. As firmly suggested by Ole Waever, "the alternative to denaturalizing related discourses of security is to take a (neo)realist concept more seriously and to examine its dynamics" (in Fierke, 2010, p. 7).

The Copenhagen School defines threats as a process of construction followed by emergency responses (particularly interventionary practices) and a discontinuation of normal politics on the political stage. Therefore, by deconstructing the Otherness of enemies or subordinates, the Copenhagen School emphasized the power inherent in construction of knowledge based on difference. Its critique is mostly based on the Foucauldian idea that discourses and practices are not only comprised by linguistic expressions, or to be judged in terms of the accuracy of representation, but also generates modes of power and exclusion (Fierke, 2010). In this line of thought, the Copenhagen School is closely associated with the Paris School, which could be considered the third generation of critical security studies. Due to its close proximity with Foucault, the Copenhagen School makes an important connection between Aberystwyth and Paris by either improving the practice of emancipation through desecuritization and using Foucault in its theoretical framework.

Foucault defines history, for instance, as produced by practices of exclusions in accordance with a master narrative. As previously observed, this concept shows how diplomacy and security institutions are not given responses to objective threats and conditions, but forming understandings of the Self and Other (Hansen, 2010). By employing this Foucauldian optic, the Copenhagen and Paris School reconfigured the critical security studies, whereby humanitarianism, under a constitutive discourse of human security, came to be considered a practice aimed at constructing meaning and order. What is important for this study, however, is that the Western humanitarian scenes could now be seen as a political spectacle/drama involved by discourses, conceptions and doctrines that ordered objects and targets.

Simply put, for the Paris School, the purpose of security analysis is to unravel the existing security/political dynamics responsible for the insecuritization of the Other. The theorists of the Paris School seek to achieve this unraveling process, by the application of a Foucauldian lens, which they believe enables them to go beyond discourses and reach the deeper technologies at play in the securitization process (Floyd, 2006). With the help of Copenhagen and Paris, we note that choices are constantly made to legitimate extraordinary measures that rely upon and reproduce some particular positions, such as the good and evil, and threatened and threatening. Consequently, the degradation of the so-called ‘politics of insecurity’ suggested by Jef Huysmans is catalyzed on the stage where the drama is performed.

The constraints imposed by the IR traditional approaches of thought limited the audience's grasp of the political theater. Because of that, our conception of security must change to meet new challenges. This new conception comes to assume that the choice that issues and problems fall under the label and sub-labels of security is a political one; and that the main goal is to contest the definition of what counts as a security threat or danger to the nation-state (Krause, 1998). By only focusing on the consequences of war, traditional approaches did not explore conditions of local emancipation. Yet, the three schools of CSS share the speech-act theory to observe discourses as types of action causing humanitarian scenes.

Ken Booth alleges that "thinking about security in relation to speech-act theory is helpful" (2007, p. 108). Booth also acknowledges that "Waever's view that to name security also means to give what is proposed the particular significance attached to dealing with existential threats and extraordinary measures" (2007, p. 108). For him, "Waever was quite right in recognizing that, in order to name something, security means to give it a particular political significance: by saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)" (2007, p. 108). Booth observes that "(…) speech-acts are more than verbal communication; they are equivalent to actions. Indeed, the word 'security' in the political discourses signifies priority" (2007, p. 108). By way of illustration, when a president of a sovereign country publicly announces that 'a crime is our biggest national security issue,' Booth argues that "(…) this means that dealing with a crime was identified as an issue that must be given priority, so time, energy, and resources must follow" (2007, p. 108).

All this considered, the framing of a particular issue as a security one could be established in the attempt to convince the audience to invoke such an issue above politics. CSS describes this process as the power of the speech-act, in the way that words do not only explain a positioned reality, but also constitute the reality itself. Within this process, most of the multiple publics perform a single role: that of being receptive. The audience as whole does not grasp that perceptions of threats are not predetermined, pre-given, and that they neither exist by nature. Thus, what most of multiple publics should realize is that threats are crucial elements of the politics of insecurity, and that they are constructed by a language of security aimed at drawing attention to a possible way to safeguard performers' interests by convincing the audience that extraordinary measures are necessary.

4.1. Knowing its role in the drama

As one may already observe, performers are able to frame a particular issue as an existential threat in attempting to convince the audience to invoke this issue above politics. This is what securitizing moves adopted by the performers on the stage are about. These moves are best understood as a set of what Thierry Balzacq calls as "interrelated practices, processes of their production, diffusion, and translation that bring threats into being" (2011, p. 3). All of this comes together in three levels of securitization. The first level consists of an issue being raised up from the non-politicized to the politicized realm. At this moment, speech-acts are in charge of presenting the issue as an existential threat.

Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert pointed out that "this first level is heavily influenced by linguistics, and specially the concept of speech-acts, i.e., the discourses that do not 'report things,' but rather 'do things'" (2011, p. 57). Linguistics play an influential role as the leading roles intend to announce that extraordinary measures should be taken to defeat a created enemy and preserve their own forms of existence. Simply put, the first level of securitization aims to convince the listeners that the speakers have the duty to maintain order, preserve survival and protect their own identities from the established threats. After using linguistics to, as Thierry Balzacq argues, "(…) prompt their audience to constitute a coherent network of implications (such as feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) regarding the critical vulnerability of a referent object," (2011, p. 2) the performers are able to reach the second level: when the issue is accepted as a real threat.

At this point, a 'securitized spectrum' is taken for granted as the audience gives the carte blanche to government action. As a result, militarization and violence are now justifiable and could be undertaken in the name of security. Furthermore, as it is explored in the next chapters of the study, humanitarian issues (such as forced migration) could also be accepted by the audience as something threatening in this second level. Under such circumstances, and by moving humanitarian issues to a 'securitized spectrum,' Ole Waever contends that "securitizing actors are capable of achieving some effects in their national boundaries" 1995, p. 80). He takes as an example "the acts of discrimination and repression against minorities, different from those that they would ensue if handled in a non-security mode" (1995, p. 80). When these acts occur, securitization is successfully achieved.

In the third and last level, securitization enables a sort of culture of impunity in and outside the political theater. As the suspension of normal politics takes place, exceptional and extraordinary measures allowing the use of force become customary facets of the drama. The audience seems to gradually lose its power to change the course of the drama because the securitized issue has already reached the maximum level, that of high politics. At this point, Thierry Balzacq is convinced that “the narratives which the regime of truth is authorized, along with the characters who are empowered to speak and the relationship between performers and audience are established” (2011, p. 8). Facing this scenario, I believe that it is incumbent upon the multiple publics in the audience to take a difficult but smart decision: to back off the security claims of the leading roles on the political stage.

For instance, this decision was not taken in the war on terror, when extraordinary measures under the ‘securitized spectrum’ were authorized. The use of torture (particularly in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp) and increased surveillance of citizens were kind of accepted by enough of the audience, with their use being legitimated even beyond the American territory. But imagine if the war against terrorism would not be framed by such a securitized spectrum? These extraordinary measures and exceptional practices would never be accepted by the audience. More recently, the threatening character of the Islamic State, for example, became a high priority for the Western security agenda. As occurred in the war on terror, the Islamic State issue was lifted above politics, braking the normal democratic processes in Western countries, specially in Europe and in the USA, where repressive border controls were taken as the only way to remove the threat.

The grammar of the security speech-act is discernible. The speech points to the existentially threatening nature of the created Other, a point of no return, a solution which breaks free the normal politics. When arguing that the Islamic State is securitized, critical theorists do not challenge the existence of the group, or that the group has indeed coordinated attacks in Europe. Instead, they put into question the processes by which this group has come to be viewed as a threat and argue that by naming the group a threat, the states are also implicated in the making of war. Describing the threat of the Islamic State group should be viewed as a political act (Eroukhmanoff, 2017). The only solution to deal with the Islamic State’s threatening nature was lifting this issue above politics by increasing border controls.

After the terrorists attacks committed by members of the Islamic State in France, Belgium, Germany, UK and Spain[17], political leaders have declared war against this group, saying that the Islamic State threatens the world as a whole, and that its destruction is a duty for the international community. In this matter, a more critical approach alleges that states may frame their claims for justice in terms of the international, but these should be deemed as expressions of national sentiment rather than a truly international one. There is no such thing as the international writ large; merely a constellation of states each endeavoring to give their image of international order a foundation in the actual (Moore, 2013). This idea gives rise to critical understandings about what is considered international.

Some critical authors who stand between the first and second generation, such as Andrew Linklater, claim for an "(…) international comprised by new discourses of emotions that would alleviate distant suffering" (2007, p. 161). The problem is that discourses of emotions to relief distant suffering outside the theater presume interventionary practices undertaken by a Western-led international community. Such practices have already proved unable to effectively cease (or alleviate) suffering in troubled regions of the world, particularly in Africa and Middle East. Thus, my suggestion concerning this assumption is that Western audiences should firstly overcome the humanitarian challenges within their own national boundaries and surrounding zones. Simply put, as long as the audience remains impassive when it comes to pressuring the performers to back off their securitizing moves that are responsible for the exacerbation of human suffering right in the front doors of the theater, the claim for a new international riddled with discourses of emotions able to alleviate distant suffering would most likely not come to triumph.

Carrying out this idea, I believe that multiple publics in the Western audience should pursue local emancipative values in ways that they would foster a more inclusive relationship with the performers through desecuritizing contributions. That is, the 'international' could only prevail if the 'national' tackles the securitized issues by overcoming the violent forms of repression against minorities – the victims of the humanitarian scenes, the ones who cannot be listened. This could only occur if high levels of public support for desecuritization are taken for granted.

17 Among these attacks are: the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015, the Brussels bombings in 2016, the Berlin attack in 2016, the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017, and the Barcelona attack in 2017.

In the auditorium of the political theater, the Western audience still finds itself in a receptive mode in relation to the discourses coming from the stage. When the humanitarian scenes are played, performers focus on discourses of featuring the Othering exceptionally. As a result, in accepting what is spoken on the stage, the Western audience validates the white man's burden, manifested itself through securitizing moves and extraordinary measures. The people in the audience are convinced to believe that it is the duty of the West to bear arms and preserve the structures of the world order. This burden has always been the primary and most important justification of imperialism in all its forms. This is most likely about civilizing the barbarians (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006).

Given that the discourse of humanitarianism presupposes a range of political subjectivities that derive from both structure of the world system and self-understandings of guilt, innocence, duty and responsibility within a supposedly international ethics, those who defend humanitarianism through law interestingly assume that law is the most appropriate way to confer humanitarian responsibility (Moore, 2013) on their civilizing mission in and outside the theater. Meanwhile, the Western multiple publics are convinced that their only role in the security drama is reduced to those of 'listening,' 'agreeing' and, most importantly, 'not judging.' The critical expressions and counter-arguments that could somehow misappropriate the power of voice of the performers and empower the voiceless are not taken into consideration. The spectators must understand, thereby, that an audience voicing the preference for desecuritization (a return to normal politics) will no longer be at the mercy of the performers. For this to happen, we should realize that our role in the security drama is not reduced to a listening mode.

The key movement of this emancipatory project is promoting open debates and expressions aimed at establishing a more dialogic community. So the role of the audience moves from objectively analyzing the threats towards the study of the processes which securitizing actors construct a shared understanding of what is collectively recognized as a threat. The society does not need to be involved with answering why a humanitarian issue was securitized. On the contrary, it is more important that we be concerned with the conditions that made the securitization possible, asking how questions: how has a specific language enabled the actor to convince the audiences of the threat? (Eroukhmanoff, 2017).

It is also important to comprehend that securitizing moves could eventually be undermined if enough of the audience decided to take other choices based on open dialogues and collective actions. In order to understand its role in the drama, the audience must, first and foremost, become well aware of the problems that capture attention of decision-makers. Developing three models for a policy to emerge, John Kingdom makes a clear distinction between a condition and a problem. In accordance with Kingdom, "bad weather, illness and poverty, for example, are conditions, not political problems; and they only become political problems once decision-makers perceive them as such and come to believe that they should be tackled" (in Léonard & Kaunert, 2011, p. 65). Kingdom considers this model as 'problem stream,' and it is extremely reliant to the existence of prominent and emblematic events or dramatic crises to emerge followed by a linguistic frame.

This first model of public policy decision making drawn by Kingdom creates the momentum to place an issue on the policy agenda, which makes it possible for the performer to reach the first level of securitization, when the issue moves from a non-politicized realm to a politicized one. Some discussions are premature and a few of them arise at just the right time for discussion to lead to action. For instance, the President (and members of Congress) might offer items for the security agenda, and they, together with congressional staff, the conventional media, lobbyists, private organizations and some members of the public, can supply other items or alternative ways of accomplishing any such item (Larkin, 2012).

What is problematic is that the problems that should be dealt with by policy-makers within the normal haggling of politics will tend to suddenly stream as issues of high politics rather than appear in sequential stages. This model can be seen as a complex changing able to offer contradictory responses to streams of problems. Consequent political responses shape and modify policy in response to streams of events. New problems often occur as policy is being implemented, hence resulting in the modifications of political responses (Denney, 2019). In addition to this, Kingdom appoints the possibility for the advent of a second model: the 'policy stream.' Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert contend that "in this model, policy alternatives are generated even in the absence of a policy problem" (2011, p. 66). As they indicate, "even when no issue is identified as a problem (or securitized, in the case of the securitization process), policy alternatives are being prepared" (2011, p. 66).

This second model could be best described as an ‘organized anarchy,’ where the knowledge of how and why particular issues make their way to the top of the public policy agenda – going from being a possibility to the actuality of the government’s chosen solution to a problem – remains in a ‘black box’ (Larkin, 2012). Perhaps the only way to promote shifts in this ‘organized anarchy’ is by developing creative expressions that claim for a less securitized dealing of the issue in question. These expressions are described in the last three chapters of the study, and they must be undertaken by a vast majority of the spectators in the audience; otherwise, they will continue to be insufficient as they ‘flow away into the river.’

In attempting to promote shifts in the ‘organized anarchy’ provided by the model of ‘policy stream,’ Ole Waever contends that “the audience should talk of a situation characterized by security means with counter-measures that are felt to be available” (1998, p. 81). Therefore, if we wish one day to avoid a policy to stream, we should convince our fellow spectators to be concerned with what Waever defines “the impossibility of imagining violence, then taking the situation out of the realm of security conceptualization” (1998, p. 81). While performers create possibilities to legitimate violence, the multiple publics should be more focused on creative expressions, on the possibilities to create an inclusive and equal relationship with the performers. In addition to this, the audience must pay attention to the third model of policy decision making called by Kingdom as ‘politics stream.’

For Léonard and Kaunert, “while persuasion is the activity characteristic of ‘policy stream,’ bargaining is the one of ‘politics stream’ because it incorporates building winning coalitions by the granting of concessions” (2011, p. 67). They point out that “(…) the coalition building achieves a sort of bandwagon effect, as long as more decision-makers want to be part of it” (2011, p. 67). It is up us, therefore, to be well aware of the fact that members of the audience (including the policy experts in the academy) and performers (such as legislators, politicians and economic elite) might easily join forces and constitute coalitions that share a common interest in securitization. Being aware of the coalitions can be the cornerstone to a successful desecuritizing move. Lasswell and Kaplan highlight that “the audience’s level of intensity is the strength of the tendency towards completion of collective actions projected or initiated” (2014, p. 7). In this manner, the higher the intensity of the audience, the larger is the share of energies for desecuritization.

Levels of intensity depend on levels of participation of the spectators in the political life, specially when models of policy public decision makings are taking shape within government circles. Given that the 'organized anarchy' on the stage can be broken through higher levels of participation, it is required for the audience to identify the problems being securitized and the coalition buildings. When the problems are not identified at time, with the level of intensity and popular participation of multiple publics in the political life remaining low, the performers and coalitions on the stage will find themselves in a better position to choose whatever solution to humanitarian problems, so decisions about securitization remain in a 'black box.'

As a consequence, the audience does not only accept an issue being lifted to high politics but also remains receptive, and the course of the drama continues to be characterized by repression and exclusion. Due to the low levels of intensity and participation of the audience, the actions and practices of the leading roles playing humanitarian scenes get into a repetition mode. The leading roles happen to play nothing more than spectacles marked by paternalistic characters and self-preserving attitudes. In scenarios where the leading roles are not to be challenged, criticized or judged by the audience, the theater will continue to be marked by a manipulative relationship between the leading roles and audience. Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert take as an example "(…) the lower level of intensity of the audience when models of policy public decision making defined the flows of asylum-seekers into Britain as security threats in 2003" (2011, p. 70).

In this particular case, Léonard and Kaunert come to indicate that "(…) the interpretation and representation of asylum-seekers as security threats was then put forward by the Prime Minister Tony Blair and accepted by all the political elites, including beyond the Labor Party" (2011, p. 70). They also remind that "this problem received the support of both the specialists and technocrats working with asylum matters in the British government circles" (2011, p. 70). As a result, Léonard and Kaunert conclude that "(…) the audience agreed to the problem in the policy stream" (2011, p. 70). Then, the British citizens proved of little relevance in policy-making process of a crucial humanitarian issue. They did not grasp that, as Thierry Balzacq says, "states strive to convince the audience because they need to maintain a social relationship with the target group" (2005, p. 185). Knowing its place in the drama means for the audience to examine this procedure.

4.2. Claiming for the return of normal politics

As Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde contend, "the senses of threat, vulnerability and security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent" (1998, p. 57). More importantly, threats seen as relevant are those that, as Waever highlights, "(...) affect the 'self-determination' and 'sovereignty' of the unit. Survival might sound overly dramatic, but it is the survival of the unit as a basic political unit that is the ultimate key" (1995, p. 50). While developing paternalistic characters and self-preserving attitudes through the use of performative capacities, leading roles can overly dramatize their survival in security discourses. Knowing that these characters, attitudes and capacities can determine senses and notions of threat, along with vulnerability and security within the theater, it is important for us to be engaged in claiming for a more democratic dealing of humanitarian issues by the governments through a less securitized narrative.

Politicizing an issue means doing two things: first, to claim that an issue is of significance for the audience in question, consequently making this issue a subject of debate and contestation. Second, once politics has a double status of referring to a political, public sphere of engagement, and of a meta-level of moves and choices, the second thing is making strategical choices between the politicized and securitized (Hansen, 2012). What is required for the audience, then, is to understand that performers might be able to make strategical choices for the intensification of an existential threat beyond the realm of normal politics.

As argued by Ole Waever, "a definition of a security problem is something that can undercut the political order within a state and transform the premises for all other questions" (1995, p. 50). In this reading, Anthony Burke takes as an example the moment "(…) when Bush, during his 2004 State of the Union address, defended the decision to invade and occupy Iraq by stating that 'America will never seek a permission slip to defend its security'" (2007, p. 4). In saying so, Bush did not only challenge, according to Burke, "(...) the legal and normative frameworks of the UN Charter and legal instruments of human rights law, but also asserted a privilege and priority of sovereignty highly familiar to many political realists" (2007, p. 4). As a result, the terrorist threat was moved from a politicized to a securitized realm in an appropriate time for Bush to mobilize the feelings of the audience.

Thierry Balzacq offers an analysis concerning the social aspect of securitization that takes into consideration "(…) the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and the power that speakers and listeners bring to the interaction" (in Salter, 2008, p. 326). Balzacq alleges that "the outcome lies with the securitizing actor's choice of determining appropriate times which the recognition – including the integration of imprinting a threat – is facilitated" (Idem, 2008, p. 326). For Balzacq, "this demonstrates that choices and decisions are constrained by history, memory, and discursive tropes" (Idem, 2008, p. 326). Beyond this social aspect of securitization, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde remind that "though in one sense securitization is the intensification of politicization, in another sense it is the opposite of politicization" (1998, p. 29). In their interpretation about these processes, "politicization means to make an issue appears to be open, a matter of choice" (1998, p. 29). However, securitization means for them "(...) to introduce an issue as existential, something important that should never be exposed to the normal haggling of politics, but rather dealt by top leaders prior to other issues" (1998, p. 29).

For Buzan and Hansen, "acknowledging that security has particular discursive and political forces, and it is a concept that does something – securitize – rather than an object, securitization refers to the process of presenting an issue in security terms" (2009, p. 213). In this manner, when performers speak the security language on the stage, an emphasis on authority is implied. This emphasis on authority comes to be referred by Buzan and Hansen as "(…) the confronting and construction of threats, an extraordinary ability to make choices, decisions and the adoption of emergency measures" (2009, p. 214). As one can already expect, such an emphasis on authority also comes to form the foundation of national security.

In Buzan, Waever and de Wilde's opinion, national security should not be idealized. They believe that "national security works to silence opposition and it gives power holders opportunities to exploit threats for domestic purposes, claiming the right to handle something with less democratic control and constraint" (1998, p. 29). They contend that "security should be seen as something negative, a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Politics should be able to unfold accordingly routine procedures, and without the elevation of specific threats to a prepolitical immediacy" (1998, p. 29). In short, securitization is negative because it inhibits the audience to participate as a counterweight of the issues discussed on the stage.

When a ‘securitized spectrum’ is taken for granted by the leading roles on the stage, counter-measures aimed at claiming for a regression to normal politics should be adopted through collective actions undertaken by the spectators of the audience. According to Mark Salter’s view, “the audience is determinative of the form of a securitizing move. By viewing a securitizing move as a kind of performance, the audience can see the importance of front and backstage” (2008, p. 326). Thereby, acknowledging that we can engage ourselves in a more activist role in the security drama, staying aware of the performative capacities and coalitions buildings in the political stage, we might figure out that, as well observed by Salter, “security actors might speak in one way among themselves, however they might use other ways to conform the expectations of a popular audience” (2008, p. 326).

We should also note that coalitions buildings and private-public partnerships are not results of the promotion of human rights and democracy. Once again, take as an example the 2003 Iraq invasion. An analysis drafted by the journalist Anna Fifield revealed that both American and foreign companies have profited from the Iraq invasion, with the ‘top ten’ contractors securing business worth at least seventy-two billion dollars between them. Fifield explains that the USA government has overwhelmingly borne the brunt of both the military and reconstruction costs by spending one-hundred-thirty-eight billion dollars on private security, logistics and reconstruction contractors, who have supplied everything from diplomatic security power plants and toilet paper[18] (Fifield, 2013).

Several counter-arguments have found resonance within multiple publics in the audience criticizing the double standards by the USA government and private companies, which referred to the way that the Western governments stood for the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights, however in many cases these values were not upheld, mainly in those cases where they were overridden by material interests (Frost, 2009). Properly speaking, while making profit from war, coalitions and private-public partnerships conformed the audience through empty justifications of human rights and democratic values.

---

18 Fifield also wrote that the controversial former subsidiary of Halliburton, which was once run by Richard (Dick) Cheney, vice-president to George W. Bush, was awarded at least forty billion dollars in federal contracts related to the Iraq war over the past decade. During the invasion, there were more contractors than military personnel on the ground. With the war in Iraq over and the conflict in Afghanistan winding down, these private companies remain (Fifield, 2013).

In order to claim for a regression to normal politics, the audience should note that coalitions buildings and partnerships do not stand for democracy and human rights, although they say so. Little is spoken about the fact that whereas advocating the excessive use of force to overthrow regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of security, for the survival of the unit and promotion of democracy and human rights, Western performers supported the repressive and undemocratic practices of Israel committed against the Palestinian peoples. Double standards like this are customary practices in the drama. What is problematic about these practices is that they are not considered a matter of contestation by the audience at a macro level. It turns out that these practices should be the reason for enough of the spectators in the audience to adopt a critical engagement in joining the ongoing conversations, expressions, and demonstrations against traditional security practices.

Mark Salter convincingly reminds us that "there is a consensus among IR critical scholars that the amount of social life which is governed by security claims and discourses has increased since 2001" (2008, p. 330). As an example, Anthony Burke also reminds us the case "when Richard (Dick) Cheney was asked by a journalist regarding the human toll of the Operation Enduring Freedom[19]" (2007, p. 148). In Burke's words, "Richard Cheney has replied this question saying that 'any loss of innocent life is to be regretted, but consider how this started, with thousands of American citizens being murdered on September 11" (2007, p. 148). Burke concludes that "(…) the White House felt that it was justified what they had to do. This was the invocation of self-defense as justification with emotive arguments. This means that actions are justifiable in the resulting state of emergency" (2007, p. 148).

Securitizing the war against terrorism meant a 'free pass' for killing thousands of innocent people outside the theater without any responsibility in terms of the law. Meanwhile, the audience never asks whether, as Waever suggests, "a phenomenon should be treated in terms of security, insofar as they do not look into securityness as such, asking what is particular to security modes of dealing with particular issues" (1995, p. 53). In Waever's view, "security and insecurity are not binary opposites: security is marked by a problem and measures taken in response, while insecurity manifests a situation with a security problem and no response" (1995, p. 53).

19 Official name used by the USA government for the war in Afghanistan. In 2014, Barack Obama announced the end of this operation.

Yet in this reading, Ole Waever comes to add that “as soon as a more nominalist approach is adapted, the absurdity of working toward maximizing and prioritizing security becomes more clear” (1995, p. 53). In this regard, the ‘anti-climax’ of the drama means for the audience minimizing security, that is to say, not casting the performers as the single guardians of values for the resolution of the central global challenges within the political theater. If we cast them as the guardians, they will continue to deal with challenges (e.g., migration, conflicts, terrorism and the like) by labeling them with security-related terms. Then, these challenges will prematurely be moved beyond the normal haggling of politics and depicted as threats.

Pursuant to Mark Salter, “the audience retains the statist view of securitization, with powerful states identifying an existential threat that requires emergency executive powers” (2008, p. 321). Prioritized issues are depoliticized and labeled by security-related concepts and ideas, moving beyond the rules of normal politics. About this matter, Mark Salter comes out again to expose the fact that “the statist model of securitization does not match the complexity of contemporary social dynamics of security to the extent that non-state actors find themselves locked into this model” (2008, p. 324). Considering that the drama goes beyond the power dynamics on the stage of the theater, I truly believe that choices and decisions about what securitize should not be limited only to the leading roles.

As long as most of the audience continue to cast the leading roles as the single guardians of values and principles for the resolution of the problems, the collective actions aimed at minimizing security will probably lose their emancipatory locus. Furthermore, if important issues surrounding humanitarian scenes continued to be prematurely labeled as security problems, a rhetorical narrative about what or who threatens, or the whom to be secured is reproduced. In Ole Waever’s argument, “the security’s problematique itself locks multiple publics into talking in terms of securitization, thereby reinforcing the hold of security on their everyday lives and thinking, even when their approach is a reflexive/critical one” (1995, p. 53). In Waever’s line of thought, “the society does not find much efforts aimed at desecuritizing politics, in which would be more effective and less destructive than securitizing issues” (1995, p. 53). He says that “this is because people do not ask themselves whether they would be able to make some efforts to keep humanitarian issues/problems off the security agenda” (1995, p. 53).

Most of the spectators in the audience still do not recognize that, as summarized by Mark Salter, “securitization is not an instantaneous or irrevocable act.” For Salter, “securitization is an issue-dependent rather than static, thus reflecting the complex constitution of social and political communities” (2008, p. 324). As Thierry Balzacq explains, “securitization presupposes intersubjectivity, context, and practices. It is a structure reliant to the centrality of the audience, the co-dependency of agency and context, and the structuring force of practices” (2011, p. 8). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, for example, are convinced that “a major part of our attempt to engage with securitization comes to be pointed to likely effects on interactions with other units” (1998, p. 206). They believe that “if we securitize this way, we will create fears in B, and in the end we will face a new security dilemma” (1998, p. 206).

On the other hand, desecuritization means to leave the issue to other procedures. According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s words, “it is possible to participate in debates over the likely events if the issue is left desecuritized” (1998, p. 206). This essentially means “(…) not to close this debate by giving a scientific measurement about whether the issue constitutes an existential threat that would demand a deterministic social universe” (1998, p. 206). To complement this assumption, Ole Waever makes clear that “desecuritizing moves are better for the improvement of democracy, as fewer issues will be dealt with in the secrecy, unaccountability, and under the auspices of emergency politics” (in Roe, 2004, p. 283).

In simple terms, in a democratic environment it is easier for multiple publics in the audience to claim for the transference of a problem out of the threat-defense sphere. Essentially, the process of moving a problem back into the ordinary public sphere implies that this issue is being re-politicized – that is, subjected to normal political processes (Zimmermann, 2017). In the ordinary public sphere of normal politics, emergency and exceptional measures that only serve self-centered interests of the performers are unusual. That is why it is important for the free societies living in democratic countries to acknowledge that contributions of desecuritization draw attention to the regression of normal politics. It falls to us, the Western audience, to know that the growth of securitizing moves would create a scenario of hyper-politicization, and the humanitarian scenes within the Western boundaries would no longer be subjected to normal political processes. This is the main goal that the ‘anti-climax’ of the security drama intends to achieve.

Mark Salter suggests that “desecuritization is politically preferable than keeping securitization as a standard procedure, inasmuch as deliberative politics are by definition more democratic than exceptional politics” (2008, p. 343). Therefore, questioning the policies of securitization is for the multiple publics the desirable measure to be taken to change the general consensus among the leading roles performing the drama. This could happen through collective actions at a macro level, with popular participation in desecuritizing moves. When the performers’ general consensus about securitization is to be challenged, the audience would be one step closer to a genuine public sphere marked by a dialogic community.

In this context it is highly suggested for the multiple publics to take into account desecuritization in order to play a more activist role in the theater. Simply put, if multiple publics acknowledged that securitization entails the “discontinuation” of normal politics (i.e. Copenhagen School), then enough of the audience would be capable of breaking free the general consensus about security issues through an emancipatory project (i.e. Aberystwyth School). This emancipatory project might be related to the Habermasian theory of communicative action because it claims for popular participation and collective actions carried out at a macro level in forms of counter-argumentation. If taken seriously by the audience, this project will be able to undermine the growth of securitization on the political stage, hence avoiding the establishment of hyper-politicization of humanitarian issues.

What is more, Paul Roe draws attention to the fact that, “for the transformation of securitized problems, there already exist a number of suggested desecuritizing strategies” (2004, p. 285). Focusing on the issue of migration, for instance, Roe explores three approaches. The first is the objectivist. For Roe, “security has an objective content against which subjective notions of threat will be either real or illusory” (2004, p. 285). Being objectivist means, for Roe, “(…) to try to convince society that migrant is not really a security problem” (2004, p. 285). He alleges that “scholars, theorists produce statistical information and other counter-arguments designed to prove, for example, that migrants will not take away jobs and they could contribute to the wealth of society” (2004, p. 285). The second approach is the constructivist. For Roe, “this strategy is not focused on determining if something is a threat or not. The goal of this approach is to acquire an understanding of how the processes of securitization operate” (2004, p. 286).

Paul Roe continues his argument saying that "the constructivist strategy consists of grasping the social construction of insecurity by asking how it is that the migrants become part of the spectacle" (2004, p. 286). This strategy builds itself on the connection between understanding and handling. The audience must understand the casual processes, so that it will be possible to handle the problem. Additionally, the third and last approach is the deconstructivist, which Roe presumes that "(…) securitization is not recounted from the outside looking in (constructivist), but rather from the inside looking out" (2004, p. 286). Yet in this reading, Jacques Derrida's linguistic philosophy of deconstruction sustains this approach, once it was also mobilized to show how the concept security depended on dichotomous distinctions between positive and negative terms. This offers the proper tools to develop the deconstructive strategy because meanings are not constituted by correspondence to a real world, but through systems of signs (Hansen, 2010).

