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The Reception of Hegel in Portugal:

The Case of Oliveira Martins

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Index

Resumo	3
Abstract	7
Acknowledgments	8
1. Introduction and other notes	9
1.1 Introduction	10
1.2 The present state of studies on Hegel and Oliveira Martins in Portugal	13
1.3. Theoretical considerations about Concepts and Categories in Oliveira Martins and Hegel ...	18
2. The Germanism of Oliveira Martins	24
2.1. Why This Germanism?	25
2.2 Sources	40
2.3 How he integrated Hegel	61
3. Social and Political Thought	79
3.1 The Socialist movement	80
3.2 Political Theoretician and Social Preacher	92
3.3 The political program for Portugal	105
4. Historiography and Philosophy of History	117
4.1 The models in History	118
4.2 Historiographic tradition	125
4.3 History as a whole	130
4.4 Philosophy of History	139
5. Conclusion	146
Sources and Bibliography	150

Resumo

O objectivo a que este trabalho se propõe abarca o tratamento da recepção de Hegel em Portugal, especificamente no pensamento do autor oitocentista Oliveira Martins. Estendendo-se em certos momentos a outros autores da chamada geração de 70 como Antero de Quental.

Um primeiro capítulo introdutório debruça-se acerca do estado dos estudos sobre Oliveira Martins e Hegel em Portugal. No que toca a Oliveira Martins, tais estudos são vistos tanto de um ponto de vista de estudos que incluam Hegel, bem como outros de carácter mais geral. Em relação a Hegel é abordada a questão da sua recepção assim como é feita uma passagem por alguns autores onde a sua presença foi mais marcante.

De seguida, ainda neste capítulo introdutório, são feitas algumas considerações sobre método, bem com alguns apontamentos críticos sobre conceitos e categorias. Abordagem que se prende em boa medida com a ideia de conceitos como construções históricas, à qual são dados alguns exemplos da pertinência dessa história conceptual para o trabalho em questão.

No capítulo subsequente em que o Germanismo de Oliveira Martins será tema em desenvolvimento, há primeiro uma chamada de atenção para o que consiste esse Germanismo em Oliveira Martins, onde tem um significado mais cultural.

Segue-se um olhar pela educação, interesses e leituras de Oliveira Martins, onde sobressaem os estudos não convencionais, que conjugados com um autodidatismo e facilitado por um ambiente eclético, o irão ajudar a furar os cânones estabelecidos e a apresentar ideias originais. Chegando assim mais facilmente às modernas ideias europeias.

Uma curiosidade juvenil levá-lo-á de encontro à filosofia alemã. As linhas de evolução do pensamento filosófico em Portugal serão também alvo de preocupação, tendo como finalidade o seu enquadramento até se chegar a Oliveira Martins. Devido ao interesse pela política, o federalismo que o fascinou aquando da sua juventude, provinha enormemente da Alemanha.

Temos depois a leitura inicial de Hegel e a relação que Oliveira Martins faz entre Hegel e a filosofia Alemã, próxima da concepção de idealismo alemão, dando uma certa unidade às ideias produzidas na Alemanha. São observadas algumas semelhanças entre esses pensadores, não descurando as diferenças.

Oliveira Martins chega aos pensadores alemães como fruto de uma reflexão própria. O Germanismo do seu amigo Antero de Quental vinha já desde Coimbra como confessa em carta autobiográfica. Nessa carta constam importantes informações sobre Hegel e a cultura Alemã,

estudando inclusive a língua alemã como parte desse interesse, apesar das dificuldades no seu uso e compreensão.

Um segundo momento terá como base fontes desse Germanismo. Enumerando-se as fontes disponíveis a Oliveira Martins, ainda que incertas, sabe-se contudo que terá lido com certeza Vera, Lermnier e Ahrens. Desenvolvendo-se mais pormenorizadamente acerca de Augusto Vera, principal fonte directa dos textos de Hegel, assim como acerca de problemas nas traduções de Hegel.

Seguem-se as fontes liberais e socialistas que se formam à volta de Cousin, em antigos alunos seus. Começando primeiramente pelos liberais, passa-se depois para os socialistas, em que Proudhon e o seu fraco entendimento de Hegel, deixam uma marca indelével em Oliveira Martins. Sendo também mencionadas algumas figuras do socialismo francês que comungam de um certo Hegelianismo, inclinando-se Oliveira Martins no entanto para a crítica liberal de Hegel. A França será a cultura de transição entre a Alemanha e Portugal.

Um último momento deste capítulo centra-se á volta da integração de Hegel no pensamento de Oliveira Martins. Para a crítica e os elogios que este lhe move, assim como a cultura alemã no âmbito deste pensar e integrar de Hegel. Fazendo-se também demarcações entre várias doutrinas e as próprias ideias de Oliveira Martins, que veremos têm origem também noutros pensadores como Fichte ou Kant.

Proudhon e o entendimento que este tem de Hegel deram os fundamentos para o Hegel dos seus primeiros escritos. Concentrando-se nas diferenças e de seguida nas semelhanças entre Oliveira Martins e Hegel, é feita uma avaliação desse hegelianismo de Oliveira Martins.

No próximo capítulo sobre o pensamento social e político de Oliveira Martins, começa por ser feita a referência ao socialismo de Proudhon traçando-se a sua evolução e trajectória. Com referências a alguns pontos importantes na sua concepção histórica da humanidade e a relação com o socialismo. Passando pelo caso específico de Portugal e os seus problemas económicos e sociais, em que Oliveira Martins devido aos seus fracassos reformadores, se aproxima de posições mais autoritárias.

Na parte seguinte o enfoque será na doutrina política de Oliveira Martins que se vai progressivamente aproximando de um socialismo de estado. Em que a visão societária mais individualista da juventude ganha contornos colectivos e o organicismo social se mostra em força. Algumas correções de doutrina que enceta levá-lo-ão a uma outra leitura de Hegel, mais simpática quanto à concepção de estado.

A ideia de ditadura ou de Cesarismo paira por esta altura também em Oliveira Martins, levando-o a um aproximação da monarquia e ao abandono das teses republicanas e federalistas, assim como ao ideário Proudhoniano. Sendo um problema que se insere na relação autoridade-liberdade que vai sendo objecto de reflexão por parte de Oliveira Martins e que se pode dizer herdeira de Hegel, prosseguindo até aos nossos dias tal debate. Silva Cordeiro irá acusá-lo de ser o introdutor do Germanismo na política, ou seja, de um autoritarismo doutrinário.

É feita também referência à sua actividade como pregador social, falando directamente para as classes médias apelando à reforma. Uma preocupação com o público que o levará a um projecto de educação do mesmo com a sua Biblioteca das Ciências Sociais.

Por fim neste capítulo é feita uma análise do seu projecto político para Portugal, as propostas que desenvolve e algumas semelhanças com Hegel quanto a leituras políticas e concepções de estado. Bem como a sua participação política no quadro parlamentar e as propostas que lá apresenta.

O lugar da monarquia em Hegel e em Oliveira Martins é também posto em evidência. A concepção de aristocracia e parlamentarismo liberal como sistemas políticos em boa medida coincidentes é semelhante em ambos os autores. Contudo Oliveira Martins vai aproximar-se do monarca e também dessa “aristocracia de sangue” que antes criticara, tendendo nos seus últimos escritos para ideias mais conservadoras.

O último capítulo ocupa-se da filosofia da história e historiografia de Oliveira Martins, concentrando-se primeiramente na ideia de modelos em história. A história vista segundo modelos e as críticas que lhe são movidas, tal como a que é feita a Hegel e à sua concepção dialéctica como um modelo panlogista. Crítica que também é movida a Oliveira Martins devido a um suposto apriorismo que o animou e a tendências mais abstractas ou generalizadoras.

Consideram-se depois o(s) chamado(s) modelo(s) historicista(s) em que o seu significado envolve a existência de diferentes concepções deste conceito. Existindo mesmo opositores ao conceito de historicismo e novas leituras que favorecem a historicidade em vez do historicismo enquanto conceito operativo no entendimento da história.

Apesar da evidente deslocação temporal e da multifacetada compreensão deste conceito, este debate contém contudo em boa medida muitas dos problemas que fazem parte do horizonte em que Oliveira Martins se move. Entre os quais o problema das leis em história e a da separação entre ciências do espírito e ciências da natureza.

Avança-se depois para a tradição historiográfica em que Oliveira Martins se insere. Como seja a história sobre um ponto de vista de algumas tendências como o romantismo, em que certos temas se afirmam em detrimento de outros, como o caso do favorecimento do indivíduo no seio do colectivo. As múltiplas origens do romantismo, entre as quais Fichte, e as suas várias fases tornam a sua classificação árdua. A historiografia de Oliveira Martins insere-se no entanto neste romantismo, contudo já numa fase de desagregação.

A história como totalidade e a classificação de diferentes tipos historiográficos em Hegel e como se aportam estes em Oliveira Martins será o próximo tema em destaque. O que essas classificações implicam e as observações que Hegel faz entre passado e futuro são temas que tomam também parte em Oliveira Martins. A finalidade da história e uma história universal à maneira de Hegel ou Kant são vistas em certa medida negativamente por Oliveira Martins, que vai desenvolvendo uma concepção da história ligeiramente diferente.

Por fim, o trabalho finaliza com a filosofia da história em Oliveira Martins e como se configura o pensamento Alemão e Hegel no quadro desta. Temos as suas primeiras concepções numa carta remetida a Batalha Reis, aquando da polémica com Júlio de Vilhena sobre o carácter da idade-média, e depois no seu *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã* que no entanto tendem a ser matizadas para outras com cariz mais pessimista, aproximando-se também das ciências naturais.

Abstract

The objective of this study is to identify and understand, by who and how was Hegel received in the historical and philosophical culture of Portugal. In the thought of Oliveira Martins we find Hegelianism to be fruitful and the interest more evident, therefore he seems the most appropriate candidate for the said study of Hegel's reception in Portugal. This work will focus on Oliveira Martins's philosophical incursions and his political program, while still being open to other authors, particularly those belonging to his generation.

The sources by which Hegel was read in Portugal, are in great part translations or interpretations of Hegel. Some of which are not rigorous and misrepresent some points and/or lose Hegel's conceptual significance. Augusto Vera, the main translator and interpreter of Hegel, above all to the French Language, is one such case. The historical events and the social environment of this epoch should also be taken into account, especially Prussia's expansionism, which will affect the understanding of Hegel's philosophy. In such an undertaking this study is faced with the problematic of interpreting the various readings of Hegel, being them with regards to his philosophy as well as in other political derivations.

In Martins's letters to Alexandre Herculano philosophy is an early theme of debate which lets us foresee his subsequent development. The personal correspondence with Antero de Quental, the best known poet and philosopher of that epoch, also proves the reading and study of Hegel. The reception of Hegel in Portugal and the objectives of this work pose such questions as: In what context were the political and economic problems attempted to be resolved in light of their readings and understanding of Hegel? What difficulties did the Portuguese authors faced in their understanding of Hegel? These problems can therefore be seen as external or internal to the reception of Hegel and they will be attempted to be explain by looking at their root causes.

Keywords:

Hegel, Oliveira Martins, History, Philosophy, Germanism

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The route I took while preparing this study was full of twists and turns. The study of the German language led me to an exchange between my home University of Lisbon and the Philosophical Faculty of the Tübingen University. In the times we are living, the academic exchanges have been greatly facilitated by exchange programs such as the European Erasmus academic exchange program. European integration has redefined the concept of national borders but there still remains much to be done in Europe and on a Global scale, with the limits of the present political system becoming more apparent every day.

To the friends that have helped me in this process, either with advice or patience, I send my dear compliments, as well as to my family, without who, this study could have never happened. The friends I have made and the professors I have met during my academic exchange in 2015, were fundamental to my intellectual development, particularly Frau. Prof. Angelika Kreß, Herr. Prof Dietmar Koch and finally Herr Prof. Ulrich Schlösser who made the exchange possible and was always helpful and friendly.

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1. Introduction and other notes

1.1 Introduction

The present work on Hegel's reception in Portugal is guided by the following question: How is the presence of Hegel to be seen in Oliveira Martins's thought and why? The studies on Oliveira Martins have been focused mainly on two fundamental areas. The first being history and the second being his socio-political thought. The philosophical basis of these two considerations have been mostly left out or have only been mentioned, without further development and explanation. This is the case with Hegel, one of Oliveira Martins's main sources, whose works had an influx in various aspects of his thought.

An isolated case where the philosophical aspects of Oliveira Martins are studied is the graduation dissertation of Maria Helena Álvares Pinto Loureiro (1964). Loureiro's dissertation, which runs through various authors and makes a close relationship between Proudhon and Hegel, affirms that Oliveira Martins did not opt for any of them, but produced rather a "marriage" of both Hegel's notion of history and totality with Proudhon's moral considerations¹. The idea that the moral philosophical precepts emanating from Proudhon are contrary to Hegel's idealism seems correct but, as Hallensleben correctly asserts², this is not the case with German idealism as a whole. The relation between Hegel, Proudhon and German idealism is more complex than portrayed by Loureiro's dissertation.

When Loureiro focuses on the philosophical aspects of Oliveira Martins and reaches the conclusion of his eclectic tendencies, the original provenience of those ideas, how Oliveira Martins understood Hegel, the sources he had available and a critical evaluation of his conclusions are lacking.

This work does on the contrary the inverse. It is focused on the philosophical/theoretical sources of Oliveira Martins and the ideas he has matured through his readings and reflections, while occupying itself with Hegel and other German sources. It takes what has been done on Oliveira Martins as a basis,

¹ "o escritor propicia o casamento do hegelianismo" ... "com um moralismo tradicionalmente laico, de tipo proudhoniano" Maria Helena Álvares Pinto Loureiro, *Aspectos Filosóficos do ecleticismo de Oliveira Martins*[texto policopiado], Dissertação de licenciatura apresentada em ciências históricas e filosóficas, Lisboa, 1964, p.120.

This is also an idea advanced by Fernando Catroga when he writes about Antero de Quental, as he asserts that to his "initial formation [which was] of French origin and of a democratic orientation, [he] mated a philosophy of history of Hegelian inspiration". / "A formação inicial de Antero foi de origem francesa e de orientação democrática, à qual acasalou uma filosofia da história de inspiração hegeliana" Fernando Catroga "O problema Político em Antero de Quental – um confronto com Oliveira Martins" in *Revista de história das Ideias*, vol. 3, Coimbra, 1981, p.416.

² Oliveira Martins approximation to moral socialism, draws him closer to German idealism but Hallensleben notes that "Martins separates himself from Hegel – and as a result from Marx-, when he appeals to the German idealism / "trennt sich Martins von Hegel – und damit von Marx -, wenn sich auf den deutschen idealismus beruft" Ekkehard Hallensleben, *J.P. Oliveira Martins und der Sozialismus in der "generation von 1865"*, [s.n], Köln, 1959.

but redirects those lines of research to the Hegelian philosophical aspects and brings them to forefront in this study.

An important admonition should be made first. The place of Hegel's philosophy in relation to his own historical time, is circumscribed to some concrete situation and the historical moment that he integrates is different from that of Oliveira Martins. The international socialist movement for example is not contemporaneous to Hegel. Therefore any study of this kind must be attentive to the contexts and the historical time(s) under study while having the following in mind: Hegel was a philosopher who lived between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of nineteenth century; Oliveira Martins was a social critic, historian and economist living in the second half of the nineteenth century. A comparison between both thinkers would be inappropriate under these terms, as Hegel is a source to Oliveira not a contemporary.

In what concerns Hegel, his reception in Portugal has largely been left unnoticed. The delay by which some of his ideas penetrated national territory can be explained by the linguistic and cultural barriers hindering such developments. Oliveira Martins, as one of the most prominent intellectuals of his generation, is probably, alongside Antero de Quental, the author whose interest in the philosophy of Hegel is more clearly manifested.

The sources for this work are the books, essays, articles and correspondence of Oliveira Martins and other authors of his generation, some of whom he befriended. The texts about German philosophy available to Oliveira Martins, which tend to be French in origin, are also another source and of course the direct German texts, some of which could be read in translated versions.

The personal library of Oliveira Martins contains some of those translations. There are no notes in these books but some passages are underlined³. It is difficult to ascertain whether Oliveira Martins underlined those passages himself though, because it seems that the foreign language books or the books difficult to acquire passed through various hands. Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* for instance appears to have belonged to Antero de Quental. Therefore these books tended to be marked with the name of the owner and appeared to be lent out to friends.

The books in which some manuscript notes can be read are those of Proudhon, where some interesting economic and social concerns could be found, such as this: "Freedom (individual) is the fatal path to go from authority (supreme) to solidarity (humanitarianism). The political revolution is the same as the economic [one]"⁴. These are most likely Oliveira Martins notes but then again, this is

³ See for instance pages 43-47, 51, 52, 94 of Hegel's *Lectures on Philosophy of History* present in Oliveira Martins's library.

⁴ "A liberdade(indivíduo) é o caminho fatal para passar da autoridade(suprema) para a solidariedade(humanitarismo). É a revolução política a mesma que a económica" See for this note page 12 of

uncertain because in addition to the earlier aforementioned reasons, Oliveira Martins's personal library also had a bumpy ride until it arrived at the University of Coimbra archives. Before it came to its present location it was part of the library of a catholic seminar in Valadares and before that in Cucujães. In those travels it was plundered of important works and it is not certain whether the notes in those books are his notes, as they could have been added or altered in some way⁵.

With the aforementioned objectives in mind, this work begins after this introductory chapter, by looking into Hegel's Germanism and the integration of Hegel's thought within Oliveira Martins's theoretical framework, with a passage through the sources he had access to. It then moves to his social and political thought, his adherence to socialism and his conception of state and politics. While looking into Hegel along the lines of his *Philosophy of Right*, Oliveira Martins's ideas with Hegelian contours are traced and some allusions to the points of contact are made.