In playing the drama, the performers act as what Jef Huysmans describes as "story-tellers, telling us a story in a particular way, contributing to the production and reproduction of the social world" (in Roe, 2004, p. 206). In Jef Huysmans' words, "telling a story is considered as actions 'inside' the world which helps to structure it. This strategy is, thereby, created on the principle that to tell a story is to handle the world" (Idem, 2004, p. 206). All this explored, these three approaches require a reinvigoration of the public sphere manifested, among other things, in the return of securitized problems to the normal politics. These three approaches also help me to write a more inclusive approach; a sort of 'anti-climax' and less securitized story riddled with collective actions and social expressions designed to deconstruct our perception of the theater and the scenes, more particularly.

When it comes to the migration issue, desecuritization is the telling of the story in a manner that is not the recounting of a drama. Desecuritization means for Roe, "(…) telling a story that the migrant is not just the migrant, but someone with multiple identities – woman, teacher, mechanic, father, etc" (2004, p. 286). This means to represent and depict the migrant, as convincingly suggested by Roe, "(…) as being someone who is just like us, just like the natives" (2004, p. 286). Consequently, this procedure requires a reconstitution of identities that facilitates change over time. Therefore, the process of desecuritization is one of shifting interrelatedness: it transforms who and what the Self and the Other are (Hansen, 2012).

What is more, the claiming for the return of a securitized issue to the normal politics means to turn this problem into a matter of choice and public debate between governments and societies. The idea of normal politics was loosely conceptualized in the original formulation by the Copenhagen School. It connotes the slow process of decision making and contestation, where decisions follow strict procedural rules of democratic politics (Aradau, 2004; Hegemann, 2018). The concept of normal politics opens up the political process, offering more opportunities for a broader range of multiple publics, arenas and arguments (Hegemann, 2018). In claiming for normal politics, desecuritization is performative, a sort of linguistic and political procedure carried out by multiple publics in the attempt to halt the language of emergency developed by governments and convince the rest of the population about the non-threatening identity of the Other (Hansen, 2012).

If security issues were (re)articulated by the normal haggling of politics, then the political theater could witness a reinvigorated public sphere underpinned by a more universal concept of citizenship. Developed by Andrew Linklater, a more universal concept of citizenship is, as Marcos Ferreira argues, "(…) refashioned through open dialogue among those affected by the global processes that are changing the world" (2017, p. 52). Marcos Ferreira asserts that "these processes are issues like non-state forms of violence (such as sexual violence and terrorism), forced migration, global climate change and resource depletion" (2017, p. 52). In addition to this, Waever advances the case of Denmark as an example of an issue being discussed within the normal haggling of politics in the public sphere. Waever says that "some television programs and other seminars on Danishness have correlated the acceptance of integration into the European Union" (1995, p. 61). In his analysis, "it was the future and form of a Danish non-state nation in public debate, and it was the cultural community that took the first approach to these new themes" (1995, p. 61).

For Ken Booth, for example, "this is a highly 'desirable situation': when people are emancipated, then what they freely choose to do is peaceful" (in Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 206) In his viewpoint, "when individuals are emancipated, a more organic political community will replace the state" (in Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 206-207). Conclusively, Waever also comes into argument that "(…) claiming for the normal politics means for the audience to acknowledge the emergence of revolution as something apart from the traditional state security" (1995, p. 61).

Within a reinvigorated public sphere, a higher level of popular participation in the political practice could contribute to rethinking humanitarian scenes, which is, according to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde's observation, "a different matter from an existential threat being considered a security problem" (1998, p. 40). However, the case of Denmark unfortunately remains an isolated one. When the political theater is analyzed as a whole, one can observe the escalating rhetoric of securitizing moves, which might eventually contain the seeds for multiple publics to cultivate effective counter-securitization moves, with the language of security threatening to become self-defeating (Zimmermann, 2017).

Drawing on Arendt and Morgenthau, Ole Waever calls instead for seeing the political situation as always unique and concrete, as a field of forces, a situation demanding a choice, a choice that has consequences. This accentuates the demand for personal responsibility, since politics is unpredictable and can never be reduced to meta-questions. With the absence of meta-answers, however, the audience has to make unfounded ethical and political choices in a world of unsolvable real-world security dilemmas (Hansen, 2012). For this to happen, it is also imperative for enough of the civilians in the society to make the political choices recognizing that knowledge concerning security and humanitarianism is not only located in the technocratic and executive realm of high politics (Hegemann, 2018).

This said, this sub-chapter also attempted to suggest that the claiming for a return to normal politics is a matter of dialogue akin to a Habermasian sense. Simply put, claiming for the return of a securitized problem to the normal haggling of politics according to a higher level of popular participation means to question the subject constructions that are on offer on the political stage. Debates over how the audience could dialogue with the performers and victims of the security drama presuppose a transformation underpinned by a cultural revolution that cannot be neglected. This means that, under any circumstances, all the actors of the drama must be listened regardless of their position, within or beyond the political theater.

4.3. Working with the activist media

After knowing that its role in the security drama is no more limited to remaining in a receptive mode, but rather it goes beyond this to claim for the return of securitized problems to the normal haggling of politics, the audience is also required to work together with the intermediate actors, such as the independent channels of communication. This is because most of the actual desecuritizing moves are often involved in non-conventional sorts of politics and carried out by members of independent channels in attempting to discuss the causes and consequences of securitization beyond the formal and traditional debates between politicians and/or academics. Through these intermediate actors, spectators in the audience can be engaged in collective forms of art and activism that question the meanings and constructions that have been offered by the performers.

Before exploring the role of what I call the intermediate actors in the processes of desecuritization, it is relevant to make reference to the approach defined by Jef Huysmans as the "'political aesthetics of everydayness,' in the way that security problems become contextualized within wider economic, social, as well as political practices" (in Roe, 2004, p. 287). In keeping with this approach, Paul Roe wonders whether "securitized problems are often recounted in such a way that their contexts become the normal problems that we, on the inside, must confront on a day-to-day-basis" (2004, p. 287). By making a connection between this approach and migration issues, Jef Huysmans alleges that "the political aesthetics of everydayness does not represent suburban riots in discourses that reify the internal enemy and relate the violence to the incivility of migrants" (in Roe, 2004, p. 287). For Huysmans, "these riots are understood in a complex story about the deterioration of life in suburbs as results of ghettoization, unemployment, etc" (Idem, 2004, p. 287).

For the aesthetics of everydayness, the label of 'illegal immigrant,' for example, does not only refer to a foreigner who is living without the legal permission to stay in a referent country, but also portrays this individual as lawless and criminal. The same happens when refugee camps are described as 'jungles' by the mainstream media, which is inadequate, once it portrays people living in these camps as savages. Also, when extreme right political parties say that migrants are terrorists, labeling an entire group to make the audience see the reality in a distorted way.

The political aesthetics of everydayness, which basically contextualizes complex problems as results of bad governance in a dystopian political theater, consists of making a deeper analysis of discourse and its labeling character. The aesthetics of everydayness suggests analyzing the multiple mechanisms that label migrants as internal enemies, violent, uncivilized, savages and terrorists. This analysis consist of acknowledging that these security labels serve one predetermined goal: establishing extraordinary measures in order to lift migration issues above politics. The audience should be aware of these labels set by governments in their dealings with minority groups. When security labels refer migrants as the internal enemies by closely associating them with urban violence, savagery and incivility, the most part of the audience will tend to deal with this issue in a defensive way. This occurs because security labels, such as 'violent,' 'illegal,' 'savages' and 'terrorists' remind threats, and they are obviously intertwined to insecurity and danger.

Ole Waever says that "to speak security does not means simply to talk in a higher-pitched voice" (1995, p. 66). In Waever's opinion, "security is a specific move that entails consequences offering an issue as a test case, becoming the name of the management problem" (1995, p. 66). Considering this assumption, and going to the opposite direction, the activist media seeks different backgrounds and approaches in order to support their emancipatory projects, such as that of the political aesthetics of everydayness drafted by Huysmans. As the internet began to consolidate itself as a powerful platform that changed the way societies communicate around the world, activist groups and social movements were able to construct a visual humanitarian discourse significantly different than that of securitization provides. In this line of thought, some of these groups are identified in the final section of this dissertation, when it is further explored desecuritizing contributions in the current humanitarian contexts in North America, Europe and Middle East.

In using independent channels of communication, civil society groups and social movements do not remain impassive when it comes to contesting the use of force undertaken by Western governments against minorities. Though at a micro level, the desecuritizing moves developed by these groups invite the Western audience to bear witness against the human suffering caused by securitization. Witnessing suffering demands a response from those who engage in it: they should participate, demonstrate or look closely, see, and remember (Chouliaraki, Orwicz & Greeley, 2019).

Desecuritization has also the objective of visualizing human suffering, and it is here considered the basis of what I call the emancipatory bond between the audience and activist media. The more people joining forces with the activist media, the more the audience will be able to look beyond individualism and materialism, thus placing a singular experience in a common interest: contributing for rethinking humanitarian scenes through a less securitized language. For this, a promoted sense of unity among audience and activist media must be taken for granted through open dialogues concerning the distinctions that shape human life, and the ties that bind different communities, identities and cultures together.

These open dialogues ought to address questions of representing human suffering according to artistic expressions and linguistic frameworks (by including a special grammar that helps the dialogues flow smoothly for the audience, so people could comfortably follow the story in line and empathizing with it). This is because representations of human suffering through artistic expressions and linguistic frameworks can prompt an increase of popular participation for contributions of desecuritization, hence making the spectators to reflect on what is to be expected of them to do against the securitization of humanitarian issues. In this way, intermediate actors can be potential sources for social interaction due to their representations of human suffering. In attempting to convince enough of the audience to take human suffering more seriously, they are able to bring into light a more critical perspective about the political theater and the Western humanitarian scenes.

Linguistic frameworks make clear what kind of a problem a problem is, what sort of tools are used for dealing with it, and which actors are protagonists and antagonists (Entman, 2004; Vultee, 2011). Securitization is a form of linguistic frame responsible for the construction of existential threats of particular problems. It is an organizing principle invoked by political actors, and crucially amplified or tamped down by the news media in an effort to channel the ways the problems are thought about (Vultee, 2011). Contrarily, the activist media intend to untangle this process, expressing an alternative perspective that aims to provide a change in public perceptions. Creating cultural and material conditions for what they believe will be a better society, the activist media also manage the linguistic frameworks, however turning them into another direction, using them to mobilize collective actions, so people could organize and work as active participants in social change (Lievrouw, 2011).

Addressing questions of representing suffering according to artistic expressions and linguistic frameworks is not that easy. A joint work between the audience and intermediate actors cannot desecuritize humanitarian issues only by saying that 'I hereby declare this issue to no longer be a threat,' as this would be invoking the language and logic of security. Desecuritization happens as a result of framings, however there is no, strictly speaking, a desecurity speech-act (Hansen, 2012). Moreover, Lilie Chouliaraki comes to define framings as "the moment of language" (2006, p. 177), that is, the dialogue about the securitized issue enacted through the discursive or artistic performances of the desecuritizing actors (audience and intermediate actors). Briefly speaking, framings also means the effort of the desecuritizing actors to interpret a securitized issue from within.

Framing is certainly concerned with artistic conventions, social landscapes, and questions of who is afforded which kinds of visibility in the activist media. In this process, the role of public memorization of victims of securitization must be investigated to ask what kinds of engagement are afforded by contemporary public spaces, public arts discourses as well as legal and political institutions (Chouliaraki, Orwicz & Greeley, 2019). In using framings in their moves against securitization, independent channels of communication often attempt to acquire higher levels of mobilization through public memorization. Nowadays, this objective depends on people's abilities to cultivate relationships, seek and give advice, make recommendations, and trust online. Thus, the main challenge for these independent channels of communication is to convince the audience to seek, find, and evaluate information beyond the mainstream media. Mass media are well suited to the presentation of consistent, repetitive messages to large, heterogeneous audiences, shaping broad-based popular opinion as well as fostering mass consumption and mobilizing mass political campaigns (Lievrouw, 2011).

As I appointed during the introduction, the mainstream media perform on the "backstage of the theater," and it helps the securitizing actors to get ready for the spectacle. In simple terms, the mainstream media represent the 'center of authority.' Their industrial routines of news tend to reinforce a bias toward the status-quo. Legitimated news, whether it comes from the Pentagon or the police department, is provided in regular places at regular times, in most of the cases by providers very familiar with the needs and norms of journalism (Vultee, 2011).

Once it selectively transmits the emergencies, situations, rituals and political myths evoked on the stage, the mainstream media little address the political aesthetics of everydayness. When the media address it, desecuritizing moves against humanitarian issues undertaken by civil society groups are not aired in prime-time. In order to encounter particular desecuritizing moves, such as the ones described in the final section, the spectator must be motivated to seek and find critical manifestations, counter-arguments and counter-measures in only a few independent channels of communication ruled by civil society groups. Therefore, in situations like these, in letting itself be shaped by repetitive messages released by the mainstream media, a spectator who is not emancipated might unfortunately be led to agree with a broad-based popular opinion. As a consequence, her (or his) level of intensity in popular participation against securitization will be close to zero.

The political aesthetics of everydayness does not simply refer to the discipline or domain of art. This approach is rather pointed to a specific mode of thought that is called upon in our engagements with representational objects. Aesthetics, in other words, refers to a special type of human judgment (Sliwinski, 2011). Aesthetics is focused on the question of agency. The same actors who accepted securitization can renegotiate the securitized issue in terms of desecuritization, pushing the issue back toward the domain of normal politics. In the same way that securitization does not require the consent of the entire audience, the aesthetics only requires the consent of enough of the audience (Vultee, 2011). This enough of the audience is called the 'critical mass,' the ones who are able to rely upon their feelings as the paramount authority. It could be anyone in the auditorium, as long as her (or his) opinion is no longer affected by what is often said on the stage.

The ones joining the 'critical mass' are called by Lilie Chouliaraki as "the reflexive spectators" (2006, p. 178). Reflexive identification is, according to Chouliaraki's argument, "(…) the capacity of the spectators to act as if they were in the scene of suffering and as if they were speaking out their perspectives on human suffering in public spaces" (2006, p. 178). A reflexive spectator is for her someone who "(…) combines the two proposals for action at a distance available in public space: 1) the theater, with its potential for engagement and identification; and 2) agora, with its potential for impartial deliberation and rational judgment" (2006, p. 179). To become reflexive, engagement and judgment are abilities to be acquired.

In short, the guiding principles of the political aesthetics of everydayness cannot be borrowed from any higher power, save the faculty of judging itself. Spectators encounter, for example, a particular object or an artistic expression, such as an illustration of a slave brutally beaten for refusing to dance. If the spectators develop feelings and sensations after encountering the illustration, a general evaluation is constituted: that of the idea presented in this picture causes me pain; the practice of slavery is inhuman (Sliwinski, 2011). In terms of a more critical reading about representations of human suffering, one may note that the activist media is the main actor in the theater that promotes artistic contributions aimed at shifting popular discourses about securitization of humanitarian issues. Properly speaking, the activist media do not merely provide us some independent channels for transmitting information, but also constitute an authentic, a practical field of collective action, whereby the 'critical mass' itself is created and played out by emancipated multiple publics and their comprising reflexive spectators.

Until today, the 'critical mass' comprised by reflexive spectators did not reach the macro level of popular participation. This is because spectators were called so far to empathize solely with positioned conceptions of Self, sharing the same threat and destiny. This was, for instance, the circumstance created in the 2000s, after the September 11. The post-September 11 reserved the spectators' capacity to, as Lilie Chouliaraki highlights, "(...) connect only for those who are like 'us,' while blocking this same capacity for the largest majority of human sufferings – like those who although are suffering close to 'us,' tend to be generally considered distant Others" (2006, p. 181). This shows us the importance of the mainstream media accounts in creating the picture of the 'world reality' that we see (Vultee, 2011).

Our empathetic identification to human suffering is limited to common feelings and fate. This is stimulated by leading roles and backstage helpers acting in pseudo-environments and capable of engaging the audience with regime of truths, hence making the spectators to empathize with their kin than with strangers, although sometimes what is spoken on the stage might include 'universal' claims of common humanity. Not surprisingly, the securitization of the war on terror reaps what the performers and mainstream media sowed. The humanitarian crises we are currently witnessing in the USA and Europe are consequences of what came after migration issues being framed as security problems under the label of terrorism.

The audience came to accept the war on terror and migration issues under the securitization umbrella, and because of that, now it finds itself in the necessity of pushing the issue back to normal politics. For this to happen, it is imperative for the multiple publics to work together at a macro level with the emancipated actors circulating within and beyond the limits of the political theater. These intermediate actors are the best alternative for the multiple publics in the audience to articulate demands for collective action, eventually inviting the rest of the spectators to become reflexive and participate more actively in the political life.

The 'anti-climax' of the security drama demonstrates that today's activist media representations of human suffering, which is comprised by forms of visuality such as painting, prints, sculpture, photography, film, television and other digital platforms, make necessary assertions regarding 'truth' and 'art,' depicting reality as-it-is and specific aesthetics tropes that testify the securitization of human trauma (Chouliaraki, Orwicz & Greeley, 2019). From this perspective, the civic engagement via activist media is both symbolic and material. As one may observe, representations of human suffering carried out by multiple publics (e.g. the intermediate actors and reflexive spectators) not only express or represent movement messages, but in fact are contributions that explain how participants make and enact movements in a sort of "politics of connections." This supports the development of mobilization outside mainstream society; it is a unique vantage that points for political and cultural intervention in mainstream politics and humanitarianism (Lievrouw, 2011).

In addition to being reflexive, the spectator must encourage what Lilie Chouliaraki came to define as "the quest to historicize the scene of suffering" (2006, p. 150). Chouliaraki also believes that "the key to the representation of the sufferer is historicity" (2006, p. 150). In her view, "historicity does not means a deep and comprehensive overview about the causal factors at play in the development of a particular event, but a minimal horizon of reference which singular events can be understood as part of an interconnected environment" (2006, p. 150). This emerges what she defines as "(…) rival forces in tension with each other – the global and the local, the Islamic and Christian, the rich and poor, and the powerful and powerless" (2006, p. 150). This considered, I intend now to examine how both reflexivity and historicity are crucial references for the audience to confront securitization by rethinking humanitarianism and the relationship with the performers.

ACT 3: THE 'ANTI-CLIMAX' OF THE SECURITY DRAMA

Desecuritizing moves: critical directions to a reconstructed political theater?

Once this section is intended to investigate how reflexivity and historicity are fundamental references for the audience to confront securitization of humanitarian problems, I should not forget to mention the book *Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*, written by Étienne de La Boétie in the 14th century. As my methodology highly suggests, it is worthwhile to take a look at those intellectuals who criticized the repressive practices and nature of states in times of tyranny. For this, La Boétie's political and philosophical claims are more than necessary, particularly when it is incumbent upon us, the Western audience, to increasingly become more reflexive and encourage the quest to historicize humanitarianism.

According to Murray Rothbard's argument, "the *Discourse of Voluntary Servitude* is lucidly structured around a single axiom, a single percipient political insight into the nature not only of tyranny, but implicitly of the state apparatus itself" (1975, p. 13). Rothbard says that "La Boétie's insight was that every tyranny must be grounded on general popular acceptance If this was not the case, no tyranny, and no governmental rule, could long endure" (1975, p. 13). For him, "La Boétie cuts to the heart of what is the problem of philosophy: the mystery of civil obedience. To La Boétie, the spectacle of general consent to despotism is puzzling and appalling" (1975, p. 14).

This insight was not only a call for rebellion against Henry, since the book was published when Henry was king of France, but also a general attack on tyranny, a device for inspiring rebellion against the then-reigning monarch. The book has definitely the surface character of a single-minded manifesto and a call to action (Schaefer, 1998). The main questions La Boétie provided consisted of what in fact seduces people to relinquish freedom, and why do they obey a tyrant. Through these questions, La Boétie anticipated, as Murray Rothbard argues, "the modern political analysts of totalitarianism, such as Hannah Arendt" (2008, p. 28).

At the outset of the work, La Boétie firmly expresses his opposition to the rule of 'several lords' and that of a single one. Taken literally, his claims signify that since human beings are naturally free and equal, tyrannies cannot originally have been established without the passive acquiescence of those who obey (Schaefer, 1998). Associating La Boétie's opposition to tyranny with the subject of this dissertation, I observe that, although there is no longer a 'single tyrant' dictating the rules of the security drama, 'several lords' hold the power and the means of habituating the audience to manipulation, alienation and submission. It is clear, therefore, that the benefits that these so-called 'several lords' take from manipulation, alienation and submission derive from the drama they have created.

Nonetheless, according to Rothbard's reading on La Boétie's work, he indicates that "La Boétie affirms that not all the citizens will be deluded or sunk into habitual submission. There will always be the people who, in contrast to 'the brutish mass,' posses clear and farsighted minds, and have further trained themselves by study and learning" (2008, pp. 28). Due to the danger these educated people may represent, Rothbard asserts that "(…) La Boétie called attention to the fact that tyrants often attempt to suppress education, so these people would be alone in their aspirations" (2008, pp. 28-29). La Boétie's philosophical legacy might be concerned with the already mentioned political aesthetics of everydayness, once it encourages citizens to contest oppression, reinforcing a sort of civic engagement by means of emancipatory aspirations. We should take this legacy into account to rethink about our receptive mode, which La Boétie would brilliantly call servitude.

What is worthy of attention, then, is the most important task of this valiant and knowledgeable group of educated people. For Murray Rothbard, "the task is that of establishing the vanguard of the 'revolutionary resistance' movement against submission" (2008, p. 29). Through a process that Rothbard calls as "educating the public to the truth," (2008, p. 29) educated people can give back to the rest of the audience the knowledge of the 'blessings' of liberty in order to resist against the political myths and security illusions created by the performers. Somehow, Voluntary Servitude provides us a sort of 'hope,' for intermediate actors and other groups of emancipated people still exist. I decide to take, therefore, La Boétie as inspiration for this last section of this dissertation, sustaining my belief that civic engagement and emancipatory aspirations can set us free from submission.

What is in many ways implicit in this final section is the political aesthetics of everydayness held at micro level by small groups of emancipated individuals. Therefore, the next three chapters demonstrate that the principles comprising the aesthetics of everydayness and explored by these groups are those of what Claudia Aradau came to define as "(…) flexibility of subjectivities and the possibility to challenge what is constructed as dangerous in our everyday life" (2004, p. 13). The desecuritizing moves of these groups show what Aradau described as "(…) a Foucauldian understanding of power as traversing social relations, and hence percolating everydayness, whereby everyday life cannot be an uncorrupted life that either precedes or confronts strategies of power" (2004, p. 13).

These groups of emancipated people look at securitization of migration issues as movements that, as Jef Huysmans highlights, "(…) involve a political spectacle, in which politicians, media and civil servants, among others, frame refugees and immigrants by means of evoking crisis situations, emergencies, myths, enemies and dangers" (2006, p. 60). In attempting to oppose this spectacle, these educated groups suggest us to imagine a world which, as William Connolly firmly describes "(…) a given field of identities might hope to recognize differences without being internally compelled to define some of them as forms of Otherness to be conquered, or even assimilated and defiled" (in Aradau, 2004, p. 13). In imagining a theater like this, we could put into practice desecuritization, doing away with scenarios of discrimination between Self and Others. For this, the audience should be convinced to promote dialogues that speak against what is constructed as dangerous.

If taken seriously by the rest of the audience, the desecuritizing moves provided by these groups could increase the 'critical mass,' making enough of the audience to recognize that security utterances, as Thierry Balzacq contends, "are nothing but complex strings of creative and performative arguments pointing toward an external threatening referent object" (2005, p. 183). In addition to this, security utterances are capable of making the victims of the security drama turn out into what Huysmans defined as "(…) an index of fear and a vehicle for both inscribing fear as a political currency and organizing values in social and political relations" (2006, p. 61). To conclude with its desecuritizing argument, this section explains that the security utterances involved in Western humanitarian scenes intensify the existing process of exclusion and submission in and outside the political theater.

Before exploring the desecuritizing moves, the central topic around this debate must include the dimensions of securitization. It seems to be important for the audience to understand that in a globalized world, it is wrong to assume that factors causing instability and poverty outside the political theater are confined outdoors. For this matter, the audience must be engaged in historicizing the scene of suffering. This exercise might begin with a critical reflection on colonialism, when Western leading roles endorsed what Andrew Linklater refers to as "the principle that they can do exactly what they like in relations with the rest of the world" (2007, p. 132). As a consequence of this principle, a long-term damage in and outside the political theater occurred, while 'several lords' have decided to treat not solely their own audience, but the secondary roles on the stage, just as they please.

In economic terms, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the leading roles established various forms of economic protection, monopoly, restrictions on labor organization and political participation within the political stage. This enabled Western's small political elite and wealthy industrialists to monopolize the field of industry and trade, producing a "dual" pattern of development, that, in all aspects, resembles the dual economies described by theories of contemporary "Third World" development (Halperin, 2006). Likewise, in geopolitical terms, the leading roles' imagination in the course of this age of exploitation showed how the geopolitical thought – the 'god's eye' view of the world as a structured whole that should be captured and managed from one (Western) viewpoint – emerged as a part of Western exploration and colonialism (Kuus, 2010). It is no surprise the fact that the modern history of human suffering directly stems from this scenario.

Within this context, Charles Call comes to argue that "Western powers privileged enhancing the coercive capacities of peripheral countries and this led to a cycle of serious problems: oppressive governments, instability, poverty and human rights violations" (2008, p. 1505). The spectators who tried to contest this scenario were suppressed, given that the political stage was controlled by the performers for the purpose of preserving and extending their social and economic power. As a result, collective actions opposing this repressive system were continually compromised (or undermined) by endeavors both to preserve privilege and to forestall acquisition of power by subordinate groups and classes. Not surprisingly, it is possible to conclude that political participation was severely limited (Halperin, 2006).

Beyond the globalized dimension of securitization, the debate must also include the cultural dimension. The securitization processes of the problems surrounding the humanitarian scenes in the West and in Israel show that the colonial legacy of the globalized dimension of securitization also entails a cultural dimension. Looking through these lenses, one should observe that migration issues are historically securitized by Western performers because either immigrants and refugees are what Huysmans describes as "(…) easily pictured as culturally (and sometimes racially) different" (2006, p. 74). Pursuant to Jef Huysmans' argument, "to some extent, the cultural implications of border controls and militarization could also represent an indirect consequence of the cultural origins of asylum-seekers" (2006, p. 74).

A non-emancipated audience tends to accept securitization of migration issues most because of the various '-isms' (e.g. racism, sexism, nationalism). Racially notions of civilization are fundamental elements of the security complex that have precipitated a range of dehumanizing, exclusionary and oppressive practices – many laundered through a states-system which has magnified the effects of sometimes hierarchical, nearly always discriminating notions of world society (Weinert, 2015). In this connection, Huysmans highlights the fact that "(…) in the cultural dimension of securitization, racism also plays a crucial role in the regulation of inclusion and exclusion of migrants" (2006, p. 74). While nationalism is a cultural discourse, Huysmans is convinced that "(...) racism is a biological discourse that unifies communities in the name of somatic and biological criteria such as the skin color, height, facial characteristics and the like" (2006, p. 74).

The humanitarian contexts in the West and Israel are show-cases of a developed Western form of racism and nationalism based on security discourses. Due to its globalized and cultural dimensions, securitization contributes to the magnitude, continuation and the deepening of humanitarian crises. It is undeniable that much transborder migration could bring some problems to the host country, but there are security discourses overemphasizing this rhetoric, and becoming what Lee Bebout called as "purposeful projects in propagating and recirculating a long-enduring nationalist and racialized story" (2016, p. 146). When issues are not discussed by democratic means, a biased narrative becomes essential to forming securitization. Bebout believes that "this rhetorical positioning exposes elements of Western police states, inhumane and inhospitable" (2016, p. 147).

Scene 5. The crisis along the US-Mexico border

As previously observed, the performative capacities and paternalistic characters developed by the leading roles on the political stage are riddled with elements of inhospitality and oppression that dictate the pace of the drama. These capacities and characters are intrinsic parts of the climax of the drama, and they aim to convince enough of the spectators in the auditorium to accept extraordinary and exceptional measures against minority groups, which are ultimately relegated to the fringes of society (i.e. outside the theater). In addition to this, the leading roles also tend to privilege the coercive capabilities of the secondary roles on the stage, bolstering authoritarian and oppressive attitudes. It is like a restricted group (or small club) of 'master-lords' helping, financing and teaching a large group of 'mini-lords' how to become more abusive, authoritarian and predatory.

When some of the secondary roles are not willing to obey the orders of the leading roles, they come to be regarded as enemies. Then, the leading roles put into practice their dramaturgical language of security in attempting to convince the audience that interventionary practices are necessary to save the lives of those who suffer from the oppressive practices undertaken by the secondary roles. But we all know that this process generates more insecurity in and outside the theater, and the victims of the drama come to be the ones facing the consequences of the authoritarianism of the secondary roles, but also suffering from the securitizing moves and exceptional measures carried out by the leading roles on the stage.

The victims of the drama are direct consequences of what is done and spoken on the stage. The victims are people suffering from the tyranny held by the 'masters' and 'mini-lords,' and they are also often neglected by the spectators who occupy a privileged status in the theater. Having the opportunity to see and listen the 'several lords' acting and speaking about security, the majority of the multiple publics in the audience does not use the opportunity as viewers and listeners to contest or confront what the lords say and decide to do about humanitarianism. When the victims of the drama knock at the doors of the theater asking for help, they tend to be rejected by spectators who are convinced that the seats of the theater are solely designated and reserved to their kin than to strangers. In more abstract terms, this occurs because the theater of world politics is marked by rituals and myths.

Associating this scenario with the crisis along the US-Mexico border, one should understand that in the early part of the 20th century, the USA pursued both in the Caribbean and Central America the strategy that Charles Call refers to as "(…) state building, which was centered on constabulary forces, and that had little attention to issues of regime, other state institutions, or accountability" (2008, p. 1505). As he indicates, "(…) the result was the rise of the officer Somoza, who has led an authoritarian Nicaragua for decades, in addition to the abusive and repressive dictatorships by Duvaliers in Haiti and Fulgencio Batista in Cuba" (2008, p. 1505). Therefore, Call is convinced that "such a security-centered state building template represented a serious danger of the failed state concept" (2008, p. 1505).

This process exacerbated insecurity in the Caribbean and Central America, but it provided a fertile ground for what Morten Bøås and Kathleen Jennings identified as "(…) the development of informal networks and power structures in which have facilitated and encouraged trans-border activities by elites" (2005, p. 393). Bøås and Jennings take as example the "(…) cross-border financial, arms and smuggling networks that have enabled elites to fortify their bank accounts and grip on power" (2005, p. 393). In Bøås and Jennings' line of thought, "these networks do not emerge from thin air: they build on existing structures" (2005, p. 393). These networks are regionalized webs of political and economic relationships between complacent elites and organizations of human trafficking, arms and drugs.

The case of the US-Mexico border demonstrates how state policies engender professional smuggling. It also demonstrates that a narrow focus on the criminal smuggler, for example, overlooks a range of important people direct or indirectly implicated and benefiting from the politics and business of smuggling. In this connection, the rapid increase of border enforcement activities from the mid-1900s drives up the costs of illegal migration, increasing the profits of human smuggling. Consequently, this attracted the attention of criminal enterprises already engaged in other typed of transnational smuggling, such as the drug trade (Kyle & Dale, 2011). Meanwhile, the Border Patrol agents are also deemed as heroes by most of the American audience. While declaring that 'human smugglers are what Lee Bebout pointed out as "(…) 'ruthless criminals' who view the migrant not as human being, but as cargo,' the Border Patrol policies, language and discourses reinforce the 'exceptionalist image' of the USA as innocent and kind" (2016, p. 148).

As Lee Bebout convincingly adds, “the Border Patrol seeks to halt undocumented migration and protect the United States from external threats all the while lending a humanitarian hand – it is militarization with a smile” (2016, p. 148). In Bebout’s viewpoint, “just as nativist fears and hate are dependent upon a discourse of white victimhood, so too does a continual militarization of the USA require a guise of humanitarian benevolence” (2016, p. 148). This is described as what I call forged American paternalism, for still the audience sees the ‘master-lords’ (the US and building coalitions) as aiding immigrants, while in reality they both financially and politically make profit from militarization and use of force.

Moreover, this scenario increased in the post-September 11, when the security environment opened more space for a further militarization of immigration law enforcement on the border. After September 11, the new expanded mission could include targeting illegal immigration. Some major military contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, were also recruited to play a larger role in border control by using some of the same high-priced, high tech tools these companies have already put to work in the Middle East, specially in the Iraqi invasion and the war in Afghanistan (Duncan & Coyle, 2013). The process of securitization of the border in the post-September 11 created a momentum within migration business, either for those elites engaged in transnational smuggling or for those who were willing to make profit from militarization.

As Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde reminded us, “in some cases securitization of issues is unavoidable, when states or minority groups face an implacable or barbarian aggressor” (1998, p. 29). They argue that “because of its prioritizing imperative, the securitization has tactical attractions, as a way to obtain attention for environmental problems, for example” (1998, p. 29). However, when it comes to solving or relieving suffering in the US-Mexico border, I tend to consider Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde’s suggestion that desecuritization is the optimal alternative, because in their view “it means not to have important issues phrased as ‘threats against which we have countermeasures,’ but to move them out of the threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere” (1998, p. 29). It is incumbent upon the US audience to acknowledge that the securitization of the crisis along the border is negative because it further exposes the inhospitable characteristics of militarization that deal with migrants as if they were servile and powerless.

5.1. For less saviorism and more medical care, signs of goodwill and cooperation

In the deserts and mountains of southern Arizona, since the 1990s there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of deaths each year among unauthorized immigrants and border-crossers. On the other hand, the official statistics compiled by the US Border Patrol consistently undercount the actual number of deaths along the border (Rubio-Goldsmith *et. al.*, 2007). This unprecedented increase of deaths is a consequence of the securitization of US immigration policies instituted in the mid-1990s and intensified right after September 11. Since then, Maria Jimenez argues that "(...) the US government has not been fully complying with international and human rights law" (2009, p. 12). Jimenez criticizes the fact the "White House for years has been alleging the use of force to protect its national security, to control its borders and to adopt a more effective immigration strategy" (2009, p. 12). But in her viewpoint, "when exercising that right, the White House should ensure that the security policies will respect human rights, integrity and dignity" (2009, p. 12).

In fact, this leads us to observe that securitization followed by the militarization of borders maximizes threats to human integrity and well-being of those in vulnerable situations. In doing so, the securitizing actor does not guarantee that its policies and actions are proportionate – as if there is no other alternative to deal with migration problems than that of appealing the use of force. In addition to undercount the unprecedented increase in the number of deaths, the Border Patrol contributes to the deterioration of the undignified conditions found in overcrowded detention camps located at the border. By forcing asylum-seekers to stay in the deplorable detention camps, the White House makes sure that human suffering can be found everywhere along the border. By the way, the access to medical services when migrant children were sick in 2019 and 2020 was shamefully little, while thousands of families were living in absolute squalor in these detention camps[20].

20 Ranit Mishori, professor of family medicine at the Georgetown University School of Medicine and director of the department's Global Health Initiatives wrote about this issue. Ranit Mishori contends that "in the detention centers, children have no access to blankets, bed, clean water, personal hygiene products, or age-appropriate food and conditions, and they were exposed to harsh environmental conditions such as cold temperature and continuous lights for twenty-four hours a day" (2020, p. 202). Additionally, Mishori indicates that "these conditions, as reported by lawmakers, legal representatives and physicians who visited the facilities, have been associated with negative mental health effects such as exacerbation of trauma, fear, anxiety, and depression" (2020, p. 202). Unfortunately, Mishori also comes to reveal the fact that "the deaths of at least seven children have been attributed to substandard condition in immigration detention that were associated with dysregulation of circadian rhythms, scabies, and infectious disease outbreaks" (2020, p. 202).

Pediatricians who have treated migrant children and seen the conditions they have endured in US custody believe that additional measures are necessary to ensure no lingering medical problems – that could include communicable diseases such as influenza and stress-related mental health issues – persist from the migrant children's time in detention. They also report that the lack of communication and transparency with the US Customs and Border Protection and the Health Human Services is the single greatest barrier to ensuring continuity of care for the children (Daley, 2019). Considering this, the family physicians should first recognize, as Ranit Mishori convincingly pointed out, "(...) the effects and impacts of political decisions on the health of children and inquire about how these security policies are affecting their individual and vulnerable patients and families" (2020, p. 202).

Physicians are one of the multiple publics in the audience, and they are crucial for desecuritization. Ranit Mishori claims that "in therms of advocacy, physicians could look to examples set by leaders within the American Academy of Family Physician whose spoke up" (2020, p. 202). In her suggestion, "we can support and applaud the collaboration of this association with other physician organizations either to issue statements and to offer a unified voice demanding change" (2020, p. 202). For her, "physicians could learn from efforts by doctors and experts seeking to influence their elected officials by starting letter campaigns, writing op-eds, issuing comments, and participating in rallies and demonstrations" (2020, p. 203).

The crisis along the border overwhelmed border enforcement operations in 2019, resulting in unsafe, precarious conditions for would-be migrants, including children. This represents a remarkable turnaround in the border security picture over a short period of time. The US Border Patrol carried out more than one-hundred-thousand apprehensions only in May 2019 – the single highest monthly total since 2006, and more than triple the number recorded in May 2018. Central American people represented forty-four percent of apprehensions (Capps *et. al.*, 2019). Not only the physicians, but also the American audience as a whole should rethink about the precarious conditions resulted from the securitization of the border by putting into action their civil liberties to fight against those policies that impact the lives of the oppressed victims of the security drama. For Mishori, "changing policies requires holding politicians accountable through voting; our votes determine what happens to migrants, how well or poorly they are treated" (2020, p. 203).

Since the mid-1900s the USA government has been securitizing its border by implementing a prevention through deterrence approach to immigration control that resulted in the militarization of the border and a quintupling of border-enforcement expenditures. But the new border barriers, fortified checkpoints, high-tech forms of surveillance, and thousands of additional Border Patrol actors did not decrease the number of unauthorized migrants crossing the border (Rubio-Goldsmith *et. al.*, 2007). The rising number of border-crosser deaths coincides with the militarization and fortification of the border, intensified by Trump's policy called Migrant Protection Protocols. Also known as *Remain in Mexico*, this policy essentially forces asylum-seekers to wait in detention camps or in dangerous border towns for the court proceedings that can drag on for months. Since January 2019, when this policy went into effect, close to fifty-thousand people had already returned to Mexico in less than ten months, facing extreme levels of violence (Blitzer, 2019).

By making asylum-seekers wait in Mexico, Trump's policy provided them the same extreme danger that they were running from. Also, in nearly all camps across the border, crimes such as kidnapping, extortion and assaults are recurrent practices undertaken by Mexican cartels. However, policies like these are not that new. Since 2011, for example, it has been evident that, as Maria Jimenez comes to argue, "(…) instead of dissuading unauthorized border crossings, accelerated militarization at the border had led to migrant dependency on smugglers, a decline in rates of migrants returning to their countries, and an increase in deaths" (2009, p. 14).

Facing this problem, the Border Patrol often arranges small and short-term special emergency tactical units to facilitate rescues of migrants. These are measures that Bebout called an epic drama telling stories of Border Patrol heroism. In Bebout's argument, "the Border Patrol rescue narrative asserts humanitarian bona fides for the United States as it simultaneously eschews responsibility" (2016, p. 149). This drama renders a more complex understanding than the 'standard' humanitarian rescue narrative. While Border Patrol agents need to compartmentalize human hunting apart from rescue, and while the press releases frame them as distinct actions, Bebout believes that "(…) hunting and rescue are imbricated, intertwined, and part of a much more complex narrative of exceptionalism and saviorism" (2016, p. 150). Here, a humanitarian scene for us, the audience, to 'applause' is created, and Lee Bebout is right in naming this scene as an 'epic' drama.

When the Border Patrol rescues a few of helpless migrants from smugglers and Mexican *bandidos*, says Bebout, "(…) in the end is the whiteness and Americanness saving the day, and the underlying logic of 'white saviorism' is secured and recirculated" (2016, p. 150). Following Bebout's way of thinking, "this narrative propels gratitude toward agents of a government who contributed to the danger that migrants face in the first place" (2016, p. 151). By all means, the American white saviorism tells us that the United State government seemed never willing to solve a crisis that it is capable of administering. This crisis requires a rethinking of how to manage migration issues – not by doubling down on security demanded by former administrations and to which President Donald Trump has increased during his last years in the White House (Isacson, Beltrán & Meyer, 2019).

Following Andrew Linklater's words, "it is possible to extend this debate further by arguing that any liberal society ought to be open to the outside world, once a strong commitment to diversity, hospitality and plurality of cultures is inherent in its very character" (1998, p. 80). This commitment could be promoted through counter-measures contesting the anti-immigration policies of family separation, deportations, detentions, and the excessive and unnecessary use of force at the border. All of this comes together with a process of desecuritization that should be materialized within what Mark Salter calls the "(…) popular politics, whereas elites and professionals remain unconvinced, such as transportation safety" (2008, p. 325). Speaking of this, transportation safety is the first issue of desecuritization.

Mark Salter takes as an example the Humane Borders, "a vigilante civil organization composed by a group of volunteers who, among other things, extrajudicially monitor the flow of unauthorized immigrants" (2008, p. 325). Whereas the US government securitized illegal migration for a segment of the American population, Mark Salter highlights that "(...) human rights groups, such as the Humane Borders, by placing water in the desert[21] as a way advocating for amnesty, act as if the problem is politicized" (2008, p. 325). Despite the fact that it operates with a small number of members and volunteers, Salter comes to consider that the Humane Borders has been "acting in a 'decisionist' mode" (2008, p. 325), opening up the possibility for more spectators to join the debate about the transportation safety.

---

21 In the Annex of this study it is provided selected photo of desecuritizing moves concerning the humanitarian scenes. There, this move of placing water in the desert is represented in Photo 1.

As a non-profit civil organization run exclusively by activists, the Humane Borders manages geospatial technologies by redeploying forms of spatial tracking and observation to assist migrants crossing the dangerous terrains of the border (Walsh, 2013). What is particularly interesting to observe is that, in place of the traditional territorial grid that divides, excludes, and selectively mobilizes bodies in accordance with the conflictive exigencies of accumulation, sovereignty, and security (Sparke, 2006; Walsh, 2013), the Humane Borders and its volunteers promote democratic frameworks of mobility and association. In this alternative moral cartography, the imperatives of restriction, gatekeeping, surveillance and control give way to those imperatives of care, hospitality, and important forms of personhood that evade state-imposed legal categories and identities (Walsh, 2013).

Costing billions of dollars, the securitization and militarization of the US-Mexico border manifests itself through what Jason Ackelson defines as "(…) agents on the ground, high technology and security measures such as fencing" (2005, p. 171). By relying on a dominant narrative that places faith in the power of technology and manpower to guide and regulate the borders, Ackelson says that "(...) policymakers borrowed solutions from the military and applied armed forces and equipment in an attempt to bring America's borders under 'control'" (2005, p. 171). The annual Homeland Security Conference, for instance, has become a huge corporate lobbying effort whereby companies compete to win profitable government contracts. Private firms have been invited to offer bids on developing the technology to be used in the border-control and securitizing programs (Sparke, 2006).

On the other hand, the Humane Borders assesses the empowering and counter-hegemonic possibilities of cartographic and mapping technologies. The volunteers belong to multiple publics that can be seen as forms of transnational practitioners invested in fostering substantial engagements pursuant to settled configurations of space, law, and technology. Over time, their efforts were augmented by the use of spatial information technologies. Forms of geosurveillance are central to three objectives: the installation and maintenance of water tanks; the creation of warning posters; and the distribution of GPS devices in which transmit distress signals to emergency responders (Walsh, 2013). This means that technologies used for state security can be re-appropriated for desecuritizing aims, unmasking what Ackelson defines as "rhetorical boundaries between 'us' and the alien 'Other'" (2005, p. 174).

What is more, an open debate about this situation would require for the reflexive spectators of the 'critical mass' to wonder why these migrants were motivated to risk their lives by crossing a militarized border. For this, one should note that the unauthorized migration into the US is the result of important factors that include the modern-day forces of globalization, the economic disparities, and the long and oppressive historical relationship between the powerful USA and the fragile Latin American nations. Through this angle, the American society can understand that the best chance of solving this crisis does not lie with misconceived border-control measures. The solution must be comprehensive immigration rooted in an assessment upon both the role of migrant labor in the United States and forces of globalization (Rubio-Goldsmith *et. al.*, 2007). An assessment like this could lead enough of the audience to better understand how important are small actions providing a little of dignity to those people who face vulnerable situations.

Understanding the importance of desecuritization means for us to be aware of how small actions developed by activist groups, such as placing water in the desert, can mean for the return of a securitized issue to normal politics. In cases where securitization harms human lives, even the small signs of goodwill must be given adequate attention, mostly because they are developed by following an honest assessment regarding the role of migrant labor and forces of globalization. Placing water in the desert to keep the migrants hydrated could merely be seen as a simple gesture, but it also has meaning for a wider society, on accounts of which activism flows in a desecuritizing spectrum. Small signs of goodwill also call into question the fact that using the military and denying asylum to those people who escape from violence are not only the cruelest measures of securitization, but also represent the interruption of an immigration policy operating since the mid-1940s, which helped many victims of the Second War to rebuild their lives in the US.

This interruption has not come about by accident. On the contrary, this is a project orchestrated by practices that recirculate a nationalist and racialized narrative. Preserving due proportions, this project is similar to the view of the Church in the Middle Ages to demonize women (i.e. witch-hunt) and construct authoritarian regimes around Europe; or to the Hitler's aspirations to exterminate Jews and materialize the Nazi regime in Germany. These projects were made to impose fear, creating distorted notions of identities sharing homogeneous beliefs, race and culture.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the USA government set out migration policies aimed at helping the white kin Europeans to rebuild their lives. Nowadays, when it comes to helping non-white peoples from non-European countries, the migration policies are interrupted, with the US government changing discourses to prioritize the tendency to end asylum. More importantly, for migration policies be interrupted, foolish possibilities, inadequate ideas and hate speeches through a dramaturgical language must be put into practice, such as that security narrative of preserving the survival of the nation against an existential threat, a created Other, a threatening enemy/evil. As a matter of fact, this is what the 2016 Donald Trump's campaign to build a wall at the US-Mexico border was all about.

It is precisely about the wall that I highlight the second desecuritizing contribution. Beyond discussions and debates about the wall itself and the negative consequences[22] that it would bring to both sides, it is also important to support and be engaged in interactive and social activities with activist purposes that challenge our conceptions about the identities, feelings and emotions involved in this subject; that is, the humanistic and cultural challenges the wall can represent. This is exactly what two Californian architects called Ronald Rael and Virginia San Fratello, who had the support of the group Colectivo Chopeke, intended to do by turning the border wall dividing both countries into a playground. As a sign of goodwill, they installed pink teeter totters that allowed children from both sides of the wall to play.

Journalists who reported this activity described it saying that this project, baptized "Teeter Totter Wall"[23], symbolizes the delicate balance between the USA and Mexico and their interdependence. When the fence on the border became a playground for children from both countries – who could now ride on seesaws built across its metal bars – part of the American society could see a plausible illustration, an example showing that the actions that happen on one side have a direct impact on the other (Manzanaro, Oelsner & Amiel, 2019). The idea of this project emerged in 2009, when Rael and San Fratello designed a concept for a binational seesaw at the border for a book, *Borderwall as Architecture*, which uses 'humor' and 'inventiveness' to address the futility of building barriers (Mezzofiore, 2019).

---

22 The wall is a simple solution to border security. Its construction is not a replacement for effective, cost-conscious enforcement measures. Those who persist in this idea ignore the obstacles that make it an unviable option that would lead to negative consequences (American Immigration Council, 2019).
23 This move is represented in the Annex as Photo 2.

When future generations from both sides are put to play together, but divided by a borderwall, then one must reflect that, as well observed by Vanda Felbab-Brown, “rather than a line of separation, the border should be conceived of as a membrane, connecting the tissues of communities on both sides” (2017, p. 24). Felbab-Brown argues that “conceiving the border as a membrane would enable mutually beneficial trade, manufacturing, ecosystem improvements, and a safer environment for all, while enhancing inter-cultural exchanges” (2017, p. 24). Making these future generations understand this assumption by involving and educating them through a small sign of goodwill such as the teeter totters should be our concern.

Meanwhile, Trump introduced a false narrative called the *Safe Third Country Agreements*, signed with Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. This agreement basically says that these countries are safe enough for the US government to deport thousands of asylum-seekers without a hearing. Through a legal justification, this narrative is meant to keep migrants from reaching the US. This issue should be embedded into a more open debate within the American society, since it does not address the ‘root causes’ that push people to flee, encouraging them to find different routes (Felter & Cheatham, 2019). In light of the fact that this agreement does not provide any assessment on the role of migrant labor in the USA and forces of globalization, the American Civil Liberties Union, until March 2020, had already litigated hundreds of lawsuits against such agreement.

These lawsuits are considered the third sign of goodwill. They are examples of a desecuritizing move undertaken by activist lawyers, one more important multiple publics in the audience. These lawsuits also appeal for more resources to deal with migration issues without applying the use of force and detentions. They claim for the hiring of more judges for the immigration system, so hiring pools and outreach programs would be broader (Isacson, Beltrán & Meyer, 2019). The American Civil Liberties Union has more than three-hundred attorneys willing to pressure the government to adopt measures aimed at reforming the immigration system. Even though this number represents only a small fraction of the total number of American lawyers, their demands should not be neglected, mainly when these lawyers, together with thousands of volunteers, come to ask for a more humane administration of the American asylum system that would (at a minimum) ensure that the asylum-seekers participate in it fully, having all kinds of legal assistance if necessary.

Through the litigation of several lawsuits, the activist lawyers stress the claim that a better and more humane administration of the asylum system could be done without locking up the people. In addition to this, another approach that should be taken into account by the American society is the strengthening of a regional cooperation in migration management. The Mexican government's lack of both capacity and institutional readiness to sustain the crisis at the border stem from the high levels of efforts that the US government is currently demanding in reducing migration. The White House should support and endorse the expanding of Mexico's capacities to process asylum and other claims, developing long-term, work-oriented immigration programs and measures, alongside enforcement efforts capable of building professionalism and regional cooperation (Capps *et. al.*, 2019).

Pursuant to a report drafted by a group of researches of the Center for US-Mexican Studies of the UC San Diego School of Global Policy & Strategy, the Trump administration's concept of security cooperation with Mexico was fairly narrow, emphasizing the eradication of poppy plants in Mexico, reinforcement of Mexico's southern border to impede the flow of irregular migration from Central America, and arrests and prosecution of prominent drug traffickers. But efforts to help reform Mexico's justice institutions and the capacities to improve the asylum processes have received less top-level attention from the Trump administration (USMEXGPS, 2018). Facing this complex scenario, the society should pressure the US government to work with Mexico, the UNHCR, and other countries such as Canada to establish regional processing programs that build the capacity to 1) adjudicate the growing numbers of asylum cases from the region closer to their source, and thereafter, 2) accept for admission as refugees those with valid claims (Capps *et. al.*, 2019).

The US has worked with Mexico through its Central America Regional Security Initiative, which aims to improve the region's security. The Obama administration created the Alliance for Prosperity in 2014, which allocated more than two billion dollars in its first three years to fostering economic opportunities, improving public safety, and strengthening institutions. Though the Trump had continued to fund this initiative, it has drastically reduced the budget (USMEXGPS, 2018). Thus, to reduce migration pressures, it is fundamental to the American interests to restore aid and foreign assistance programs, cut recently by the Trump administration, that combat violence and improve living standards (Capps *et. al.*, 2019).

These securitizing decisions to both reduce budgets of regional cooperation and cut humanitarian assistance reflected, in fact, what Lee Bebout firmly describes as the "American exceptionalism, and the imagining of the nation-state as a racial state" (2016, p. 111). Additionally, the rhetoric of heroism and saviorism in the way that specific security practices of humanitarianism (e.g., saving a few migrants from Mexican *bandidos*) create the picture in the audience's imagination that the United States is, as Bebout identifies, "(…) a protective force of racialized communities at home and abroad" (2016, p. 111). Trump's white saviorism represented a forged humanitarianism, and it was bound to what Bebout refers to as "(…) the racial manifestation of American exceptionalism" (2016, p. 111) that finds expression in harmful practices of securitization followed by militarization.

The 'anti-climax' for this are what Ken Booth referred to as "the powerful positive forces for a more secure world" (2007, p. 26). This is a race against time, contends Booth, "(…) in particularly considering the opportunities and resources for the promotion of new kinds of humanitarianism, emancipation and community, as a consequence of developing local networks, the growing questioning of some old thinking and practices" (2007, p. 26). However, Booth says that "there is an urgent sense in some quarters that something should be done about surviving on an ever-smaller planet" (2007, p. 26). Booth truly believes that "the political activity is important, because only collective action could have radical effects" (2007, p. 26). Eventually, for those who are students of international relations, Booth suggests that "one of the main challenges is to reconceptualize security studies, hence replacing regressive ideas with radical alternatives" (2007, p. 26).

Collective actions – beginning with small things like placing water in the desert, installing some teeter totters in the borderwall, litigating lawsuits against the asylum policies, or participating in the political life through rallies and demonstrations – are radical alternatives to popular mobilization, enabling the audience to overcome securitization. For Andrew Linklater, "non-state actors have additional obligations to ensure just treatment for the rest of humanity. The duties of national citizens require collective action to improve the life-chances of the unjustly excluded" (1998, p. 206). Concerning the situation along the US-Mexico border, collective actions are already taking place. It is us to the rest of the American audience to partake these actions by challenging what is constructed as dangerous in their everyday lives.

5.2. Paths to take against children in cages, deportations and double standards

The two first desecuritizing paths to be taken against the crisis along the border are represented in forms of art. According to James Young's view, "art is a source of knowledge in the same way as science is" (2001, p. 65). Art creates knowledge in different ways. In short, semantic representations (employed in the sciences) help us understand, as Young argues, "(...) the world in a way very different from the way visual illustrations (characteristic of the arts) do. While the first provides rational demonstrations, the second is used to show" (2001, p. 65). For Young, "although artworks cannot provide rational demonstrations of perspectives, they can provide illustrative demonstrations of the rightness of a perspective" (2001, p. 69). In cases of human suffering, more precisely, artworks with an activist focus put audiences in a position to recognize the rightness of a less securitized perspective.

In a more theoretical sense, Karen Frostig contends that "arts activism reflects a democratic paradigm, eliciting multiple viewpoints that challenge the dominant discourses" (2011, p. 50). Activism through art is concerned with what she calls "(...) the artistry of social consciousness grounded in human interaction, presenting an innovative use of public space in order to address contested issues of cultural and sociopolitical significance allied with systems of power and control" (2011, p. 51). In other words, the use of art as a critical knowledge, either to 'reflect' or 'contest' securitization of humanitarian issues, involves working outside of traditional institutions, namely in public spaces, where the civil society could address and make use of modes of collective actions and activism (Dufour, 2002).

Art could be a useful vehicle of activism as could dialogue and live speeches. Nowadays, with benefit of internet, for example, representations, illustrations and images travel fast online, which increases the ability of arts activism to build large networks that overcome time and space constraints, leading to a movement spill-over (Cammaerts, 2015). In using the vehicle of art and the benefit of internet, the desecuritizing actors are able to extend their message beyond the public spaces, whereby the visual representation of oppression and violence are embedded in an emancipatory project with the goal of empowering enough of the audience to be reflective and active participants in the political life. More importantly, activism through art is a political activity meant to replace regressive ideas.

Turning art into many forms of reflexivity, criticality, contestation, education and emancipation means to encompass what Alina Campana called as "(…) a variety of work towards social and political consciousness, human empowerment, and change" (2011, p. 281). The arts' role in activism might probably include factors listed by Campana as "(…) the communication of a movement's or group's opposition and vision; facilitation of open dialogue towards political and social consciousness for participants and public; and creation and expression of collective identity and solidarity" (2011, p. 281). These three interesting factors enact a critical knowledge which James Young appointed as "(…) practical, a knowledge about how to act and how to look at moral situations" (2001, p. 101). This knowledge is critical because, as Young points out, "(…) presents a perspective on a certain sort of moral situation. It puts the audiences in a position to reflect if certain practices undertaken by the performers could be right or wrong" (2001, p. 101).

In the case of the humanitarian crisis along the border, more precisely, I take into account Karen Frostig's opinion about arts activism manifesting itself by visual representations of state oppression and violence against minorities, which, in her argument, "(…) attempt to engage high levels of community participation towards social change by galvanizing citizen dissent" (2011, p. 52). As the last sub-chapter explained, since 2017, for example, Donald Trump administration pushed forward tough-on-law immigration agenda through limiting legal immigration, reducing the number of refugees allowed into the US, increasing militarization at the border by arresting thousands of families. The government's recent policies have endangered the children's health by using force to separate parents and children from each other, by caging children in unsanitary, deplorable and unsafe conditions, and has proposed detaining children indefinitely (Bhatnagar, 2019).

What is little known about family detention of migrants is that this policy can cost hundreds of dollars per day to be put into practice. The ones paying this are the American spectators, those who belong to a so-called liberal, free, open-minded and democratic country. These spectators are told to be living in a political myth called "American dream" that makes them pay for locking up migrants, including children. These people live in a forged dream as they pay for the cruel detention of migrant children. In simple terms, the "American dream" becomes the worst nightmare, the reflection of a manipulative performers-audience relationship.

The Trump family separation policy builds precisely on a long and brutal history of separating children from their families and communities. The US government has consistently valued and supported white, middle-class, married families as a means to build the American nation. The families that are indigenous, of color, poor, queer, and non-normative gender have been treated as "threats" to fear and expel or labor to exploit. The forced separation of migrant families at the Mexico border fits into the United States' long history of treating enslaved families as property, whose members could be sold away from one another (Licona & Luibhéid, 2018).

The first example of a desecuritizing move through the visual representation of the family separation was undertaken by the Claremont United Methodist Church, in the state of California. In December 2019, a Christmas nativity scene[24] organized by this church transformed the birth of Jesus into a statement about the family separation, asking the American audience to reflect on what they refer as the most well-known refugee family in the world. Although the target audience was reduced only to the American Catholic community, the wise decision to artistically represent the birth of Jesus into a humanitarian statement means to intervene in the US government's escalating securitization of the crisis along the border with Mexico, which is increasingly rendering thousands of innocent children to the aforesaid vulnerable, inhumane, horrifying and deplorable conditions.

The Trump administration believes that making detainment "aggressive" will deter people from crossing the border. But years of research show that such deterrence policies rarely work. In light of this evidence, these long and cruel detentions appear specially inhumane and unnecessary (Bhatnagar, 2019). Aiming to create a critical knowledge about Trump's cruel deterrence policies and what Christmas really represents, Karen Clark Ristine, the lead pastor at the Claremont Methodist Church, reminded us the fact that "(…) after the birth of baby Jesus, Joseph and Mary were forced to flee to Egypt to escape King Herod, a tyrant" (in Noor, 2019). Ristine asks "what if Joseph and Mary sought refuge in the US nowadays?" And she continues: "imagine they forcibly separated at the border, and the baby Jesus, no older than two, taken from his parents and placed behind the fences of a detention center along with more than five-thousand other children" (Idem, 2019).

24 This 2019 Christmas nativity scene organized by the Claremont Methodist Church in the state of California is represented in Photo 3 in the Annex.

Such unusual Christmas nativity scene shows Joseph and Mary, in separate cages, facing a cradled baby Jesus in a cage, with Joseph's arms outstretched towards him (Noor, 2019). The three sculptures are separated from each other in metal cages, surrounded by barbed wires and spikes. By all means, this artwork symbolizes the thousands of nameless families separated at the border. But more than that, the representation of baby Jesus separated from his parents can be seen as a form of activism, making what Karen Frostig called as "the invisible visible" (2011, p. 52). Pursuant to Forstig, "in the true sense of arts activism, invisible refers to abuses of power and privilege that lead to social dysfunction and social injustice" (2011, p. 52). Turning Trump's abuse of power more visible, we see a specific multiple publics (a Catholic Church) working for what Campana calls as "a cognitive liberation, a shift from a hopeless submission to a readiness to change" (2011, p. 281).

The visual representation of the invisible offers some sense of the pedagogic possibilities of artistic practice today (Dufour, 2002). Artistic representations with an activist message align with critical pedagogy, where a complex view about the relationship between the performers and audience is key. Alina Campana appoints the fact that "with this view comes the necessity of constant reflection followed by a dialogue about this relationship" (2011, p. 286). Also, Campana highlights that "(…) the pedagogic possibilities of artistic practice means to identify the hidden curricula embedded in society and institutions which helps to keep power structures in place" (2011, p. 286). This requires us to have a deeper look into the issues of power and confront what is spoken and done on the political stage.

The second desecuritizing move in form of art concerns the cages[25] installed with figures mimicking migrant children lying in the custody of US immigration officials around Des Moines, Iowa's capital city. The Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, an immigration legal services organization, tweeted images showing chain-link cages on the side of a Des Moines road with figures designed to look like children under mylar blankets (Bowden, 2020). So, properly speaking, the mannequins play recordings of those migrant children who have been detained, many whom are heard crying from inside the cage installations. These cages represent those detained under the US custody (ABC News, 2020).

25 One of the small chain-link cages with fake children crying that were installed around Des Moines are presented in the Annex in Photo 4.

The cages were set up for the 2020 Iowa caucuses, which took place on February 3. Following this important event for the 2020 USA presidential election, it was fundamental for the human rights activists to show how serious and deplorable is the situation at the border. Wisely, these groups appealed to art as a way to reflect the humanitarian crisis, asking for a more humane dealing of the problem without the excessive use of force. Representing human suffering through art, the fake cages in Iowa caucuses best depicts the critical viewpoints of a few reflexive spectators that challenge dominant security discourses. In an open statement to the press, the chief advocacy officer for RAICES, Erika Andiola, argued that "these horrors along the border and throughout the USA immigration system are frequently ignored by the public and politicians" (in ABC News, 2020). She adds: "we are asking people: please do not look away from the terrors enacted in your name" (Idem, 2020).

In a parallel fashion, Andrew Linklater comes to remind us that "(..) in each case defending the fundamental rights of the vulnerable people requires some efforts to reconcile the right of collective self-determination with the duties to engage the interested parties in open dialogue" (1998, p. 84). For Linklater, "(…) increasing levels of harms further underline the point that local communities should not exercise the power of self-determination without considering their moral duties to other human beings" (1998, p. 84). Desecuritization requires, then, what Linklater comes to determine as "(…) commitment to regard the insiders and outsiders as moral equals" (1998, p. 84). Properly speaking, I take Linklater's statement into account, in light of the fact that it places the interests of the minorities groups and vulnerable people suffering from securitization before the interests of the co-nationals on the grounds of what he interestingly described as a "common humanity."