In the last chapter, the philosophy of history of Oliveira Martins and his historiography will be the topic of discussion. The understanding of history by Oliveira Martins and the critiques drawn against philosophy foresees a complicated relationship with Hegel, as Oliveira Martins comes closer to the natural sciences. He then thinks those natural sciences provide the basis for history even if the methods of history are different from those of natural sciences.

There are reflections on history that find place both in Oliveira Martins and Hegel such as, the different historiographic prisms and ways of looking at history or the relations between past and future. Oliveira Martins defends a philosophy of history different from that of Hegel because he denies the possibility of a universal history; he sees philosophy of history more as a tendency in the historical development that could be looked for only in thought.

The evolution towards such a position does not invalidate some of the propositions he had set forward, particularly the important place of the Germanic world in the historical development. While generally a continuity can be seen in his thought, we can still see an evolution towards a different orientation. His earlier position is reflected in a letter to Jaime Batalha Reis as well as in his *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã*, where the division between natural and spiritual sciences is already visible. Starting in the 1880s, he increasingly distrusts those "sciences of the spirit" (ciências do espírito) and the laws applied to history through philosophical speculation.

Proudhon's Théorie de l'impôt, question mise au concours par le Conseil d'État du Canton de Vaud en 1860, to be found in Oliveira Martins's library.

⁵ See for a wider exposition on these issues the introductory study of the library's catholic where some of the missing works and other short-comings are mentioned. Paula Fernandes Martins, *A biblioteca de Oliveira Martins*, introdução de Martim de Albuquerque, Guimarães Editores, [s.l.], 2009, pp.7-.15

See also Carlos Câmara Leme "A biblioteca de Oliveira Martins: do seminário de Valadaras para a universidade de Coimbra. A 'joia da coroa' da biblioteca geral de Coimbra" in *Público*, 10 of April of 1993, pp.34-35.

1.2 The present state of studies on Hegel and Oliveira Martins in Portugal

The relation between the two authors put in evidence, requires first a short overview of the studies that have been made, as part of this work on the reception of Hegel in Portugal focused around Oliveira Martins.

The studies can be seen at least in three different levels, the study of Hegel's presence in Oliveira Martins, the studies on Oliveira Martins and lastly the studies on Hegel in Portugal.

The treatment of Hegel as a main topic in the work of Oliveira Martins is something that has not been done yet, the closest we have to an work of this nature is Maria Loureiro's study *Aspectos Filosóficos do ecleticismo de Oliveira Martins* about the eclectic tendencies in Oliveira Martins's philosophical thought. In this study Hegel is one of the main references under analysis and she addresses the problem under the banner of the "influences" he suffered from various currents. Another graduate thesis that follows the same path is Maria do Carmo Nieto Guimarães' thesis: *Oliveira Martins, político e historiador: Influência da filosofia alemã* (1941). By posing the problem in such a way, either the thought of the influenced or the influencer of the idea under analyses, is accordingly at some point merely accessory to the exposition. And as such the problem posited in this way does not take into account the process of thinking, maturing and integration of the ideas Oliveira Martins came to know from the source texts.

Another way to pose the problem is a comparison between the two authors, such as the comparatist effort Francisco Elias de Tejada makes between Oliveira Martins and Durkheim⁶. The objective proposed in this work, however, even if a consideration of the idea of influences and a comparatist effort is not completely dismissed, is rather to look at the marks of Hegel in the thought of Oliveira Martins.

The relation between Oliveira Martins and German thought in a broader sense, which also includes Hegel, has had its presence in some studies about Oliveira Martins. This topic is discussed for instance by W. Kreutzer who dedicates the third part of his essay *Oliveira Martins e o pensamento alemão da sua época* to Oliveira Martins and Hegel⁷, as well as in Jorge Nemésios's book entitled *Oliveira Martins – O seu filosofar e o historicismo do homem: estudo compreensivo* (1955), where the topic of historicism is discussed.

There are other studies which, although not focusing specifically on Hegel, look at the theoretical sources of Oliveira Martins, where Hegel and Hegelians are some of the references. This is

⁶ See Francisco Elias de Tejada, "Oliveira Martins y Durkheim" in *Gil Vicente*, 2nd series, II, 7-8, 1952, p.97-109.

⁷ See W. Kreutzer "Oliveira Martins e o pensamento alemão da sua época" in *Estudos Sobre Cultura e Literatura Portuguesa e Alemã*, Accções Integradas Luso-Alemãs Coimbra-Würzburg, coordenação Ludwig Scheidl, Minerva, Coimbra, 1997.

the case with George le Gentil (1935) and Álvaro Manuel Machado (1990s). Le Gentil for instance starts by saying Oliveira Martins “suffered an ascendant, moreover durable and efficient, of Fichte and Hegel⁸, proceeding to the sources where “he could have known Hegel by Vera’s translations and from the already disseminated work in France, of Charles de Rémusat about modern German philosophy”⁹, and according to him, by the influence of Hegel he “adheres to the thesis of society as superior to the individuals”¹⁰. Therefore for le Gentil, Oliveira Martins’s reading of Hegel boils down to the problem of the relation between society and the individual¹¹, while Álvaro Machado focuses on the movement of German culture as it arrives in Portugal, which is altered by its passage through France. The mixture of poetry and philosophy produces a French Germanism that is characteristic of a new literary school in France¹².

As for the studies on Oliveira Martins, they are numerous and this second level of studies (according to our earlier definition) more often than not also deals with Hegel. A good example is the well know Oliveira Martins biography by Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins, where Hegel is said to have a determinant weight in his thought on various occasions.

It could be said that during the whole 20th century the interest in Oliveira Martins is manifested in all the great intellectual figures such as Fidelino Figueiredo, Oscar Lopes, António José Saraiva, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Eduardo Lourenço and above all in António Sérgio.

Due to the limits of this introduction an exhaustive listing of the written works about Oliveira Martins goes beyond its capacity. Some works that should, however, be emphasized are Augusto Santos Silva study of Oliveira Martins socialism, the various outstanding books of Fernando Catroga on historiography, theory of history and 19th century culture, Carlos Maurício books on the reception of Oliveira Martins’s thought and finally the studies of Sergio Campos Matos on heroism and other topics.

In terms of history of historiography and theory of history, Oliveira Martins has also always been a central figure to those who concentrate on these themes¹³. The ideas put forward by Oliveira

⁸ “sofreu o ascendente, aliás durável e eficaz, de Fichte e de Hegel” G. le Gentil, *Oliveira Martins (Algumas fontes da sua obra)*, Cadernos da Seara Nova, estudos literários, Seara Nova, Lisboa, 1935, p.26.

⁹ “ele podia ter conhecido Hegel pelas traduções de Vera e pela obra já disseminada em França, de Charles de Rémusat sobre a moderna filosofia alemã” idem, ibidem, p.36.

¹⁰ “adere à tese da sociedade superior aos indivíduos, admitindo, com todas as suas consequências, a concepção hegeliana do maquiavelismo” idem, ibidem, p.37.

¹¹ See idem, ibidem, p.38.

¹² See Álvaro Manuel Machado “A crítica literária em Oliveira Martins: Paixão e Ciência ou o Germanismo afrancesado” in *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra*, vol. 18, Coimbra, 1999, p.239-245.

¹³ See on this topic:

Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *Ensaio III. Teoria da história e historiografia*, Sá da Costa, Lisboa, 1971.

Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História Breve da Historiografia Portuguesa*, Lisboa, Editorial Verbo, 1962.

Lúis Reis Torgal et al, *História da história em Portugal sécs. XIX-XX.*, vol. 1, Círculo de Leitores, [s.l.], 1996.

Martins and his generation have transited to the 20th century, which, even with the work of critique, have had a lasting influence. Some of the ideas of Oliveira Martins which will be a recurrent topic of discussion are for instance the idea of decadence¹⁴, the nature of history and its ends, civilizational types/races and society as an organism, besides all the historical theses he proposed.

There are many other works which focus on a multiplicity of subjects, from the dramatic, artistic and tragic history of Oliveira Martins to the place of humanity in his work, with a passage on religious, philosophical and anthropological themes¹⁵. From all these different and temporally wide-spaced works, the international congress held in Coimbra in April of 1995, 150 years after Oliveira Martins's birth, with the title *Oliveira Martins: Literatura, História, Política*, is a landmark in the Martinian studies.

In what concerns the study of Oliveira Martins's thought and work, there is still much to be done. He wrote extensively throughout his life and even though he did not make a living directly from writing, it can be said this was a second profession and source of income. He explored a variety of narratives, from fiction to journalism, writing a bit of everything. This led Silva Cordeiro to affirm that what we can find in Oliveira Martins are opposing views and that he "fluctuates with the wind of momentary impressions"¹⁶. Such an evaluation although excessive could be said to partially conform, especially with regards to his journalistic work.

His intellectual development certainly has a rational explanation and the balances and counter-balances we can often find in his work have some coherence when viewed in light of the positions and tendencies he progressively moves to. These are not so easily grasped in isolated readings, where our point is to show that there is still much room to explore in the complexity of his mind. The publication

Miriam Halpern Pereira, "A historiografia contemporânea sobre o século XIX" in *Ler História*, 1991, 21, pp.93-125.

Pedro Vilas Boas Tavares, "Da ideia de cultura à cultura Portuguesa: reflexões sobre o devir histórico em Oliveira Martins" in *Problemáticas em História Cultural*, Porto, Instituto de Cultura Portuguesa, 1987.

¹⁴ See António Machado Pires, *A ideia de decadência na geração de 70*, 2nd ed., Lisboa, Vega, 1992.

¹⁵ See for all the designated themes the following books:

Carlos Manuel Coelho Maurício, *A imagem humana: o caso de Oliveira Martins* [Texto policopiado], 1867-1955, Lisboa, [s.n.], 1995.

António Manuel Antunes de Matos Ferreira, *O pensamento de Oliveira Martins sobre religião* [texto policopiado], Provas complementares de doutoramento em História (História Contemporânea), Universidade de Lisboa, [s.n.], Lisboa, 2005.

Carmo Salazar Ponte, *Oliveira Martins, a história como tragédia*, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1998.

M. Viegas Guerreiro, *Temas de antropologia em Oliveira Martins*, Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, Lisboa, 1986.

Jorge Seabra, *Oliveira Martins. Raça e filosofia da história*, Coimbra, Faculdade de Letras, 1992.

¹⁶ "flutua à ventoinha da impressão momentânea" Joaquim Silva Cordeiro, *A Crise em seus aspectos morais, Estudo introdutório*, organização e notas de Sérgio Campos Matos, 2nd ed., Edições Cosmos, 1999, p.144.

of his “complete works” starting in the 50s, which, even if not entirely complete, contains the main ones, has no doubt promoted the interest in Oliveira Martins and helped in its study.

Finally the reception of Hegel and the studies about him in Portugal are two matters that relate to one another. Can we circumscribe the reception of Hegel to a given period? Or is it still taking place today? These are debatable questions and to clear up some doubts, Hegel’s reception in Portugal is situated here in the 19th century, while more detailed studies on Hegel would still require a longer maturing process of critique.

In the studies about Hegel an enduring presence can be seen in the juridical considerations of his philosophy¹⁷, with the examples of Cabral de Moncada and Jose Brandão. Vamireh Chacon, however, in his short essay on the reception of Hegel in Brazil and Portugal, considers that the early juridical appropriations of Hegel were Neokantian, therefore we cannot properly speak of a Hegelianism thereafter:

“From then on it is excessive to speak properly of hegelianism in Portugal. What happens there and continues, consists of Orlando Vitorino’s, Carmo Ferreira and António José Brito research, especially by last one, a scholar of various Hegelian hermeneutics, [which happen to be] disperse, at some point compiled in books. After a long phase of a Neokantian appropriation of the German idealism by the juridical philosophers, from which Cabral de Moncada is the greater expression, the Hegelian studies have been gaining maturity also in Portugal”¹⁸.

The authors mentioned specifically as Hegelian are a more recent development. The absence of other Hegelian sources in Chacon’s essay becomes apparent, particularly the works of Joaquim de Carvalho and Vasco de Magalhães Vilhena in which Hegel is object of reflexion, as in Joaquim de Carvalho’s essay *Hegel e o Conceito de História da Filosofia*¹⁹. But those partial conclusions seem on

¹⁷ Interestingly João Luis Oliva comes to the conclusion that “The political-constitutional Martinian discourse accompanied therefore, the main lines of his contemporary juridical thought” and as a result “at the end of the last century, his ideas were frequently cited” Oliva still considers, however that, nonetheless these ideas of Oliveira Martins give prominence to collective rather than individualistic societal models, they are still far from those shared by Hegel. / “O discurso político-constitucional martiniano acompanhava, assim as mais marcantes linhas do pensamento jurídico seu contemporâneo” ... “nos finais do século passado, as suas ideias eram frequentemente citadas.” João Oliva “Oliveira Martins e o Socialismo catedrático” in *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra*, vol. 18, *op. cit.* p.134 et 136.

¹⁸ “Dai em diante é excessivo falar de hegelianismo propriamente dito em Portugal. O que lá houve e prossegue, consiste na pesquisa de Hegel por Orlando Vitorino, Carmo Ferreira e António José Brito, em especial por este último, um scholar de várias hermenêuticas hegelianas, dispersas, em tempo reunidas em livros. Após a longa fase de apropriação neokantiana do idealismo alemão pelos jusfilosófos dos quais Cabral de Moncada é a maior expressão, os estudos hegelianos vêm adquirindo maturidade também em Portugal.” Vamireh Chacon “A recepção de Hegel em Portugal e no Brasil” in *Hegel, a Moralidade e a Religião*, n.3, editing by Denis L. Rosenfield, Jorge Zahar editor, Rio de Janeiro, 2002, p.146.

¹⁹ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Princípios da filosofia do direito*, tradução de Orlando Vitorino, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1976, p.3

the whole correct and from António Sérgio's preface written for Oliveira Martins's *Teoria do Socialismo* we can read the main lines along which this critique moves. The suspicion or even negative idea of Hegel's philosophy as obscure and unintelligible had a strong presence in Portugal.

The translations of Hegel's aesthetic texts(1952) by those associated with the *Filosofia Portuguesa* movement, which looked for a national character to Portuguese philosophy will also provide reflexions and studies on Hegel. But Orlando Vitorino, who is part of this philosophical movement, focusing however not only on Hegel's aesthetics, but also on his philosophy of right, will still tell us in the preface of his translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1958) that Álvaro Ribeiro, the main figure of the said movement, has "reverted from Hegel to Aristoteles"²⁰. Vitorino also dedicates a chapter to Hegel's reception in Europe and Portugal in an earlier interpretative book of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*²¹.

The Hegelian readings of Marxists will make an important contribution to the study of Hegel as well. In addition to the already mentioned Magalhães Vilhena, we will see in Eduardo Chitas' PhD thesis on the topic of Hegel and the Enlightenment and in various José Barata-Moura books, detailed studies on Hegelian problematics.

Other scholars that have occupied themselves more exclusively with Hegel are Manuel Ferreira Carmo, João Lopes Alves, Joao Augusto da Silva (João Medina), Mário Donas, Edmundo Balsemão Pires and Diogo Ferrer, these are mostly part of a younger generation where Hegelian studies have taken some thematic guided orientations²². Despite its merits such studies remain circumscribed to specific academic circles and still lack the breadth of a wider divulgation.

²⁰ "Revertendo de Hegel para Aristoteles" G.W.F. Hegel, *Princípios da Filosofia do Direito*, tradução de Orlando Vitorino, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, [1959], P.XXIV

²¹ See Orlando Vitorino, *Introdução filosófica à filosofia do direito de Hegel*, Sociedade de Expansão Cultural, Lisboa, 1961, Pp.31-44.

²² See for the mentioned authors:

João Augusto da Silva, *Dialéctica da totalidade na Fenomenologia do espírito de Hegel*, Tese de Licenciatura apresentada à faculdade de letras da Universidade de Lisboa, 1965.

Manuel José do Carmo Ferreira, *Hegel e a justificação da Filosofia: Iena, 1801-1807*, Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1992.

João Lopes Alves, *O estado da razão: da ideia hegeliana de Estado ao Estado Segundo a ideia hegeliana*, sobre os princípios da filosofia do direito de Hegel, Colibri, Lisboa, 2004.

Mário Donas, *O conceito "direito" e a linguagem na filosofia do direito de G.W.F. Hegel*, Coimbra editora, Lisboa, 2006.

Emundo Balsemão Pires, *Povo: eticidade e razão*, Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 2006.

Diogo Ferrer, *Lógica e realidade em Hegel*, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, 2006.

1.3. Theoretical considerations about Concepts and Categories in Oliveira Martins and Hegel

When looking at the conceptual apparatus of Oliveira Martins we may notice that it differs from the concepts used by Hegel even if the words in some cases remain the same. Not only the conceptual meaning of these words shared by both thinkers differ from each other, but these concepts have different meanings from what we take them to be today as well. There is as such a history of concepts which has been accounted for by a segment of the social sciences. This does not mean, however, that we can apply this scheme to every situation and in our study particularly, the movement brought about by culture, has in some cases broadened Hegelianism to extents that only a shadow of the original thought remains.

The problem that poses itself is to find the points of connection, a difficulty that is increasingly accentuated the more these thought-theories are intertwined, being a problem which upwells to the question of making philosophy after Hegel. If there truly existed a Hegelianism, how true it was to Hegel in each case is another matter and here is not the place for concerns over Hegel's orthodoxy. We should, however, certainly also consider, as part of this same issue, thinkers which are not Hegelian but have in any case taken some conceptions from Hegel and both of them, Hegelianism and these thoughts with roots in Hegel, co-exist in time. The history of concepts is, on the one hand, something much more noticeable when we look at the distant past, but ,on the other hand, in thinkers that are contemporaneous to each other, as in this case, the processes that are at play are mostly of a different kind. We can call them a more basic level of the dialectics of culture, and these processes belong in my perspective to history itself, helping cementing the culture of a given epoch by giving it determination. I believe this perspective should also be included in the history of concepts²³.

In identifying some of the main concepts in Oliveira Martins and Hegel, and their web of inter-relations we have an attempt to fill a gap between both authors by bridging together. The connections are already in place because no man is an island, and they can be closer or wider according to the features they share. The concepts as the refined products of human thought are the structure behind any theory, with them theories become cognizable as they provide the unity of thought by unifying differences and oppositions. But they have themselves multiple understandings associated, with them concepts as merely a vehicle of signification, or as possessing explanatory powers, or as being more or less concrete. These are different characteristics attached to concepts corresponding to different ways of thinking them.

We can also identify in Hegel the development of a different understanding of concepts. They are not the product of some unalterable scheme of categories or a priori concepts as in Kant, they do

²³ See in this respect Jörn Rüse "Historical thinking as intercultural discourse" in *Western Historical Thinking, an International debate*, edited by Jörn Rüsen, Berghahn Books, New York, 2002.

not belong either to a system of classification as in Aristotle, but rather have in themselves different degrees of reality. The categories in Hegel have primarily an objective side. The subject as the source of differentiation of subject and object undresses its subjectivity, becoming one with its self-alienation, allowing for a complete beginning, an object without any presuppositions, with no subjective interference, taking it as it is²⁴. This is what Hegel defines as pure being and from it all the categories follow, categories that are at the same time dynamic, changing from one into the other according to the dialectical movement of the real. These categories as principles have their justification in their synthetic progression, running through the various determinate forms of being while “grasping the manifoldness of determinations in their unity”²⁵. That is his early critique of Kant when he speaks of “quiescent dead subjects of the intelligence”, because he took these categories for granted as given by formal logic²⁶. This is an observation that acquires a definitive formulation in his logic when he affirms that everything needs first to be proven historically²⁷.

Following Hegel this work won't be tracing the formation of these concepts with some fixed categorical foundation, where a history could only be said to exist of the concepts but not of a higher level of categories. But in here it is believed, like Hegel points out, that there is some more universal structure that can be called the level of categories. These categories, although belonging to a different level, have a conceptual meaning themselves. They have naturally a more basic function, being in this way persistent but not unchangeable. They are, however, the starting point for the development of the concept, because they are the most general, more abstract and the less determined, being above all logical categories. Hegel recapitulates in his *Science of Logic* how they are not fixed determinations on the one hand and on the other hand how they relate to one another, thus forming an organic unity, in what it can be taken as a direct reference to Kant²⁸. Their logical process is in this sense also

²⁴ See Hegel's introductory text on his greater logic << With what must the beginning of science be made? >> where he precisely says: “we have to do to ensure that the beginning will remain immanent to the science of this knowledge is to consider, or rather, setting aside every reflection, simply to take up, *what is there before us.*” G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, translated and edited by George di Giovanni, Cambridge university press, 2010, p.47. / “des reinen Wissens aus der Anfang seiner Wissenschaft immanent bleibe, ist nichts zu tun, als das zu betrachten oder vielmehr mit Beiseitsetzung aller Reflexionen, aller Meinungen, die man sonst hat, nur aufzunehmen, was vorhanden ist.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol 5*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, p.68.

²⁵ See G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic, op. cit.* p.707. / “die Mannigfaltigkeit von Bestimmungen in ihrer Einheit zu fassen” G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II, Werke, vol. 6, op. cit.* p.106.

²⁶ Hegel refers directly to these matter on his first lengthy work when he speaks of “die Kategorien selbst teils zu ruhenden toten Fächern der Intelligenz”. G.W.F. Hegel, *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen system der philosophie, Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807, Werke, Vol. 2, op. cit.* p.10.

But this same critique can be traced as further back as to his more youthful writings on religion and on the dogmatic way Kant was then being used.

²⁷ “What is the *first* in science had of necessity to show itself to be the first *historically.*” G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic, op. cit.* pp.65. / “Was das Erste in der Wissenschaft ist, hat sich müssen geschichtlich als dass Erste zeigen.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol. 5, op. cit.* p.91

²⁸ “More to the point is that the emptiness of the logical forms lies rather solely in the manner in which they are considered and dealt with. Scattered in fixed determinations and thus not held together in organic unity,

historical, this is why he starts with no presuppositions in determining them when studying the nature of thought, a thought that is first of all historical. Even the most basic forms of human cognition are historically developments of contradictions that existed in ancient societies²⁹. The later development of such contradictions leading up to a higher stage is in the nature of logic, it is internal to it, hence with regards to its determination and categorical structuring thought determines itself in its own logical process by means of ascending to ways that better explain reality.

As pointed out earlier, categories have their own conceptual meaning, however, they should not be confused with the concepts and used interchangeably³⁰. They are knots to which we move while conceiving things, a position or a moment in the progression towards the concept³¹. It is in this

they are dead forms and the spirit which is their vital concrete unity does not reside in them. Therefore they lack proper content – a matter that would in itself be substance. The content (...) is usually sought for them outside them. But logical reason (...) within itself, holds together all the abstract determinations and constitutes their proper, absolutely concrete unity (...) it is not the fault of the subject matter of logic if the latter seems empty but only of the manner in which this subject matter is grasped.” G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, op. cit. pp.27-28. / “Sondern das Gehaltlose der logischen Formen liegt vielmehr allein in der Art, sie zu betrachten und zu behandeln. Indem sie als feste Bestimmungen auseinanderfallen und nicht in organischer Einheit zusammengehalten werden, sind sie tote Formen und haben den Geist in Ihnen nicht wohnen, der ihre lebendige konkrete Einheit ist. Damit aber entbehren sie des gediegenen Inhalts, - einer Materie, welche Gehalt an sich selbst wäre. Der Inhalt (...) für sie außen gesucht werden. Aber die logische Vernunft“ (...) “das alle abstrakten Bestimmungen in sich zusammenhält und ihre gediegene, absolut-konkrete Einheit ist“ (...) “es ist nicht Schuld des Gegenstandes der Logik, wenn sie gehaltlos sein soll, sondern allein der Art, wie derselbe gefaßt wird.“ G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke*, vol. 5, op. cit. p.41-42.

²⁹ See for instance the historical importance Hegel attributes to language and its formation as revealing the categories of thought “An extensive and consistent grammar is the work of thinking, and its categories are apparent in it” G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Volume I: Manuscripts of the introduction and the lectures of 1822-3*, edited and translated by Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2011. p.117. / “Die ausgedehnte konsequente Grammatik ist das Werk des Denkens, das seine Kategorien darin bemerklich macht” G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, op. cit. p.85.

³⁰ See José Barata-Moura who speaks about this same issue: “Even if holders, by their constitutions, of a conceptual structure, categories cannot, however, be simply identified as, taken for, or be assimilated to, the concepts

In reality, they represent and correspond to a form and a superior synthetic level of conceptual organization that develops fundamentally in the epistemological sphere” / “Se bem que detentoras, por constituição, de uma estrutura conceptual, não podem, todavia, as categorias ser simplesmente identificadas com, tidas por, ou assimiladas aos, conceitos.

Na verdade, elas representam e correspondem a uma forma e a um patamar sinteticamente superiores de organização conceptual que, fundamentalmente, na esfera epistemológica se desenvolve.” José Barata-Moura, *Totalidade e contradição: acerca da dialéctica*, 2ª edição aumentada e revista, edições avante, Lisboa, 2012, p.24.

See also António Hespanha who traces the origin of these words and their meanings: “Categorias. Uma reflexão sobre a prática de classificar” in *Análise Social*, vol. 38, nº168, 2003, pp.823-840.

³¹ See Hegel who refers to them as knots in his logic: “Here and there on this web there are knots, more firmly tied than others, which give stability and direction to the life and consciousness of spirit” G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, op. cit. p.17. / “In diesem Netze schürzen sich hin und wieder festere Knoten, welche die Anhalts – und Richtungspunkte seines Lebens und Bewußtseins sind, sie verdanken Festigkeit und Macht” G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke*, vol. 5, op. cit. p.27.

or Pinkard who refers to them as positions to which the thought moves to “What moves in the Science of Logic is not the conceptions but thought itself. Each category is a position to which thought moves” Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Dialectic: Explanation of Possibility*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1988, p.14

sense that Gadamer speaks of a new scientific character of logic, a new theory of concepts, where the concept is to be built from the least determinate logical categories³². Categories are therefore characteristic of Objective Logic, while the concepts properly - or at least the most developed form of the concept - are characteristic of Subjective Logic. Characteristic but not exclusive to it, concepts for instance will appear in previous steps of the progression but not in their defining form. Everything is dynamically integrated, as Hegel's system should be taken to be.

The dialectics of the abstract and the concrete is of no less importance in the building up of the concept. In this way a concept only has significance in a universe of propositions inter-connected between each other forming a system that, besides giving meaning to empty words, also explains them³³. An abstract concept is the abstraction itself taken in isolation, while a concrete concept is the relational unity of this first abstraction. Taken in isolation a concept would only have a symbolic function of designating an object, very poor in its defining ability³⁴. But that is actually the first step in the dialectics of the concrete and the abstract, when the concrete empirical reality ascends into the abstract as thought-object and in this element moves to the concrete.

In this attempt at explaining the concepts used by Oliveira Martins and Hegel, they will be informed by this deeper significance that the concept has in Hegel, taking the concepts not in isolation but rather looking for them in the unity of the diverse or in a systematic way.

Kosselleck and Jurgen have studied how concepts evolve through time, a fact which is particularly relevant for the study of different social epochs; they stated this same problem in different contexts and studied this phenomenon to great extent³⁵. I think this approach is of great use to our study. Not only because it becomes clear what is being spoken about when concepts such as: Nation,

³² See Gadamer "Hegel seeks to give logic a new scientific character by developing the universal system of the concepts of the understanding into a "whole" of science." and further on:

"if he had decided to develop these categories right at the beginning, he would have had to presuppose both" (...) "In the effort to derive the interrelationship of all categories from each other" (...) "All categories are determinations of the content of knowledge, i.e., of the Concept. Since the content must be developed in its manifold determinations in order to arrive at the truth of the Concept, science must begin where there is the least determinacy." Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic: five hermeneutical studies*, Yale University Press, Massachusetts, 1976, pp.81-83

³³ See Pinkard for his conception of concepts in Hegel as giving an explanation rather than a signification, Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Dialectic: Explanation of Possibility*, op. cit.

³⁴ "The genuine sense, genuine content of each abstract definition taken separately is revealed through its links with other definitions of the same kind, through a *concrete unity of abstract definitions*" Evald Ilyenkov, *The dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in Marx's Capital*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p.37.

³⁵ See Reinhart Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten, Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und Sozialen Sprache Mit zwei Beiträgen von Ulrike Spree und Willibald Steinmetz sowie Dutt*, Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

Jörn Rüsen „How to make sense of the past – salient issues of Metahistory“ in *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in South Africa*, vol. 3, n. 1, July 2007, pp.169-221.

Race, Contradiction, Dialectics are mentioned, but also because in this way they relate to one another in the context of the whole. That is considered essential to Hegel where his concepts are integrated into a system. They relate to one another inside this system but with this perspective in mind, they can also relate to concepts outside his system of thought or even to other philosophical systems when viewed in light of their relationships. Javier Fernandez Sebastián considers Hegel to be one of first thinkers to account for this dimension of the historicity of concepts³⁶.

Oliveira Martins also had this approach, not in terms of a clear drawn philosophical system but he considered, for instance, that it is not possible to truly grasp history without the vision of the whole. This relationship with the culture and the conceptual frameworks of his time also shines light on how his conceptual construction came about.

The concept of “povo” for example is something that others before Oliveira Martins, especially Alexandre Herculano which he considered a mentor on many levels, equated to what we could call the middle *bourgeoisie*. The people, as Victor de Sá notes, are taken by Alexandre Herculano as the “possessors” of propriety, not everyone is part of this category of “povo”³⁷. When we see him glorifying the people (“povo”), he is actually talking of those who by their own power were able to ascend into the status of possessors, which inherently makes them free men³⁸.

In Oliveira Martins the word used to speak of those who acquired freedom by means of being possessors is *bourgeoisie*. Following Alexandre Herculano’s steps he also thinks that having property furnishes the freedom humanity strives for, in this way a parallel could be drawn between both concepts as they define in broad terms the same social class even if the words differ³⁹. But contrary to

³⁶ Javier Fernandez Sebastián “Historia, historiografía, historicidad. Conciencia histórica y cambio conceptual”, in *Europa del sur y América latina. Perspectivas historiográficas*, Manuel Suárez Cortina, ed., Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2014, pp. 25-64.

³⁷ “by his turn, the historian Alexandre Herculano, in the same manner as Guizot and Tocquville in France, consecrated historically the victorious *bourgeoisie* in his Middle Ages studies. Showing the gradual ascension of <<the people>> that is: of the owners, those, that, since Middle Ages, could little by little reach the superior posts of state” / “por seu turno, o historiador Alexandre Herculano, à semelhança de Guizot e de Tocqueville em França, consagrou historicamente a burguesia triunfante nos seus estudos mediáveis. Mostrou a subida gradual do <<povo> isto é os possidentes, aqueles, que, desde a Idade Média, acederam pouco a pouco aos cargos superiores do Estado.” Victor de Sá, *A crise do Liberalismo e as primeiras manifestações das ideias socialistas em Portugal (1820-1852)*, Seara Nova, Lisboa, 1969, p.51.

³⁸ “For me the people is something solemn, intelligent, laborious, they are those who possess and work” / “Para mim o povo é algo de grave, de inteligente, de laborioso, são os que possuem e que trabalham” Alexandre Herculano, *Opúsculos*, vol. 2, 4th ed., Bertrand, Lisboa, 1908, p.193.

³⁹ “the *bourgeoisie* is nothing but the part of the people that manages to reach liberty, acquiring as such a new order of privileges, establishing a third class, the phenomenon of its formation is part of the history of the people” / “a burguesia não é mais do que a parte do povo que consegue alcançar a liberdade, e adquirindo por ela nova ordem de privilégios, estabelecer uma terceira classe, o fenómeno da sua formação faz parte da história do povo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, Prefácio do Dr. António Sérgio, Guimarães & Co. Editores, Lisboa, 1974, p.202.

Alexandre Herculano, Oliveira Martins believes everyone can ascend to that category and following Proudhon's thesis, he thinks that in fact humanity is actually tending towards equality.

The conceptual differences between both authors are thus not only important to understand their mutual relations but also to understand the thought of the author itself. There is a system of concepts which give intelligibility to the thoughts exposed. We will see along this work how the constructing of certain concepts in Oliveira Martins will gain their significance contentwise.

The next chapter will begin by looking into the Germanic elements in his thought and to his arrival at philosophy. In doing so it will mainly focus on his early books where the genesis of this tendency is engendered.

2. The Germanism of Oliveira Martins

2.1. Why This Germanism?

Answering this question first demands the clarification of the reasons behind Oliveira Martins's affinity towards Germany, as well as a reflection and a discussion on the meaningfulness of this Germanism. In Oliveira Martins this affinity means generally, the recognition of the German ideas and culture as occupying the highest ground in the development of modern thought. However, it does not imply an unconditional support for German aspirations in Europe especially towards the end of the century. It tends to be rather quite the opposite; it is because of Germany's prestige on this level that such hegemonic pretensions were possible and when political circumstance became favourable then such projects were engendered, even if those pretensions fall outside classical German culture.

The term Germanism describes well the content of what is to be looked at in Oliveira Martins. The effort in making this term precise is not merely a linguistic preciousness but it aims also at clearing up some historical misunderstandings and doubts that may arise from it. What makes Germany German or Portugal Portuguese; this is the point of departure in answering the questions posed by the formation of a national character. Something that is or has traces of Anglosaxonism does not imply that this something is an anglophile construal. On a basic level we have culture as circulating elements while on the level of construction, although capable of defining this something, there are still many different elements concurring in an open interaction. For instance, Oliveira Martins by adopting some of the solutions that were proposed in Germany, being them philosophical, political or historical, it does not mean these were the only ones in the aggregate of his thoughts. Germanism is also not synonymous with Germanophilism. The second term seems to imply a partial view, while the first term embraces a whole range of elements that fall outside the spectrum of a particular sectarian consideration.

The difficulty also lies in the presuppositions we have today. The formation of Germany as a modern nation was only accomplished at the end of the nineteenth century. If we speak of Germanism before this date it means something quite different, as it relates more to a cultural environment. We would then already hear about Germany spoken of as a nation. Fichte's brilliancy in his famous "Discourse to the German nation" exemplifies the extent to which this idea was broadcasted and present in the mind of the people, mostly in the intellectuals rather than "the people". However, the unity that existed was greatly counterbalanced by divisions⁴⁰. Hegel quite righteously realized that at

⁴⁰ See Whaley on the term *Kleinstaaterei* coined on the nineteenth century to denote this internal division of principalities and small territories, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume II The peace of Westphalia to the dissolution of the Reich 1648-1806*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012. p. 187
See also Mathias Schnettger "Kleinstaaten in der Frühen Neuzeit. Konturen eines Forschungsfeldes" in *Historische Zeitschrift* 286, 2008, pp.605-640

the time there was an ideal Germany, but in reality it failed to materialize, or at least it failed to do so in the forms which a nation-state had acquired in modern age⁴¹. For obvious reasons, this work will not occupy itself with moving through all the stages of the building up of Germany. But even if we understand in Germanism, a notion of totality, this does not mean that everything is uncritically accepted. Doctrines such as Pan-Germanism are only derivations of a German national project, taking up on past developments but moving them into other directions⁴². A further analysis would show us not only their partiality but the slipping away from the main problem of the German nationality by being circumscribed into an imperialistic phase of Germany.