Placing the interests of the vulnerable people in forms of desecuritization means to develop what Campana referred to as "self-reflection and evaluation" (2011, p. 286). Two important prerequisites for self-reflection and evaluation are for Campana "empathy and awareness of others; being able both to relate to and see oneself in relation to other people and groups" (2011, p. 286). These two qualities are, as suggested by Campana, "(…) key to collaborative work towards change because they are motivator and guide in facilitation of an emancipatory project" (2011, p. 286). Empathy and awareness generates, therefore, what Lilie Chouliaraki defines as "denunciation and aestheticization" (2006, p. 44).

All of this comes together in a process that includes what Karen Frostig refers to as "compassion, curiosity, dialogue, engagement, analysis, ethical concerns, and ideas about empowerment and agency" (2011, p. 54). When it comes to reflecting about representations of human suffering, specially the fake cages placed in Des Moines, Iowa, and acquiring the prerequisites of "empathy and awareness" (Campana, 2011), "denunciation and aestheticization" (Chouliaraki, 2006), or "compassion and engagement" (Frostig, 2011), means not to grasp this representation of crying caged children under discomforting emergency thermal blankets as simply a "part" of the landscape. It is human pain happening, it is extremely uncomfortable. It is also not simply demanding empathy, but also asking that we, the audience, reimagine our listening. It is a call to action (Licona & Luibhéid, 2018).

These prerequisites altogether constitute "critical attunement," an original concept developed by Karen Frostig, which is "(…) derived from mutual regard and may be grasped as a method of working together with marginalized and disempowered individuals to restore agency and transformation" (2011, p. 52). Critical attunement might bring out what Frostig calls as "(…) the socially informed analytic tool of criticality into relationship with expansive modes of attunement to find the common ground of conflict, empathy, and activism" (2011, p. 52). For this reason that representations of suffering through forms of art are fundamental, once they offer the recognition of the Other as an autonomous being, a matter of resistance against the multiple forms of oppression (Weinert, 2015). They also lead us to reflect upon the "moral worth of others," either by representing the baby Jesus separated from his parents, or placing mannequins crying from inside cages installations.

From a more critical approach, these moves can change the way how enough of the audience perceives what is constructed as dangerous in everyday life. Since this dissertation was written before the 2020 US election, I hope the US citizens did not overlook these moves when it comes to voting. For this purpose, the RAICES placed signs in the cages of Des Moines that read "#DontLookAway," a linguistic framing meant to be seen and heard for its own sake. Artworks comprised by linguistic framings, like the "#DontLookAway," are intentionally created by activist groups of civil society to make the audience feel uncomfortable, uneasy, concerned and self-reflexive. They are meant to create a practical knowledge that teaches us that securitization should be a matter of contestation.

What is also particularly problematic is that the US government continued to deport thousands of migrants amid Covid-19 outbreak. The securitization of the migration issue did not cease even during the pandemic. In the scramble to contain the spread of Covid-19, Trump administration pushed forward with its aggressive immigration enforcement agenda, deporting thousands of people to their home countries, including some who are sick with the virus. Deportations of children and teenagers without guardians have also risen sharply (Dickerson & Semple, 2020). The Guatemala's government, for instance, called for a moratorium on deportations, or at least a slowdown, that would allow the country's system of shelters to ramp up to meet the needs of these populations. However, deportation proceedings for many detained migrants have continued (Fernández & Joffe-Block, 2020).

Guatemalan officials said that American deportation flights have aggravated the outbreak in Guatemala because people already infected with the virus have returned. There is evidence that Guatemalans may be growing increasingly suspicious of returning migrants for fear they may be importing infection (Dickerson & Semple, 2020). Yet in this reading, the NowThis News, a social media-focused news organization, in partnership with the Emerson Collective, an organization focused on securing human rights for immigrants, posted videos on YouTube[26] showing many unaccompanied children and teenagers being expelled since the beginning of the pandemic. In showing images of hundreds of migrants being deported and many children held in cages, these two organizations take the path of asking the American citizens to call the congresspeople to refund immigration policies.

These two organizations also manage their social media accounts to expose the existence of a double standard in how conservative and indigenous protesters are constantly treated by the US police. In a video posted on Facebook[27], the NowThis News released images of unarmed indigenous people who were protesting against pipelines in the US being met with rubber bullets, pepper spray, and even arbitrary detentions made by the police, while armed conservative protesters – white people waving around American flags and signs against the use of masks and the pandemic lockdown – were treated peacefully by the police, without a single detention.

26 See NowThis News & Emerson Collective (Ed.) (2020) – Migrant Children Face Higher Risk of Deportation amid COVID-19 [3:50 min]. US: NowThis News.
27 See NowThis Politics (Ed.) (2020) - 'This is America': TikTok user nailed the blatant double standard in how conservative and indigenous protesters are treated [5:16]. US: NowThis Politics.

Border activists and anti-border wall protesters can also be victims of this double standard treatment. According to an internal Pentagon document obtained exclusively by the online news show The Young Turks and the nonprofit news organization The Intercept, the US military forces deployed to the southern border were monitoring domestic protesters, including anti-border wall groups. The military, the document reveals, has focused particular attention on groups peacefully protesting against the Trump administration's child separation policy (Klippenstein, 2019). According to another NBC San Diego report, sourced from documents leaked by a Homeland Security official, the US government was systematically identifying and monitoring journalists who covered immigration, civil rights attorneys, and protesters who demonstrated against Donald Trump (Timmons, 2019).

In the late summer of 2018, for example, as protest against the Trump immigration policies intensified and the movement to abolish the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) gained momentum, this federal agency was keeping tabs on "anti-Trump protests," according to documents obtained by the published weekly magazine called The Nation, via a Freedom of Information Act request. Among the protests the agency tracked several activists promoting immigrants' rights and opposing the administration's deportation policies (Tobias, 2019). For the Trump administration, anti-wall protesters are considered threat estimate, an assessment detailing the risk of perceived border threats (Klippenstein, 2019). Dozens of reporters, immigration lawyers, and activists, particularly those covering the US' controversial treatment of asylum-seekers near San Diego and other lawyers representing refugees there, were tracked by a "secret database" accessible to Homeland Security agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Timmons, 2019).

Jake Laperruque, counsel for the Constitution Project at the Project on Government Oversight, contended that "threat estimates that focused on protesters are highly disturbing" (in Klippenstein, 2019). Cataloging individuals protesting creates what Laperruque calls "serious risk of abuse, and without misconduct, monitoring the protesters is likely to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights" (Idem, 2019). Laperruque believes that "'Make America Great Again' should not mean returning to John Edgar Hoover-style surveillance" (Idem, 2019). Jody Kuh, a member of the movement Rise and Resist, says that "if the government focused on those against Trump, it gets into the realm of what fascist regimes do" (in Tobias, 2019).

Whereas indigenous communities, protesting for the sake of the environment, their sacred land and way of life, and human rights activist protesting against Trump's immigration policies were met with the police of surveillance, militarization and excessive use of force, white conservative people, carrying guns in the streets and not respecting social distancing rules, faced no kind of punishment by the police. Such a double standard treatment is one of the representations of the oppressive and exclusionary security drama that is told according to a racialized story. As one may note, minorities and oppressed groups (in particularly the indigenous community and migrants) are not allowed to be heard, as if these people were held hostage outside the theater. In the meantime, one should also observe that most of the spectators in the audience constitute what Lilie Chouliaraki brilliantly describes as "mere observers, those who are not engaged in rational and counter-argumentation on the 'universal' values of the spectacle that they are watching" (2006, p. 45).

In attempting to solve this problem, Andrew Linklater comes to suggest the Western audience to be more involved in what he claims for "(…) dialogues and debates in which hold the promise that political decisions and choices will not be reached by ignoring or suppressing marginal and dissident voices" (1998, p. 41). In this matter, Linklater asserts that "(…) the logic of such as argument is that dialogic communities will be sensitive to the needs of the victims of the totalizing project: namely, aliens beyond secured borders and a range of internally subordinate groups" (1998, p. 41). Thereby, the sociological paths for the spectators to take ought to be those of social resistance, of being able to participate at a macro level in the political life, by being aware of the deliberative processes celebrated by desecuritizing moves representing suffering, showing migrants being deported amid the pandemic outbreak, as well as protesters facing double standard treatment. In doing so, the narrative might be dismantled and the course of the security drama be changed.

Though at a micro level, spectators have already been developing a humanitarian awareness that, as Chouliaraki argues, "connects them with the victims of human suffering and with their own possible arguments about the spectacle" (2006, p. 45). Hence, the process called by Chouliaraki as deliberation comes to be celebrated in the version of desecuritization, and it stems from this awareness by some spectators that they are always part of an ongoing conversation. By using this process as a starting-point, we can speak about migration in a less securitizing mode.

Scene 6. The migration issue in Europe

In the last twenty years, if one take a look at a set of European newspapers headlines, one will realize how migration in the EU is largely defined in terms of security. Accordingly, many IR critical scholars who have engaged with research on the 'security/migration nexus' in a European context believe that the perception of migration as a security issue has become a central feature of contemporary policy discourse and practice on migration in the European Union (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). Since the events that followed the so-called *Refugee Crisis* along the Greek-Turkish border in 2015, the anti-immigration border architecture in the Mediterranean has been built upon preventive and defensive measures with the understanding that the goal is to bring the 'crisis' under control. In this context, preventive measures are aimed at preempting the departure of potential migrants. Defensive measures are designed to seal the border against unwanted migrants and expel those who still succeed in reaching or crossing it. These include militarization, deportation, or migrant detention (Topak & Vives, 2020).

Didier Bigo firmly observes that "in seeking to understand border controls in the European Union and the practices of (in)securitization operating in that context, it is fundamental to avoid an approach framed solely in terms of securitization theory" (2014, p. 211). In accordance with Bigo's point of view, this "(…) often implies presentism, together with a 'lack of attention' to the space/time structuration that rendered possible this scenario" (2014, p. 211). Bigo's assumption draws attention to migration as a constitutive factor of the European border, with the forces of the movements of migration challenging and reshaping the border. This perspective of putting migration central to the analytical endeavor points to the intrinsic structural fragility of the border regime (Hess & Kasparek, 2017).

Turning back to history, despite the fact that the postwar European welfare states evolved in an era of liberalization of trade and investment, they were premised on national control with access to welfare state rights and limited migration, not caring about non-European individuals dying in the dangerous routes or transit zones. Put another way: a context of relative social closure (Brochmann & Dolvik, 2018). Understanding history means to identify the causes that contributed to what some scholars call "dilemma" at the core of the European border regime.

Culminating in the creation of the EU internal market, this dilemma refers to the question how to reconcile a neoliberal economic paradigm of a – preferably global – free circulation of goods, services, and capital with a continued biopolitical will to control the movements of people (Hess & Kasparek, 2017). This dilemma is in fact involved by two particular moments of conflict over migration that either the representatives of European Union institutions and the member states governments serve to maintains and reinforce imaginaries: on the one hand, the imaginary of a Europe as a tolerant and liberal post-national or trans-border project; on the other, the imaginary of member states maintaining national sovereignty and the 'monopoly of violence.' What is actually meant to be preserved is the illusion of distinct realms of influence, authority, and 'power,' particularly in light of the vanishing of that which seems to keep these realms distinct (Stierl, 2020).

Within these two particular moments of conflict, political elites legislate citizenship. This signifies that they are responsive to European citizens' concerns and the moral panic over the perceived perils of uncontrollable asylum-seeking migration. In this regard, citizenship classes in the United Kingdom, for instance, were intended to manage public unease about a perceived asylum seeker 'influx' posing a threat to an 'imagined' Britishness (Khan, 2018). Didier Bigo also gives an example of "(…) a small but important part of the military personnel from the navies of some Southern European countries who view themselves as being at the front line of a clash of civilizations" (2014, p. 212). Taking these examples into account, we can note how those who seem to speak in the name of "Europe" are compelled to assert the trans-border and post-national idea of Europe vis-à-vis member state governments that are said to pursue nationalistic, xenophobic, violent, and 'un-European' migration policies. What emerges in these moments of friction are ideas about what it might mean to govern migration in European and un-European ways (Stierl, 2020).

Pursuant to the CASE Collective (a network of junior and senior researches who share an interest in examining practices of security), the fact of viewing themselves at the front line of a clash of civilizations, EU member states governments tend to mobilize conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state. Securitization does more than just potentially open the political scene to groups from extreme right, it entails structural effects ordering the audience on the model of extraordinary emergency or exception (CASE Collective, 2006).

From deep divisions within the military-strategic field to the European society as a whole, when conflictual or threatening relations are established, Didier Bigo truly believes that "governments and societies may see migrants enemies and as potential fifth column, and are not inclined to help them when they attempt to cross the sea" (2014, p. 212). Responses to the alleged threat of unwanted migration could be, therefore, platform in the way that a new form of sovereignty would be articulated through border policy. Whereas the EU is described as an entity that is more than an international organization – less than a state – in the field of border security, it is increasingly acting as a state. Perhaps one should also take as an example the abolishment of internal border checks, which has displaced the threat of unwanted migration to the external borders of the European Union, and made their collective management an issue of common interest (Topak & Vives, 2020).

As a result, this ensued conflicts within the Schengen system, which were already indicative of the instability to come. While on the EU level there was a decisive discursive shift towards a humanitarian rationale that prioritized the saving of lives at sea, in the immediate aftermath no decisive policy shift was discernible. The border regime in Europe became conflicted, so it is not possible to argue precisely which direction the development of this regime – together with the European project as a whole – will take (Hess & Kasparek, 2017). However, tentative conclusions can be formulated. One of them is that, to a certain extent, the conflicted character of the regime was exacerbated due to the governments' tendency to convince the audience through the various forms of '-isms' (e.g. racism, sexism, nationalism) that securitization of migration issues and its preventive and defensive measures are indispensable for the European welfare. Therefore, racially notions became crucial elements of the European security complex that have precipitated, like in the United States, a set of dehumanizing, extraordinary, exclusionary and oppressive practices against non-Europeans and non-white people.

Since the conflicts in Africa and Middle East exacerbated, the EU's actions are criticized by civil society organizations and academics for its focus on security measures, claiming that securitization is not the answer to the crisis. The adoption of emergency actions that go beyond ordinary politics, and the emphasis on a dialectic between migration and security on political narratives, legitimized the securitizing moves adopted in the current migratory crisis (Ferreira, 2018).

The current securitizing scenario is surrounded by what Jef Huysmans describes “the myth of European cultural homogeneity” (2006, p. 73). Huysmans observes that “discourses representing migration as a cultural challenge to social and political integration have become an important source for mobilizing security rhetoric and institutions” (2006, p. 73). For Huysmans, “forms of new and radical conservatism, including the clash of civilization discourses, might articulate a dream of cultural, spiritual and racial unity that is threatened by factors like cultural decadence and a drawing cultural war” (2006, p. 73). Non-Europeans and non-white people, e.g., immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, face this myth everyday, once they are considered as threatening to European national cultures.

The concern about the potential danger of migrants, the economic, social and political impacts of migration and the extensive set of institutional practices that regulate migration are what consolidate the security/migration nexus. Within this context, the ‘migration management regime’ is often accused of employing extreme measures. Frontex, the European border management agency, has been accused of violence and the death of thousands of migrants as they try to reach the border of Europe (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). Didier Bigo reveals that “testimonies have revealed the structural violence of indifference on the part of the Greek, Italian and Maltese authorities regarding boats in danger” (2014, p. 212). For Bigo, “the lack of assistance of their navies are in sharp contradiction to the long tradition of solidarity between sailors at sea and the rescue of boats in distress” (2014, p. 212).

When the structural violence of indifference and lack of assistance fail to prevent unwanted entries, mass deportations are oftentimes done without regard to the individual circumstances of those deported, who may be entitled to particular protections, such as minors, asylum-seekers, or refugees (Topak & Vives, 2020). The connection between security and migration is clear within the priorities in terms of internal security of EU members, once they consider irregular migration as a threat to security, thus emphasizing the role of border management in the management of migration. In more simple terms, illegal migration threatens the European cultural homogeneity, though illegal migration solely represents a small part of the total migration to the European territory. The repeated use of the word ‘illegal’ in the European jargon emphasizes the representation of a threat (Ferreira, 2018), and this supports the myth of European cultural homogeneity.

But not everything of EU corresponds to the maintenance of this myth. Take as an example the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, which, having the support of international law specialists, says that securitizing a problem that is of a humanitarian nature means to adopt policies and practices that are often contrary to legal obligations that would ensure the effective search and rescue operations, the prompt and safe disembarkation and treatment of rescued people, the prevention of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment (Council of Europe, 2019). In securitizing a problem that is of a humanitarian nature in order to maintain the myth of European cultural homogeneity, the European Union member states make what Jef Huysmans refers to as "(…) the indirect connection between migration policies and racism and xenophobia" (2006, p. 75). An example of this is the use of handcuffs, leg irons and drug sedation, when carrying out deportations, which reflects the militarization of the migration management (Nyers, 2006; Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014).

It can be true that high levels of migration impact the economic, institutional and political features of the particular welfare and labor regimes. Variations in generosity might affect the attractiveness to potential migrants as well (Brochmann & Dolvik, 2018). However, when some EU states emphasize restrictions and control by using handcuffs, leg irons and drug sedation for deportations, they are implying what Jef Huysmans calls "the negative portrayal of groups of migrants" (2006, p. 75). For Huysmans, "this kind of a policy risks sustaining public expressions of racism and xenophobia in the present political context" (2006, p. 75). In doing so, EU member governments exacerbate the crisis, not helping to reduce the deaths at the sea as migrants often attempt to reach a safe shore in Europe.

Meanwhile, states' search and rescue operations have been reduced, resulting in the rescue of refugees and migrants in distress at sea taking much longer, or sometimes coming too late altogether. This has contributed to making the Mediterranean route more dangerous. Restrictive measures have also allowed trafficking in human beings and smuggling to flourish (Council of Europe, 2019). For Bigo, "this produces the image of a territory as a 'container' where the borders are the 'skin' of the collective body that has to be defended to protect the insiders against outsiders" (2015, p. 62). Conclusively, Didier Bigo convincingly pointed out that "(…) the language is of political order as well as a horizon of war, with the connotations of a dystopian world made of death, killing, and sovereignty" (2015, p. 62).

Rather than being developed overnight, these measures were built upon earlier initiatives applied in the Western Mediterranean route, like the System for Integrated Surveillance of External Borders and mass deportation practices from Spain to Morocco. Despite differences in geography, government, and the profile of the incoming migrant population, there is a definite convergence in the ways the Spanish, Italian and Greek border control measures are being implemented (Topak & Vives, 2020). As Didier Bigo contends, "death in the Mediterranean Sea creates a paradox within a discourse in terms of walls and fences in the middle of the sea, and it turns liquid into solid, and electronic signals into barriers" (2015, p. 63).

What is more, the crisis in the Mediterranean is intertwined with the humanitarian context in Libya, a country that became vulnerable to smuggling networks. The humanitarian context in Libya is a consequence not only of the conflicts which escalated in degree and form after the 2011 NATO-led intervention, but also of the wider economic crisis that has taken place due to the decrease of the oil production. With humanitarian agencies unable to help the residents of overcrowded refugee centers, thousands of displaced people are highly encouraged to leave the Libyan territory by making their way to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea, where illicit trade and large movements of refugees are controlled by militias and gangs, with the full knowledge of European institutions and governments.

Al-Qaddafi's human rights violations were crimes to be punished, of course, but an economic stability and the security of the Mediterranean Sea were to a certain extent maintained by his regime. However, when the establishment of the NATO-led intervention followed the creation of a security drama played by a restricted club of leading roles, the number of displaced people in need of assistance increased, along with the deplorable conditions of the refugees centers. In this matter, apart from the debate whether the NATO-led intervention was successful or a failure, whether it should be undertaken or not, its unpleasant effects and fragments in Libya remain. Moreover, Tim Dunne says that "(…) the fissures in the world order were evident during and after the NATO-led intervention in Libya" (2015, p. 60). Those who supported the intervention argued that Libya was a textbook case, whereas others, according to Tim Dunne, "(...) argued that the intervention risked doing irreparable damage to the R2P norm and its prospects for becoming the go-to framework for responding to atrocity crimes committed by tyrants" (2015, p. 60).

Besides, in the wake of a decade-long NATO and UN mission in Afghanistan, the illegal and irrational Western mission in Iraq, and in the midst of a global economic recession, Robert Murray seems definitely convinced that "(…) the West could not afford a full-scale humanitarian intervention under the prototypical R2P auspices in political, economic or military terms" (2013, p. 31). Instead, Robert Murray comes to allege that "both the UN Security Council and NATO states showed themselves for what they are: rational survivalists" (2013, p. 31). He assumes that "they looked at Libya and asked themselves the most important question: how can we benefit from a mission with it costing the least?" (2013, p. 31). Conclusively, human security from thirty-five-thousand feet is for Robert Murray "(...) as rational a strategy as possible when faced with the prospect of oil and gold reserves for all those actors direct and indirectly involved in the intervention" (2013, p. 31).

Michael Walzer believes that "Libya did not qualify as a humanitarian intervention because it was not a genocidal massacre like Rwanda" (in Doyle, 2015, p. 109). According to Walzer, "it was instead an ordinary rebellion against a typical tyrant, however one incapable of succeeding on its own. The intervention in Libya was not justifiable, and this has surely wounded the R2P" (Idem, 2015, p. 109). Moreover, Michael Doyle reminds us that "(…) the legitimacy of the NATO-led intervention in Libya, in the sense of wide support, was not fulsome" (2015, p. 139). In his opinion, "there were many important abstentions from the not insignificant and powerful countries of Germany, Brazil, China, India, and Russia" (2015, p. 139).

According to Robert Murray's words, "what seems to have emerged from the Libya mission is the more pragmatic and far less clandestine doctrine of 'Rationality to Protect'" (2013, p. 31). For him, "this allows states to carefully calculate where an intervention would take place, under what conditions, and how beneficial such a mission might be to their own interests" (2013, p. 31). He also believes that "Libya could have been a clear example of human security in action, but it was far from triumph for norms over self-interests" (2013, p. 31). All this considered, what is relevant to comprehend is that interventionary practices that were followed by performative capacities culminated in a fragile situation in the Mediterranean Sea. When EU members had to deal with all the consequences of these practices, they decided to endorse a set of emergency actions under a securitizing process based on historical expressions of racism and xenophobia.

What is particularly problematic about the humanitarian context in Libya is that the country does not take party of any international refugee conventions. For this reason, the Amnesty International believes that displaced people are left with limited alternatives. The UNHCR is unrecognized, and its operations are limited. Outside the detention centers, thousands of refugees and migrants remain in precarious circumstances. Meanwhile, EU member states – particularly Italy – implemented a series of measures to close off the migratory routes through Libya and across the Mediterranean, including boosting the capacity of Libyan maritime authorities to intercept migrants and refugees and bring them back to Libyan soil (Amnesty International, 2018). Just as the US tweaks the rules to securitize the border with Mexico, the EU member states also endorse securitizing moves that force asylum seekers return to the deplorable conditions in Libya.

In 2017, EU member states controversially established an agreement with Libyan authorities to return would-be asylum-seekers detained while crossing the Mediterranean (Felter & Cheatham, 2019). In adopting these measures, European governments have largely achieved their objective of blocking refugees and migrants from crossing into Europe. However, these policies have in turn left thousands of refugees and migrants to languish in Libya without regular status, at high risk of violence and exploitation (Amnesty International, 2018). The fact is that not only do hundreds of migrants continue to die at sea, but also in some cases they come to be intercepted and brought to countries where they are often subjected to torture, rape, slavery and unlawful detention (Council of Europe, 2019).

The EU-Turkey Agreement that was signed in 2016 also makes Turkey partly responsible for the management of the European eastern border, while creating a new buffer state. Nevertheless, several questions regarding its legality came about, as the Agreement violates EU law on issues like detention and the right to appeal. The Agreement also denies potential refugees the possibility to request international protection in the EU, and violates international and European law protecting refugees and asylum-seekers, namely the principle of non-refoulement (Ferreira, 2018). Moreover, in a receptive mode, the European audience seems not interested in contesting and confronting the governments to look for possibilities of handling the migration crisis within a less securitized frame. For this, European multiple publics ought to be strong-minded enough to think on their own.

6.1. We Watch the Med: fulfilling duties of solidarity

Taking action through activist campaigns of desecuritization – usually organized and prioritized by many multiple publics in the audience – might also contribute to a promoted sense of community and to what Andrew Linklater appointed as "the responsibility to Otherness" (1998, p. 48). Manifestations of social activity based on solidarity activism against any form of violence, abuse of power and oppression, however small they may be, can already be considered desecuritizing moves. For Michel Agier, for example, "spaces emerge, in this age of globalization and local interventions by the 'international community'" (in Kynsilehto, 2018, p. 182). These spaces become for Agier "(…) sites of political and social expressions of a new emancipatory model acted out in and on the limits" (Idem, 2018, p. 182).

According to Ole Waever's argument, "whereas the securitization of certain issues could be related to identity, societies must look at the possibilities of handling humanitarian contexts by non-security means; to take in the crises, but leave them unsecuritized" (1995, p. 60). The main key to handle humanitarian crises by non-security means is to develop ideas and actions that follow what Andrew Linklater defined as "(…) a 'Kantian inclination' to raise up against local abuse of power, no matter who the author or the victims might be" (1998, p. 72). In a humanist and postmodernist sense, one might also associate Kantian inclination with solidarity activism, an emancipatory practice that is not so recent.

As previously observed in the case of the humanitarian crisis along the US-Mexico border, some vigilante civil society groups, like the Humane Borders, have been engaged for years to provide food, water and clothes for people transiting the desert. These solidarity networks create innovative practices in areas where states fail their connected responsibilities. One of these areas can also be the ongoing tragedy at the Mediterranean Sea (Kynsilehto, 2018). Back to 2011, the Mediterranean Sea was monitored with scrutiny that enabled the European states to become aware of any distress of boats at high sea, and to be effective in providing rescue operations. Nonetheless, a report[28] turned the surveillance technologies into evidences of responsibility for the crime of non-assistance in a drastic event.

28 See Heller, Charles, Pezzani, Lorenzo & SITU Studio (2012) – *Report on the "Left-To-Die Boat."* London: Goldsmiths University of London.

The left-to-die-boat case concerned a vessel that had departed from Libya and was drifting at the Mediterranean Sea for two weeks with all eyes watching, including the international media, a NATO operation that was going on against the Al-Qaddafi's regime, as well as the existing surveillance in place by the European Border Agency Frontex and national coast guards of the Mediterranean coastal states. Sixty-three people died on board (Kynsilehto, 2018). According to the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (S&R), which divided the world's ocean into search and rescue areas, the sovereign countries overseeing each area are responsible for rescuing people in distress at high sea. However, the nature of international law can strategically be mobilized by the performers of the political theater. In the left-to-die-boat case, more precisely, the coastal European states have decided to avoid engaging in rescue missions at high sea.

Two years later, in October 2013, the sinking of another vessel carrying over five-hundred refugees in Lampedusa led to the implementation of a Task Force that proposed guidelines and measures to better address migratory flows. Yet, despite the commitment to implement the actions proposed, the ones taken were not enough to prevent the worsening of the crisis and the increasing loss of lives at sea (Ferreira, 2018). These tragedies and the failure of states to respond adequately triggered a response around the Mediterranean. The Watch the Med[29] is one of the initiatives resulted from this concern, which created an alarm phone that provides a number, working 24/7 and covering the Mediterranean Sea corridors. The idea is to localize boats in distress at sea and contact the coast guard responsible to perform a rescue operation for the passengers. This initiative consists of providing details that the coast guards can no longer claim they were not aware of (Kynsilehto, 2018).

This manifests a sort of civic duty and engagement, in the way that the so-called 'critical mass' of the audience appears to be taking action by acknowledging and valuing migrants as political actors, not as threats. In this connection, the most important task for enough of the spectators in the audience is to grasp the conceptualization of migrants as not threatening; beginning by recognizing the performer's lack of minimal solidarist forms of humanitarian rescue, an important feature of the oppressive structure of securitization.

29 One of the rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea provided by the Watch the Med initiative is in Photo 5 in the Annex of this dissertation.

In accordance with Lilie Chouliaraki and Tijana Stolic's statement, "the symbolic instability of the refugee, swiftly shifting between speechless victim and evil-doing terrorist, lies at the heart of the audience's refugee imagery" (2017, p. 1165). They assert that "although these bodies are deeply political, in that they emerge at the intersection of corporeal and geopolitical relations of power between the West and global South, they lack civic status" (2017, p. 1165). The dehumanization of people in distress at high sea is for them "(…) the effect of the power relations that claim to sustain them as human bodies, in the first place" (2017, p. 1165). They argue that "characteristic of news, in imagery of UN camps and dinghies in the sea invites a monitorial relationship with those it depicts, registering their existence and offering minimal context for their suffering" (2017, p. 1165).

On the other hand, if we discuss about the conditions of human suffering with the purpose to value migrants as political actors, we are able to rupture the audience's refugee imagery, recast migrant vulnerability as resistance, and ultimately represent migrants as dynamic players in emancipatory projects of transnational solidarity activism (Chouliaraki, Orwicz & Greeley, 2019). In practical terms, this is what the Watch the Med is all about. The 24/7 Alarm Phone created by this initiative has developed into an infrastructure in support of the right to freedom of movement, accompanying the persistence of migration movements in the fight against the securitized European Union border regime (Bayer *et al*, 2019).

The increasing securitization of borders is the main factor contributing to ever-more risky journeys. Without professional help, overcoming borders has become nearly impossible. In this scenario, the Watch the Med continues to voice solidarity with migrants, with those unable to escape, those on the move, and those who, after all, still face extreme forms of violence (Edding & Stierl, 2019). Whereas the Libyan coast-guards – trained, funded and equipped by their European allies – launch mass interception campaigns at sea by returning thousands of migrants into inhumane detention camps and an active warzone, the Watch the Med is engaged in situations where a non-governmental chain of solidarity activism prevents death or refoulement (Stierl & Kopp, 2019). The Watch the Med, in partnership with other projects and initiatives, insist that civil society has to take action as long as this 'war against refugees' is going on: 1) in sea rescue, 2) in emergency phone networks and 3) in the denunciation of violations at the borders (Stroux, 2019).

Critical engagement of the ‘critical mass’ emerges within social movement-types of responses to humanitarian crisis situations like the Watch the Med. The acts of solidarity activism provided by hosting communities in Europe became visible in independent channels of communication. These movements have triggered many questions which are being answered in the midst of events. These questions also concern the need for organizing the acts in the best way to respond multiple needs (Kynsilehto, 2018). Examples of organized acts could be those of the cases from 3rd April 2019, when sixty-four people reached out the Alarm Phone, and were later rescued by the Sea-Eye’s rescue ship called Alan Kurdi. Also, on 4th July 2019, other fifty-five people who had already survived a night at sea called the Alarm Phone and were later discovered by Mediterranea's Alex. Other three boats alerted the Watch the Med and then were rescued by Open Arms between August 1 and 10. Or the eighty people who dialled the Alarm were rescued by the ship SOS Mediteranée’s Ocean Viking on 9th August 2019 (Stierl & Kopp, 2019).

In the meantime, the EU’s current approach to cooperation with third countries and NGOs is marked by unstable, security-driven deals and an insular, ‘not-in-my-backyard’ approach that leads to chaotic governance (Fine, 2019). For this reason, the Council of Europe recommends the EU members states to seek a constructive cooperation with NGOs conducting rescue operations to safeguard life and dignity of migrants and refugees. Stigmatizing rhetoric against NGOs carrying out search and rescue activities should be avoided, and their work should also be recognized in protecting the life of people at sea (Council of Europe, 2019).

The stigmatization of NGOs opens up a fertile ground for a possibility that this will exacerbate anti-immigrant populism in Europe by warping EU citizens’ view of contemporary migration (Fine, 2019). The stigmatization of NGOs activities is accompanied by the construction of migrants and refugees as dangerous Others, connecting them with terrorists, playing with what Didier Bigo referred to as “stereotypes of folk devils and criminalizing them through specific administrative practices” (2015, p. 65). In Bigo’s view, “this narrative is normalized in a war of civilizations, which turned into a war against migrants where mobility is seen as an invasion” (2015, p. 67). Bigo argues that “the defense of the nation presupposes that acts take the form of a cynical excuse for letting people die that are not “our” people. This regime of justification is oriented and attracts believers” (2015, p. 67).

Didier Bigo indicates that “governments are like sailors whose job is to ‘bale out the boat of the nation,’ filtering people by choosing what flows are allowed in order to ‘nurture’ growth, and by sending back the ‘irregulars’ as soon as possible” (2014, p. 214). For Bigo, “they share Zygmunt Bauman’s idea about the liquidity of modernity, but not his cosmopolitan agenda” (2014, p. 214). In more general terms, they show no interest on developing opportunities to take sustainable practices providing safe and legal migration pathways and reduce dependency on smugglers, coupled with the risk that migrants will embark on dangerous and deadly journeys (Fine, 2019). These practices imply a long-term approach that includes factors listed by Bigo as “(…) preparedness, timely information, increased trust, along with better synergies between border guards and the police across countries” (2014, p. 214).

These sustainable practices are alternatives that could only be taken seriously by the performers if most of the spectators decided to perform a more transformative role concerning the migration crisis. It is incumbent upon the audience to develop what Andrew Linklater identifies as the “(…) main political objectives of the existing counter-hegemonic movements that solidarity anticipates cooperation” (1998, p. 38). Considering this, states would begin to show interest on developing opportunities to undertake sustainable practices only if enough of the citizens enhanced the existing solidarity idea at a macro level, with discourses emphasizing equal treatment for immigrants. As long as the solidarity idea is reduced to a micro level, discourses emphasizing a nationalistic rationale, linking migration issues with criminality, terrorism or prostitution, will continue to prevail (Ferreira, 2018).

For this, we should consider the existence of both discursive models concerning migration issues, the one focused on the political aesthetics of everydayness (supported by the solidarity idea) and the other focused on Self-Other dichotomy (separating individuals to the utmost degree). In the latter model, Jef Huysmans contends that “plurality of opinion in the public space, economic competition and aesthetics differences could be limited because of the need to affirm the unity of the community and to protect its survival” (2006, p. 129). As Huysmans points out, “(…) a created Other/enemy has also the significant capacity to unite the functionally fragmented society of the liberal state” (2006, p. 129). In this kind of discourses, performers’ approaches to migration happen to establish no transparent rules, procedures, or processes on save and rescue missions, disembarkation, or relocation.

The EU, for example, initially began to address the relocation of asylum-seekers through a temporary Europe-wide instrument with specified rules and procedures, however, this appears to be moving backwards to engage in relocation with less formality, fewer players, and opening more room for both exclusionary and discriminatory practices (Fine, 2019). The exclusionary and discriminatory quality of the current EU migration policies is highlighted by wording, like “improving the mobility of professionals,” which condemns most migrants as ‘unwanted’ (Slan & Abdullah, 2019). In other words, negative political discourses on migration are ideologically oriented, and they resort to many linguistic labels aiming to portray the arrival of large number of migrants as something threatening.

For instance, in 2011, the Italy’s Prime Minister Berlusconi’s speech resorted to the wording ‘human tsunami,’ In 2015, the headlines of the Washington Times: ‘Stop immigration flood’; the BBC News: ‘Migrants flood trains in desperate bid to leave Italy’; or the Mail Online: ‘Forget the Greek crises or Britain’s referendum, this tidal wave of migrants can be the biggest threat to Europe since the war’ (Ferreira, 2018). These headlines reinforce the security language aimed at depicting migrants as threatening. Moreover, the fear is that a narrative of “out-of-control” migration can further strengthen these discriminatory discourses, contributing to further reinvigorate the already existing audience’ support for harsher migration policies across Europe. However, the price paid by the EU in terms of its credibility is illustrated by the criticism coming from the NGOs and human rights advocates – not to mention the negative impact this is having on those whose lives are harshly affected by these security discourses and policies (Alagna, 2020).

Eventually, desecuritizing moves, such as the one provided by the Watch the Med initiative, face accusations of being what Hagen Kopp interestingly called “solidarity criminals” (2015, p. 71). For Kopp, “the members of the Watch the Med know that governmental repressions follow political and media hypes and, if necessary, they construct completely arbitrary so-called criminal offenses” (2015, p. 71). For every desecuritizing move like the Watch the Med there will be what Kopp calls as “accusations of abetting illegal entry or residence” (2019, p. 124). Also, for the ones accusing NGOs as criminals, says Bigo, “(…) the world is a world of states, and if compassion is possible, not a cosmopolitan world where rights to live in the best countries would be accepted” (2015, p. 71).

However, Hagen Kopp also observes that "(…) the Alarm Phone has the most continuous history in the discussion group and is active with many teams in several cities and countries" (2019, p. 124). For Kopp, "the transnational and deliberately decentralized structure make it harder for persecuting authorities to paralyze this hot-line project overnight" (2019, p. 124). What particularly makes the Watch the Med Initiative an organizational model of desecuritization is its widespread network structure. According to Kopp's observation, "this network structure follows a preventive anti-criminalization strategy; when one head is cut off, two others should grow back" (2019, p. 124). This is how they can keep the solidarity idea alive, demonstrating to the rest of the audience that non-state actors can fulfill duties of protection. In today's world, detention is one of the practices of securitization of the European border management. But migrants should not be seen as a flow; even when they are detained, they have the right to be treated in humane conditions.

The Watch the Med could already witness in real-time what occurred throughout a refoulement operation of a boat comprised by one-hundred migrants on 20th January 2019. In the course of the operation, the Libyan and Italian authorities separated the migrants into groups of men and women and locked them in a merchant vessel. Migrants were beaten when they refused to disembark and forced in small groups to leave the vessel and go to the harbor of Misrata, in Libya, thereafter transferred to a detention camp. From there, some of the women also sent pictures of unhygienic conditions and bodies marked by torture (Conni, 2019).

The Alarm Phone team continues to grow, with several activists from all different countries in Europe, Africa and Middle East. The establishment of its widespread network structure is what sustains its solidarism, regarded by many as acts of disobedience. Here, I would rather call them acts of desecuritization, projects of solidarity subverting the security logic in the way that reflexive spectators come to emerge as, according to Céline Cantat and Margit Feischmidt's definition, "the local helpers, a central figure of the desecuritizing field" (2018, p. 382). Cantat and Feischmidt observe that "the local helpers have of yet received limited scholarly attention and have not been the main subject of a broader comparative academic approach" (2018, p. 382). When it comes to examining the European humanitarian scene, reflexive spectators also play a substantial role in the everyday protection of minorities through informal structures, like the Alarm Phone.

Knowing that solidarity is not mere passive feeling but also includes practical dispositions to act (Laitinen & Pessi, 2014), reflexive spectators engage themselves in fulfilling duties of protection in situations where performers fail to provide a proper organizational role. As Céline Cantat and Margit Feischmidt note, “the growing involvement of volunteers and non-professional actors to provide assistance to the victims of humanitarian crisis signaled a temporally significant shift with potential longstanding impact in the practices and habits of care provision” (2018, p. 382). Therefore, in a sociological and psychological sense, the growing involvement of volunteers in local humanitarian contexts is studied in empirical research through a focus on behavior. Sociologists believe that behavior is not enough for solidarity, as acting out of solidarity requires the presence of attitudes or emotions, e.g., sense of belonging and concern for other’s well-being (Laitinen & Pessi, 2014).

Solidarity as desecuritization, however, ties form and sometimes dissolve with new information and new emergencies. Not everyone is physically able to go and work for weeks or months and provide help where it is needed the most, be it for financial reasons, family commitments, emotional capacity or other reasons. For this purpose, we, the audience, need to recognize that these are not only available ways to ‘do something’ against securitization and to act in solidarity. Every encounter counts. Everyone is needed (Kynsilehto, 2018). Everyone in the audience can be moved by what Céline Cantat and Margit Feischmidt define the “moral and ethical imperatives towards providing assistance to minorities” (2018, p. 384). One can take as examples the Watch the Med and other coalitions that came together in innovative ways to organize material support for hundreds of refugees around Europe. Cantat and Feischmidt indicate that “people with no or little previous experience of social and political activities mobilized, often using social media and informal means of communication to organize collective responses” (2018, p. 385).

Solidarity is associated with local emancipation. Unlike the global thinking of humanitarianism developed by performers on the political stage, the solidarity idea carried out by reflexive spectators is primarily internal to the audience, where the multiple publics could share mutual interests. The more the spectators take this solidarity idea seriously, the more the audience recognizes we are meant to play a fundamental role in local humanitarian scenes, shaping new policies that could best serve everyone’s interests without sacrificing fundamental rights.

6.2. From refugee strikers to an imaginary Farlandia

As one may observe, research dedicated at empirically unfolding desecuritization comprise a very small part of the IR critical literature. Widening the critical literature might be a worthwhile endeavor to understand either the logics of security and the greater pursuit of peace and justice. Such contribution could feasibly originate in empirical research (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). In attempting to improve empirical studies in desecuritization, the next desecuritizing moves explore the centrality of the audience in the European humanitarian context. In addition, these empirical cases demonstrate the co-dependency of agency (audience) and context (migration crisis), and they also claim for a better and more humane dealing of the migration issue in and outside of the European borders.

The centrality of the audience is the main point of analysis here, once its comprising multiple publics are fundamental for the success of a desecuritizing move, depending upon our ability and senses of empathy to identify ourselves with the humanitarian crises taking place in our surroundings. Multiple publics are certainly crucial for desecuritization, and for what Mark Salter defines as "(…) re-politicization – the repatriation of a security issue back to the realm of deliberative (normal) politics" (2011, p. 128). Considering that its role in the drama should not be reduced to a receptive mode, the audience may acknowledge that, as Salter contends, "(…) its appetite for securitization varies greatly with the rhetorical appeal made in direct relationship to the competing claims for desecuritization" (2011, p. 128).

Although claims for desecuritization usually come from multiple publics in the audience, other actors might also be capable of making desecuritizing claims to the nature of threat. As a matter of fact, contributions of desecuritization come not only from actors performing inside the political theater, but also from outsiders. One important example of that was the 2012 Berlin Refugee Strike[30], which was mainly organized by silenced voices in the fringes of society. It is worthwhile to take a deep look at this case, given that it was implicated in a context of securitization and in attempts of desecuritization (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014).

30 After showing a securitizing move about a humanitarian crisis taking place at the high sea, the 2012 Berlin Refugee Strike played an active role in revealing the world the outcomes of an oppressive immigration regime taking place within the boundaries of the European countries. This event is represented in the Photo 6 in the Annex.

In exploring this case, one might note that despite of being more marginalized than other constituents, refugees successfully aggregated resources of social-organization and notably self-produce cultural resources. Due to the protest tactics, the Berlin Refugee Strike momentarily changed the institutional political authority not only in Germany, but in Europe (Bahr, 2013). In a nutshell, in early 2012, refugees from different *lagers* or camps in Germany came together through local discussions and debates aimed at finding solutions to end either the food voucher and the isolation system. They declared that they intended to fight the laws and policies that violated their freedom and dignity. Besides, in the attempt to respond to the suicide of the Iranian asylum-seeker Mohammed, they have decided to built a protest camp in Würzburg, where he had died. Few days after, several camps followed in other cities and the movement moved to Berlin (Langa, 2015).

From the motivation and actions of this movement organized by silenced voices, it quickly becomes evident that the chants of the refugee strikers "no one is illegal!", "struggle for freedom!", and "no borders, no nations, stop deportations!" are indicative of a radical critique of discourse and practices of the Western modern state system (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). Not only in Germany, but also in most of the European countries, asylum-seekers are often placed in public accommodations. In Germany, during the time their demands for asylum are processed, they are only allowed to leave their administrative authority's district with the permission of municipal or federal levels (Bahr, 2013). Deprived from freedom, and by claiming among other things the right to free movement, the refugees left their isolated camps around Germany in a march to Berlin. Many covered a distance of six-hundred kilometers in twenty-eight days. In Berlin, they occupied schools and federal offices, organizing demonstrations and hunger-strikes (Langa, 2015).

One of the main points about the Berlin Refugees Strike is that its discourses and actions could be viewed as an attempt of desecuritizing itself from the securitized category of the border management regime. The striker perceived the migration management regime articulated to expose refugees to isolation and exclusion. The march was meant to deal with the existence of particular camps or practices, and the system as a whole. It is important to observe that it was the nation-states and contemporary forms of exercising authority and security that seemed to be the root problem of the manifestations (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014).

Various instances in connection with the strike appear to be plausible examples of collective action. The march to Berlin, for example, stems from the decision taken to reach the heart of political decision-making in Germany. The goal of the march was explicitly to put pressure on the system (Bahr, 2013). As a consequence, the Berlin Strike had a great impact on German Parliament and the Committee on International Affairs was forced to meet with the protesters because of their hunger-strike. In the course of the meeting, the two major right wing parties of Germany spoke out against the protesters demands. But there were also some members of parliament supporting human rights. From 2013 to 2014, the obligation of residence was loosened in some German federal states, where those who seek asylum in Berlin, for example, were allowed to travel in Brandenburg, too (Langa, 2015).

Due to the fact that it regarded the practices of the European migration management regime as arbitrary, the Berlin Strike draws on international language by mobilizing legitimacy for their struggle. In showing that the migration management regime was somehow dictated by colonial rules, the refugees and supporters attempted to situate their struggle in a historical context of colonialism, whereby a political frontier is established between the oppressor/oppressed, or the colonizer/colonized (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). This was a desecuritizing move that confronted the traditional notion drawn by the leading roles that refugees are just human beings subjected to the law. The problem is that the law happens to exclude and deprive silenced voices in the fringes of society from a politicized life.

The Berlin Refugee Strike also had partial reliance on supporters and civil actors. Coalition-building with organizations active in asylum policy was made, once these organizations had a specialized knowledge on conducting protests. The networking among these actors gave rise to new ideas and actions, such as the famous march to Berlin. At this moment, refugee-activists created human, social-organizational and cultural resources by using aggregation, self-production and, to a lesser extent, co-optation (Bahr, 2013). This happened because the refugees have managed to enlarge their solidarity network. While the Berlin Strike was taking place, the refugees and protesters received a significant support from the German society in terms of food, clothes, financial and legal support. For example, there were students giving free German classes to refugees at the occupied school in the district of Berlin called Kreuzberg, and there were also doctors and lawyers (Langa, 2015).

Moreover, appealing to a wider aim of changing the structure of the system, the refugees decided to link their struggle to other silenced voices, the underprivileged, marginalized, and lower groups of society. In fact, they established a solidarity connection with these groups, which was underpinned by a logic of equivalence establishing capitalism as a common Other (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). Properly speaking, their struggle was related to a broader fight for social justice, including the homeless community and low-class workers. This struggle spread out around Europe, with other refugees strikes taking place in Austria, France and the Netherlands. These events have brought into light the colonial heritage of the immigration policies in Europe. The European audience could finally see, through media reports and the visual representations of the strikers, that securitization was articulated by a racialized story under a colonial script.

In a political theater where relations of unequal power between performers, audience and victims of the security drama prevail, contributions of desecuritization through collective actions (e.g. the Berlin Refugees Strike) serve as critical means for the spectators to better understand the political aesthetics of everydayness, and then to confront and contest the existing colonial heritage of the political theater. By taking desecuritization for granted to confront the system and structures of exclusion, the audience can develop dialogic communities based on Habermasian notions of social learning, so a sociology of international relations could be created. The sociology of international relations consists of higher levels of popular participation in wider communities of dialogue, involved by networks of what Andre Linklater describes as "(…) social cooperation and more inclusive solidarities" (1998, p. 125) that might change the course of the drama and its oppressive structures.

For this purpose, European citizens should empower one another to build an infrastructure that is focused on the political fight, by organizing conferences, workshops and so on (Langa, 2015). It is precisely about organizing conferences, workshops and the like that the next desecuritizing move of this study is concerned with. For school students in the Czech Republic, officers of the UNHCR schools programme have simulated a drama[31] of the asylum process – not real life, but an interesting exercise in empathy (Womack, 2019).

31 This move is in Photos 7 and 8. This move is important because students can realize that were born into a system that wants to make them comfortable, so they never challenge it.

This exercise was described by Karen O'Reilly as "the social imaginary in lifestyle migration in Europe, which is an attempt to grapple with the creative, individual and ever-changing nature of the political imagination" (2014, p. 211). This drama could offer what Karen O'Reilly refers to as "(…) the socially-shaped ways that a place or lifestyle could be imagined, with the social outcomes of a high number of spectators acting on their political imagination in terms of their own lives and the shaping of places" (2014, p. 211). This exercise somehow addresses the colonial heritage of the European migration regime, which is important, because this issue has not been addressed in the way that it needs to be, once the audience is not having these conversations. The more the spectators (mainly the next generations) have enough insight to explore, understand the regime, and hence bring it to the forefront, the less they will be complicit of the system. If we do not discuss this issue with the next generations, all forms of oppression will continue to perpetuate.

Bearing this in mind that the UNHCR programme was first tested in Sweden, then it came to the Prague British International School to continue to stimulate discussion about refugees. The morning begins with the students, in the position of refugees and migrants, queuing up to see "immigration officers," played out by UNHCR staff, from an imaginary country called "Farlandia." The "officers" bark orders in "Farlandish," a made-up language that nobody understands. The "refugees" try to make sense of application forms in the abracadabra (Womack, 2019). This simulation has much in common with critical pedagogy and social justice education. What the educators (UNHCR staff, in this case) attempted to do was to expand education through the inclusion of a visual culture and an imaginary lifestyle underpinned by a critical pedagogy with the purpose of empowering students to be more thoughtful, more reflective, and active participants in the political life.

In doing so, the educators show that the struggle for human rights is reliant on the development of social relations (Langa, 2015). The educators also recognize that, to disrupt the regime, they need to talk about it with their students, empowering them to use their privileged status and call for change. For this, the educators must situate students in positions of disadvantage, for them to understand the unjust set of constraints that refugees encounter. A simulation like Farlandia is a good example, inasmuch as it best provides the students the idea of how being a refugee feels like, so they can deal with the complexity of the regime and see the nuance.

Having experienced a critical pedagogy, like the one provided by the UNHCR programme, the spectators might be able to pursue what Karen O'Reilly comes to describes as "(…) the power or capability to change things, knowledge about what would occur if they change things, and enough reflective distance from their current situation to start to think about some alternative options" (2014, p. 222). This kind of exercise in empathy by using imagination plays a key role. As O'Reilly contends, "imagination resides in the individual: images can evoke, suggest imaginary futures, portray humanitarian crises, help the imagination in its work. Nonetheless, the imagination itself and the desire this creates are individual" (2014, p. 222). Critical pedagogy stimulates imagination, creativity and innovation, making spectators reflect about the fears and challenges refugees encounter in their everyday lives.

Besides making students feel as if they were refugees, the UNHCR programme also offered lectures given by refugees, like Mr. Ibrahim, a Syrian refugee who makes an appearance as a sort of "human library," telling the students of his five-years effort to settle in the Czech Republic. Ibrahim says that he does not mind being a "human library," once he noticed how little experience they (locals) have with foreigners. Ibrahim's main goal is to change their ideas about his homeland by explaining that Syria has an ancient culture and history, and sadly much of this has been destroyed (Womack, 2019). Discourses like this provide reflection and questioning that, in accordance with Campana's argument, "(…) aligns with critical pedagogy, where a complex view of relationship between individuals, community, and world is key" (2011, p. 286). For Campana, "with this complex comes the necessity of constant reflection on and dialogue about those relationships, and the curricula embedded in society and institutions that keep power structures in place" (2011, p. 286).

When spectators are able both to relate to and see oneself in relation to other people, specially vulnerable groups, they begin to grasp what Karen O'Reilly called "the interpretative processes where choices are imagined, evaluated, and reconstructed by actors in ongoing dialogue with unfolding situations" (2014, p. 222). According to O'Reilly, "(…) the imagination is part of agency, and is essential to understanding critical pedagogy and human actions" (2014, p. 222). Also, simulating Farlandia to students is not an exercise that will be traumatic for them. On the contrary, the educators are mindful about the oppressive immigration regime and about the information and knowledge they are giving to the next generations.

For some of the students who experienced the programme, for example, the film and meeting with Mr. Ibrahim also had a greater impact than the role playing. A student called Sebastian, 17, said that “with the simulation, I knew we were just acting. However, the film and Mr. Ibrahim’s talk really moved me, making me feel what it is like to be a refugee” (Womack, 2019). This kind of critical pedagogy that provides reflection and questioning about humanitarian issues can be associated with Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of Freedom*. Paulo Freire was convinced that “the essence of the educator’s ethico-political choice is their consciously taken option to intervene in the world” (2000, p. 102). As Freire indicates, “this is what Amilcar Cabral called ‘class suicide’ and what is defined in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* as a resurrection during Easter” (2000, p. 102). According to Freire’s way of thinking, “educators must be convinced that a just world is a dream worth striving for” (2000, p. 102). In his conclusion, “their struggle for radical change means more than wait for it to arrive because someone said it will arrive somehow and someday” (2000, p. 102).

The imaginary Farlandia consists of diminishing such a distance that separates the victims of the security drama and the audience. The simulation of an imaginary Farlandia embodies a critical pedagogy very in common with Paulo Freire’s assumptions that offer students the opportunity to have a sense of their rights and responsibilities in a democratic society that recognizes the common good over the corporate good (Giroux, 2010). Paulo Freire contends that “the knowledge that underpins the ‘crossing over’ required of the reflexive spectators to diminish the distance between them and the perverse reality of the exploited is the knowledge grounded in a sort of ‘ethical code’”(2000, p. 103). For Freire, “with this knowledge, human exploitation would no longer be permitted” (2000, p. 103).

In Freirean pedagogical context, students learn how to expand their own sense of agency while recognizing that to be voiceless is to be powerless. Giving students the opportunity to imagine and feel like belonging to oppressed groups means to engage them in a culture of questioning about who has control over the specific modes of knowledge, identities, and authority (Giroux, 2010). Not only Farlandia, but also the refugee strikers are cases of local emancipation, whereby knowledge is transformed, challenging authority and oppression. These moves are one step forward to learning how to act rather than being submissive. These are desecuritizing cases that recognize agency and collective action as major dimensions for social change.

The refugee strikers and the imaginary Farlandia are illuminating, and they could not have changed minds radically, however they are points of reflection that, to certain extent, lead the audience to experience of others as they have gone through live. Although at a micro level, they might empower enough of the audience to engage in advocacy on behalf of the victims of the drama. Justyna, 19, for example, after experiencing Farlandia, argues that she will definitely try to find out more about refugees. Another student called Maud goes further, saying that this experience has inspired her to consider doing volunteer work with refugees (Womack, 2019). Ultimately, I truly believe that supporting desecuritization of the migration crisis in Europe, either by creating an Alarm Phone or organizing strikers and workshops underpinned by a critical pedagogy, means moving beyond our receptive mode by reflecting about power, history, memory and justice.

First of all, the Western audience has to know that something is up in the political theater, and that it is not fair. Secondly, enough of the audience, in particularly the students who will be next generation, should not be afraid to discuss about how oppressive the performers can be. This means for the spectators in the audience to situate themselves in the theater in the way that they can lift up their voices and say what is spoken on the political stage is not right. The theater is rigged and we should talk about it. This is not a battle, but rather an attempt to do better. Simply put, desecuritization is a practice that multiple publics have room to improve. This is a conversation for everyone. The more inclusive is the desecuritizing language, more inclusive reflexive spectators are in bringing the larger society into a better understanding of the political theater, so the audience can be champions of a better relationship with the performers on the political stage.

Scene 7. About the American-Israeli theater

Upon his entry into the White House, US President Trump vowed to put an end to the decade-long Israeli-Palestinian tensions by assembling a peace team made up of personal confidantes. The policy implications of this close convergence led to the implementation of far-reaching and pro-Israel decisions on the ground in which countered prior US Mideast policy, alienated the Palestinian Authority, and further challenged the ability of the US to act as an impartial mediator (Wermenbol, 2019). Before the *Deal of the Century* was announced, Trump had already refused to unequivocally back a two-state settlement, and refrained from clearly condemning Israel's settlement policy in the occupied territories. In 2018, Washington had also stopped funding the UNRWA. The USA had been by far the largest contributor, covering about one-third of UNRWA's total budget. The background to this is that Trump shares the Israel government's view that UNRWA perpetuates the refugee problem by encouraging refugees to insist on their right to return to Palestine, rather than integrating within their current host states (Asseburg, 2019).

In the Barack Obama administration, the United States had signalized an intention to decrease the involvement in the Middle East. This approach reflected weariness in Washington regarding long and unsuccessful military engagements in the region, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. There was a concern about shifting US policies during Obama era, as then the US President seemed critical of Israeli settlement activity[32]. Trump, on the other hand, offered public support to a number of Israeli positions concerning territorial questions that were generally unacceptable to the international community (Eiran, 2020). Additionally, the US embassy move to West Jerusalem, which took place in May 2018, had the opposite international response to what Netanyahu and Trump desired. The United Nations and the European Union, conversely, rejected the unilateral step. Palestinian protesters, who already were in the midst of protesting the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, clashed with the Israeli army, resulting in the death of six Palestinians (Wermenbol, 2019).

32 There is a dubious side to the manner that Obama and US foreign policy dealt with Israeli settlements. While Obama and his Secretary of State John Kerry seemed critical about this issue, trying to mediate deals between Israel and the Palestinians (Eiran, 2020), the US delegation to the UN completely shielded Israel from international scrutiny by applying veto power. One such instance included the delegation's efforts to scotch a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel's settlements in 2011, despite the fact that a key element of US Mideast policy in early 2009 had been producing a complete settlement freeze in the West Bank (Wermenbol, 2019).

Today, combined US and Israeli pressure has created a situation where the very existence of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) is at stake. In 2018, the United States ended its financial support for the PA and Palestinian civil society, and also closed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington DC. (Asseburg, 2019). Since 2018, almost two-hundred Palestinians have also been assassinated by Israeli soldiers. OCHA reports increases in unarmed Palestinian causalities as well as the impact of tear gas canisters used by Israeli soldiers. The excessive use of force (e.g. the specific targeting of knees by Israeli snipers in the course of the Great March of Return protests in Gaza, along with the exposure of children to such levels of violence) should not only raise alarm bells, but also lead to urgent calls for international sanctions (Pace & Yacobi, 2020).

Within this context, in January 2020, the US offered a blueprint to resolve the Arab-Israeli tensions, called a "vision for peace" (or in its popular name: the *Deal of the Century*), under which Israel will retain thirty per cent of the occupied West Bank, including all of its settlements. Trump's support for Israel territorial designs holds the seeds of future instability. In case Israel entrench formally into West Bank, it will institutionalize inequality between the Israelis and almost three million Palestinian people in the West Bank (Eiran, 2020). The Deal was also formulated without active and informed Palestinian participation. In keeping the Israeli notion of security, Trump's plan for Israel and Palestine proposes, among other things, the annexation of the Golan Heights to Israel, with Israel enjoying full control and administration of the entire region of the River Jordan; the creation of the Palestinian state without armed forces, and the prohibition of the return of Palestinian refugees.

In accordance with the recently-appointed Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh, any American/Israeli peace plan that ignores the Palestinian people's aspirations for an independent state is doomed to fail. The Palestinians were highly critical of the plan. For the Palestinian envoy Nabil Shaath, the plan was intended to dangle around fifty billion dollars in economic support in front of the financially strapped PA as a bribe to accept the peace plan and give up its goal of creating a sovereign Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied regions (Wermenbol, 2019). Additionally, within the Middle East Quartet, consisted of global powers such as the UN, the European Union, the US, and Russia, there has been no response from any of them (besides the US) to Trump's plan (Pace & Yacobi, 2020).

All this considered, the American *Deal of the Century* was unlikely to contribute meaningfully to resolving the Israel-Palestine tensions. On the contrary, the deal risks further escalating the tense situation and accelerating the erosion of joint conflict management. Even under strong pressure, the Palestinian leadership was not to be expected to agree to the US approach (Asseburg, 2019). In simple terms, in this American-Israeli theater, Donald Trump creates a political spectacle by endorsing annexation and occupation that violate the international law, thus putting his ally Netanyahu under the spotlight of a stage that is more than ever occupied by segregationist, oppressive and civilizationalist performers.

The American-Israeli theater is not merely rhetoric. The spectacles played out by American and Israeli performers could be described by what John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt called as "the remarkable backing that the United States has long provided to the Jewish state" (2007, p. 24) As explained by Mearsheimer and Walt, "more than any other country, the United States has been Israel's great benefactor" (2007, pp. 24-25). By performing as the leading roles in the theater, USA and Israel envisage civilization states established by peace plans, deals and discourses of democracy, however they also dedicate more time for intolerance and extremism than for the rule of law. This is considered here as political theater, in the way that the leaders of both countries pursue security policies by manipulating their audiences to undermine the Palestinian-Other through violence.

Having the support of its most powerful ally, the US, Israel endorses the *Deal of the Century* with the purpose to formally annex the parts of West Bank and the Golan Heights. This move would alter Israel's demographic makeup with Palestinians and Jews almost equal in numbers. But this was also further bound to weaken Israel's democracy – already under strain. This move was expected to create meaningful internal tensions and a setting for future violent eruption, as the Palestinians were expected to resist this arrangement (Eiran, 2020). In a critical and emancipatory perspective, therefore, it is suggestible for the American and Israeli audiences to recognize how dangerous was this plan, once it could bring more instability in the future. If these audiences remain in a receptive mode before what is spoken on the stage, they will definitely be party of the spectacle, paying no attention to human lives whatsoever. Instead, they should be more engaged in an open and serious public discussion about the pros and cons of the American-Israeli relationship.

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt highlight the key elements developed by the American and Israeli leading roles aimed at manipulating their audiences and that constitute what they call the "(..) Israel lobby, which is meant to strive to influence discourses about Israel in the media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical to shaping popular opinion" (2007, p. 168). As argued by Mearsheimer and Walt, "(…) such a lobby promotes efforts to portray Israel in a 'positive light' and it goes to considerable lengths to marginalize anybody who questions Israel's past and present conduct or seeks to cast doubt on the merits of unconditional US backing" (2007, p. 168). In their conclusion, "pro-Israel forces are well aware that dominating discussions about the Jewish state is essential to their agenda. Even though these efforts do not always succeed, they still seem effective" (2007, p. 168). In any case, we should be aware about knowledge concerning Israel, which tends to be biased to preserve a civilizationalist project.

As members of free and democratic civil societies, the Western spectators should examine the events in Israel/Palestine from the point of view of the values implicit in the societies they live in. In doing so, it will be apparent for them that, by denying people their civil liberties, Israel is somehow posing a threat to that portion of global civil society – it is threatening human rights (Frost, 2009). For this purpose, a public debate regarding the American-Israeli's deal should have addressed the issues that might contribute to a lasting resolution of the tensions, mainly the fulfillment of the right to national self-determination of both peoples, and the guarantee of individual human rights (Asseburg, 2019). The desecuritization debate about the conflict must include a message that brings these criteria into light.