Apart from the misunderstandings which Germanism may lead to, this concept is adequate as a point of departure for two motives. Firstly, because the medium from which Hegel came is an object of interest for Oliveira Martins, giving at same time insight into his reaching up for Hegel; and secondly because he was accused of Germanism, mainly because of his philosophical ideas and the evolution of his political positioning.

The difficult circumstances surrounding Oliveira Martins's education are an idiosyncrasy that should not be undervalued. The autodidacticism he was forced to, combined with the constraints of the Portuguese society, gave accent to an eclecticism that was already peculiar to his generation and even more so to the author of *Portugal Contemporâneo*.

When pushed to its extremes, we can see the crudest forms in an almost pathological way so well displayed in Antero de Quental, who sees after all eclecticism as the tendency of the age. He tries to pull away from tradition, rebelling against what were then the defined aesthetical models, philosophical conceptions and political ideas while mounted on a multiplicity of doctrines, which could hardly form a coherent whole. An agitation that turned out to be unfruitful, by thoughts and projects which never lasted long, lacking a strategy and a systematic objective, they were ever changing to the point of disaggregation. He would return harm's way to the same tradition he tried to break from, with the conceit of reaching harmony, only for the antinomies to appear in later stages and then again invest against them until reaching a point of exhaustion.

In these moments of crisis Antero de Quental was struck by a pessimism that would become increasingly worse throughout the remainder of his life. There was a collective psychology, he would say, from which people were unable to move away. Nobody can truly change society if the people do

⁴¹ See G.W.F. HEGEL, *Die Verfassung Deutschlands, Werke, vol 1, Op. cit.* 1986.

⁴² See for instance Ernst Hasse as anonymous author in his *Großdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950* is part of a larger group of publicists who taking on previous and then present German history support an expansionist nationalistic project, racist in nature. While on the other hand in eastern parts of Europe, Germans were as much discriminated in the imaginary of the people as were ethnic Slavs in Germany, such as the poles. In Dostoevsky classic *Crime and Punishment*, the pawn is an old greedy German lady.

not want this, and society is resistant to change, to surprises; it is so possessed of a mind of its own, that the pains and sorrows, even if foreseen, are an almost unavoidable fatality. The confession he gives to Oliveira Martins shows us clearly this idea:

“I never believed that you, or anyone else, would be capable of impeding the Portuguese crisis, not even of deterring or mitigating it, because it always seemed to be that societies cannot be taken by surprise and that there are no ingenious combinations capable of imposing to the mass of man that which at the bottom of their heart they do not want by all means”⁴³

A fatality also symptomatic to the individual and his character as something deeply rooted in the soul, as if one could not move away from his nature, an issue that if dealt with would lead to the theory of essences.

Although much more down to earth, Oliveira Martins still had his share of bitter pills and unresolved dichotomies between revolution and tradition. His pragmatic stance with regards to problems is praised by Antero de Quental⁴⁴, and a pronounced working ability is noted by Antonio Sergio as compared to the eccentricity of Antero de Quental⁴⁵. But we still see him condemning absolutism and Caesarism in politics, only to have him defending it later as a means to curtail the excesses of liberalism, as well as by reasons of bypassing a counterproductive parliamentarism which he criticizes. By the end of the century we see Silva Cordeiro, in a blatant allusion to the autocratic statism that had developed in Germany, identify him as the mentor of Germanism in politics. This later defense of Caesarism can only be understood as a disenchantment from politics in the interregnum between his parliamentary trial and his declared failure.

When ascertaining the genesis of the Germanism which protrudes Oliveira Martins’s thought and work, having a specific treatment in the figure of Hegel and later, for the sake of analysis, occupies specific domains of politics and history; it should be noted that such Germanism here in the spotlight will play a role in other chapters. This initial Germanism also demands a look at Oliveira Martins’s

⁴³ “Nunca acreditei que Você, nem ninguém, fosse capaz de impedir a crise portuguesa, nem sequer de a retardar ou mitigar, porque sempre me pareceu que as sociedades se não podem tomar por surpresa e que não há engenhosas combinações capazes de imporem aos homens em massa aquilo que eles no fundo do coração não querem de modo algum.” 29 of June [1887] letter to Oliveira Martins, Antero de Quental, *Cartas*, Leitura, organização, prefácio e notas de Ana Maria Almeida Martins, vol. 3, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 2009, pp.112-113.

⁴⁴ See Antero de Quental letters where he refers to such skills in order to help him: “I count on you to stimulate me, even [to] force me to organize my future life in a rational manner” / “Conto com V. para me estimular, e obrigar até a organizar maneira racional.” 23 of August of 1877 letter to Oliveira Martins, Antero de Quental, *Cartas*, prefácio e notas de Ana Maria Almeida Martins, vol. 2, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 2009, p.42.

⁴⁵ See António Sérgio, *Ensaio, Oliveira Martins: Impressões sobre o significado político da sua obra*, Tomo V, 2nd ed., Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, Lisboa, 1981, p.13.

arrival at philosophy and the treatment of the conditions through which philosophy was to be found in the Portuguese society.

The most recent notable changes in philosophical direction came from the time of Marquis of Pombal's reformism. In this period, which comprehends the Portuguese illuminism, there are, according to Joaquim de Carvalho, two main philosophical tendencies⁴⁶: one was the traditional metaphysical-theological view of a reheated scholasticism after the shock of the renaissance; the other one was a mitigated empirism stripped of polemical elements. In this second tendency we have on the one hand in the figure of Verney an empirism closer to a scientism of Newtonian extraction and on the other hand the followers of António Genuense in a mixture of empirism along the models of intellectualist rationalism⁴⁷. What is characteristic of these two main tendencies is that, by the interference and dependency on the political powers⁴⁸, they possessed a certain degree of syncretism to attenuate any traces of subversive ideas, from which a third tendency emerged, setting forward the basis of the later eclecticism that aspired to triumph over these imposed limitations.

Complementarily, there is a new historical methodology coming out of Pombal's reformism, the true destroyer of traditional monarchy. History acquired the status of a discipline to be studied and used in a publicist and partisan spirit in order to justify the absolutist reform, creating the conditions to rethink history and its epistemological statute. This partisanship naturally implied a partition, however, no longer comprising only the old versus the Pombalist reform but also new ideas, which were against such an absolutist enterprise as theorized by Luis Reis Torgal⁴⁹. The same way Alexandre Herculano, as the starting point of modern Portuguese historiography, is tributary of these previous developments in historical studies, so is the tendency shown in nineteenth century Portuguese philosophy to these earlier reforms, in which the way to come out of Verney's illuminism and Genuensism was precisely through this eclectic tendency.

In walking the road Oliveira Martins took until his arrival at philosophy, we face the problem of reconstructing the past and the formation of a mind. How to give life to a lived or living something when science is restricted to analytical processes, divisions and differentiations, in short, the

⁴⁶ See Joaquim de Carvalho "On a general level, the great intellectual directions were then either oriented towards a metaphysical-theological [sense] or [towards] a scientific-rational sense" / "De modo geral, as grandes direções intelectuais ou se orientaram por então no sentido metafísico-teológico ou no científico-racional" Joaquim de Carvalho, *Introdução ao ensaio de filosófico sobre o entendimento humano de John Locke, Obra Completa de Joaquim de Carvalho, Tomo II*, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa, 1981, p.301.

⁴⁷ See António Alberto de Andrade, *Verney e a cultura do seu tempo*, Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra, 1965, pp.380-381.

⁴⁸ See for matters on censorship and not only about censorship bodies, like the Real Mesa Censória newly created to centralize as well as to hinder the previous influence of the church, but censorship actually directly related to Marquis of Pombal, Lopes Praça, *História da Filosofia em Portugal*, Guimãres Editores, Lisboa, 1981, p.281.

⁴⁹ See Luis Reis Torgal "Antes de Herculano..." in *Historia da História em Portugal sécs. XIX-XX, op. cit.* pp.19-37

understanding which separates. How do we devise a way to capture that something in its living state without just enumerating a collection of data given to us by the understanding, stripped of liveliness, of color? This is, above all, a problem of style and Oliveira Martins considered the job of the historian to be that of a painter, to feel, to be imaginative and create. In history, artistically speaking, there are many technics, colors and materials coming out of the artist's palette. One of them is, for example, the ability to find the configuration of someone in the main traces of someone else's attributes and draw illustrations, a technique particularly handy in learning the past from the present. When looking at his *Elementos de Antropologia*, as he is referring to the process of humanization, we read at a certain point that:

“Anthropology came, at last, to explain scientifically a fact” ... “the existence of so many men, even within the most cultivated societies, [that are] yet positively brutes” ... “Without going out of one's own narrow village sphere, without inquiring about the habits and thoughts of savage people, neither prospect the revelations of archeology – The historian of this genre can reconstruct the succession of the human states, with living neighboring examples”⁵⁰

In this same way we can find in history, individual or collective figures that share a similar disposition, and from one we can learn traces of the other. This conception even holds synchronously. If we look for instance at friendships, we will find dispositions that are shared by both persons and we can tell plenty about someone by having information about their close friends, like in the case of Oliveira Martins and Antero de Quental.

We may head too far off track from the positive datum collected from reality and in this sense fail to portray things realistically, but in another light it is much more effective because the produced effect is greater than its cause viz. the positive datum. A parallel could be drawn to Hegel when he says that a higher order of art is one which is not concerned with producing things realistically, following strict points and inferences, but rather one that excites the idea or feeling in the observer. The excellency of a piece of art is not fixed there, petrified in its beauty, but rather in its capacity to excite beauty, in moving someone to beauty by also having this beauty concretely in oneself and not merely as a passivity, we appreciate beauty therefore not as an externality but rather by truly living it. A piece of art that has for its purpose the portrayal of luminosity is the most beautiful, the more capable it is of producing in us the idea of light and not because light is immediately present in the object.

⁵⁰ “A antropologia veio, por fim, explicar cientificamente um facto”... “a existência de tantos homens, até no seio das mais cultas sociedades ainda positivamente brutos!” ... “Sem sair do acanhado âmbito da sua vila; sem indagar os hábitos e ideias dos povos selvagens, nem sondar as revelações da arqueologia – o historiador deste género pode reconstruir a sucessão dos estados humanos, com os exemplos vivos e vizinhos.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Elementos de Antropologia: História natural do homem*, Guimarães e C.ª Editores, 1954, Lisboa, p.204.

In Oliveira Martins this notion is deeply rooted: art taking hold of reality for the latter to better make its emergence in our mind and, in a Hegelian sense, connect with our ideas. In portraying some historical time, institution or figure what is relevant for Oliveira Martins is the drama and the life unfolding. The reader takes part by directing his thought from the actions, thoughts, tastes, habits and other multiformous constituents of a historical reality, which are but an approximation to the life of the individual or of a complex, to the position and relevance of this individuality or organization and the reflect it had in history, basically the idea of the said figure. In a second order of importance is literality or the positive hard facts; the idea that is associated with what is being exposed is more important. An excess of imagination is not condemned, but rather it is even encouraged if it does not collide with the said facts.

Had Oliveira Martins thought of himself, he would have painted the vivid impersonation of a young man inspired by literature, discovering in art a means of ascension of the spirit to the absolute. The reflexive character could be seen in his gaze and as he walked one could already feel the interiority of an artist, admirer of great things, soon realizing the need for study as these do not come by easily. Even though of a middle-lower *bourgeois* origin, he has the notion since youth, emphasized by misfortunes, “that life for him has not been easy, or happy”⁵¹, it is plagued with injustices. He found in his beloved art a transgressive vehicle, and history, as the greater theater of tragedy, had shown him the movements of humanity and the real possibilities of enacting true freedom. From this insight an ingrained conviction in progress followed as well as a better awareness of the recent struggles of his countrymen. He unearths in them the true spirit of art, as he finds, also in them, such precept in principle: the ideal, giving logic to the monumental collective work of humanity.

A more profound sense of life was born from which art emanates and from where everything begins, and after reaching the heights of such an idea, it never came out of his mind. Such a greatness of ideas he finds it in the masters; by trailing their path he returns to himself enriched with the strength and creativity to conceive and with the will to know, to learn and find himself again. From the slope of the mountain he begins speculating, devising ways to the resolution of such disparities, to bring unity to the chaos, think totality and find connections in the apparent separateness of appearance.

This conjectural characterization was here a mere exercise, but even if it is not realistic in a strict sense, it still reflects the main lines of thought behind Oliveira Martins and does not contradict the facts. Such a “technique” helps with having a better understanding of persons, situations and

⁵¹ “A vida não tem sido para mim uma coisa fácil, nem alegre” Letter to Magalhães in Novembro of 1893, J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Correspondência*, Prefaciada e Anotada por Francisco D’Assis Oliveira Martins, António Maria Pereira livraria, Lisboa, 1926, p.237.

structures. The historical science is after all not a docimastic endeavor, merely based on sources and facts in a quest for purity, pertaining to be objective at the price of being filled with abstractions.

The movement from philosophical speculation to a more detailed study and consideration of German philosophy seems like a natural development for someone with intellectual ambitions of theorizing and proposing changes in the society. Joaquim de Carvalho, however, suggests that Oliveira Martins's Germanism came as a later extension from the influence of his close friend Antero de Quental, rather than as a previous course of self-reflection:

“The historian owed the poet bibliographic annotations and translations from the German, even confessed in *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã*, being licit to suspect that Antero was the one who lead him to Germanism”⁵².

Making notice of Antero de Quental's helping hand in the translation and explanation of some German texts to Oliveira Martins⁵³, he leaves this suspicion vague enough for any suppositions. On further reading, his dislike of Oliveira Martins's history of philosophy becomes apparent. He accuses him of lacking a proper critical study and understanding of the source texts. However, he does recognize after all that this was not his goal, but rather the more proximate task of a publicist, being his readings as such integrated in the context of his political activity⁵⁴. This critique is a legitimate objection coming from an academic consideration, but his thesis on the development of Oliveira Martins's Germanism is questionable.

Before Antero de Quental was befriended with Oliveira Martins, we can already see traces of this Germanism in Oliveira Martins. Straight from his first published work, *Febo Moniz*, we can read that “in Germany there is a transformation underway from which perhaps a new era will begin, passing the focus, around which all forces of the confederation revolve, from orthodox Vienna to Philosophical Berlin.”⁵⁵. We can see where the focus lies, even if referring to the process of national integration in Germany, he is conscious of Berlin as a philosophical center, where most of these federative ideas were being produced in an effort to unify Germany.

⁵² “o historiador deveu ao poeta indicações bibliográficas e traduções do Alemão, aliás publicamente confessadas no *Helenismo e Civilização Cristã*, sendo lícito suspeitar que foi Antero quem o conduziu ao germanismo” Antero de Quental, *Cartas Inéditas de Antero de Quental a Oliveira Martins*, publicação Francisco de Assis de Oliveira Martins com prefácio de Joaquim de Carvalho, Imprensa da Universidade, Coimbra, 1931, p.IX.

⁵³ This also reinforces the motives behind the book inscription which is dedication to Antero de Quental accompanied by a Virgil poem that has a deeply prophetic connotation.

⁵⁴ See Joaquim de Carvalho, *Evolução da historiografia em Portugal até fins do século XIX, Obra completa de Joaquim de Carvalho, Tomo II*, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa, 1981, p.151.

⁵⁵ “na Alemanha opera-se uma transformação donde há-de porventura surgir o início duma era nova, passa o foco, em roda do qual giram todas as forças da confederação, de Viena ortodoxa para Berlim filósofa” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Febo Moniz*, Prefácio de F. A. D'Oliveira Martins, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1988, p.262.

The federalist ideal had a history in Portugal, starting at least with the municipalist ideas, which are related to federalism, of the liberals with their pinnacle in the figures of Mouzinho da Silveira and Alexandre Herculano. Oliveira Martins was in his youth a supporter of such a federalism and this is the main pillar behind *Febo Moniz*. To this effect he further exposes his ideas in a series of five newspaper articles which go by the heading *Principio federativo e a sua applicação à Península Ibérica* in 1869.

This topic was not strange to Teófilo Braga, at the time a correspondent of Oliveira Martins. Teófilo was the most vocal proponent of this federalism in the choir reverberating the belief that Portugal's decadence was part of a broader decadence of the Latin races. The Germanic races on the contrary with its federative constitutions were achieving success⁵⁶. It is true that Oliveira Martins did not go so far in the beliefs of these doctrines, but he certainly shared some points of view with Teófilo Braga. It is no wonder then that this Germanism affirms itself, as these "federative principles" are precisely the most developed in Germany.

This support of federalism is even more marked in a series of unsigned articles in the newspaper *A República*, founded and directed by Antero de Quental, Oliveira Martins, Batalha Reis, Manuel de Arriaga and António Enes⁵⁷. In the newspaper n°3 we read how Bismarck, "born in a land [educated in] the highest philosophy, the most secure science, and the most profound literature" attempts to evangelize Germanism to the rest of the European nations⁵⁸. While the article is an attack on German expansionism, the main idea exposed is the presentation of federalism as the natural political form of societies.

The federalist project in Germany went through an original maturing process and its peculiarity, as opposed to other mainly political federalist theories, is the metaphysical fundament it has and without going as far back as to Kant, starting from Fichte and then the early romantics, we see the federalist ideas growing around the German national sentiment. As a result of the French invasions, patriotism combined with liberal views gained terrain. It finally became clear to Frederick William III that the present political organization could no longer bind his kingdom. A definitive turn was made possible through various liberal reformers who took power in the government of Frederick William III. Many were under the influence of Kant, including former students as in the case of Theodor von Schön. Although there was much resistance towards these reforms and only slow did they advance, while

⁵⁶ See idem, ibidem, p.12.