For this, we should firstly not be willing to treat the mainstream media's coverage of Israel as the single source of information. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt highlight that "(…) the mainstream media's coverage consistently favors Israel, and does not call the American support into question in any way" (2007, p. 169). Having this in minds, it is fundamental for the audience to search for other sources of information released by columnists and reporters who, as Mearsheimer and Walt remind, "(…) have no special feelings for Israel and feel comfortable criticizing its policies and the USA-Israel relationship" (2007, p. 169). Mearsheimer and Walt conclude that "there are some people who may be pro-Israel, however they would welcome a more open discourse about that country" (2007, p. 169).

If we read the Weaver's writings, we might notice that subjects are not given prior to their entrance into the public sphere, but rather they are constituted in discourse (Hansen, 2012). Bearing this in mind, we might also conclude that the notion that Israelis and Palestinians are incompatible groups was established by a securitized narrative. The setting of securitized narratives might eventually be abstract but their consequences are visible. For example, the Israeli occupation of territories, as in the West Bank, have dramatically increased, whereas the securitized narrative of Palestinians-Other has been produced and reproduced, which made the Palestinian peoples targets that could be reduced to domination.

Take as an example the Israeli wall/barrier in West Bank, which has many purposes, and means many things. In Anthony Burke's line of thought, "(…) even more profoundly, the wall separates Jewish and Palestinians in a way that the two-state solution imagined in the Oslo or Geneva accords would not have" (2007, p. 67). As Burke argues, "the wall is about separation, solidifying the mutual hostility and alienation that deepened since the Second Intifada began in 2000" (2007, p. 67). Knowing that the wall is largely supported by the Israeli people, Burke contends that "(…) it may provide them with short-term security solely to undermine it over long-term" (2007, p. 67). The wall emboldens for Burke "(…) the champions of the occupation and it embitters the Palestinians for whom its meaning is different, yet another fact of colonization, domination and control" (2007, p. 67). The wall only prioritizes one side in the social, security, political, and economic fields.

The securitization of the crisis was carried out by strategies that removed the Palestinians from politics in ways that placed them within the untouchable box of security. In the view of Israel defence establishment and the US administration, Palestinians represent a threat that can be countered by the construction of a tool as indiscriminate as a wall in West Bank (Abu-Zahra, Leech & MacNeil, 2016). The success of a securitization act is for Mark Salter "(…) dependent not solely on the formal syntax or on the informal social context, but also to the particular history, dominant security narrative, and the constitutive characters and the structure of the setting itself" (2008, p. 331). Michael Walzer reminds us, for example, "when the Former Israeli Prime Minister Shamir said that the Intifada represented a form of warfare against the State of Israel – as if a few of Palestinian children with slingshots would pose a threat to the existence of the state" (2004, p. 108).

As Michael Walzer pointed out, "(…) the absurdity of this discourse was widely accepted – for have not the Arabs been at war with Israel for more than forty years now" (2004, p. 108). Walzer also argues that "the reiterated refrain of right-wing political rhetoric, 'everyone is against us,' is simply untrue, but it is too widely accepted. For all their military strength, the Israelis often feel terribly vulnerable" (2004, p. 108). In Walzer's conclusion, "what the Israeli want from recognition is security" (2004, p. 108). Mearsheimer and Walt observe, however, that "(…) the existence of the Jewish state is now recognized and accepted by several countries around the world. Its economy is developing and the Israeli citizens are prosperous" (2007, p. 341). Considering this, they believe that "it is time for the United States to treat Israel not as a particular case but as a normal state, aiming to deal with Israel as much as it deals with any other country" (2007, p. 341).

Anthony Burke observes that "(…) in a place where security is an overwhelming obsession and a real problem, we are witness to its failure and dissolution as an existential state and as a meaningful concept" (2007, p. 67). In Michael Walzer's interpretation, "the safest prediction concerning the future is a grim one: stalemate rather than settlement" (2004, p. 112). He alleges that "mutual recognition and coexistence are defended by a minority of Israeli Jews and by a small minority of Palestinian Arabs" (2004, p. 112). There is a great value in (re)thinking about the security of the region as a process of emancipation through what Burke refers to as "(…) the model of transnational responsibility that would work as a subversion of security and held out by a promise of a sustainable security, in the way that no one would be sacrificed" (2007, p. 67). This is interesting in light of the fact that the historical outbreaks of violence are proof that an imposed peace without 'mutual' recognition of the humanity other is illusory (Silberstein, 1989).

Anthony Burke says that "the desire for identity and sovereignty is not per se illegitimate" (2007, p. 95). But it should be, in his argument, "(…) matched with reflexive contributions capable of providing dignity and calling of the human, in all alienness and diversity, before the abstract being of the nation" (2007, p. 95). In this connection, it is wise to explore contributions of this sort undertaken by reflexive spectators that either recognized or appreciated the cultural roots of a less securitized and non-violent approach able to bring both communities into a more inclusive conversation concerning the future of the region.

7.1. New forms of connections and new kinds of peacemakers

William Parry argues that "in West Bank, many non-violent anti-wall demonstrations are organized by local committees, often by the village youth" (2011, p. 188). Parry takes as example "(…) the demonstrators in the city of Ni'lin, who consisted of local men and boys, some activists and left-wing and anti-Zionist Israelis" (2011, p. 188). Parry also indicates that "the demonstrations vary in size from a few dozen to a few hundred people, always depending on the significance of the occasion and social commotion" (2011, p. 188). He adds that "(…) banners, flags and t-shirts expressing solidarity, along with chants, cameras, loudspeakers and the spirit of defiance and resistance; these are what they bring to the frontline" (2011, p. 188). The Israeli response tends to be, in Parry's definition, "(…) predictable: repression, exercised by disproportionate and deadly force" (2011, p. 188).

Nonetheless, there are exceptions within the Jewish society, i.e., spectators willing to build new forms of connections with the Palestinians. Rather than submitting to the prevailing security discourse (such as the 'everyone against us' that reduces Israel to mere survival), many Israelis actively resist this fate and create novel forms of resistance, connections, and community alongside Palestinians. Israeli narratives of security are also countered by video reportage and painstaking research among Palestinian human rights organizations (Abu-Zahra, Leech & MacNeil, 2016). These novel forms of resistance developed by Israelis are exemplary manifestations of empathy, solidarity and responsibility compassion.

In attempting to grasp what form of responsibility empathy makes possible, Lilie Chouliaraki and Tijana Stolic believe in "responsibility of charitable giving, which encourages a relationship of compassion" (2017, p. 1169). Chouliaraki and Stolic contend that "the ones acquiring this responsibility are people who physically (and literally on the border) share history and complexity with the marginalized groups" (2017, p. 1169). They also think that "(…) these people form an agency that enacts moralizing responses and inspires affective actions" (2017, pp. 1169-1170). Though estimated to constitute only eight percent of Israel's Jewish population, the citizens having this responsibility represent fifty percent of the significant debate in Israel regarding the Arab question. Most of them are individuals who charge that the State of Israel is Zionist and represents a barrier to peace (Glass, 2016).

Perhaps one of the most relevant groups of the anti-Zionist movement is the Neturei Karta, a Jewish civil group that belongs to a larger 'ultra-Orthodox' Judaism. This group established its community in Jerusalem since early 19th century, but never recognized the modern State of Israel and its administration. Such a dissident voice within the Jewish history is deemed important to reassess the exercise of power by Israel in dominating and colonizing the Other, the Palestinians (Epafras, 2010). This group believes that the new settlements in occupied territories and the large-scale expropriation of Arab land come from Zionism. They say that the popular racism in Israel is the direct result of the Zionist view (Glass, 2016).

When the *Deal of the Century* was announced, the Neturei Karta, in a demonstration alongside Palestinians activists, has sent a message in the name of masses of Jews worldwide stating that they would not support a deal that is made to oppress other people for the benefit of Israel, more precisely the Palestinian neighbors with whom they have lived for hundreds of years in peace. In a video posted on Facebook, the Neturei Karta shows a demonstration, where one of its leaders, alongside Palestinian activists provided a speech stating that the only path to peace is for the Jewish community to identify the root cause of the problem, restoring all the rights of the Palestinian people, and compensating them for their suffering over the last years by ending the entire occupation. Only then could the Jews live in peace with the Palestinians as they were living before Zionism (Neturei Karta, 2020).

Demonstrations of this kind[33] manifest a reflexive position that creates connections between Israelis and Palestinians. Also, the activist role of the Jewish anti-Zionist diaspora reveals to be that of preventing Israel to justify any power domination and coercion toward the Palestinian-Other. The NK condemnation of the Zionism as the peril of Jews and the world is fundamental to think of seriously for the effect of the exercise of excessive force by the State of Israel in dominating and colonizing the Palestinian-Other (Epafras, 2010). What is more, the NK and other anti-Zionist civil groups bring into light a special reading of the Zionist colonial power. According to their point of view, Zionism was and is a colonial movement, but with an essential difference to other colonialisms. While classical colonialism is to exploit, Zionist colonialism displaces and expels the Other (Glass, 2016).

33 One of these demonstrations that gather Jewish and Palestinians together is represented in Photo 9 in the Annex of the dissertation.

It is a kind of “ctrl+alt+delete” colonialism. This is the interpretation of other anti-Zionist social movements, namely the Combatants for Peace (CFP) and the Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP). The CFP is a volunteer group of former Israeli soldiers and former Palestinian militants working together in the attempt to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and increase the peace capacity within both communities. By rejecting the possibility of long-term peace through violent means, CFP members are attempting to rebuild social relationships through open dialogues and reconciliation activities that encourage each side to understand the collective aspirations of the other side (Sauders, 2011).

The CFP is the world’s only non-violent movement founded and sustained by former armed combatants in an ongoing conflict. The unique impact of CFP grassroots, binational approach was recognized in 2016 and 2018 when this movement was nominated for the Nobel Peace (CFP, 2018). House lectures, where the members are invited to speak to organizations or in private homes for a group of friends and colleagues of the homeowner, constitute their most frequent form of activity. Furthermore, CFP local groups participate in direct non-violent resistance actions, accompanying Palestinian shepherds and farmers to their fields and demonstrating against the Israeli Separation Barrier (Sauders, 2011). Among the programs and activities offered by this movement, it is worth stressing the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day Ceremony (which is focused on the Israeli society and that seeks to expose the occupation’s violence, teaching them about the reality on the ground and mobilizing them to demand an end to the occupation and a just peace from their political leaders) and the Freedom March (which aligns creative expressions with the tactics of stopping traffic to marching together) (CFP, 2018).

Likewise, the JVP provides another form of connection through art and education. Aiming to make the audience get rid of the receptive mode, the project *Free Films Library* was meant to engage people around the world with learning, reflection, and action in favor to the anti-Zionist cause. The *Free Films Library* was developed by the JVP Boston, and the films are licensed for private home use. The project contains fourteen pages of film indications produced by Palestinians movie-makers. Some of them might depict graphic violence and despair, but the inspiring resilience and determination of the Palestinians is almost always present (JVP, 2018). They can be watched by clicking on the links below the description of each one of them.

For this and other desecuritizing moves that these Jewish movements are seen as integral part to the Palestinian cause. In bringing non-violence to the public conversations, either through training or educational workshops, they make one step forward in transforming societies (CFP, 2018) through a less securitized dialogue. Through public demonstrations or film projects, these civil groups encourage a relationship of compassion with the Palestinians, refusing to normalize the Israeli "ctrl+alt+delete" colonialism. By seeing fellow Jews acquiring the responsibility of charitable giving with the Palestinian cause, Jewish spectators are called to join the 'critical mass' and strengthen the new forms of connections with the victims of the security drama that call for a radical change about the issue.

Speaking of "ctrl+alt+delete" and films that can be watched on any computer screen, the next desecuritizing move about this issue consists of a video game that was developed to teach the audience how Israelis and Palestinians can work together to achieve peace. The video game is called *PeaceMaker*[34]. Asi Burak was one of its creators, who, together with Eric Keylor and Tim Sweeney, developed an article explaining that "the video game was meant to be a tool used to teach teenagers how both sides of the conflict could work together" (2005, p. 307). As Burak, Keylor & Sweeney indicate, "the player is able to choose to take the role of either the Israeli Prime Minister or the Palestinian President, react to in-game events, and interact with other political leaders and social groups to create a stable resolution to the conflict" (2005, p. 307). They conclude that "PeaceMaker aims to prove that computer games could deal with serious political issues and that playing for peace could be as challenging as satisfying as playing for the opposite goal" (2005, p. 307).

The game is complex and realistic, which means it is also difficult to win. An experiment with students developed by the professors Cleotilde Gonzalez and Lisa Czlonka found out, for example, that almost forty percent of players were not able to win once in four tries. The 'hard mode' is so impossible that most players gave up (Brodey, 2014). Cleotilde Gonzalez and Lisa Czlonka say that "the players attempt to make effective policy choices leading to peace, while having to respond to external events like suicide bombings, army raids, and demands of public opinion. The main goal is to create a stable two-states solution to the conflict" (2010, p. 137).

34 In relation to this issue, a screen-shot depicting the gameplay PeaceMaker can be seen in the Annex, more precisely in the Photo 10.

Gonzalez and Czlonka asked students of an Arab-Israeli History course to play the game at the beginning and again at the end of the semester. In the end, Gonzalez & Czlonka noticed that "(…) results revealed that political and religious background correlate to game performance at the beginning of the semester, but that correlation disappears by the end of the semester" (2010, p. 138). They suggest that "learning to stand in the others' shoes might reduce the effect that both religious and political preconceptions may have on our actions" (2010, p. 138). Asi Burak, Eric Keylor and Tim Sweeney believe that "many aspects of the conflict have a universal importance and are related to social, economic, and foreign policy issues throughout the world" (2005, p. 307). They also suggest that "either in high school and college classrooms, teachers might use *PeaceMaker* as an engaging and a fresh way to involve students in discussing the issue. It educates future leaders, allowing to experiment social and political roles that they can someday inhabit" (2005, p. 307).

A major challenge in designing the game was making the narrative as impartial as possible. Thus, this involved lots of research. The creators met with Palestinian government officials, NGOs, and student groups to get their input on how best to expose their side of the story (Brodey, 2014). Cleotilde Gonzalez and Lisa Czlonka summarize that "players choose actions to take in the game and accumulate points according to the effects those actions have upon the approval ratings of multiple interests groups" (2010, p. 139). *PeaceMaker* is for Burak, Keylor and Sweeney "(…) about relations, whereby eight different actors are simulated and interact with the players based on conditional mood. Graphical thermometers depict the levels of anger and disapproval of the actors with the player's policies" (2005, p. 308).

PeaceMaker is exciting to play. When it goes well, it feels like the player is putting altogether in a complex, living puzzle, and when it finally comes together, it feels glorious. The game has also a positive impact on players. Playing it might reduce personal bias and learn to stand in another's position when engaging in conflict resolution exercises (Brodey, 2014). Asi Burak and Laura Parker say that "when the *PeaceMaker* was launched, one student said she had learned more about the Israeli-Palestinian issue by playing the game than from what she had read or seen in newspapers and on television" (2017, p, 22). They indicated that afterwards, "the creators of the game began testing it all the time, in universities and even in high schools around the USA, including Jewish schools" (2017, p, 22).

When it comes to provide future research directions, Gonzalez and Czlonka suggest "(…) the extension of the game for a larger diversity of participants in all sense: religions, affiliations, and gaming hours" (2010, p. 144). Gonzalez and Czlonka also indicate that "the creators of the game built partnerships with the Peres Center for Peace, a non-profit organization that conducts workshops in Israeli and Palestinian schools" (2010, pp. 144-145). About this partnership, Asi Burak and Laura Parker explored the fact that "the Peres Center for Peace is an independent, nonpolitical organization founded by the former Israeli President Shimon Peres with the aim of working toward peace in Middle East" (2017, p, 28). In their opinion, "this was the creator's chance to make a real contribution. If people at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could play *PeaceMaker* and learn something about the conflict, everything would have been worthwhile" (2017, p, 28).

After this experience, the creators have heard from the players, and the responses affirmed their intentions for the game. The players thanked them and told them how good it felt to achieve peace. The creators believe that the game gave the players renewed hope that there was a way these things could happen (Brodey, 2014). According to Asi Burak, Eric Keylor and Tim Sweeney, "*PeaceMaker* can engage people to ask significant questions about the conflict. The interaction forces them to learn the geography of the region as well as to understand the stakeholders' agenda" (2005, p. 309). They also argue that "the architecture of this game may be used to explore political, social, economic and security theories concerning both particular armed conflicts and general conflict resolution" (2005, pp. 309-310).

The creators also worked on a sort of new PeaceMaker 2.0, which is primarily about showing how the Israel-Palestinian conflict changed in the last years. Besides, Eric Brown, one of the creators of the game, was the president of Games for Change, a nonprofit that helps develop socially oriented games. Brown has helped push out a diplomacy game about Syria, an Oregon Trail-style game simulating migration across the US-Mexico border, and UN-backed mobile game aimed at girls in the developing world (Brodey, 2014). This idea of developing socially oriented computer games appears to be interesting for a more IR critical approach that would give what Robert Cox comes to define as "(…) proper attention to social forces and processes and see how they relate to the development of states and world orders" (1981, p. 128). An initiative like this means one step forward in the inclusion of unheard voices.

Socially oriented games could be considered contributions of desecuritization, mostly because they are able to heightening what Booth defines as "(…) the sensibility of persons towards each other's hopes and fears" (2007, p. 345). When it comes to promoting debates about the return of securitized issues to the normal haggling of politics, socially oriented games might include an important segment of the public sphere: the computer game fans. What is actually imperative for desecuritization is to engage the audience in new forms of connections, either by motivating spectators to partake in anti-Zionist movements or letting them being taught by a game that shows how Israelis and Palestinians can work together to achieve peace. Even though protesting on behalf of the Palestine cause and playing a computer game for peace are different approaches, these are moves with a similar objective: challenging the stereotypes reinforced by the securitizing rhetoric.

Much of the debate about desecuritization has been heavily theoretical and philosophical; basing itself on different ontological presumptions concerning the possibilities and conditions of change and transformation in regards to identity, institutions and statehood (Hansen, Falkentoft & Rode, 2014). As such, the different contributions mentioned in this chapter confirm the outcomes of desecuritization, becoming empirical applications for further development of desecuritization as a reflexive and critical practice. Though little, these contributions coming from the audience could limit what Mark Salter referred to as the "appetite or tolerance for security: not everything must be pitched as security, and not everything must be considered an existential threat of great priority" (2011, p. 116).

While the conceptual toolset provided by the Copenhagen School discussion of securitization shows how Palestinians have been confined to a permanent state of emergency, denied basic rights and dignity and labeled as a threat, the Aberystwyth School articulates the need for normative and emancipatory response (Abu-Zahra, Leech & MacNeil, 2016). The pedagogical goal of a socially oriented computer gameplay focused on a peaceful resolution of a conflict, coupled with the pragmatic nature of both Palestinian and Israeli anti-Zionist activism, suggest that human emancipation could be promoted. At the local level, these contributions demonstrate that, as Booth says, "(…) the two societies can learn to enter into the counter-fear of those they fear themselves. They do not have to accept what they find in the minds of their enemies, but they do have to understand it" (2007, p. 345).

7.2. Banquets amid the rubble and the reconstruction of the humanitarian scene

It is a scene repeated in millions of households every year across the world: Muslim families sit down together to break their fast during the holy month of Ramadan. Nonetheless, in Gaza, the backdrop to the meals served as a reminder to the violence which already killed thousands of civilians and destroyed vast swathes of the area (Drury, 2015). During the most sacred month in Islamic culture, millions of Muslim families worldwide fast from dawn until dusk each day. Within this context, an intriguing manifestation takes places in Gaza City in 2015. Many pictures of Muslim families breaking their fast amidst the rubble and destruction on the background circulated on social media[35] (Challouki, 2015).

The concrete slabs and pylons, once home to hundreds of people, rise up behind those Palestinians picnicking amidst the rubble on brightly colored rugs. These families seemed almost oblivious to the destruction around them as they come together like millions of others around the world during Ramadan (Drury, 2015). Over years of violence, bombings, blockade and internal division, the majority of the two million people of the Gaza Strip have learned to live with constant electricity cuts, and with around eighty percent of them depending on humanitarian and relief aid for their livelihood. This is still happening at a time when the poverty rate appears to be exceeding more than sixty percent (Balousha, 2020). However, in a place where destruction is a part of a life marked by the absence of some individual liberties, Palestinians make the ruins and rubble an act of resistance as they decide to use creativity to keep their religious practices alive and to show the world how is to be living under a securitized and militarized environment.

About two million people have been living under a tight Israeli blockade since 2007. They have been subjected to brutal military assaults since 2008, in the context of the Israeli policy of "mowing the lawn," military attacks and bombardment which indiscriminately kill civilians and cause massive levels of damage to civilian infrastructure in Gaza and other occupied regions. This Israeli securitized campaign continues throughout the years under a questionable prerogative of undermining the military and political power of Hamas (Alashqar, 2019).

35 Destroyed buildings and houses are now part of a fast-breaking scenario as Palestinians gather in long tables for a grand banquet. Photos11 and 12 in the Annex show this incredible move.

The dominant security narrative put forward by the Israeli leaders places Israel under threat from both burning kites and rockets from Gaza, and Israel claims that both its actions and any future attack are responsive to Palestinian threats. This security narrative is not only harmful but it is based on a complete distortion of the facts that must be challenged. In a situation where basic rights are denied and systems set up to control Palestinians are enforced through violence and state power, there must be an expectation that some Palestinians will indeed respond through resort to violence (Merryman-Lotze, 2018). Yet in this reading, even though the story continues to be covered by the international media through reports of some rockets, shooting and airstrikes involving both parties of the conflict, since March 2018, large numbers of people in Gaza City have been protesting peacefully every week in the “March of Return” demonstrations at the border (Alashqar, 2019).

It is necessary, then, to challenge the limited way in which violence is defined and discussed. Life for Palestinians is defined by legal and structural violence that denies their rights, limits opportunity, and costs lives. The systematic denial of people’s basic rights is a form of violence sustained by the Israeli securitizing moves (Merryman-Lotze, 2018). Following this reading, it is fundamental to argue that the legal and structural violence must be addressed by debates of desecuritization. Social engagement, mass movements and non-violent struggles are one of the key options available to the Palestinian community to take collective initiatives towards political change (Alashqar, 2019). In this manner, the images of several Palestinian families breaking their fast in banquets amongst rubble of buildings and houses correspond to this initiative. It is more than practicing a religious tradition; it is about showing resistance against years of oppression and suffering.

Palestinians are often told that if they stopped firing rockets and digging tunnels, the Israeli government would lift the blockade. However, the reality is that for over a decade rocket fire from Gaza has been limited whereas Israeli attacks on Gaza are nearly daily occurrence. Outlining how the dominant security narrative about Gaza rockets is wrong is not done to minimize the impact of any kind of violence, but understanding the dynamics of what is happening is necessary if change is to come (Merryman-Lotze, 2018). Performances, such as the grand banquets, are ways to demonstrate that security narrative does not silence voices. There will always be demonstrations of unity and resistance, even when everything looks destroyed.

In this view, the level of intimacy between the Self (Israel) and the Other (Palestine) seems so high that, as Alexander Wendt argues, "whatever the Self is able to do, the Other will resist out a desire to maintain its identity" (1999, p. 228). So, whatever the Self does, the Other will express resistance. Breaking fast amidst the rubble with concrete slabs and pylons on the background might look like a simple thing to do, however it is a clear demonstration of a non-violent initiative of resistance. Those images of the banquets become art made in open and public space. They show that while the Palestinians are daily living under destruction and a serious humanitarian crisis, the desire to maintain their identity and resistance remains very strong. It is not by accident that the saying "to exist is to resist" can be found written in several walls around Gaza and the occupied territories of West Bank.

The desire to maintain identity and resistance through performances, such as the banquets amidst the rubble, also means to challenge the priorities of Israeli official discourses, inverting security narratives, demonstrating the ways institutions and practices which are purportedly in the business of providing security are often in fact those producing the greatest insecurity (Rossdale, 2016). Not only the movement organizers of the banquets, but also the aforesaid Palestinians and Jewish anti-Zionist civil groups, or even the creators of the *PeaceMaker* computer game, all of them develop what Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman come to refer to as "the deep knowledge of the grievances, aspirations and values of the various publics that they wish to mobilize" (2015, p. 68). In Ackerman and Merriman's observation, "this knowledge forms the basis for developing or communicating visions that attract widespread support and mobilize people" (2015, p. 68).

Julie Norman argues that "(…) while studies on armed resistance such as suicide bombings and rockets attacks are undoubtedly useful, it is crucial for theorists and practitioners alike to better understand the use of non-violent resistance as a form of activism" (2011, p. 2). This could be done by, as asserts Norman, "(…) exploring the potential of 'civil-based' actions as an alternative framework for popular struggle in Palestine" (2011, p. 2). Civil-based actions influence the dynamics of desecuritization through non-violent means. When people live in danger, they are compelled to act. When resistance is necessary to existence, non-violent forms are the alternatives that oppressed people could express their concerns. Then, desecuritization becomes a vehicle that the victims of the drama communicate to the audiences.

Non-violent forms of activism through widespread mobilization is necessary for successful challenges, however it is not sufficient for their success. Resilience, which refers to the ability to withstand and recover from repression, is necessary for the oppressed people to sustain resistance, despite the actions of opponents constrain or eventually inhibit their activities (Schock, 2015). By reconstructing a humanitarian scene like the one found in Gaza, with rubble of buildings and houses serving as scenario for fast-breaking banquets, the Palestinians are implicitly showing to the audiences a visible practice of popular resistance. In reconstructing this specific humanitarian scene in Gaza, the Palestinians are giving us an example of how desecuritizing moves through non-violent forms of activism can serve as tools for rethinking the humanitarian scenes, more generally.

One of the critical keys to the potential success of non-violent forms of activism has been what scholars come to refer to as "non-violent discipline." Just as the Humane Borders in the US-Mexico border and the organizers and supporters of the refugee strikers around Europe, important Palestinian and Jewish civil groups have, in many struggles, bravely remained firm and yet non-violent, refusing to respond to violence with violence. Within this process, violent repression of non-violent activists undermines the oppressor's legitimacy and demonstrates the justice of the non-violent activists' cause (Pinckney, 2016). The non-violent discipline does not only contest security narratives, but it also seeks to desecuritize in a more dialogic way. In this reading, this could be seen when activists take collective actions aimed at limiting practices that render them insecure, and when they work to build less securitized narratives that engender forms of local emancipation.

While strategically managed throughout non-violent activism, desecuritization in collective forms of protests, art expressions, performances, lectures, lawsuits and demonstrations emerge in a struggle which Julie Norman is convinced that "(…) can function as tools for both mobilization and consciousness raising of the audiences" (2011, p. 4). For Norman, "these actions serve to show that opposition movements are challenging the oppressors, thereby encouraging others to critically analyze their situation and, ultimately, work for social change" (2011, p. 4). Considering this assumption, the desecuritizing moves offered in the course of this last section were presented for us to rethink the Western humanitarian scenes by raising consciousness about the situation in and outside the political theater.

For Andrew Linklater, “the West represents a major advance in the development of moral-practical rationality, and dialogic potentials are embodied in liberal-democratic institutions to an unusual extent” (1998, p. 122). We should grasp that despite its dichotomy, performative capacities and a politics of insecurity, the political theater retains what Andrew Linklater refers to as “(…) the potential for generating an improved social order out of itself that extends the critique of wrongful exclusion” (1998, p. 122). Though its performers cause the security drama and jeopardize the humanitarian scenes, the theater has also space for what Linklater defines as “(…) modes of resistance that endeavor to preserve or widen dialogue in the context of intensifying systemic pressures which are global in character and are evident in the politics of assorted social movements” (1998, p. 123). This modes of resistance were described as the contributions coming from reflexive spectators and victims of the drama engaged in claiming for immanent possibilities for change.

Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman contended that “(…) high levels of civilian participation in civil resistance are arguably the single largest predictor of movement success” (2015, p. 70). In Ackerman and Merriman’s interpretation, “this makes sense since the more people withdraw consent and obedience from an authoritarian, the weaker the authoritarian becomes, and the greater are the cost to them of trying to remain in control” (2015, pp. 70-71). In joining a range of non-violent forms of desecuritization, the audience develops the early stages of a higher level of popular participation aimed at introducing what I called in the beginning of this study ‘the Shakespearean model’ of an inclusive language with the performers. In doing so, the reflexive spectators (‘critical mass’) and intermediate actors of the theater can raise what Julie Norman wisely referred to as “(…) awareness about the humanitarian grievances through solidarity networks” (2015, p. 38).

This awareness is manifested in desecuritizing moves, and if taken seriously, it can make pressures on the leading roles to consider a normal bargaining process of the political sphere. Practices of resistance and activism – in producing subjugated knowledge, revealing the exclusions and power relations of discourses, and engaging actions that seek to respond to the insecurity – invite an ethical response to security (Rossdale, 2016). If this invitation is adopted by enough of the audience with civilian participation, then an important opportunity for what Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman call “the backfire of repression” (2015, p. 71) takes place.

Commitments to a more inclusive dialogue between performers and audience already exist. The capacities to establish these commitments are present in the Western audiences, but the performers embodied them into what Andrew Linklater calls as "unusual degree" (1998, p. 123). As indicated by Linklater, "Habermas argues that technical-instrumental and strategic rationalization are barriers to moral-practical learning" (1998, p. 123). For Linklater, "deep logics of control and police prevent societies from realizing emancipatory potentials" (1998, p. 123). However, Linklater summarizes that "the capacity to extend human sympathies and eradicate unjust exclusion has not been extinguished" (1998, p. 123). The problem is that such a capacity to extend human sympathies receives little attention. Hence, we see a major gap in the knowledge in terms of examining the phenomenon of popular nonviolent forms of desecuritization carried out by some emancipated actors and other groups located outside the theater, i.e., in the fringes of Western societies.

This major gap exists because desecuritizing moves, including the ones mentioned in this last section, are what Julie Norman decided to identify as "limited, and not yet coupled with widespread popular mobilization at a macro level" (2015, p. 38). Concerning the IR scholarship, for example, desecuritization is little explored, since, according to George Lawson, "IR theory traditionally holds particular areas of study and a sense of hierarchy" (2008, p. 22). For Lawson, "the 'fetishization' of anarchy, Westphalia, sovereignty, the balance of power and such other concepts, produced a disciplinary structure of international relations that some areas of study came to be considered more central than others" (2008, p. 22). Constructivist by its nature, the desecuritization debate comes to be, and borrowing Lawson's explanation, "(…) subsequently left to appear as cutting edge (at best) or as peripheral (at worst). Either way, the result is always the same: marginalization" (2008, p. 22).

Reconstructing and rethinking humanitarian scenes is a hard challenge, once the audience must be convinced to undertake actions that promote a less securitized and more inclusive dialogue with the performers. However, this also means for the IR scholarship to better comprehend desecuritization, beginning with realizing that it is itself the product of the audience. This involves a critical thinking in the criteria of theory, its function and attributes, so that a theoretical contribution for emancipation could be made. By any means, changing the course of the drama by rethinking humanitarian scenes is an intellectual and a social challenge for all of us.

LIGHTS OFF AND THE CURTAINS CLOSE

Concluding remarks

This dissertation provided perspectives about international relations from social and political positions in time and space. Due to its constructivist framing, the critical approach developed in this study borrowed from the dramaturgical world notions of performances for the metaphorical representation of the abstract politics of IR as a political theater. In exploring the theatrical metaphor, I indicated the existence of a dichotomy while a drama is performed, with special characters and performative capacities developed by the leading roles on the stage. This metaphor was conceived particularly because I have decided to take into account Robert Cox's reading of the world that must be seen, in his view, "(…) from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, dominance, subordination, present crisis, past experience, and hopes and expectations for the future" (1981, p. 128).

By looking at the world through these lenses, and also focusing on security-related issues, such as humanitarianism, I was able to draw an analysis of the international structure according to a metaphor that could explore conceptions of nation, classes, dominance, subordination, past and hopes for a better future. Carrying out this idea further, Noora Kotilainen's analogy of humanitarian issues with the dramaturgical world was certainly important for my theatrical metaphor. According to Kotilainen's argument, "humanitarian communication takes a form that resembles the arrangement of a theatrical tragedy play" (2016, p. 157). She also believes that "the audience functions as the decisive subjects of the tragedy play, who are invited to feel, to be moved and to react when faced with the pain of others" (2016, p. 157).

I am certainly in sympathy with this metaphor. If there is a critical approach to rethinking humanitarian scenes and seeing the world through subjective and metaphorical lenses, it has to be through a theory that introduces the audience as decisive subjects of the theater. For this, the theory should be summed up by what George Lawson firmly defined as the "(…) call to make international relations more 'policy relevant,' the desire to extend IR's openness to other disciplines, and seek higher public profiles for the discipline" (2008, p. 21).

By using critical approaches with the purpose of opening IR to other disciplines, I defined the Western society as a highly stratified audience, which its constitutive multiple publics are granted with what Nicholas Onuf refers to as "(…) information needed to know where everyone stands on every occasion" (2013, p. 209). This information, as Onuf contends, "(…) tells every member of every network what all members of the society can, may and should do" (2013, p. 209). This idealized description of traditional society constitutes what he defines as "(…) the point of reference for what we think it means to become modern" (2013, p. 209).

Having this in mind, and in concluding that information and knowledge are biased (since everything that is spoken on the political stage is intended to preserve the prevailing order of the theater), my approach asked how this notion of becoming modern came about. Thus, the first conclusion that can be drawn is that becoming modern is the outcome of a dystopian drama, where paternalistic characters use a specialized language that operates at the level of persuasion. This language is here defined as dramaturgical, and it leads the audience to believe in a Western exceptionalism. This language is also inherent in foreign policy discourses, dictating how the leading roles play the security drama, hence resulting in the construction of threats and demonized Others as representatives of evil/enemies that are seen as the opposite of the Western traditional values and principles.

As Thierry Balzacq indicates, this occurs because of an "(...) intersubjective process called securitization, where a set of interrelated practices, along with the processes of their production, diffusion, as well as the reception or translation, bring threats into being" (2011, p. 3). Exploring the process of construction of securitization, together with understanding its meaning for the political theater and the security drama, was definitely an arduous task to be accomplished. Bearing this in mind, the first two sections of the dissertation started out by theorizing the process of securitization and whether contributions of desecuritization would be possible, and if so, under what circumstances and by whom should they be undertaken. In this way of thinking, to accomplish such an arduous task, I found myself motivated to understand that a discourse which presents something as an existential threat to a referent object, according to Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde's words, "(…) does not by itself establish securitization – this is a securitizing move, where the issue is securitized only if and when the society accepts it as such" (1998, p. 25).

The intersubjective process called securitization prescribes what is called the security drama, and it is about calls for closure against things perceived as existentially threatening. The consensual establishment of threat needs to be sufficient so as to produce substantial political effects. What constitutes a threat is viewed, therefore, by critical security studies stating that it depends on a shared understanding of what is meant by such a danger to security (Adiong, 2009). In understanding this reading, I advanced, with the help of the Copenhagen School theorists, an alternative path described as desecuritization, which aims to contest those who speak of security successfully. In doing so, I argued that the we, the Western audience, are able to recognize that securitization is not subjective, but it constitutes valid and specific meanings within and beyond the political theater of IR.

Turning to critical visions of the world politics, I found out that securitization is transmitted into a grand strategy as the desire to protect a so-called Western exceptionalism through the maintenance of a balance of power favorable to the Western-Self. Unfortunately, this is accepted in an unproblematic way and it is unquestionably treated as static, immutable or unchangeable. In opposition to that, I have brought critical accounts that study the political theater of international relations other than through the idea that it is incontestable or unquestionable. These critical accounts aim to undermine the growth of securitization in the political stage, avoiding what it was here defined as the hyper-politicization, when a humanitarian issue (e.g., forced migration) is dealt with a threat-defense procedure.

I qualified my theoretical argument by investigating the process of moving some securitized issues back into the ordinary public sphere, which would imply that this issue is being re-politicized, that is to say, subjected to normal political processes. For this to happen, I explored in the second section three approaches that require a reinvigoration of the public sphere manifested, among other things, in the return of securitized issues to the normal politics. That is why I have decided to describe the abstract universe of the politics of IR through a theatrical metaphor, whereby performers play harmful roles, while the audience should open up public discussions concerning the meanings and values of security and how they came to dominate the political theater. Nonetheless, if we do not discuss these meanings and values, remaining in a receptive mode, we will continue to give carte blanche for those who produce the greatest insecurity in the political theater.

As a matter of fact, in remaining in a receptive mode, without any discussion concerning this matter, most of the spectators in the audience are convinced to agree with what Didier Bigo defined as “practices of security professionals that produce relations of insecurity” (in Leander, 2016, p. 301). In this scenario, the humanitarian scenes are played on the stage according to what Jef Huysmans describes as the “politics of insecurity, whereby assessments of particular choices, discourses and practices are enacted in the name of security, and with humanitarian and military security interests risking to become closely intertwined” (2006, p. 5).

Considering this, I argue that human suffering exacerbates among the powerless, marginalized and voiceless victims of the drama, and this should make us consider desecuritization as something necessary. As I well observed during this study, desecuritization is to be understood as performative acts undertaken by the ‘critical mass’ of the audience that should be stimulated and rearticulated at a macro level through repetition and innovation. However, for us to consider desecuritization, it is important to challenge notions that view the theater as what Der Derian defined as “discontinuous yet recurrent, and endless cycle” (2009, p. 303). Nicholas Onuf, for example, says that “(…) the modern nation is an elusive abstraction, consisting as it does of people tied by place, history and sentiment” (2013, p. 210). This abstraction is for Onuf comprised by “(…) a bounded space called the state and a rationalized, coordinated ensemble of officials called the government, which is presumed to act on behalf of the state and its people” (2013, p. 210).

What can be conclusive about the endless cycle of the theater is that its constitutive elusive abstraction of modern nation, which is coordinated by a state-centric system, intensifies security narratives that enhance states’ power and their potentials for the domination of society. It is imperative to know, therefore, that if we do not discuss about this problem, we help to consolidate what James Der Derian defines as “the Nietzsche eternal recurrence, where there is no pre-established harmony between the furtherance of truth and the well-being of mankind” (2009, p. 193). As Der Derian alleges, “(…) from God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People, the history of IR has been an effort to resecure the center, to keep at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference” (2009, p. 303). To change this scenario, we should consider what Der Derian calls “(…) the politics of pluralism to negotiate the ambiguities and paradoxes of a life that the only certainty is death” (2009, p. 303).

Bearing this in mind, this study opens up possibilities to new discussions and future developments of researches about how important is for the Western audience to consider the immanent possibilities for changing the conception of the elusive abstraction of modern nation, whereby grand narratives developed by the performers tend to intensify state power by silencing social voices through an endless cycle of securitization. Eventually, this dissertation served not only for academic reasons, but for contributing to the critical thinking that high levels of civic engagement might change the way we look at the IR, knowing that our place in it means to consider immanent possibilities that contest how things are dealt on the political stage. Even if this simple contribution requires a long-term change, the first step was already made: that of presenting critical ideas through theory and exploring examples of different forms of activism developed by reflexive spectators.

In this study I decided to follow Anna Leander's suggestion of listening "(…) to the criticism that points to places where the stagings in IR go wrong and become unpersuasive" (2016, p. 309). As observed throughout this dissertation, the 'critical mass' represents the fact that the stagings can go wrong if we acknowledge that, as Noora Kotilainen contends, "(…) a tragedy play is written and engineered by an arranging agent – by a scriptwriter, the assembler of the scene" (2016, p. 159). This tragedy play is what was here defined as the security drama, and it can also be associated with Luc Boltanski's brilliant definition of the "(…) managerial form of governance, whereby a constant flux reproduces stable hierarchies; always with the same people on top" (in Leander, 2016, p. 305).

In response to this drama, this dissertation brought into light empirical examples of unpersuasive groups of reflexive spectators in the audience that, undertaking different forms of expressions and humanitarian activism, suggested ways of reacting or contesting the people on top; always in an effort (though at a micro level) to not resecure the center, trying to get rid of (or at least reduce) the dystopian features that define the political theater, such as anarchy, suffering, chaos, and difference. These empirical examples respond to the research question of the study. They show that desecuritization, due to its different forms of expression, is the preferable path to be taken by the audience to participate in the humanitarian scenes through a more interactive approach. Through the improvement and recreation of these desecuritizing moves that the dystopian features of the theater can be undermined.

Dystopian is a form of exaggerating illiberal regression. IR has become dystopian because it fetishizes the illiberal and expansionary character of security politics, a character that is seen as propagated by the mobilization of fear. The politics of insecurity and fear risk, thereby, a totalizing vision of the future that freezes out openness and determination (Van Rythoven, 2017). Thus, a more critical approach meant to criticize such a totalizing vision, somehow following a Postmodernist perspective which, as asserted by Andrew Linklater, "(…) argues that potentials for domination are not accidents of history, but they are rather inherent in modernist regimes of truth" (1998, p. 63). That is why a critical theorizing was important to support my empirical cases, once it provides a proper theoretical framework based either on the openness of the international relations discipline and on the civic determination of those people engaged in challenging regimes of truth.

Furthermore, investigating historicity in IR helps to understand that, in some cases, groups denied the recognition of Others as (fully) human, and acted violently against those who they detest, or even erected legal and political structures to ensure their exclusion from sociopolitical relations and the protection of the law (Weinert, 2015). Dehumanizing the Other is one of the characteristics of the drama, and this occurs because of securitizing moves that dissemble the true nature of the leading roles' interests to continue to dominate the theater. This observation is worthy of attention, and we must give it a high priority when it comes to drawing a critical view of international relations. As Ken Booth summarizes, "the truth of the world must be revealed, systematically and accessibly – if with contention" (2007, p. 15). He says, however, that "(…) the interested public (everywhere) have invariably to rely upon nationalized and nationalistic statistics, more concerned to advance government interests, to manipulate minds than advance knowledge" (2007, p. 15).

For the multiple publics in the Western audience, and including the students of international relations, there is much more to be gained if we are committed to recognizing our role in the theater, opening up our eyes to see the real picture of the world that the performers painted, which is only made to promote their interests in terms of power. Indeed, this opens up one more possibility that this dissertation provides for research developments in the near future. As such, this dissertation motivated me to develop a cross-national experimental research to assess spectators' humanitarian awareness through visual representations of human suffering.

As a visiting fellow at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, and as a doctoral candidate at the University of Lisbon, I considered all the lessons that could be learnt from this dissertation to develop an experimental research with students from both universities in order to identify their senses of empathetic concerns and levels of political participation after encountering visual representations of human suffering in the Mediterranean Sea. Because of its multidisciplinary perspectives, this dissertation guided me to draw new researches based on quantitative social sciences and social psychology studies in the attempt to investigate social phenomena in the politics of international relations. This study offered me analytical tools, and theoretical and empirical bases to develop a new research aimed at assessing students' reactions to visual representations of human suffering, opening up the possibility to examine whether the next generations of decision-makers, scientists, theorists, activists, influencers and the like will be reflexive and critical to take action by considering immanent possibilities for changing the course of the drama.

To make it possible to think like that, it was crucial for me to investigate the three schools of CSS. These schools seem to achieve a neat delineation between normative (Aberystwyth), analytical (Copenhagen), and sociological (Paris) approaches (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Although distinct schools of security thought, they all share critical theory as the main theoretical framework. Speaking of which, critical theory provides what James Der Derian defined as "essential tools for understanding how the most pathological politics and most powerful technologies can combine to produce recurring crises of insecurity" (2009, p. 3). Critical theory also led me to understand that practices articulated through security utterances imply an audience to the extent that a fear-as-mobilization logic treats the spectators of this audience as passive objects for authoritative speakers to competently instill anxieties over everything from migrants to diseases (Van Rythoven, 2017).

Hate, disregard, and disparagement as social practices are prevalent in human life, informing a perverse organizational logics. That is why we must construct even our most aspirational of theories on dystopic facts (Weinert, 2015). In doing so, we create what Booth calls "radical shifts in attitudes that would turn our compassion into an ethics of autonomy" (2007, p. 17). And instead of falling into what Ackerman and Merriman call "the acquiesce to tyranny in hopes that it will evolve to something milder," we would "(…) launch an insurrection to gain freedom" (2015, p. 63).

Thereby, it falls to us, the spectators, to decide which path to take. In this study, for example, the last three chapters of the final section depicted a 'critical mass' who decided to take the second path. You name it. Placing water in the desert, building a binational playground, showing the baby Jesus separate from his parents in different cages, placing several fake children in cages around the cities, developing an Alarm Phone to rescue refugees at the high sea, organizing or joining refugees strikers in opposition to the oppressive immigration regime, providing simulations about the situation at the European borders for students, joining forces towards Anti-Zionism demonstrations, creating a computer game to teach peace, and breaking fast with banquets amid rubble were examples of emancipated spectators and victims of the drama choosing the path of insurrection to gain freedom.

These examples treated the victims as subjects, rather than objects. They also demonstrate that, for dissuading the fear and aggressive security postures of the performers, we should express at a macro level our empathetic concerns about the inherent factors of the dystopian fate that the political theater has been taking. Moreover, in living in a dystopian theater, we must be reflexive enough to enact dynamics of civil resistance, namely mobilization and construction of alternatives. Resistance needs widespread participation to increase the likelihood of success of desecuritizing moves over humanitarian issues. Timur Kuran brings into light the fact that "the cost of collective action decreases when the size of an activist movement increases. When social and political opposition to an oppressive regime reaches a critical level, regime change is likely" (in Schock, 2015, p. 16).

As we could observe in the 'anti-climax,' this is what happened with the Berlin Refugees Strike, when a vulnerable group – living under what can be considered a 'dystopian scenario,' once their rights and freedoms were denied by an oppressive immigration regime – was able to change (though momentarily) the institutional political authority, acquiring higher levels of support from the audience. This event shows us that the audience and the victims can join forces to develop objectivist, constructivist and deconstructivist strategies that could see beyond what is obvious about the drama. We must appreciate what these strategies means for our freedom of action in the everyday politics. By paying attention to these forms of expression that give a little of dignity to those who suffer from oppression, we could be equipped to grasp that civic engagement reduces the harms produced by the drama.

In all these cases explored in the study, efforts of resistance open up possibilities to challenge what is constructed as threatening and dangerous in our everyday life. They also question what is constructed as being ‘our’ reality. Furthermore, the last specific objective was to identify whether there is a clear line of delimitation between the interests of the main actors in the theater of IR and human life. Regarding the performers and leading roles playing the drama, I found some difficulties to clearly identify a line of delimitation, since their interests in human life are very limited by power and geopolitical aspirations, coupled with their interpretations of ‘threat’ and ‘danger’ that circulate within the political theater.

Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss argue that “the politics of applying adjectives of ‘humanitarian’ and ‘human life’ reinforce acts of securitization, and in several cases their application has been manipulated or dismissed while lives are in the balance” (2018, p. 96). In this way of thinking, it is important to understand that linking humanitarian discourse to the geopolitical dimensions of the international structure should not be thought of as a mapping exercise but as an analysis of how power and knowledge circulates within the international life (Moore, 2013). All of this comes together in a process of rethinking IR through spheres of analysis. In the case of this study, the sphere of analysis was the ‘critical mass’ and its activist role that could provide us a clear line of delimitation between the interests of an emancipated part of society with the relief of suffering and protection of human life.

Unlike the performers – whereby they often decide to play with human life to gain benefits and preserve their interests – the ‘critical mass’ can develop local acts of emancipation, which not only unmask the language game of security, but also place human life at a higher stage than the traditional practices of security. This study demonstrated, therefore, that the ‘critical mass’ may be useful to rethink humanitarian scenes as it applies its best interests in human life not for the political purposes of public-private partnerships and building coalitions, but rather for the well-being of the society. While playing the drama, performers decide to attach their interests in human life to discourses of human security that come to be labeled according to a security frame. This illustrates my conclusion that terms of security have little concern for reducing human suffering. Real change can only come from the audience if enough of spectators realized that interests in human life are used as cognitive tools that fuel doctrines and help to preserve interests of dominant speakers.

In today's world, we know that only the performers are allowed to 'do' and 'speak' about humanitarianism successfully, and this is the reason why the security drama continues to exacerbate a dystopian scenario. Going beyond the security drama means for us, the spectators of the audience, to provide critical attention to the existing acts, forms of expressions and manifestations opposing the securitization of humanitarian issues in the everyday politics. For most of the audience to be allowed to 'do' and 'speak' about humanitarianism successfully – hence developing a more inclusive and equal relationship with the leading roles – its constitutive multiple publics should be more critically engaged in criticizing the fundamental tenets of the traditional security discourses coming from the political stage.

More importantly, we should look at empirical emanations of desecuritization within and beyond the political theater that emerge as social responses of oppression and violence. Rethinking the humanitarian scenes does not mean the end of the security drama, but the transformation of it. There will be always leading roles fulfilled by power interests dressed up with humanitarian discourses; not because this is given or natural, but because they decide to be rational entities battling one another with little regard to human life. Transformation in the field of IR is a long-term process about freeing ourselves from what is given to us as truth and reality. Transformation begins with realizing that we are not mere spectators waiting for isolated acts of white saviorism involved by a rhetoric of heroism. It begins with overcoming the receptive mode, realizing that we no longer need to wait for 'superheroes.' Transformation requires further stimulation of desecuritizing strategies that challenge the general absence of our subjecthood and the repression of marginalized people.

In fact, this is the limitation of this study, once transformation can only succeed if desecuritization is undertaken at a macro level. All the empirical cases depicted here were contributions of desecuritization at a micro level that appear to be not strong enough to make the leading roles look at the victims and the multiple publics in the audience with different eyes. In other words, only through macro levels of popular participation that the security drama can be written and told according to a more inclusive and less securitized story. However, this study raised a number of desecuritizing moves that somehow, following their particular ways of expressions, questioned the dystopian characteristic of the drama, making us rethink and see humanitarianism through emancipatory lenses.

The desecuritizing moves presented here were carried out by what Alina Campana defines as "artist/educators/activists whose work echo contemporary sociological notions of activism" (2011, p. 288). The arts and creative process produced and reproduced by these notions of activism become what Campana calls "(…) tools, or vehicles, to achieving other goals, like dialogue, sharing experiences, gaining and developing voice, envisioning alternatives to the status-quo" (2011, p. 288). If taken into account as start-points for the transformation of the drama, these notions of activism suggest a dialogic community claiming for an inclusive relationship with performers in their dealings with humanitarian issues.

Andrew Linklater concludes that "(…) engaging in dialogue about the ways social practices and policies harm their interests is a key ethical commitment for any society that embarks on the process of change" (1998, p. 7). In taking this process into consideration, it was important for me, as an IR student, to give more recognition to those who, as Ken Booth highlights, "argue, with a surer touch of the empirical evidence, about the space that exists for constructive dialogue" (2007, p. 444). Ultimately, it was worthwhile for me to explore and understand the horizons of desecuritization under the umbrella of critical theory with the purpose of opening up a fertile ground for the development of dialogic communities in a long-term process. Desecuritization reveals a site for multiple publics to develop what Alina Campana considers as "critical pedagogy and social justice education" (2011, p. 289). This also informs, and borrowing again Campana's words, "(…) a little-understood but increasingly popular strain of art and visual culture education preparation programs, offering a wealth of potential for critical research" (2011, p. 289).

In closing, I must acknowledge that if we were to look beyond the security drama by rethinking the current humanitarian scenes in the West, we should enlarge our moral boundaries to include forgotten worlds in a more open and public dialogue that is sustained by notions of local emancipation. This is not an easy task, once it requires great sensitivity in the way that we would recognize that our role should never be reduced to a receptive mode. After writing this dissertation, I am definetely convinced that human agency has a great capacity to provide a less violent security drama, transforming the political theater through intercultural dialogues.

Annex:

Selected photos of desecuritizing moves

Photo 1.

Photo credit: Humane Borders.

Placing water along the US-Mexico border

Water is a resource that helps us to keep healthy. However, as in many regions under poverty around the world, drinkable water is a scarce resource along the US-Mexico border. In this case explored in the fifth scene, placing water in the desert means not merely providing a basic resource to keep asylum-seekers healthy, but it also calls attention to the fact that the individuals belonging to this vulnerable group have the right to be as healthy as they can, even under a securitized environment, like the militarized zone of the US-Mexico border. Besides, in the attempt to guarantee a minimum of dignity to this vulnerable group, the Humane Borders explores the geospatial technologies that the US government uses to track mobile bodies in the desert. This is an example that shows us that traditional technologies aligned with securitizing moves of states can be re-appropriated for the benefit of desecuritization.

Photo 2.

Photo credit: Ronald Rael.

Teeter Totter Project: when the fence became a binational playground

Children and adults from both sides of the border came to play together. This small group of people is not merely exercising the basic right to engage in recreational activities, but they are also showing to the rest of the audience that walls or fences do not impede them to socialize. Unlike what the American exceptionalist discourse portrays about the other side of the wall, this picture shows children and adults who have the same feelings, dreams and human decency as the Americans citizens. The people coming from the other side are not that threatening and dangerous as the racist and exclusionary discourses usually report. This picture brakes paradigms while motivating the American audience to become more reflexive and to recognize that boundaries should serve as safer environments for all people, so that desirable inter-cultural exchanges could be enhanced.

Photo 3.

Photo credit: Claremont United Methodist Church.

Christmas nativity scene: Joseph, Mary and baby Jesus in separate cages

This desecuritizing move was an important reflection about the Trump's migrant separation policy. It provokes a fundamental religious quest, making the audience reflect how would be if Joseph and Mary, carrying the baby Jesus, went to the United States in 2019 trying to seek a safe haven. As they attempt to cross the border, they would probably be detained, with baby Jesus being separated from his parents. The baby Jesus, no older than one, would probably experience a horrific situation, being brought to a detention center with no basic standards for the care of children. There, baby Jesus could face a high possibility to be put in a cage, in conditions that human rights activists and lawyers call as horrifying. This image is appealing because the representation of these figures is intimately connected to the beliefs of a vast multiple publics of the audience: the Christians and Catholics.

Photo 4.



Photo credit: Sunrise Movement.

#DontLookAway at children in cages: when Des Moines, Iowa, woke up with fake children in cages all over the city

This image represents one of the many installed small cages containing models of children crying around the city of Des Moines, Iowa, in 2020. This moment was remarkable due to the political event that took place in Iowa. The small cages were installed during the Iowa caucuses to choose the Democratic candidate for the US President Elections. The #DontLookAway went viral as people passing through the cages took photos and posted them online. It is a sort of desecuritizing move in everyday politics that calls attention of the audience and politicians, both groups of people that seem not interested on immigration issues. In this action, spectators could have a deeper contact with the proposals suggested by human rights organizations to promote a radical change through a reform of the immigration system that would be followed by less securitizing practices (i.e. demilitarization) and a more humane compromise. This was an interesting attempt to open up a public debate about the situation at the border, which is ignored in the political statements.

Photo 5.

On 4 July 2019 Mediterranea's rescue vessel Alex rescued 54 people in distress, after the Alarm Phone had received their emergency call and passed it on.
Photo: Mediterranea

Photocredit: Mediterranea.

Watch the Med Initiative: an Alarm Phone that saves lives

Aimed at supporting the right to freedom of movement, this initiative is already six years old. During this time, the volunteers of the Alarm Phone got into contact with thousands of boats in distress at the Mediterranean Sea. The hotline works 24/7, with more than two-hundred activists spread out across Europe and North Africa and in a daily fight against the EU border regime. This image in specific shows one of the rescues provided by the members of the Watch the Med Initiative, who received a call and passed it on to the authorities. However, their work is facing ongoing threats because of the closed European harbors as well as the criminalization of the rescue missions at high sea. Such a desecuritizing move demonstrates us that part of the audience (although still at a micro level) does not give up on fighting against a European border regime that already killed thousands of migrants that attempted to reach Europe through the Mediterranean Sea.

Photo 6.

Photo credit: Deutschhilde, Creative Commons.

The Berlin Refugee Strike: the march that momentarily changed the institutional political authority in Europe

This was a brave act of civil disobedience against the German immigration regime, when refugees came together and marched to Berlin, where the protesters peacefully occupied schools and offices. As I described in the course of sixth scene of this dissertation, the protesters received a meaningful support from the German society. Some local and federal politicians joined the negotiations, and most of the states of Germany agreed with reducing the travel lock from six to three months. Since then, the Berlin Strike continues to encourage refugees from other countries around Europe to engage themselves in protests and demonstrations for the development of an 'open-arms' migration policy in the admission of refugees.

Photos 7 and 8.

Photo credit: Michal Novotný.

Photo credit: Michal Novotný.

The imaginary Farlandia: when students in Prague, the capital of Czech Republic, simulated a drama that is real for refugees in Europe

What is interesting about this simulation with students in Prague was its close association with Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy that offer students the opportunity to have a sense of their responsibilities in a democratic audience. Making them feel like they belong to an oppressed group means to engage them in a position of questioning.

Photo 9.

Photo credit: Ahmad Gharabli.

Anti-Zionism demonstrations: Jewish and Palestinians together against Zionism

Anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews join protests waving Palestine flags as a demonstration against the American-Israeli plan to assure sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and other settlements. In the seventh scene of the study I also brought into light other examples of desecuritization including Jewish and Palestinians, specially the events organized by the Jewish Voice for Peace and the Combatants for Peace. The JVP, for example, provides a "Free Films Library" focused on educating the audience about the conflict through films. The CFP organizes, among other activities, the Freedom March by stopping the traffic in Israeli cities.

Photo 10.

Credit photo: PeaceMaker.

PeaceMaker: do you think you can solve the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians?

A reputed computer game that teaches its players how to deal with the conflict by peaceful means. It provides us a little sense of reality through the computer screen. When it comes to observe desecuritizing moves about this matter, PeaceMaker is worthy of attention. The game was already played by many students at many universities in North America and Middle East. There are some interesting studies concerning this computer game, such as the one drafted by the professors of the Carnegie Mellon University, Gonzalez and Czlonka, who developed an empirical investigation of the game with their students.

Photo 11 and 12.

Photo credit: Mustafa Hassona.

Credit photo: Hamza Al-ajweh.

Banquets amid the rubble in Gaza City: demonstrations of resistance, even when everything looks destroyed

Bibliography

Abu-Zahra, Nadia, Leech, Philip & MacNeil, Leah (2016) – Emancipation versus Desecuritization: Resistance and the Israeli Wall in Palestine. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, v.31, n3, pp. 381-394.

Ackelson, Jason (2005) – Constructing security on the US-Mexico border. *Political Geography*, v.24, pp. 165-184.

Ackerman, Peter & Merriman, Hardy (2015) – The Checklist for Ending Tyranny. In A., Burrows, Mathew & Stephan, Maria (eds.), *Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?* (1st ed., pp. 63-80). Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council.

Adiong, Nassef Manabilang (2009) – Securitization: Understanding Its Process in the Field of International Relations. *Seminar Paper*, Department of Political Sciences, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 25 March 2009. Munich: GRIN Publishing.

Adler, Emanuel & Barnett, Michael (1998) – A framework for the study of security communities. In. A. Adler, Emanuel & Barnett, Michael (eds.), *Security Communities* (1st ed., pp. 29-66). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alagna, Federico (2020) – From Sophia to Irini: EU Mediterranean Policies and the Urgency of "Doing Something." *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, v.20, n32, pp. 1-6.

American Immigration Council (2019) – 2019 Update Report: Reforming the Immigration System. *American Bar Association*, v.1, pp. 1-72.

Amnesty International (2018) – *Amnesty International Report 2017/2018.* London: Author.

Aradau, Claudia (2004) – Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-26.

Aradau, Claudia & Huysmans, Jef (2013) – Critical Methods in International Relations: The Politics of Techniques, Devices and Acts. *European Journal of International Relations*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-24.

Ashley, Richard (1984) – The Poverty of Neorealism. *International Organization Journal*, v.38, n2, pp. 225-286.

Ashley, Richard (1995) – The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Power Politics. In A. Der Derian, James (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigations.* (1st ed.. pp. 94-128). London: Palgrave.

Asseburg, Muriel (2019) – The "Deal of the Century" for Israel-Palestine: US proposals are likely to speed demise of two-state settlement. *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, n20, pp. 1-4.

Auth, Günther (2005) – *International Society and the Making of International Order: Outline of a Praxeological Theory of International Relations.* Münster: LIT Verlag.

Bahr, Thurid (2013) – The Refugee Strike Berlin: struggles for autonomy within the movement. *Seminar Paper*, International RC21 Conference 2013, Berlin, 29-31 August 2013. Potsdam: University of Potsdam.

Balzacq, Thierry (2005) – The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations*, v.11, n2, pp. 171-201.

Balzacq, Thierry (2011) – A theory of securitization: origins, core assumptions, and variants. In A. Balzacq, Thierry (ed.), *Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. (1st ed., pp. 1-30). Abingdon: Routledge.

Barkawi, Tarak & Laffey, Mark (2006) – The postcolonial moment in security studies. *Review of International Studies*, v.32, pp. 329-352.

Barnett, Clive (2015) – On the milieu of security: situating the emergence of new spaces of public action. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, v.5, n3, pp. 257-270.

Barnett, Michael (2008) – Humanitarianism as a Scholarly Vocation. In A., Barnett, Michael & Weiss, Thomas (eds.), *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics.* (1st ed., pp. 235-263). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barnett, Michael (2010) – *The International Humanitarian Order.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Barnett, Michael & Weiss, Thomas (2008) – Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present. In A., Barnett, Michael & Weiss, Thomas (eds.), *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics.* (1st ed., pp. 1-48). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bauer, Harry & Brighi, Elisabetta (2009) – Introducing pragmatism to international relations. In. A. Bauer, Harry & Brighi, Elisabetta (eds.), *Pragmatism in International Relations.* (1st ed. pp. 1-8). Abingdon: Routledge.

Bayer, Marion; Kopp, Hagen; Santer, Kiri & Stierl, Maurice (2019) – Introduction: five years of Alarm Phone. In A. Bayer, Marion; Kopp, Hagen; Santer, Kiri & Stierl, Maurice (eds.), *From the Sea to the City: 5 Years of Alarm Phone*. (1st ed., pp. 14-17). Berlin: Watch The Med.

Bebout, Lee (2016) – *Whiteness on the Border: Mapping the US Racial Imagination in Brown and White*. New York: New York University Press.

Beer, Yishai (2018) – *Military Professionalism and Humanitarian Law: the Struggle to Reduce the Hazards of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bellamy, Alex (2005) – Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq. *Ethics and International Affairs Journal*, v.19, n2, pp. 31-54.

Bhatnagar, Prashasti (2019) – Children in cages: a legal and public health crisis. *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, v.34, pp. 181-185.