⁵⁷ Catálogo Biblioteca Nacional, Volume 38, Lisboa, 1991, p.53.

⁵⁸ "nascido num pais formado na mais alta filosofia e na mais segura ciência, na mais profunda literatura" *A República*, n°3.

along the way some of the more radical elements were set aside. Nevertheless, a confederation could be established in 1815⁵⁹.

By the influence of such reformers Hegel would settle in Berlin, giving a new impulse to the ideas of the national unity of Germany. The idea of a German constitution was advanced by the reformers, but this promise was never fulfilled until at least 1848. However, within the possible limits, a package of administrative reforms, diplomatic negotiations to further integrate this confederation, later evolving into economic integration and the development of national economy theories, were some of the outcomes of such efforts. With the favourable environment, philosophy in Berlin triumphed under the auspices of Hegel. Cherished by this spirit of a concrete united Germany, we will see the building up to what would become the revolution of 1848⁶⁰.

But the demands for a constitution were no longer along the lines of those set forth by Kant. Its failure had already been proven by the weakness of the confederation - even if not thoroughly implemented - which was partly inspired on Kant. Some liberal sections supporting the revolution were then closer to the Hegel's critique of Kant and his cosmopolitan federalism, which he criticizes for its formalism, where we "have a form higher than that which constitutes its mere being"⁶¹. Praising its advances but also criticizing the defects of its crystallization⁶², a problem that ultimately comes to the Kantian question of what ought-to-be and what really is.

After the split between the liberals and the working class, hope for more radical reforms was defeated, however, due to the uprising and subsequent heavy persecution, a wave of political refugees inundated Europe, helping to disseminate these German ideas of federalism. The persecution of the political opposition led, already in the beginning of the forties, to the forced immigration/expulsion of

⁵⁹ See on this topic Walther Hubstach, *Die Stein-Hardenbergschen Reformen*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1989.

Marion W. Gray, *Prussia in Transition. Society and politics under the Stein Reform Ministry 1808*, Philadelphia, 1986.

And also for a long term perspective structured under topics, the classic work of Reinhart Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution. Allgemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung und soziale bewegung von 1791 bis 1848*, dritte edition, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1981.

⁶⁰ See Bakunine who draws a vivid image of such developments in one of his essays, worth a citation, however, due to its length I forward the reader to: Michael Bakunine, *Statism and Anarchy*, translated and edited by Marshall S. Shatz, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.129-133.

⁶¹ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, New York, 1978[reprint of 1952], p.217 / "zum Gesetze seines Seins zu haben und, indem er das erfaßt, was er ist, eine höhere Gestalt als diese, die sein Sein ausmachte, zu sein." G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen und den mündlichen Zusätzen, Werke*, vol. 7, Suhrkamp, Baden-Baden, 1867, p.504.

⁶² "it is only defective when it is crystallized, e.g. as a cosmopolitanism in opposition to the concrete life to the state." idem, ibidem, p.134 / "nur dann mangelhaft, wenn es etwa als Kosmopolitismus sich dazu fixiert, dem konkreten Staatsleben gegenüberzustehen." idem, ibidem, p.361.

many intellectuals engaged in these struggles. At first supported and financed by the *bourgeoisie*, soon cleavages with the powers in place, made them back off from such businesses.

Before this event, Hegel's ideas had already been divulged to the French via Cousin, who gave a series of lectures on Hegel in France, however, having a weak understanding of Hegel and his ideas, he leaves them sadly amputated. The circulation of Hegelian ideas continued in France through Augusto Vera, for some time a protégée and most likely a former student of Cousin, while a federalism of Kantian-Hegelian inspiration would be advanced by Proudhon⁶³.

The development of these federalist theories on French soil, were consequently subsidiary of such happenings, from these developments certainly drunk Oliveira Martins, along with the awareness of the reforms which Germany was forced to do in response to the said revolution, especially in the decades of 1860 and 1870. News which must have arrived in Portugal and to Oliveira Martins who started studying the precedents of such ideas as part of his interest in politics.

From the study of various philosophical traditions in connection with his political theory Oliveira Martins arrives at German philosophy and from here to Hegel, a Germanism that progressed by going through various author with a necessary passage through Hegel. The author of *Teoria do Socialismo* organizes Hegel in a Germanic philosophical school that belonged together, and as such Hegel is the heir of a succession of philosophical systems tracing back to Kant:

“Sitting, however, on the sovereign human reason, finding in it the norm, the moral law, Kant opens the field in which German philosophy will walk. We will see how he does it; we will see how, while the Latin world through history and economy seals the discovery of the individual, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel ran in gigantic steps the field of the science of the human spirit, and constructed its philosophy.”⁶⁴

This totality becomes more evident when he further relates this German intellectual production with Europe and modern age in a triadic distribution:

⁶³ See J.P. Proudhon, *Du Principe Fédératif; et de la nécessité de reconstituer le parti de la Révolution* [1863], Paris, 1921.

⁶⁴ “Assentando, porem a soberana razão humana, encontrando dentro dela a norma, a lei moral, Kant abre o terreno que a filosofia germânica vai andar. Veremos como o faz; veremos como, enquanto o mundo latino pela história e pela economia selava a descoberta do indivíduo, Fichte, Schelling e Hegel percorriam a passos gigantescos o terreno da ciência do espírito humano, e construíam a sua filosofia.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.76.

“The modern idea is the conclusion of a philosophical movement that starts in Spinoza and Leibniz, goes from Vico, through Kant, through Diderot, through Goethe, through Hegel in to Feuerbach, to Proudhon, to Michelet, to Herbert Spencer, to Vacherot etc...”⁶⁵

The first citation is identical to the conception of a *German Idealism*, widely accepted and methodologically relevant in the thematic at hand, as many of the Hegelian philosophical and historic conceptions could already be seen in an embryonic stage in authors such as Schlegel and Herder. The notion of progress in the perfectibility of reason, the unconscious, non-being and the power of the negative, the absolute as approximation, the notion of dialectics and the relativity of truth, these were already some of the ideas advanced by the romantics, Schlegel, Novalis and Solger among others.

Herder’s idea of the progressive realization of reason in humanity by a process of self-education where:

“the natural state of man is the state of society” [and with the natural laws] “the first governments among human beings were also established” ... “This is where the nature ended her foundation of society and left it for reason or the need of man to base higher edifices upon it.”⁶⁶

Such idea sounds in principle similar to what Hegel supplements us his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* by going through all the series of configurations of the human consciousness or “The detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of science”⁶⁷ or even in this same modality of reason, one of the pivotal notions in the aforementioned work of Hegel, the interrelation and relativity of the slave equated to the master, appears to be sensitive to Herder when he speak of the degeneration of governments:

“The good Mother could do nothing but teach them through reason, through historical tradition, or finally, through their own felling of pain and misery.” ... “the slave, under the most

⁶⁵ “A ideia moderna é a conclusão do movimento filosófico que a partir de Spinoza e Leibniz, vem por Vico, por Kant, por Diderot, por Goethe, por Hegel, parar em Feuerbach, em Proudhon, em Michelet, em Herbert Spencer, em Vacherot etc...” J. P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: Exame constitucional da sociedade portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, prefácio de António Sérgio, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1990, p.78.

⁶⁶ See Johann Gottfried Herder, *Another Philosophy of History and select Political Writings*, translated with introduction and notes by Ioannis D. Everigenis and Daniel Pellerin, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 2004, pp.121-122.

⁶⁷ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, translated by A. V. Miller with analysis of the text and foreword by J.N. Findlay, F.B.A, F.A.A.A.S, Oxford University Press, [New York], 1977, p.50. / “Die Reihe seiner Gestaltungen, welche das Bewußtsein auf diesem Wege durchläuft, ist vielmehr die ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewußtseins selbst zur Wissenschaft.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke*, vol. 3, *op. cit.* p.73.

oppressive despotism always share with his master in rapine, and is the despot not always the greatest slave ?”⁶⁸

A differentiation must however be made between each of these representatives of the German idealism, since they conflict in key points. To this effect Hegel was a harsh critic of the romantics, as in the case of dialectics, where he sees a dead end in the dialectics proposed by the romantics. A false infinite which does not produce any advances and is in fact a finite notion, a riddle that succumbs to a bad negative. This is according to Hegel: *Das Böse* viz. the evil par excellence.

When Hegel in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* writes about the topic of dialectics, he speaks of Solger, the leading theorist behind the irony of the romantics and denounces this doctrine and to where it leads:

“the dialectical moment of the idea, to the point which I call “infinite absolute negativity”, to the activity of the idea in so negating itself as infinite and universal as to become finitude and particularity, and in nevertheless cancelling this negation in turn and so re-establishing the universal and infinite in the finite and particular.”⁶⁹

Hegel recognizes this type of dialectic which goes by the name of irony in the romantics, a form of dialectic initiated by Socrates, which acquires in the romantics an ideal form from its original dialogical function. This irony of the romantics originates from Fichte’s subjective philosophy, negating any substantial truth except for the original I as the creator to which all the rest is to this *Tathandlung* viz. the pure activity of the I, a mere appearance:

“This virtuosity of an ironical artistic life apprehends itself as a divine creative genius for which anything and everything is only an unsubstantial creature, to which the creator, knowing himself to be disengaged and free from everything is bound, because he is just able to destroy it as to create it.”⁷⁰

As one can see, naturally not the entire theme of Germanism is Hegelian. Hegel was the first to criticize a whole range of doctrines. But neither was Oliveira Martins a Hegelian per se, although he shared concepts of Hegelian extraction and followed percepts of his philosophy of history. This fact highlights the importance of the study of Hegel’s divulgation literature, in order to understand some

⁶⁸ See Johann Gottfried Herder, *Op. cit.* p.126

⁶⁹ See G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics lectures on Fine Art, Vol I*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, pp.68-69 / “das dialektische Moment der Idee, auf den Punkt, den ich <<unendliche absolute Negativität>> nenne, auf die Tätigkeit der Idee, sich als das unendliche und Allgemeine zu negerien zur Endlichkeit und Besonderheit und diese Negation ebensoviele wieder aufzuheben und somit das Allgemeine und Unendliche im Endlichen und Besonderen wiederherzustellen.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesung Über die Ästhetik, Werke*, vol. 13, *op. cit.* pp.98-99.

⁷⁰ See idem, *ibidem*, p.66 / “Und nun erfaßt sich diese Virtuosität eines ironisch-künstlerischen Lebens al seine göttliche Genialität für welche alles und jedes nur ein wesenloses Geschöpf ist, an das der Freie Schöpfer, der von allem sich loss und ledig weiß, sich nicht bindet, indem er dasselbe vernichten wie schaffen kann.” idem, *ibidem*, p.95

of the critiques he directs at Hegel and what idea of Hegel's philosophy he had. Besides the fact that the then concurrent philosophical appropriations of Hegel, in a wide range of heterogeneous doctrines and in a diversity of areas, ranging from politics to religion, had a not at all uncommon corresponding partial misrepresentation of Hegel.

By holding in this study that Oliveira Martins's initial move towards Germanism and his subsequent approach to Hegel was the product of a self-reflective proneness, it should be recognized, however, that Antero de Quental exerted great influence on him - and not only Antero de Quental - especially in what is related to Hegel. It is true that he did not meet Antero de Quental before 1870, but we know that in the circles he took part, Antero de Quental and the nonconformists of Coimbra were a topic of debate⁷¹. This is especially true for the *Tertúlia da Farmácia Ultramarina*, a bohemian salon where debates were held under the auspices of Sousa Martins, his old school friend and university colleague of his younger brother Guilherme Oliveira Martins, who was working on a family property belonging to an uncle⁷².

Antero de Quental is remarkably elucidative in his writings with high sounding confessions of the intellectual sources of his generation, which helps us trace the formation of their conceptions about Hegel. In an autobiographical letter to Wilhem Storck he is very emphatic in declaring he was one of the main fathers of the Germanism flourishing in Coimbra at the time he studied there:

"The reading of Faust from Goethe (in the French translation of Blaze de Bury) and the book of Rémusat about the new German philosophy exerted however on my spirit a deep and lasting impression: I was definitely conquered for Germanism; and, if from all the French, I preferred Proudhon and Michelet, it was no doubt because these two were the ones that felt [closer] to the spirit beyond the Rhein. I read then much Hegel, in the French translations of Vera ([as] only later did I learn German); I do know if I understood [him] well, neither would the independence of my spirit allow me to be his disciple, but it is certain that the great tendencies of such a synthesis seduced me. In any case Hegelianism was the starting point of my philosophical speculations, and I could say that it was inside it that my spiritual evolution took place."

(...)

"How did I accommodate the cult of these doctrines of the apologist of the Prussian State, with the radicalism and socialism of Michelet, Quinet and Proudhon? Mysteries of the youthful incoherence"

⁷¹ See Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins, *Oliveira Martins: uma Biografia*, Prefácio de Eduardo Lourenço, Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1986, p.42.

⁷² See idem, *ibidem*, pp.50-51.

(...)

“This was the point of departure for the current Portuguese literary evolution” ... “Hegelianism exploded in [the group of] Coimbra”

(...)

“there was a group in Portugal of 16 to 20 young man, who did not care about the Academy and the academics, who were no longer catholic or monarchic, who spoke of Goethe and Hegel like the old had spoken of Chateaubriand and Cousin; of Michelet and Proudhon, like [those] others of Guizot and Bastiat”

“The facts confirmed this impression: 10 or 12 of the first names of today’s literature all came (except 2 or 3) from [this] Coimbra school or from its influence. Germanism had set foot in Portugal. A new era for Portuguese thought was open.”⁷³

The content of this text is rich on different levels. To start with, the fact that he did not know German but learned it only later, which, according to our research, begun at least in a systematic form, when he travelled to America, since we know that “A German grammar made his delight” whilst being on the ship⁷⁴.

⁷³ “a leitura do Fausto de Goethe (na tradução francesa de Blaze de Bury) e o livro de Rémusat sobre a nova filosofia alemã exerceram todavia sobre o meu espírito uma impressão profunda e duradoura: fiquei definitivamente conquistado para o Germanismo; e, se entre os franceses, preferi a todos Proudhon e Michelet, foi sem dúvida por serem estes dois os que mais se ressentem do espírito de Além-Reno. Li depois muito de Hegel, nas traduções francesas de Vera (pois só mais tarde é que aprendi alemão). Não sei se o entendi bem, nem a independência do meu espírito me consentia ser discípulo: mas é certo que me seduziram as tendências grandiosas daquela estupenda síntese. Em todo o caso, o Hegelianismo foi o ponto de partida das minhas especulações filosóficas, e posso dizer que foi dentro dele que se deu a minha evolução intelectual.”

(...)

“Como acomodava eu este culto pelas doutrinas do apologista do Estado prussiano, com o radicalismo e o socialismo de Michelet, Quinet e Proudhon? Mistérios da incoerência da mocidade!”

(...)

“e foi o ponto de partida da atual evolução da literatura portuguesa” ... “O Hegelianismo dos coimbrões fez explosão.”

(...)

“havia em Portugal um grupo de 16 a 20 rapazes, que não queriam saber da Academia nem dos Académicos, que já não eram católicos nem monárquicos, que falavam de Goethe e Hegel como os velhos tinham falado de Chateaubriand e de Cousin; e de Michelet e Proudhon, como os outros de Guizot e Bastiat”

(..)

“Os factos confirmaram esta impressão: os 10 ou 12 primeiros nomes da literatura de hoje saíram todos (salvo 2 ou 3) da Escola Coimbrã ou da influência dela. O Germanismo tomara pé em Portugal. Abria-se uma nova era para o pensamento Português.” 14 of May of 1887 letter to Wihlelm Storck, Antero de Quental, *Cartas*, vol. 3, *op. cit.* pp.92-95.

⁷⁴ “uma gramática alemã fez as suas delicias”, João Gaspar Simões, Antero de Quental, Editorial presença, Lisboa, 1962, pp.45-46.

Carolina Michaelis however furnishes us a less favourable view of Antero de Quental's knowledge of German:

"I will speak in the first place of his relationship with our language. He could not speak it. He pronounced it slowly [and] with much effort. Neither did he write it. And even less could he understand the familiar language, quickly pronounced" ... "Antero(which in any case spoke French very well, for his part he read English, Italian and Spanish and was not lost in Latin) was not afraid of his insufficiencies in German" ... "what was very important for him, was to read, but to read from the Masters"⁷⁵.

She places the beginning of this learning of the German language as an autodidact in 1867. He certainly had in the beginning of 1870 already started reading in German as a letter to Oliveira Martins attests: "I have been studying German, and I understand it a little better"⁷⁶.

Another appointment is the recognition of the German ideas broad influence among his generation, of which Hegel was the dominant force. However, the sources of such Germanism appear to be French. It was through Augusto Vera that Antero de Quental had his initial contact with the philosophy of Hegel, inside of which his spiritual development took place. He also has doubts over his understanding of Hegel, as well as contradictory thoughts about Hegel which he identifies as the apologist of the Prussian state. In wake of such clues given by Antero de Quental the next section will look into the basis of such beliefs which leads us to the next section, the sources of this Germanism in Oliveira Martins.

⁷⁵ "Direi em primeiro lugar, das suas relações com a nossa língua. Não a falava. Pronunciava-a devagar e a custo. Nem a escrevia. E muito menos entendia a linguagem familiar, rapidamente enunciada" ... "Antero (que de resto falava muito bem o francês, pela sua parte lia inglês, italiano e espanhol e não era de modo algum hóspede em latim) não receava a sua insuficiência no manejo de alemão" ... "O que lhe importava, e muito, era saber ler, mas ler os Mestres" Carolina de Michaelis, "Antero e a Alemanha" in *Antero de Quental in Memoriam*[edição Fac-Similada], Editorial Presença e Casa dos Açores, Lisboa, 1993, pp.391-394.