Bigo, Didier (2014) – The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts. *Security Dialogue*, v.45, n3, pp. 209-225.

Bigo, Didier (2015) – Death in the Mediterranean Sea: The Results of the Three Fields of Action of European Union Border Controls. In A. Jansen, Yolande, Celikates, Robin & de Bloois, Joost (eds.), *The Irregularization of Migration in Contemporary Europe: Detention, Deportation, Drowning* (1st ed., pp. 55-70). London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Bøas, Morten & Jennings, Kathleen (2005) – Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the 'Failed State'. *The European Journal of Development Research*, v.17, n3, pp. 385-395.

Bøas, Morten & Jennings, Kathleen (2007) - 'Failed States' and 'State Failure': Threats of Opportunities? *Globalizations*, v.4, n4, pp. 475-485.

Booth, Ken (2007) – *Theory of World Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boucher, David (2009) – *The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and Human Rights in Transition.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brochmann, Grete & Dolvik, John Erik (2018) – The Welfare State and International Migration: The European Challenge. In A. Greve, Bent (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State* (2nd ed., pp. 44-65). Abingdon: Routledge.

Brown, Chris & Ainley, Kirsten (2005) – *Understanding International Relations* (3rd ed). New York: Palgrave.

Bull, Hedley (2002) – *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. (3rd ed.). New York: Palgrave.

Burak, Asi & Parker, Laura (2017) – *Power Play: How Video Games Can Save the World*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Burak, Asi; Keylor, Eric & Sweeney, Tim (2005) – PeaceMaker: A Video Game to Teach Peace. In A. Maybury, Mark; Stock, Oliviero & Wahlster, Wolfgang (eds.), *Intelligent Technologies for Interactive Entertainment* (1st ed., pp. 307-310). Berlin: Springer Verlag.

Burke, Anthony (2007) – *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Buzan, Barry & Hansen, Lene (2009) – *The Evolution of International Security Studies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole & de Wilde, Jaap (1998) – *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Call, Charles (2008) – The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'. *Third World Quarterly*, v.29, n8, pp. 1491-1507.

Campana, Alina (2011) – Agents of Possibility: Examining the Intersections of Art, Education, and Activism in Communities. *Studies in Art Education*, v.54, n4, pp. 278-191.

Cammaerts, Bart (2015) – Social media and activism. In A. Mansell, Robin & Hwa, Peng (eds.), *Digital Communication and Society* (1st ed., pp. 1027-1034). Oxford: Wiley-Blachwell.

Campbell, David (1992) – *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cantat, Céline & Feischmidt, Margit (2019) – Civil involvement in refugee protection: reconfiguring humanitarianism and solidarity in Europe. In A. Cantat, Céline; Feischmidt, Margit & Pries, Ludger (eds.), *Refugee Protection and Civil Society in Europe* (1st ed., pp. 279-293). New York: Palgrave.

Capps, Randy; Meissner, Doris; Soto, Ariel G. Ruiz; Bolter, Jessica & Pierce, Sarah (2019) – *From Control to Crisis: Changing Trends and Policies Reshaping US-Mexico Border Enforcement*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

CASE Collective (2006) – Critical Approaches to Security in Europa: A Networked Manifesto. *Security Dialogue*, v.37, n4, pp. 443-487.

Center for US-Mexican Studies (2018) – *US-Mexico Security Cooperation 2018-2024*. San Diego: UC San Diego School of Global Policy & Strategy.

Chandler, David (2004) – The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the 'Liberal Peace'. *International Peacekeeping Journal*, v.11, n1, pp. 59-81.

Chouliaraki, Lilie (2006) – *The Spectatorship of Suffering*. London: SAGE Publications.

Chouliaraki, Lilie; Orwicz, Michael & Greeley, Robin (2019) – Special Issue: The visual politics of the human. *Visual Communication Editorial*, v.18, n3, pp. 301-309.

Chouliaraki, Lilie & Stolic, Tijana (2017) – Rethinking media responsibility in the refugee 'crisis': a visual typology of European news. *Media, Culture and Society*, v.39, n8, pp. 1162-1177.

Clapton, William (2014) – *Risk and Hierarchy in International Society: Liberal Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Palgrave.

Combatants for Peace (2018) – *Combatants for Peace Annual Programs Report, 2017-2018*. Jerusalem: author.

Council of Europe (2019) – *Lives saved, rights protected: bridging the protection gap for refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean*. Strasbourg: author.

Cox, Robert (1981) – Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium Journal of international Studies*, v.10, n2, pp. 126-155.

Davey, Eleanor; Borton, John & Foley, Matthew (2013) – *A history of the humanitarian system: Western origins and foundations*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group.

Débord, Guy (2002) – *The Society of the Spectacle*. Canberra: Hobgoblin Press.

Der Derian, James (2009) – *Critical Practices in International Theory: selected essays.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Doyle, Michael (2015) – *The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the responsibility to protect*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dufour, Kirsten (2002) – Art as Activism, Activism as Art. *The Review of Education, Pedagogy & Cultural Studies*, v.24, n1-2, pp. 157-167.

Duncan, Thomas & Coyne, Christopher (2013) – The Origins of the Permanent War Economy. *The Independent Revie*w, v.18, n2, pp. 219-240.

Dunne, Tim (2015) – The English School and humanitarian intervention. In A. Murray, Robert (ed.), *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of*

International Relations. (2nd ed., pp. 60-67). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Duvall, Raymond & Varadarajan, Latha (2003) – On the practical significance of critical international relations theory. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, v.11, n2, pp. 76-86.

Eagleton-Pierce, Matthew (2011) – Advancing a Reflexive International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, v.39, n3, pp. 805-823.

Edding, Miriam & Stierl, Maurice (2019) – Women on the move. In A. Bayer, Marion; Kopp, Hagen; Santer, Kiri & Stierl, Maurice (eds.), *From the Sea to the City: 5 Years of Alarm Phone*. (1st ed., pp. 27-29). Berlin: Watch The Med.

Eiran, Ehud (2020) – Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel. *Istituto Affari Internazionali,* v.20, n7, pp. 1-25.

Entman, Robert (2004) – *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion and US foreign policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Epafras, Leonard (2010) – Unhoming Homeland: Jewish Diaspora and Neturei Karta Community. *Melintas: International Journal of Philosophy and Religion*, v.26, n3, pp. 255-270.

Eroukhmanoff, Clara (2017) – Securitization Theory. In A. McGlinchey, Stephen; Walters, Rosie & Scheinpflug, Christian (Eds.), *International Relations Theory* (1st ed., pp. 104-109. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda (2017) – *The Wall: The Real Costs of a Barrier between the United States and Mexico*. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Ferreira, Marcos Farias (2017) – Critical Theory. In A. McGlinchey, Stephen; Walters, Rosie & Scheinpflug, Christian (eds.), *International Relations Theory* (1st ed., pp. 49-55). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Ferreira, Susana (2018) – From narratives to perceptions in the securitization of the migratory crisis in Europe. In A. Karakoulaki, Marianna; Southgate, Laura & Steiner,

Jakob (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century* (1st ed., pp. 57-73). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Fierke, Karin (2010) – Critical Theory, Security and Emancipation. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-22.

Fine, Shoshana (2019) – All at sea: Europe's crisis of solidarity on migration (Policy brief). *European Council on Foreign Relation*s, v.0, n0, pp. 1-19.

Finnemore, Martha (2003) – *The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Floyd, Rita (2006) – When Foucault met security studies: a critique of the 'Paris School' of security studies. *Seminar Paper*, 2006 BISA annual conference, Cork, 18-20 December 2006. Cork: University of Cork.

Friedrichs, Jörg & Kratochwil, Friedrich (2009) – On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology. *International Organization*, v.63, pp. 701-731.

Freedman, Lawrence (2008) – *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East.* New York: PublicAffairs.

Freire, Paulo (2000) – *Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy, and Civic Courage.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Frost, Mervyn (2009) – *Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations.* Abingdon. Routledge.

Frostig, Karen (2011) – Arts Activism: Praxis in Social Justice, Critical Discourse, and Radical Modes of Engagement. *Journal of the American Art Therapy Association*, v.28, n2, pp. 50-56.

Giroux, Henry (2010) – Paulo Freire and the Crisis of the Political. *Power and Education*, v.2, n3, pp. 335-340.

Gonzalez, Cleotilde & Czlonka, Lisa (2010) – Games for Peace: Empirical Investigations with PeaceMaker. In A. Cannon-Bowers, Jan & Bowers, Clint (eds.),

Serious Game Design and Development: Technologies for Training and Learning (1st ed., pp. 134-149). Hershey: IGI Global.

Gozzi, Gustavo (2017) – The 'Discourse' of International Law and Humanitarian Intervention. *Ratio Juris: International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law*, v.30, n2, pp. 186-204.

Glass, Charles (2016) – Jews Against Zion: Israeli Jewish Anti-Zionism. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, pp. 56-81.

Gray, Colin (2007) – *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hagmann, Tobias & Hoehne, Markus (2009) – Failures of the state failure debate: evidence from the Somali territories. *Journal of International Development*, v.21, pp. 42-57.

Halperin, Sandra (2006) – International Relations Theory and the Hegemony of Western Conceptions of Modernity. In A. Jones, Branwen Gruffydd (ed.), *Decolonizing International Relations* (1st ed., pp. 43-64). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Hamati-Ataya, Inanna (2013) – Reflectivity, reflexivity, reflexivism: IR's 'reflexive turn' - and beyond. *European Journal of International Relations*, v.19, n4, pp. 669-694.

Hansen, Lene (2006) – *Security as Practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Hansen, Lene (2010) – Poststructuralism and Security. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-24.

Hansen, Lene (2012) – Reconstructing desecuritization: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it. *Review of International Studies*, v.38, pp. 525-546.

Hansen, Nanna Kathrine; Falkentoft, Maja Felicia & Rode, Carsten Baltzer (2014) – Desecuritizing Migration: the case of the Berlin Refugee Strike. *Roskilde Universitetscenter's Digitale Arkiv*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-76.

Harrison, Ewan (2004) – *The Post-Cold War International System: strategies, institutions and reflexivity*. London: Routledge.

Hegemann, Hendrik (2018) – Toward 'normal' politics? Security, parliaments and the politicization of intelligence oversight in the German Bundestag. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, v.20, n1, pp. 175-190.

Hehir, Aidan (2011) – Pandora's box?: humanitarian intervention and international law. *International Journal of Law in Context*, v.7, n1, pp. 87-94.

Heinze, Eric (2003) – *The Logic of Liberal Rights: a study in the formal analysis of legal discourse.* London: Routledge.

Held, David (2003) – The Changing Structure of International Law. In A. Held, David (ed.), *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (2nd ed., pp. 162-176). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Herring, Eric (2008) – Critical terrorism studies: an activist scholar perspective. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, v.1, n2, pp. 197-211.

Hess, Sabine & Kasparek, Bernd (2017) – Under Control? Or Border (as) Conflict: Reflections on the European Border Regime. *Social Inclusion,* v.5, n3, pp. 58-68.

Hinsley, Harry (1963) – *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobson, John (1998) – The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations. *Review of International Political Economy,* v.5, n2, pp. 284-320.

Hoffman, Peter & Weiss, Thomas (2018) – *Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Holzgrefe, J. L. (2003) – The humanitarian intervention debate. In A. Holzgrefe, J. L. & Keohane, Robert (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (1st ed., pp. 15-52). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hurd, Ian (2011) – Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World. *Ethics and International Affairs Journal*, v.25, n3, pp. 293-313.

Huysmans, Jef (2006) – *The Politics of Insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hynek, Nik & Chandler, David (2013) – No emancipatory alternative, no critical studies. *Critical Studies on Security*, v.1, n1, pp. 46-63.

Jewish for Peace (2018) – *JVP Free Library: Borrow Films for Free*. Boston: JVP Boston.

Jimenez, Maria (2009) – *Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the US-Mexico Border*. San Diego: American Civil Liberties Union.

Jones, Branwen Gruffydd (2006) – Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, amd Imperialism. In A. ones, Branwen Gruffydd (ed.), *Decolonizing International Relations* (1st ed., pp. 1-22). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Kaldor, Mary (2003) – Global Civil Society. In A. Held, David (ed.), *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (2nd ed., pp. 559-563). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Keane, John (2003) – *Global Civil Society?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keohane, Robert (2003) – Political authority after intervention: gradations in sovereignty. In A. Holzgrefe, J. L. & Keohane, Robert (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (1st ed., pp. 275-298). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Khan, Amadu Wurie (2018) – The cultural 'therapeutics' of sovereignty in the context of forced migration. In A. Karakoulaki, Marianna; Southgate, Laura & Steiner, Jakob (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century* (1st ed., pp. 28-44). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Kleingeld, Pauline (2019) – On Dealing with Kant's Sexism and Racism. *SGIR Review*, v.2, n2, pp. 3-22.

Kopp, Hagen (2019) – For corridors of solidarity. In A. Bayer, Marion; Kopp, Hagen; Santer, Kiri & Stierl, Maurice (eds.), *From the Sea to the City: 5 Years of Alarm Phone*. (1st ed., pp. 123-127). Berlin: Watch The Med.

Koskenniemi, Martti (2004) – International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* v.0, n0, pp. 1-26.

Kotilainen, Noora (2016) – *Visual Theaters of Suffering: Constituting the Western Spectator in the Age of the Humanitarian World Politics.* PhD dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Finland.

Krause, Keith (1998) – Critical Theory and Security Studies. *SAGE Social Science Collections*, v.33, n3, pp. 298-333.

Krčál, Petr (2017) – The Enactment of Security: Dramaturgical Analysis of the Security Aspects of Public Ceremonies. *Seminar Paper*, Security Forum 2017, Banska Bystrica 8-9 February 2017. Banska Bystrica: Interpolis.

Kuus, Merje (2010) – Critical Geopolitics. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia, International Studies*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-26.

Kyle, David & Dale, John (2011) – Smuggling the State Back In: Agents of Human Smuggling Reconsidered. In A. Kyle, David & Koslowski, Rey (eds.), *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives* (2nd ed., pp. 33-59). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kynsilehto, Anitta (2018) – Solidarities in migration. In A. Karakoulaki, Marianna; Southgate, Laura & Steiner, Jakob (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century* (1st ed., pp. 181-196). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Langa, Napuli (2015) – About the refugee movement in Kreuzberg/Berlin. J*ournal für kritische Migrations und Grenzeregimeforschung*, v.1, n2, pp. 1-10.

Laitinen, Arto & Pessi, Anne Birgitta (2014) – Solidarity: Theory and Practice. An Introduction. In A. Laitinen, Arto & Pessi, Anne Birgitta (eds.), *Solidarity: Theory and Practice* (1st ed., pp. 1-29). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Larkin, Paul (2012) – John Kingdon's "Three Streams" Theory and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. *Journal of Law and Politics*, v.28, n25, pp. 25-50.

Larking, Emma (2018) – Migration and human rights – exposing the universality of human rights as a false premise. In A. Karakoulaki, Marianna; Southgate, Laura & Steiner, Jakob (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century* (1st ed., pp. 45-56). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Larrain, Jorge (1989) – *Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism and Dependency*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lasswell, Harold & Kaplan, Abraham (2014) – *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Lawson, George (2006) – The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations. *International Studies Review*, v.8, n3, pp. 397-423.

Lawson, George (2008) – For a Public International Relations. *International Political Sociology*, v.2, pp. 17-37.

Lawson, George & Tardelli, Luca (2013) – The past, present, and future of intervention. *Review of International Studies*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-21.

Layton, Robert (2006) – *Order and Anarchy: civil society, social disorder and war.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leander, Anna (2011) – The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of International Relations. *International Political Sociology*, v.5, pp. 294-313.

Léonard, Sarah & Kaunert, Christian (2011) – Reconceptualizing the audience in securitization theory. In A. Balzacq, Thierry (ed.), *Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. (1st ed., pp. 57-76). Abingdon: Routledge.

Lezaun, Javier (2002) – Limiting Social: Constructivism and Social Knowledge in International Relations. *International Studies Review*, v.4, n3, pp. 229-234.

Licona, Adela & Luibhéid, Eithne (2018) – The Regime of Destruction: Separating Families and Caging Children. *Feminist Formations*, v.30, n3, pp. 45-62.

Lievrouw, Leah (2011) – *Alternative and Activist New Media*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Linklater, Andrew (1998) – *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Linklater, Andrew (2007) – *Critical Theory and World Politics: citizenship, sovereignty and humanity*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Linklater, Andrew (2015) – Civilizations and International Society. In A. Murray, Robert (Ed.), *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations.* (2nd ed., pp. 40-44). Bristol: E-International Relations.

MacFarlane, Neil & Khong, Yuen (2006) – *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Mearsheimer, John (2001) – *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mearsheimer, John & Walt, Stephen (2007) – *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Mills, Charles (2018) – Black Radical Kantianism. *Res Philosophica,* v.95, n1, pp. 1-33.

Miranda-Reyes, Aramis (2015) – *Renaissance Humanism and the Ottoman 'Other': discourse construction, position and power.* Master's thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies, The City University of New York, United States.

Mishori, Ranit (2020) – US Policies and Their Effects on Immigrant Children's Health. *Am Fam Physician*, v.15, n101, pp. 202-204.

Moore, Thomas (2013) – Saving friends or saving strangers? Critical humanitarianism and the geopolitics of international law. *Review of International Studies*, v.39, pp. 935-947.

Morrow, Aishling (2017) – Poststructuralism. In A. McGlinchey, Stephen; Walters, Rosie & Scheinpflug, Christian (eds.), *International Relations Theory* (1st ed., pp. 56-61). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.

Murray, Robert (2013) – Humanitarianism, Responsibility or Rationality? Evaluating Intervention as State Strategy. In A. Hehir, Aidan & Murray, Robert (eds.), *Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention* (1st ed., pp. 15-33). London: Palgrave.

Nay, Olivier (2013) – Fragile and failed states: critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids. *International Political Science Review*, v.34, n3, pp. 326-341.

Newman, Edward & Richmond, Oliver (2001) – Introduction: Beyond Peacekeeping? In. A. Newman, Edward & Richmond, Oliver (eds.), T*he United Nations and Human Security* (1st ed., pp. 1-14). London: Palgrave.

Norman, Julie (2011) – Introduction: Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada. In. A. Hallward, Maia Carter & Norman, Julie (eds.), *Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and Advocacy* (1st ed., pp. 1-12). London: Palgrave.

Norman, Julie (2015) - "We Do Not Work for Peace": Refraining Nonviolence on Post-Oslo Palestine. In. A. Schock, Kurt (ed.), *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle* (1st ed., pp. 35-58). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Nyers, Peter (2006) – Taking Rights, Mediating Wrongs: Disagreements over the Political Agency of Non-Status Refugees. In. A. Huysmans, Jef; Dobson, Andrew & Prokhovnik, Raia (eds.), *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency* (1st ed., pp. 48-67). London: Routledge.

Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (2013) – *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in social theory and international relations*. Abingdon: Routledge.

O'Reilly, Karen (2014) – The role of the social imaginary in lifestyle migration: employing the ontology of practice theory. In. A. Benson, Michaela & Osbaldiston, Nick (eds.), *Understanding Lifestyle Migration: Theoretical Approaches to Migration and the Quest for a Better Way of Life* (1st ed., pp. 211-234). London: Palgrave.

Orford, Anne (2003) – *Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pace, Michelle & Yacobi, Haim (2020) – Can the EU Stand Up to Trump's "Deal of the Century"? *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, v.20, n10, pp. 1-6.

Parry, William (2011) – *Against the Wall: The Art of Resistance in Palestine*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books.

Payne, Rodger & Samhat, Nayef (2004) – *Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse Norms, International Regimes and Political Community.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Peoples, Columba & Vaughan-Williams, Nick (2014) – *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Pinckney, Jonathan (2016) – *Making or Breaking Nonviolent Discipline in Civil Resistance Movements.* Washington, DC: ICNC Press.

Pula, Besnik & Stivachtis, Yannis (2017) – Historical Sociology and International Relations: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Large-Scale Historical Change and Global Order. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, pp. 1-38.

Roe, Paul (2004) – Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization. *Security Dialogue,* v.35, n3, pp. 279-294.

Rosenberg, Justin (1994) – *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*. London: Verso.

Rossdale, Chris (2016) – Activism, resistance and security. In. A. Nyman, Jonna & Burke, Anthony (eds.), *Ethical Security Studies: A New Research Agenda* (1st ed., pp. 201-215. London: Routledge.

Rothbard, Murray (1975) – *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude.* Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Rothbard, Murray (2008) - *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude by Étienne de La Boétie.* Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Rubio-Goldsmith, Raquel; McCormick, Melissa; Martinez, Daniel & Duarte, Inez Magdalena (2007) – A Humanitarian Crisis at the Border: New Estimates of Deaths Among Unauthorized Immigrants (Policy Brief). *Immigration Policy Center*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-5.

Salter, Mark (2008) – Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, v.11, pp. 321-349.

Salter, Mark (2011) – When securitization fails: the hard case of counter-terrorism programs. In A. Balzacq, Thierry (ed.), *Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. (1st ed., pp. 116-132). Abingdon: Routledge.

Sauders, Robert (2011) – Partners for Peace: Cooperative Popular Resistance and Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In. A. Hallward, Maia Carter & Norman, Julie (eds.), *Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and Advocacy* (1st ed., pp. 53-68). London: Palgrave.

Schaefer, David Lewis (1998) – Montaigne and La Boétie. In. A. Schaefer, David Lewis (ed.), *Freedom over Servitude: Montaigne, La Boétie and Voluntary Servitude* (1st ed., pp. 1-30). Westport: Greenwood Press.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2002) – Goffman meets IR: dramaturgical action in international community. *International Review of Sociology,* v.12, n3, pp. 417-437.

Schmidt, Brian (1998) – *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Schmitt, Carl (2007) – *The Concept of the Political* (2nd ed., expanded edition). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Schock, Kurt (2015) – Introduction: Civil Resistance in Comparative Perspective. In. A. Schock, Kurt (ed.), *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle* (1st ed., pp. 1-34). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Scholte, Jan Aart (1999) – “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?” *Working Paper*, Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, Coventry, May 1999. Coventry: University of Warwick.

Schweller, Randall (1996) – Neorealism’s status-quo bias: what security dilemma? *Security Studies*, v.5, n3, pp. 91-121.

Seybolt, Taylor (2010) – Humanitarian Intervention and International Security. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-26.

Silberstein, Laurence (1989) – *Martin Buber’s Social and Religious Thought: Alienation and the Quest for Meaning*. New York: New York University Press.

Simpson, Gerry (2004) – *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slan, Sarah & Abdullah, Osama (2019) – How Europe externalizes its borders: the case of Morocco. In A. Bayer, Marion; Kopp, Hagen; Santer, Kiri & Stierl, Maurice (eds.), *From the Sea to the City: 5 Years of Alarm Phone*. (1st ed., pp. 76-81). Berlin: Watch The Med.

Sliwinski, Sharon (2011) – *Human Rights in Camera*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Sparke, Matthew (2006) – A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border. *Political Geography*, v.25, n2, pp. 151-180.

Spens, Christiana (2014) – The Theater of Cruelty: Dehumanization, Objectification & Abu Ghraib. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, v.5, n3, pp. 49-69.

Stein, Janice (2013) – Threat Perception in International Relations. In A. Huddy, Leonie; Sears, David & Levy, Jack (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. (2nd ed., pp. 364-394). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stierl, Maurice (2020) – Reimagining Europe through the Governance of Migration. *International Political Sociology*, v.14, n3, pp. 252-269.

Stierl, Maurice & Kopp, Hagen (2019) – The Alarm Phone in the Central Mediterranean. In A. Bayer, Marion; Kopp, Hagen; Santer, Kiri & Stierl, Maurice (eds.), *From the Sea to the City: 5 Years of Alarm Phone*. (1st ed., pp. 53-59). Berlin: Watch The Med.

Stone, John (2016) – George Orwell on politics and war. *Review of International Studies*, v.43, n2, pp. 221-239.

Stroux, Salina (2019) – "No one can stop the rain", but Europe tries hard. In A. Bayer, Marion; Kopp, Hagen; Santer, Kiri & Stierl, Maurice (eds.), *From the Sea to the City: 5 Years of Alarm Phone*. (1st ed., pp. 60-75). Berlin: Watch The Med.

Terrenas, João (2015) – *Beyond War and Peace: an inquiry into the possibilities and political significance of collaboration among security theories.* Master's thesis submitted to the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales.

Topak, Özgün & Vives, Luna (2020) – A comparative analysis of migration control strategies along the Western and Eastern Mediterranean routes: sovereign interventions through militarization and deportation. *Migration Studies*, v.8, n1, pp. 66-89.

Trombetta, Maria Julia (2011) – Rethinking the securitization of the environment: old beliefs, new insights. In A. Balzacq, Thierry (ed.), *Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. (1st ed., pp. 135-149). Abingdon: Routledge.

Van Rythoven, Eric (2017) – Fear in the crowd or fear of the crowd? The dystopian politics of fear in international relations. *Critical Studies on Security*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-17.

Vultee, Fred (2011) – Securitization as a media frame: what happens when the media 'speak security'. In A. Balzacq, Thierry (ed.), *Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. (1st ed., pp. 77-93). Abingdon: Routledge.

Waever, Ole (1995) – Securitization and Desecuritization. In A. Lipschutz, Ronnie (Ed.), *On Security* (1st ed. pp. 46-86). New York: Columbia University Press.

Waever, Ole (1998) – Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community. In. A. Adler, Emanuel & Barnett, Michael (eds.), *Security Communities* (1st ed., pp. 69-118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Waever, Ole (2004) – Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New ‘Schools’ in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery. *Seminar Paper*, ISA Annual Convention, Montreal 17-20 March 2004. Storrs: International Studies Association.

Walsh, James (2013) – Remapping the border: geospatial technologies and border activism. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, v.31, pp. 1-19.

Walt, Stephen (2010) – Realism and Security. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, v.0, n0, pp. 1-27.

Walzer, Michael (2004) – *Arguing about War.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Weinert, Matthew (2015) – From Cinderella to Beauty and the Beast: (de)humanizing world society. In A. Murray, Robert (Ed.), *System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations.* (2nd ed., pp. 90-97). Bristol: E-International Relations.

Weldes, Jutta (1999) – *Constructing National Interests: the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (v.12). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Welzel, Christian (2013) – *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wendt, Alexander (1995) – Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. In. A. Der Derian, James (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigations* (1st ed. pp. 129-180). London: Palgrave.

Wendt, Alexander (1999) – *Social Theory of International Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wermenbol, Grace (2019) – *Israel-Palestine and the Deal of the Century: US Foreign Policy under President Donald J. Trump 2017-2019.* Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Wheeler, Nicholas (2000) – *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, Michael (2011) – The continuing evolution of securitization theory. In A. Balzacq, Thierry (ed.), *Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. (1st ed., pp. 212-222). Abingdon: Routledge.

Woolfson, Alexander Florey (2012) – *The Discourse of Exceptionalism and US Grand Strategy, 1946-2009.* PhD dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations, The London School of Economics, United Kingdom.

Young, James (2001) – *Art and Knowledge*. London: Routledge.

Zimmermann, Hubert (2017) – Exporting Security: Success and Failure in the Securitization and Desecuritization of Foreign Military Interventions. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* v.11, n2, pp. 225-244.

Webliography

ABC News (2020) – *Activists stage 'kids in cages' demonstrations near caucus voting in Iowa.* Retrieved from https://abc7chicago.com/immigration-reform-demonstrations-detention-centers-kids-in-cages/5902586/

Alashqar, Yaser (2019) – *Gaza: what life is like under the continuing Israeli blockade.* Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/gaza-what-life-is-like-under-the-continuing-israeli-blockade-124528

Balousha, Hazem (2020) – *Gazan families preserve tradition of Ramadan by the sea.* Retrieved from https://www.arabnews.com/node/1666061/middle-east

Blitzer, Jonathan (2019) – *How the US asylum system is keeping migrants at risk in Mexico.* Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylum-system-is-keeping-migrants-at-risk-in-mexico

Bowden, John (2020) – *Fake children in cages installed throughout Des Moines ahead of Iowa caucus.* Retrieved from https://thehill.com/latino/481282-fake-children-in-cages-installed-throughout-des-moines-ahead-of-iowa-caucus

Brodey, Sam (2014) – *Think You Can Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? Play this Game.* Retrieved from https://www.motherjones.com/media/2014/08/peacemaker-video-game-israeli-palestinian-conflict/

Challouki, Hanan (2015) – *Ramadan in Gaza: This is what it looks like.* Retrieved from https://mvslim.com/ramadan-in-gaza-this-is-what-it-looks-like/

Daley, Jim (2019) – *Detained Migrant Children Need Continuous Medical Care.* Retrieved from https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/detained-migrant-children-need-continuous-medical-care1/

Drury, Flora (2015) – *Ramadan in Gaza: Families pictured breaking their fast among the rubble of last year's war with Israel.* Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3132747/Ramadan-Gaza-Families-pictured-breaking-fast-rubble-year-s-war-Israel.html

Felter, Claire & Cheatham, Amelia (2019) – *Can 'Safe Third Country' Agreements Resolve the Asylum Crisis?* Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/can-safe-third-country-agreements-resolve-asylum-crisis

Fernández, Valeria & Joffe-Block, Jude (2020) – *Deported amid coronavirus: US sends Guatemalan family home to face new threat.* Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/02/deported-coronavirus-ice-family-separations

Fifield, Anna (2013) – *Contractors reap $138bn from Iraq war.* Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/7f435f04-8c05-11e2-b001-00144feabdc0

Isacson, Adam; Beltrán, Adriana & Meyer, Maureen (2019) – *There is a Crisis at the US-Mexico Border. But it's Manageable.* Retrieved from https://www.wola.org/analysis/fix-us-mexico-border-humanitarian-crisis/

Klippenstein, Ken (2019) – *The US military is monitoring interfaith group opposed to child separation, leaked document reveals.* Retrieved from https://theintercept.com/2019/11/11/border-protest-groups-surveillance/

Manzanaro, Sofia Sanchez; Oelsner, Natalia & Amiel, Sandrine (2019) – *Watch: Mexican and American children play abross border wall on pink seesaws.* Retrieved from https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/31/watch-mexican-and-american-children-play-across-border-wall-on-pink-seesaws

Merryman-Lotze, Mike (2018) – *Challenging Narratives about Gaza and Violence.* Retrieved from https://www.gazaunlocked.org/content/challenging-narratives-about-gaza-and-violence

Mezzofiore, Gianluca (2019) – *Artists installed seesaws at the border so kids in the US and Mexico could play together*. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/30/us/seesaws-border-wall-us-mexico-trnd/index.html

Neturei Karta International (Ed.) (2020) – *Message from Neturei Karta on the Deal of the Century* [5:41]. Canada: Neturei Karta International.

Noor, Poppy (2019) – *California nativity scene displaying Jesus in a cage causes stir.* Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/09/nativity-scene-jesus-mary-joseph-cages-claremont

Timmons, Heather (2019) – *The US government is tracking immigration journalists and Trump protestors.* Retrieved from https://qz.com/1567399/the-us-government-is-tracking-immigration-journalists-and-anti-trump-protests/

Tobias, Jimmy (2019) – *Exclusive: ICE Has Kept Tabs on 'Anti-Trump' Protesters in New York City.* Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/ice-immigration-protest-spreadsheet-tracking/

Womack, Helen (2019) – *Prague students play out an ordeal that is real for refugees.* Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/ceu/11011-prague-students-play-out-an-ordeal-that-is-real-for-refugees.html