⁷⁶ "Tenho estudado alemão, e já entendo menos mal o que leio." 28 [of Augusto of 1874] letter to Oliveira Martins, Antero de Quental, *Cartas*, vol. 2, *op. cit.* p.381

2.2 Sources

In this section the sources from which this Germanism emanated will be traced and problematized. Because of the nature of such an inquiry, specific allusions to Oliveira Martins will be made only when pertinent, as the main objective is to have a general view, hopefully a not too impressionistic one, of the sources available to Oliveira Martins. Apart from the direct sources, sources indirectly coming from philosophical and political circles that integrated some Hegelian ideas should also be considered, such as those of socialism, positivism and eclecticism. Those who outline mainly critical elements, gave even more strength to the discussion on and interest in Hegel. These indirect sources are, however, for the most part, circumstantial and we will focus more on direct sources.

Previously the formation of this Germanism was grounded on a youthful period of Oliveira Martins's life, mostly pre 1870, and the generation he is associated with, where the sources and direct references to Hegel or German philosophy are still fragmentary. Still trying, however, to delineate possibilities and draw hypotheses based on the available information, the people and the intellectual circles he was related to in Portugal, considering, in addition, the general course of Europe's history.

This part will now occupy itself with Oliveira Martins's texts globally, where the relation is more direct, inclusively with notes, quotations and bibliography references. This procedure will require a descending process to look into the sources, because first, in Oliveira Martins they are not the originals but translations, and second, the cultural environment and historical/political conjuncture, which is variable, has an influence on this reception. For example, he was first a follower of Proudhon but moved progressively towards another socialist camp, that of state socialism. Therefore, a different understanding of Hegel and his philosophical positioning is to be found in later mature works.

How Hegel's philosophy was understood and what were taken to be its practical implications are two sides that should be differentiated for methodological reasons. These are, on the one hand, the interpretations of his doctrine in terms of ontological and epistemological fundamentals, involving technical aspects which pertain specifically to the Hegelian system; on the other hand, there is what comes to be the political side of Hegel. When taken to its limits, the political arena is seen as a reflection of this Hegelianism, or, according to some of his detractors precisely the opposite, which amounts to the argument of accepting the existent and then simply give the political appearances a cognitive form.

However, these two sides are inter-related, because to think reality, as Hegel does, he accommodates it in forms of thought, expressing a rational understanding of this reality by building a structure which allows working on this same reality. The implications of uncovering undesired phantoms from a reality expurgated of contradiction, some of which are still incipient in its

phenomenal forms, question the rationale of such reality and what is in thought is for the subject no longer acceptable to remain so circumscribed.

There was a very clear project since Hegel's youth; he sought the renovation of the community, trapped in lifeless forms of existence, by looking at Greek classical culture. But instead of advocating going back to these early religious forms, he looked for the transitions; he looked at how it was possible that this lively element of Greek religion degenerated. This is where his sight will focus on and from this initial religious view he will build his speculative system on the pyre of dialectics, the kernel of the logic of change, realizing that opposing elements, instead of being consumed and taken to the last consequences, were in fact commonly hindered from development with a subsequent suspension of reason that reflects on the community. The relation between Hegel's theory and the development of society, or in Hegel's terms, the life of the community where reason builds itself up, is understandably enormous and the destructive power of such doctrine would not remain indifferent to those who perceived it. This relation is duly seen by numerous antagonists to the extent that the political outcomes are often regarded as the result of Hegelian philosophy, as an inspirer of Revolution, where developments in this area are mere Hegelian prerogatives deduced directly from his system and that these two sides are non-differentiable.

In the analysis of the Hegelian sources of Oliveira Martins, such methodology helps us differentiate between the ideas in vogue. The intellectual radication of Oliveira Martins is not always clear, especially in his first books in which a bibliography is lacking, and where references and footnotes are, although when present very reveling, sparse. He ventures to take conceptions from different sources and puts them together in a synthesis, however, somewhat schematic, they become muddled and their provenience uncertain, although sometimes we are able to discern the line, or better yet, the branch from where they came from.

Antero de Quental's statement about Augusto Vera as a source for the reading of Hegel is also confirmed in Oliveira Martins. In the books in which a bibliography is given, we find the following translation of Hegel: *Philosophie de la Religion*, tr. Vera, Paris, 1876 (in *Sistema dos Mitos Religiosos*, 1882) and a reference is also given to this same translation in a footnote of *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã*⁷⁷. Even if this translation is from 1876, it is legitimate to assume that Oliveira Martins had read other translations from Vera before, as these were the ones available at the time he wrote *Teoria do Socialismo*, in which Hegel and German philosophy are discussed at length. In his personal library the only translation by Vera to be found, besides the already mentioned *Philosophie de la Religion*, is the translation *Philosophie de la Nature* which apparently belonged to Antero de Quental. He also had an

⁷⁷ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *O Helenismo e a Civilização Cristã*, prefácio Dr. José Marinho, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1985, p.327.

English translation of Hegel's *Lectures on Philosophy of History* by J. Sibree with the edition date of 1878, so only later would he have access to it⁷⁸. Another possibility of getting familiar with Hegel is through second hand material: either from early Germanistic disseminators, although none is to be found in his personal library, such as Auguste Ott, *Hegel et la Philosophie Allemande* or Joseph Willm's, *Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel*⁷⁹, which were often culturally close to Germany, as in this case where both were Alsatians; besides Rémusat divulgation material about German philosophy which he certainly read. Or apart from these, Hegel could have come from socialist circles and from Proudhon.

Yet another source are the liberals. However, these were mostly critical of Hegel. But they were surely present in Oliveira Martins's considerations and the authors mentioned by him, such as Heinrich Ahrens and Emilé Lerminier, had direct contact with Hegel's philosophy. They were, however, far from being Hegelian and even a political alignment in terms of liberalism in light of later developments is questionable. It is nevertheless almost certain that when Hegelianism first set foot in France, this critique came from a liberal standpoint. These interpretations of Hegel were the least dialectical and it seems Oliveira Martins had read both these views on Hegel, as well as those of Augusto Vera, naturally the translations but possibly also his interpretative books.

Augusto Vera was a Neapolitan émigré, who seems to have arrived in France at around 1835. There is a wide variety of contradictory texts about Vera. Some even mention him as a student of Hegel⁸⁰, others as a student of Cousin – which seems plausible – while the dates for his arrival in France, for the acquaintance with Hegel and him being a teacher in France vary. Although our goal is not so much concerned with Vera's biography, but rather to have an insight into Hegel's reception in France starting with Vera, it is more plausible that Raffaele Mariano, a student and close friend of Vera holds an upper hand in this matter⁸¹.

According to Mariano, Augusto Vera got acquainted with Hegel through a German teacher. Vera gained a teaching position in Bern's Hofwyl institute, but shortly after moved to a College in

⁷⁸ See for all the mentioned translated works of Hegel in possession of Oliveira Martins, Paula Fernanda Martins, *A Biblioteca de Oliveira Martins, op. cit.* pp.203-204.

⁷⁹ See Michael Kelly "Hegel in France to 1940: a bibliographic essay" in *Journal of European Studies*, Vol XI, 1981, p.31.

⁸⁰ See for instance Jean-Michel Rabaté. "The reception of Hegel and Heidegger in France: Alexandre Kojève, Jean Hyppolite, Maurice Merleau-Ponty" in *Modern Europe Criticism and Theory: A critical guide*, edited by Julian Wolfreys, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006, p.204.

⁸¹ See for his biographical essay on Augusto Vera: Rafael Mariano, *Uomini e Idee*, G. Barbéra Editore, Firenze, 1905. p.227.

See also for some other dates, an encyclopedia entry which says: Augusto Vera left Italy in 1827, travelled through France, arriving at Paris in 1828 and in here he would be invited to teach at Bern in 1831, but after a couple of months would be returning to Paris where he teaches philosophy. *Dizionario Biografico degli scrittori contemporanei*, dir. Angelo de Gubernatis, Col tipi dei successori Le Monnier, Firenze, 1879, p.1030.

Champel Genève as a teacher of French and Latin. It was in Genève that he met this Hegelian, who was a German teacher, but he did not stay long in Switzerland and shortly after, at around 1839, he returned to France where he had first studied Philosophy, since 1835, for two years at *La Sorbonne* University. Upon this return he reestablished contacts with people he had known and in a couple of days, as he took part in literary saloons of Paris sponsored by Louise Colet, he was in contact with Cousin. By the influence of Cousin he was able to teach in France, who, besides giving him a bachelor's diploma, wrote a recommendation letter to the influential Pierre-Simon Ballanche:

"M. Auguste Véra, who will present you this letter, is a young Italian who was strongly recommended by one of my friends, Romain, who occupies himself with fruits of the excavations of Sabine. I have initially welcomed M. Auguste Véra because of the recommendations he carried; but I was quick in welcoming him by himself. Now, I can recommend him myself, with all confidence, by his own merit, which I could appreciate, and for his personal qualities, which I was able to put to test. [Since] M. Auguste Véra occupies himself with philosophy, it is very natural that he wishes to be in contact with you. I consider myself fortunate for having this occasion offered to me in order to get back to our old relations, which have only been suspended because of our different careers; you my dear friend, are devoted to the public career, me, I have remained in my obscure corner. All the [assistance] you can [give] to M. Auguste Verá, I will accept as a motive of recognition for myself."⁸²

Augusto Vera will first teach at Collegio communal di Mont-De-Marsan in Landes. He was then promoted to Toulon (1840), later moving to Lille and finally Paris (1848) as a substitute professor. While in Toulon he wrote *Philosophie Allemande – Doctrine de Hegel*. During this period he pledged support and intervention in his favour to his benefactors for a teaching position in Paris saying "that I prefer any position in Paris rather than an advantageous position in the provinces; I consider, in fact my stay in Paris decisive for my future"⁸³. But this request will not be taken in consideration, when the estrangement with Cousin grows. While provisionally staying in Paris he took part in an examination

⁸² "M. Auguste Véra, qui vous présentera cette lettre, est un jeune Italien qui m'a été fort recommandé par un de mes amis, Romain, qui s'occupe avec fruit de fouilles dans la Sabine. J'ai d'abord accueilli M. Auguste Véra en raison de la recommandation dont il était porteur; mais je n'ai pas tardé à l'accueillir pour lui-même. Maintenant, je puis le recommander moi-même, en toute confiance, pour son propre mérite, que j'ai pu apprécier, et pour ses qualités personnelles, que j'ai été dans le cas de mettre à l'épreuve. M. Auguste Véra s'occupant de philosophie, il était très naturel qu'il désirât être en rapport avec vous. Je m'estime heureux de l'occasion qui m'est offerte de me remettre dans nos anciens rapports, qui n'ont été suspendus que par la différence de nos carrières; vous, mon très cher ami, vous étant dévoué à la carrière publique, moi, étant resté dans mon coin obscur. Toute l'utilité dont vous pourrez être à M. Auguste Véra, je l'accepterai comme un motif de reconnaissance pour moi." Victor Cousin, *M. Victor Cousin, sa Vie et sa Correspondence*, par J. Barthélemy-Saint Hilaire, 3^e vol, [s.n], Paris, 1895, pp.395-396.

⁸³ "che preferirei una posizione qualunque a Parigi ad una posizione più vantaggiosa in provincia; considero, infatti, il mio soggiorno a Parigi decisivo per il mio avvenire" Charles Alunni "Per un dialogo franco-italiano in filosofia: l'italia come 'terzo escluso' dagli Annali franco-tedeschi" in *Bioetica, globalizzazione ed ermeneutica: limpegno critic della filosofia nel mondo contemporaneo*, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2003, p.210.

for a position in the university, but, according to Raffaele, this examination turned out to be an abuse and the nomination did not follow by the influence of Victor Cousin, then adverse to Vera. Faced with the eclectic-spiritualist adversaries he had gained and no prospects of progress to an academic career, besides a romantic relation that failed to produce a marriage, Vera was left without any attachments to France, leading him to leave for Great-Britain.

His countryman Giuseppe Ferrari, who took part in this same aggregation examination of the University of Paris, had been suspended earlier as professor from the Strasbourg University in 1841, in what became known as "The Ferrari Case"⁸⁴. In 1847 he had been recommended by Quinet for a supplement professor position at Collège de France and was accepted by the university but denied entry by the ministry of education. Here again in this aggregation he will not be accepted by the influence of Victor Cousin. Kelly in his study on Hegel's reception in France mentions the endemic xenophobia in French universities at the time⁸⁵. Augusto Vera may have been aware of this, and the fact that his name in Cousin's recommendation letter goes by an adapted French version Auguste could be based on such grounds.

Vera as a right Hegelian could not establish himself intellectually in France in an evident refusal - from the conservative group which at first had him under its wings - of the acceptability of such doctrine. In this adverse environment there was no Hegelian school in France, neither from the left and their revolutionary ideas, who tended to emphasize the progressive elements of Hegel's philosophy; nor from the solidifying force of Hegel that tended to come from the right Hegelians and their orthodoxy, as Augusto Vera was unable to maintain his friendships.

Vera was briefly under the influence of Victor Cousin, but he felt out of favour and the relations between him and Cousin were not cordial anymore at the outbreak of the 1848 revolution. There was a controversy between the Hegelian/Germanistic school and the spiritualist school of Cousin's eclecticism; the latter was aligned with the catholic traditionalist reaction, on the aftermath of the revolution. He attacks both the elements of an orthodox catholic-religious affirmativeness and of a "popular philosophical metaphysics" in the philosophy of Cousin in which "the eclecticism ...[is] a great sorcerer whose art consists in responding to everything without responding to anything". This opposition to the then dominant French spiritualism further isolated him from French culture⁸⁶.

⁸⁴ See on this matter: Charles Pfister, "Un episode de l'histoire de la faculté des lettres de Strassbourg. L'affaire Ferrari" in *Revue Internationale de l'enseignement*, Volume 80, 1926, pp.334-355

⁸⁵ See Michael Kelly, *Hegel in France to 1940: a bibliographic essay*, *op. cit.* p.34

⁸⁶ "l'eclettismo... è un grande stregone la cui arte consiste nel rispondere a tutto senza rispondere a niente" Charles Alunni, *op. cit.* p.213.

According to Charles Alunni this transformation into a marked Hegelianism took place in 1847. The initial protégée of Cousin was at first charged with the task of studying German philosophy and Hegel in particular, being in effect aligned with Victor Cousin. His treatment of Hegel was, like the one made at the hands of the Germanists earlier mentioned⁸⁷, always cautious in pointing out the mistakes and by all means critical. His doctoral thesis *Platonis, Aristotelis Et Hegelii de Medio Termino Doctrina* (1845) points in this direction when it proposes a middle term that unites the finite and infinite, criticizing Hegel for a syllogistic distortion because it is impossible to arrive at reality with pure reason, the adequate knowledge of reality is that of existence. His first essay on the doctrine of Hegel (1843) revolves already on this same topic and goes in a similar direction. Therefore, Raffaele Mariano says precisely that his study of Hegel was still in its infancy, lacking a full understanding of Hegel. The move to Hegel was progressive in proportion to his distancing from Cousin, while an implicit critique of the psychology of Cousin could already be found in his doctoral dissertation⁸⁸.

After the 1848 events, Hegel was delegate to the famous *toter Hund* of Moses Mendelssohn⁸⁹, and any possible argument in defense of Hegel was ever more difficult. Augusto Vera was forced into an intellectual exile and since 1851 he lived in England until moving back to Italy in 1860, where he taught at the University of Napoli. During this period he published an immense number of Hegel translations in French.

Though a follower of Hegel, Augusto Vera was far from being progressive. In terms of a positioning in the Hegelian schools he would be an old or a right Hegelian, inclusively reproaching the young Hegelians in his *Introduction a la philosophie de Hegel*, where he states that “The young Hegelian school is nothing but an exaggeration of the philosophy of Hegel. In obedience to the habits of a false and superficial logic, it has pushed its principles to their extreme consequences”⁹⁰. Furthermore affirming that “without doubt, the philosophy of Hegel is liberal and progressive, if we may use such an expression, and, on the other hand, the notion that Hegel has of things is not always in accordance with the one we ordinarily make use of”⁹¹. Thereafter he explains that liberalism is after all a pre-

⁸⁷ See page 42 of the present work.

⁸⁸ See Charles Alunni, *op. cit.* P.211

⁸⁹ See on this issue the accusation Mendelssohn drawn to Jacobi and his adversaries by saying that “people still always talk of Spinoza as if a dead dog” even though they constantly spoke of him / “Reden die Leute doch immer von Spinoza, wie von einem todtten Hunde”, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi et Moses Mendelssohn, *Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn*, edited by H.Schulz, Reuter und Reichard, Berlin, 1916, p.88.

⁹⁰ “La jeune école hégélienne n’est que l’exagération de la philosophie de Hegel. En obéissant aux habitudes d’une logique fausse et superficielle, elle a poussé ses principes à leurs conséquences extrêmes” Augusto Vera, *Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel*, [s.n], Paris, 1855, pp.16-17.

⁹¹ “Sans doute, la philosophie de Hegel est libérale et progressiste, qu’on nous passe cette expression, et, d’un autre côté, la notion que Hegel se fait des choses n’est pas toujours d’accord avec celle qu’on s’en fait ordinairement” idem, *ibidem* p.17.

requisite for making philosophy. Progressive does not indeed mean what we generally take it to be, as paradoxically a couple of years later in Naples we see him involved in a polemic where he defends the death penalty. This form of punishment was accepted by Hegel but only in the cases of murder and he would rather have it wither away.

In this interpretive text of Hegel we can identify some early conceptions of Vera's Hegel: The idea as the place where being and thought unite, with some clear platonic reverberations; being and ought-to-be closely associated, with this last one working towards the later, echoing Kant; God as impersonal and identified with reason, with the absolute, and man as made in his image. This last assertion will be further explored by Vera as it becomes apparent that one of his objectives is, to a certain extent, the reformation of Catholicism. Even in this introduction to Hegel we see him further expanding the idea of Man not just made on the image of God, but actually being God himself as its expression, otherwise God would be an empty shadow.⁹² One can see an attempt at harmonizing his understanding of Hegel with that of catholic faith. Besides, one of the main issues while he was in France was of a religious nature, and precisely there he started translating Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*. In the second edition of his introduction to the philosophy of Hegel we see it even more clearly, as the principle of unity is "not only on the Hegelian philosophy" but also "Christianity advances, none other than the same pretention. And on this point, Catholicism and Protestantism are in agreement, as they both admit and teach that the Christian religion is the absolute religion"⁹³. They share the same principle in the dogma of trinity, therefore, we are told in the opening of the first chapter, that Hegel's philosophy has at the same time a dogmatic and a historic character. In dogmatism Vera sees the unmovable principles of the Hegelian system, but for all it is worth Hegel had quite a different understanding of dogmatism as that which fixates, and there is a place for dogma in Hegel's manner of philosophizing but only as a moment⁹⁴.

It is not surprising that Augusto Vera gave priority to Hegel's logic and the systematic approach of Hegel. He elevated Hegel's system to the statute of a fixed truth and as far as Hegel's philosophy is concerned, logic is the easiest to crystalize. Only later would a different Hegel see the day of light in the French thought, focusing on other sides of Hegel with Hyppolite and the translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, leaving many to consider that Hegel's system should be left behind, as

⁹² See idem, ibidem, pp.110-111

⁹³ "pas seulement que la philosophie hégélienne ... le christianisme avance, ni plus ni moins, la même prétention. Et sur ce point, le catholicisme et le protestantisme sont d'accord; puisqu'ils admettent et enseignent tous les deux que la religion chrétienne est la religion absolue" Augusto Vera, Introduction a la philosophie de Hegel, Librairie Philosophique de Ladrange, 2nd ed., Paris, 1864, p.LXXXV.

⁹⁴ See Bernard Mabile, "Is Hegel Dogmatic?" in *The Philosophical Forum*, Volume 31, Issue 3-4, Fall-Winter 2000, p.275-276 et 291.

for instance in Jacques D'Hondt where the system is a way of thinking and Hegel's method should not be paralyzed by his system⁹⁵. An idea which is already to be found in Hyppolite:

“Although the implications of Hegel's system are conservative, the advance of the dialectics is revolutionary, whatever Hegel's intentions may have been”⁹⁶.

Much of the later interpretations of Hegel will be refusing the systemic approach, as most of these conceptions take the system as a straightjacket of dialectical thought. There are, however, still discordant voices such as that of Mabille who sees in Hegel's system, an open system capable of receiving the other⁹⁷, without this violence done to the things of which the phenomenologists accuse Hegel. Whom Hyppolite also refers to when he mentions “Contemporary thinkers” that “accept Hegel's phenomenology but reject his ontology”⁹⁸, but they do so, precisely to dismiss dialectics. These later developments extent further than the topic at hand, yet, the question of orthodoxy is not something strange to Augusto Vera.

While teaching in Italy, Vera had to face a strong opposition from various students of Hegel, of which the most notable were Spaventa and Labriola. They were critical of Augusto Vera's interpretations of Hegel, which in Labriola's opinion did not bring anything new to the original thought of Hegel but were in fact detrimental to Hegel as “he is an orthodox Hegelian”⁹⁹. In Labriola's review of the *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* by Vera, he sees in the Vera's mode of treatment an “edifying modus” or an attempt to build postulates of easy apprehension but little scientific value¹⁰⁰. He does not focus so much on translation aspects but more on the way in which Hegel was being treated by Vera, and he is in fact quite shocked by Rosenkranz's recommendation of Vera to those who were not able to read Hegel in German, based on his “intelligence for philosophical facts”¹⁰¹.

⁹⁵ “The abandonment of the system ...” / “Le délaissement du système ...” Jacques D'Hondt, *Hegel et L'Hégélianisme*, Presse Universitaires de France, Troisième édition corrigée, Paris, 1991, pp.73-74 for the quote/reference and also p.101 for further exposition.

⁹⁶ See Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit*, translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman, Northwestern University Press, 1974, p.398. / “Si les conséquences du système sont conservatrices, la marche de la dialectique est révolutionnaire quelle que soit par ailleurs l'aillurs l'intention même de Hegel” Jean Hyppolite, *Genese de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel*, Tome II, Editions Mouton, 1946, p.386.

⁹⁷ See Bernard Mabille, “Is Hegel a Dogmatic?” in *The philosophical forum*, Volume XXXI, NOS 3-4, Fall-Winter 2000, p.291

⁹⁸ See Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit*, op. cit. p.205 / “nos contemporains” ... “Ce'est l'ontologie hégélienne qu'ils refusent, non sa phénoménologie.” Jean Hyppolite, *Genese de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel*, Tome I, op. cit. p.197.

⁹⁹ “er ein strenggläubiger Hegelianer ist” Antonio Labriola, *Ricerca sul problema della libertà e altri scritti di filosofia e di pedagogia*, a cura di Luigi dal Pane, Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 1962, pp.275.

¹⁰⁰ See Antonio Labriola, *Ricerca sul problema della libertà e altri scritti di filosofia e di pedagogia*, op. cit. pp.275-276

¹⁰¹ “Wer jetzt noch klagen sollte dass er Hegel in der deutschen Sprache nicht zu verstehen vermöge, dem kann man nunmehr Vera's Uebersetzung empfehlen. Diese muss er verstehen, versteht sich, wenn er den zur

When looking more directly to what relates to Vera's translation, it is Benedetto Croce who will be one of his early critics articulating such concerns in his preface to the translation of Hegel's encyclopedia¹⁰². Croce gives various examples with side by side phrases and one can draw his own conclusions, and Croce's conclusion is the following:

"So it seems to me that the translations of Vera, - which have been and are the main, almost unique, mediators of the knowledge of Hegel and his works in the neolatin nations – are inferior to their reputation, and they should be kept and be used with suspicion even if benevolent."¹⁰³

These shortcomings were certainly noticed by the left Hegelians of the "school" of Spaventa, but they tended to be left on a second plan in face of many polemics that arose between them, of which the differences between these Hegelian schools Barzellotti makes notice¹⁰⁴. A more recent critique of Augusto Vera's translation comes from Andre Doz who stresses interesting points such as the tendency, at the time, to favour elegance instead of exactitude and the difficulty to have a balance between a free and a good translation.

This preference for elegance is stressed in expressions that lack the proper correspondent in French such as *an sich, für sich, an und für sich*, which have a particular conceptual significance in Hegel and when translated at the hands of Vera they lose some of their original meaning. This is most obvious in the translation of *an und für sich* as "absolute interiority"¹⁰⁵ instead of the literal form "in and for itself"¹⁰⁶. Vera leaves the original German term in parentheses, but Andre Doz warns that this translation may still lead to equivokes¹⁰⁷.

Another aspect of the problem of translating Hegel's texts is the inexistence of a philosophical conceptual framework in the language they were being translated to. This is most evident in the translation of *aufheben* which has the double sense of eliminating and preserving. Augusto Vera translates it mainly as "suppress"¹⁰⁸ with the participle form *aufgehoben in* being translated a couple

philosophischen Erkenntniss überhaupt nöthigen Verstand mitbringt" Karl Rosenkranz, *Hegels Naturphilosophie und die Bearbeitung derselben durch den italienischen Philosophen Augusto Véra*, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1979[reprint][1869], p.9.

¹⁰² See Benedetto Croce, *Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche in compendio*, tradotta da Benedetto Croce, Laterza & Figli, Roma, 1907.

¹⁰³ "Perciò a me sembra che le traduzioni del Vera, - che sono state e sono le principali, quasi uniche mediatrici per la conoscenza dell'opera di Hegel presso la nazione neolatina, - siano inferiori alla loro fama, e debbano esse guardate e adoperate con diffidenza sia pure benevola" idem, ibidem, p.XX.

¹⁰⁴ See Barzellotti "No speculative movement" in *From Kant to Croce: Modern Philosophy in Italy 1800-1950*, edited and translated with an introduction by Brian Copenhaver and Rebecca Copenhaver, pp.86-88.

¹⁰⁵ intèriorité absolue

¹⁰⁶ En et pour soi-même

¹⁰⁷ See Andre Doz, "Vera Traductuer et Interprete de Hegel in Annali della scuola normale superiore di Pisa" in *Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, Serie III, Vol, XVI, Pisa, 1986*, p.1267.

¹⁰⁸ Supprimer

of times as “absorbed in”¹⁰⁹, which Doz considers, combines both the positive and negative form. This is “a great inconvenience” because it uses two different words to translate one ambivalent German word¹¹⁰. It should be further pointed out that the word “suppress” with its negative connotation may lead to confusion, especially because Kant’s antinomies also promised to suppress contradictions. Besides, this will be the manner in which Oliveira Martins will understand the synthesis; the contradictions are suppressed in a higher term but subsist externally. While for Hegel the contradictions are thought in a process of change, in which contradictions are allowed to develop instead of being suppressed, the result is richer than the initial positive term and the contradictions are overcome.

A few more concepts and their corresponding translation are analyzed, for instance: *Begriff* is translated as *notion*, like in the A.V Miller’s English translation of Hegel’s *Logic*, instead of *concept*. *Wirklichkeit* is translated as essential reality¹¹¹, *Unmittelbarkeit* and *Mittelbarkeit* as immediacy and mediateness¹¹² correspondingly. The conceptual analysis continues and some are seen as good translations, like the three previous examples, and others are seen as bad translations. From this second group I would pick out *Bestimmtheit* which Vera translated as *determinateness*¹¹³, which he finds by all means inappropriate. The objection to this translation stems probably from Heideggerian philosophy, where this concept is taken on as the condition of that which is capable of being determined, involving a *talification* (*Beschaffenheit*) which is then the actual state of a thing. This objection is further exposed in some of his other works, in which he makes clear his preference for the translation of *Bestimmtheit* as *determinacy*¹¹⁴:

“Bestimmung, Bestimmtheit: these words are rendered respectively as determination and determinacy. Literally the first has the active signification: the act of determining; the second the passive signification: the state of being determined” ... “In Bestimmtheit, what stands out is the character of the delimited, distinct of something else, whether due to the character of the determined in general, or whether in respect of the same content that belongs to it due to the fact of being the determined he is”¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁹ Absorbé en

¹¹⁰ See Andre Doz, *Op. cit.* p.1267.

¹¹¹ réalité essentielle

¹¹² Immédiatité and médiatité

¹¹³ déterminabilité

¹¹⁴ déterminité

¹¹⁵ “Bestimmung, Bestimmtheit: ces mots sont rendus respectivement par détermination et déterminité. Littéralement le premier a la signification active: l’acte de déterminer; le second la signification: passive: l’état de ce que est déterminé.” ... “Dans Bestimmtheit, ce qui ressort est le caractère du délimité, distinct d’autre chose; soit qu’il s’agisse du caractère du déterminé en général, soit qu’il s’agisse du contenu même qui lui revient du fait d’être le déterminé qu’il est.” Andre Doz, *La logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l’ontologie*, Librairie Philosophique, Paris, 2007, p.305.

Andre Doz also gives a general analysis of Vera's Hegelianism and speaks of "certain points that facilitate the understanding of Hegelian thought which were quite well highlighted by Vera"¹¹⁶, and he eulogizes Vera for taking notice of the differences between logic and ontology. Where in Aristotle logic tends to be formal, in Hegel there is an ontological scope he gives to the syllogism. He also pays attention to Hegel's systematization and its circular connectivity. But Doz cannot help recognizing that "the weaknesses of the Vera's exposition are difficult to contest"¹¹⁷.

In this last respect I would emphasize what he sees as the lack of clarity in the exposition of the concept of dialectics, in which he translates *ander*¹¹⁸ for *contraire*, which would fundamentally deform the idea of the other as not being indifferent. Being the negative of the positive, it also has the positive within itself. This particular piece of translation Doz refers to could not be found, but looking at the context it seems he is speaking about Vera's interpretative Essay *Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel* and not a particular translation and it seems the passage goes as follows "The dialectic is based on the co-existence of contraries, which is besides in a way how one represents contradiction"¹¹⁹. He clearly states that this happens in a translation; however, as pointed out earlier no occurrence of such translation could be found.

In face of his not so rigorous translations, the choir of Vera's critics multiplied throughout the years, both in Italy and France, patented in Alexandre Koyré saying that he was a "more enthusiastic than competent"¹²⁰ disciple as well as Georges Canguilhem who says "the old translation of Vera enjoys only a limited credit, it was at its worst"¹²¹.

Cousin has often been said to be the introducer of Hegel in France, this seems to actually be the case, particularly because much of the interest for Hegel in France came from his earlier expositions of Hegel's philosophy. It should not be forgotten that Cousin was considered sympathetic to the liberals and persona non grata in Germany. He was arrested by the Saxon police in Dresden on the suspicion of being a "subversive" by secret indications of the French police, and Hegel had to intervene in his favour by writing a letter to the Prussian interior ministry for him to be released. This event led

¹¹⁶ "certains points propres à faciliter l'intelligence de la pensée hégélienne on été assez heureusement soulignés par Vera" *op. cit.* p.1275

¹¹⁷ "les faiblesses de l'exposé de Vera sont difficilement contestables" *idem, ibidem*, p.1276.

¹¹⁸ other

¹¹⁹ "La dialectique est donc fondée sur la coexistence des contraires, de quelque façon d'ailleurs qu'on se représente la contradiction" Augusto Vera, *Introduction a la philosophie de Hegel*, A Franck Editeur, Paris, 1855, p.145

¹²⁰ See Alexandre Koyré, *Etudes d'Histoire de la Pensée Philosophique*, Colin, Paris, 1961, p.206.

¹²¹ See Georges Canguilhem, "Hegel en France" in *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, vol,27, 1948, p.284.

to a round of encounters between Cousin and Hegel which would probably involve philosophical discussions¹²².

The teachings of Cousin about German philosophy started at least in the years of 1819-20 as result of his visits to Germany between 1817 and 1818. Hegel was one of his main influences, as well as Schelling, but in his last lectures their names were hardly mentioned, especially from 1829-30 onward. He plagiarized what he was able to grasp and in the courses of 1828 Hegel was never mentioned but the public suspected that some thoughts he exposes come from Hegel, while Hegel himself was aware of this use of his philosophy by Cousin¹²³. Karl Ludwig Michelet would later say that Hegel jokingly referred to Cousin in these terms “he has taken some fish from me but drowned them in his own sauce”¹²⁴.

Cousin would remain on good terms with Hegel for the remainder of his life, but, frankly speaking, he was never really close to Hegel. His interest was scattered to German philosophy and culture in general, which Hegel gives him credit for and thanks him for disseminating German philosophical ideas in France, when Hegel exchanges letters with Cousin. The later criticism he makes of Hegel as obscure, a new scholasticism or its reimplementation, are some of the thesis advanced by Hegel’s detractors in his time, of which Cousin also had knowledge. The “philosopher of the Prussian State” was already an accusation that both the liberals and conservatives would throw at Hegel, because he did not support the particularisms of individual states and the liberties of the feudal system. Humboldt would be one of those accusing Hegel of scholasticism¹²⁵.

It is also important to notice that some of the students who took part in Cousin’s classes, particularly in the earlier years of 1819-20, would become interested in Hegel, a few even going as far as to actually study under him in Berlin. Some of them would be the later critics of Hegel as in the case of Eugène Lerminier, who was cited by Oliveira Martins in his *Teoria do Socialismo*¹²⁶. Hegel as the apologist of the Prussian state in France came mostly from these Liberals or ex-Liberals. The ones who had the advantage of actually having attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin, were in this manner better prepared for a critique of Hegel from the point of view of a liberal-conservative nationalism. The sources of this current are scattered in Oliveira Martins and a proper examination requires a re-visitation of these authors in a different light.

¹²² See Terry Pinkard for a detailed exposition of this incidente. Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000, pp.524-528.

¹²³ See Jacques D’Hondt, “Hegel et Les Socialists” in *La pensée: Revue du rationalism Moderne*, n° 157, Juin 1971, p.6.

¹²⁴ “er hat mir einige Fische entwendet, sie aber in seiner eigenen Sauce ertränkt“ Karl Ludwig Michelet, in *Der Gedanken*, Berlin, Mai, 1862, p.136.

¹²⁵ See Terry Pinkard, *op. cit.* pp.608-611.

¹²⁶ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.48-49

The autobiographical letter of Antero de Quental states that “Chateaubriand and Cousin” had been substituted by “Michelet and Proudhon”. But whether the philosophy emanating from Cousin remained is another question because even if only an indirect treatment of Hegel comes from Cousin, his former students would be going along that route and had knowledge of the source texts. These were certainly known to Oliveira Martins, as through them we have most of the critique surrounding Hegel. Of those who attended the lectures of Hegel in Berlin, Eugène Lerménier, a former liberal who turned conservative and was aligned with Guizot, will be one of those virulent critics of Hegel. Lerménier was one of the sources of Oliveira Martins; therefore, some of the critiques of Hegel in what relates to the state and to philosophy of right, has probably emanated from this liberal-conservative section.

Lerménier is the first to recognize Cousin as the introducer of Hegel in France, but he says that he is the first to actually name him¹²⁷, because Cousin does not return the glory of the ideas exposed to its rightful owner, which is Hegel, in an evident case of plagiarism¹²⁸. Already from the decade 1830 Lerménier would be denouncing Hegel’s illiberalism, particularly in his *Philosophie du droit*, which Oliveira Martins for sure has read and which is part of his personal library. There he is critical of Hegel’s “abstract reason that constitutes God, the world and history” and sets Hegel apart from his predecessors, with Kant as the philosopher of duty and Fichte of liberty. Hegel has made some original generalizations in history but his philosophizing has brought absolutism to philosophy, sacrificing life to his logical formulas and in this sense “the philosophy of Hegel is a continuous logical trinity”¹²⁹, where Hegel “sacrifices everything to logic, [politics] is [from that] oppressed and he substitutes so to speak the movements of life for mechanical impulses..”¹³⁰. This will be one of the earlier Oliveira Martins’s critiques, when he sees in Hegel the absolutism that reflects a Hegelian conception of reason above everything else¹³¹.

But Oliveira Martins tends to emphasize the unity of the intellectual movement from Kant to Hegel, whereas Lerménier makes a marked differentiation of Hegel because “the party of Hermann,

¹²⁷ “I have pronounced the name and made known some ideas, but returning the glory to him” / “j’ai prononcé le nom et fait connaître quelques idées, mais en lui en renvoyant la gloire” E. Lerménier, *Philosophie du droit, volume I*, Paris, 1835, pp. XLVI-XLVII.

¹²⁸ See E. Lerménier, *Lettres philosophiques adressées à un Berlinois*, Paris, 1832, p.85.

¹²⁹ See Lerménier, “La philosophie de Hegel est une trinité logique continue” E. Lerménier, *Philosophie du droit, volume II, op. cit.* P.185.

¹³⁰ “sacrifie tout à la logique, en est opprimé, et substitue pour ainsi dire aux mouvements de la vie des ressorts mécaniques” idem, *ibidem*, pp.185.

¹³¹ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo, op. cit.* p.80

Luther, Kant and Fichte detests dogmatism¹³². However, he still relates each of those philosophers (Kant, Fichte, Hegel):

“The philosophy of Kant, of which we have already drawn the sketch elsewhere, leads us to the idealism of Fichte that creates everything, God and the world. Schelling and Hegel then take away philosophy from this solitary monologue of the professor of Jena, trying to summarize in one same unity nature, history and thought. Hegel’s natural right especially offers us an admirable critical view of past history, but not a tendency towards the future. Its practical application has something of stagnant and illiberal¹³³”

Oliveira Martins prefers to take this sense of continuity, denoting however, on occasions, the abstractness of Hegel’s philosophy or even its political uses which Lerminier denounces. When asked about the significance of Hegel’s logic Lerminier answers: “What is Hegel’s point of departure? Pure abstraction. What is the apogee, and so to say his peroration? Pure abstraction.”¹³⁴ With it then the absolute state is also justified as “with such a philosophy one constantly absolves power, one amnesties despotism, one gives patience to the evils of men¹³⁵ and in practice “through these formulas and his detours, he comes to make of the monarchy the personality itself of the state, in such a way that without a monarch there is no people, but simply a collection of individuals, a formless mass, but not a society”¹³⁶

Oliveira Martins too, although in the different historical context of his time, will be making this relation between Prussia and Hegel’s philosophy where the “the militar-historical-feudal traditions of the party of the cross” will be “allied to the transcendent doctrine of the absolute I of Hegel¹³⁷ and “the old feudal and military Prussia has found in Hegel an appropriation of the spirit of the 19th century

¹³² “La partie de Hermann, de Luther, Kant et de Fichte, répugne à dogmatisme” E. Lerminier, *Philosophie du droit*, vol. 2, *op. cit.* p.200

¹³³ “La philosophie de Kant, dont nous avons déjà ailleurs tracé l’esquisse, nous conduira à l’idéalisme de Fichte qui crée tout, Dieu et le monde. Schelling et Hegel viennent ensuite arracher la philosophie à ce monologue solitaire du professeur d’Iéna, tentent de résumer dans une même unité la nature, l’histoire et la pensée; et surtout le droit naturel de Hegel nous offrira une vue critique admirable sur l’histoire du passé, mais pas de tendance vers l’avenir, mais l’application pratique quelque chose de stagnant et d’illibéral” E. Lerminier, *Philosophie du droit*, vol. 2, *op. cit.* P.25.

¹³⁴ “Quel est le point de départ de Hegel? l’abstraction pure. Quel sera son apogée, et pour ainsi dire sa péroraison? l’abstraction pure ” idem, *ibidem*, p.188.

¹³⁵ “avec une telle philosophie on absout constamment le pouvoir, on amnistie le despotisme, on prend patience sur les maux de l’homme” idem, *ibidem*, p.199.

¹³⁶ “A travers ces formules et ses détours, il arrive à faire de la monarchie le personnalité même de l’état, de telle sorte que sans monarque il n’y pas de peuple, mais simplement une collection d’individus, une masse informe, mais pas de société.” idem, *ibidem*, p.192

¹³⁷ “As tradições militares-histórico-feudais do partido da cruz aliadas à doutrina transcendente do eu absoluto de Hegel” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *Op. cit.* p.150

to their ideal, it has used [the German confederation], and has won”¹³⁸. The summary we have in Oliveira Martins of Hegel’s philosophy is mainly taken from the *Philosophie du droit* of Lerminier and this French tradition beginning with Lerminier will continue in posterity.

Besides these objections, Lerminier opposed also French to German philosophy and defends a non-adoption or the adoption of a modified version of these ideas by the French, with the national consciousness of France evoked as a justification for this denial:

“The descendants of Descartes and Rousseau, can we accept the literal importation of the speculations and the phraseology of Kant and Hegel? Should not all the legitimate philosophical movement come from a national consciousness?”¹³⁹

The most representative follower of Lerminier’s request will be Émile Beaussire. After 1848, Hegelianism, if not a taboo, was remembered for negative reasons: for its obscurity, errors and radicalism. To such extent was this attack on Hegel that a planned doctoral thesis on Hegel by Hyppolite Taine, a student of Victor Cousin, was denied by the University in 1851¹⁴⁰. In the decades of 1860 this policy eased up and we have a resurgence of Hegel, with Beaussire continuing this line of philosophical nationalization proposed by Lerminier, when he writes in 1865 *Antécédents de l’Hégélianisme dans la Philosophie Française*¹⁴¹. There, he proposes Dom Deschamps to pioneer a philosophy similar in contours to Hegel’s philosophy, before Hegel had developed his. In 1863 Emile Poitou also writes an article entitled *Les disciples de France en Hegel*¹⁴², where he says the most famous followers of Hegel then were Renan and Taine. These would become intellectual references for Oliveira Martins. Books of Beaussire or Poitou cannot be found in Oliveira Martins collection but most of those mentioned as disciplines of Hegel were the authors of many of the books Oliveira Martins had read, which, beside those already mentioned, also include Vacherot.

Although these more or less liberally oriented men of letters profess a sort of Hegelianism, they will be nonetheless accepting the critiques of Hegel circulating in France, with some of this criticism also coming from Germany. The association of philosophical ideas with the political

¹³⁸ “A velha Prussia feudal e military encontrou em Hegel uma apropriação do espírito do século XIX ao seu ideal, usou dela, e venceu” idem, *ibidem*, P.152.

¹³⁹ “Descendants de Descartes et de Rousseau, pouvons-nous accepter l’importation littérale des spéculations et de la phraséologie de Kant et de Hégel? Tout mouvement philosophique légitime ne doit-il pas sortir de la conscience nationale?” E. Lerminier, *Philosophie du droit, vol II, Op. cit.* p.260

¹⁴⁰ See Michael Kelly, *Hegel in France to 1940: a bibliographic essay, Op. cit.* p.31.

See also Taine entry in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy where we are told the “projected work on Hegel was declared unacceptable by the University” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, New York, 1998.

¹⁴¹ See Emile Beaussire, *Antécédents de l’Hégélianisme dans la Philosophie Française*, Germer Baillié Libraire Editeur, Paris, 1865.

¹⁴² See Eugène Poitou “Les disciples de Hegel” in *Revue Nationale et étrangère politique, scientifique et littéraire*, Paris, 1863.

circumstances brought about by a Prussian expansionist, is made clear for instance by Beaussire who says they are an evident result of Hegel's philosophy. Like Lerminier he defends Kant and Fichte against Hegel, saying that the philosophy of Hegel is one of expansionism and war, whilst that of Kant is one of perpetual peace and understanding¹⁴³. After 1870 the critique of Hegel will be going along these lines, mainly in three vectors, 1st the philosopher of Prussian expansion and restauration, 2nd the obscure dialectician proponing a panlogistic fatalism, 3rd the statist and curtailer of freedom. These critiques helped spreading some misconceptions about Hegel, but at the same time aroused interest in Hegel and made him a topic of debate. Oliveira Martins and Antero de Quental will be tributary to such developments.

Another source for Hegel's philosophy, which is reflected in Oliveira Martins, is Proudhon. His first contact with Hegel was very deficient. This becomes evident in his *De la creation de l'ordre dans l'humanité*, where Kant is seen as the initiator of a new dialectic about the law of the composition of concepts in which "Hegel generalized this ingenious idea. The world, the Universe-God, according to him, develops itself in three consecutive moments, forming between them the terms and the period of eternal evolution, I, Non-I, Absolute"¹⁴⁴. This mixing up of Hegel with Kant leads him to affirm that Hegel, like many other philosophical schools, adopted this fashionable trinity dogma. At that time he was in contact with the political *émigrés* coming from Germany, and this seems to be the source of such assertions. Many of them had quite heterogeneous beliefs, ranging from the materialism of Feuerbach to the idealism of Hegel with the pantheistic ideas of Moses Hess in between. In one way or another they occupied themselves with the trinity doctrine, but Proudhon was not really able to grasp the wealth of those ideas because he lacked the knowledge of the source texts.

He took some of the easy assertions, probably flowing in the air at the time, trying to integrate them in his philosophy while at the same time making a superficial critique. This is quite evident when he speaks of Hegel's common place assimilated ideas as in the case of "nature, when one embraces it as a whole, lends itself just as well to a quaternary classification as to a ternary classification, as it would probably lend itself to many others, if our intuition was more comprehensive; as a consequence,

¹⁴³ See Andrea Bellantone, *Hegel en France, Volume 2*, Editions Hermann, 2011, Paris, pp.11-15.

¹⁴⁴ "Hegel généralisa cette idée ingénieuse. Le monde, l'Univers-Dieu, selon lui, se développe en trois moments consécutifs, formant entre eux les termes et la période de l'éternelle évolution, *Moi, Non-Moi, Absolu*" P.J. Proudhon, *De la création l'ordre dans l'Humanité: ou, Principes d'organisation politique*, Librairie Internationale, Paris, 1868, p.116.

The first edition of the said work is somewhat different:

"Hegel poussa cette idée ingénieuse à l'infini. Le monde, l'Univers-Dieu, selon lui, se développe en trois moments consecutifs, formant entr'eux les termes et le période de l'éternelle evolution *Moi, Non-Moi, Absolu.*" P. J. Proudhon, *De la création l'ordre dans l'Humanité: ou, Principes d'organisation politique*, [s.n], [Paris(?)] 1843, p.170.

From now on this work will quote from this first edition

the progressive creation of Hegel reduces itself to the description of one point of view among thousands.”¹⁴⁵

It is true Hegel admitted that these geometric forms had a symbolism, as he states in his 1801 thesis: “the square is the law of Nature, the triangle of the spirit”¹⁴⁶. But he is also very empathic in his logic that such forms are only that: formal, abstract. The form of the rational is a triplicity, but “instead of a triplicity, the abstract form may be taken as a quadruplicity, in this way, the negative or the difference is counted as a duality” and on further reading it becomes clear that these are only formal designations which need proper development¹⁴⁷.

Proudhon’s proposition goes on from such a statement into supporting his claims of a serialist dialectics by saying that Hegel was imprisoned in a particular series. Taking part in the choir of sophistry, saying that Hegel “series” viz. Hegel dialectics, may well be a linguistic artifice, where the oppositions of the first and the second terms were not sharp enough, and the third term was not truly synthesized. In such effort Hegel has “anticipated the facts instead of waiting for them” by means of forcing his formulas. And such a method is not enough to give account for the details which his serial dialectics does¹⁴⁸.

This serial dialectics of Proudhon, however, is far from original. It actually comes from Fourier, and Oliveira Martins is aware of this Fourierist provenience of Proudhon’s series¹⁴⁹. The novelty is that he develops it in a scientific way, free from what he criticizes as fantasies. Fourier’s series were based on “the instinct” that “conducts him to the serialization of the ideas” but he lacked knowledge of the series as he did not deepen the rules on this dialectic¹⁵⁰. Fourier acquired the knowledge of the series from the point of view of an unreflective intuition, having in his work a number of unscientific formulations, because he was unable to distinguish between truth and error.

What is notable in Proudhon, and much to his credit, is how he managed to take possession of Fourier series and redress it in a metaphysical jargon. Fourier was the first to denounce this

¹⁴⁵ “la nature, quand on l’embrasse dans son ensemble, se prête aussi bien à une classification quaternaire qu’à une classification ternaire; qu’elle se prêterait probablement à beaucoup d’autres, si notre intuition était plus compréhensive; par conséquent, que la création évolutive de Hégel se réduit à la description d’un point de vue choisi entre mille.” idem, ibidem, p.171.

¹⁴⁶ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets (1801)*, Preceded by the 12 Theses Defended on August 27, 1801, trans. Pierre Adler, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal I, 1987, pp.276.

¹⁴⁷ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic, Op. cit.* p.746 / “insofern nun jenes erste Negative schon der Zweite Terminus ist, so kann das als Drittes gezählt und statt der Triplizität die Abstrakte form als eine Quadruplizität genommen werden, das Negative oder der Unterschied ist auf diese Weise als eine Zweiheit gezählt.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke*, vol. 6, op. cit. 564.

¹⁴⁸ See J.P. Proudhon, *De la création l’ordre dans l’Humanité: ou, Principes d’organisation politique*, op. cit. p.171.

¹⁴⁹ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, op. cit. p.317.

¹⁵⁰ “l’instinct de Fourier” ... “le conduisait à la sériation des idées” P. J. Proudhon, op. cit. p.259.

metaphysics and in the building up of his theories, such principles were dismissed and he thoroughly fought against these influences. It is no wonder that he saw most of the intellectuals of his age with scorn and considered Kant “the protometaphysician of modern age”¹⁵¹. The theory of series elaborated in his *Théorie de l’unité universelle* is where Proudhon would get inspiration from¹⁵².

The treatment of Fourier is out of the scope of this text, but there are some interesting points that should be made reference to. One point is that Karl Grün, a close associate of Proudhon, inclusively translating Proudhon’s *Système des contradictions économiques ou Philosophie de la misère*, also writes about Fourier series. The interest in French socialism by Grün, like by many other German political refugees, started in Germany and upon exile in France, the contact with Proudhon became constant. Grün considered Proudhon the Feuerbach of France, certainly because of his attacks on religion, a relation that Marx also makes in a letter from 1865¹⁵³. The other point is: in what way did Fourierism and utopian socialism, in general, helped dismissing Hegel and the possibility of a left Hegelian school in France? Jacques D’Hondt has written an interesting article on how socialists came under the influence of Hegelianism¹⁵⁴, especially those who belonged to the movement initiated by Saint-Simon, of which isolationism, syncretism and later dismemberment were detrimental to a broader dissemination of Hegel.

The primary figures that brought knowledge of Hegel to France and particularly to saint-simonians were Eugène Rodrigues, Gustave d’Eichtahal, Jules Lechevalier and for a short time also Eugène Lerminier. The interest in French socialism among German intellectuals was so notable that Lechevalier would give conferences about it in Germany¹⁵⁵. If any socialism could be assigned to German nationals it would be to those known as the young Hegelians, and in this sense the interest was mutual: the French were interested in German philosophy and the Germans in French socialism. The four thinkers mentioned earlier were, according to René Derré, associated with Hegel or were themselves young Hegelians¹⁵⁶ who brought some of their conceptions to the French socialist movement. The Katheder socialists, later admired by Oliveira Martins, were certainly of another generation and their ideas were quite different from those of these earlier socialists. If they had any impact in France, it was more on the level of a reformed liberalism, such as that of Francophone

¹⁵¹ “le protométaphysicien de l’école modern” Charles Fourier, *Des Manuscrits*, Librairie Phalanstérienne, Paris, 1851, p.33.

¹⁵² See Charles Fourier, *Théorie de L’Unité Universelle*, 4 Volumes, [Publiée par la société por la propagation et pour la realisation de la theorie de Fourier], Paris, 1841.

¹⁵³ See *Marx and Engels Collected works, On Proudhon*, vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985, p.26. / *Karl Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Über Proudhon*, vol. 16, Dietz Verlag, 1962, Berlin.

¹⁵⁴ See Jacques D’Hondt, “Hegel et les socialistes” in *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁵ See idem, *ibidem* p.17.

¹⁵⁶ See Jean René Derré, chapter “Le saint simonisme est-il jeune hégélien?” in *Regards sur le Saint-Simonisme et les saint Simoniens*, Presse Universitaire de Lyon, Lyon, 1986, pp.45-74.

Lavaleye, which Oliveira Martins thoroughly read. The Hegelianism of this earlier group, starting with Cousins's eclecticism, evolved for the most part within socialist circles and circulated into different philosophical ideas. Many of those associated with it would then be moving close to Saint-Simonian socialism and even to Auguste Comte. It was D'Eichthal who gave long translated excerpts of Hegel's philosophical works to Comte and these appear in fact to be found in the positivist archive¹⁵⁷. Hegel will have indeed a day in the positivist calendar corresponding to the 27 of October.

The contact Oliveira Martins may have had with utopian socialism was marginal. He dismissed it, like Proudhon, as fantasies. But there was certainly an idea of Hegel in the French imaginary that, if not revolutionary himself, he was at least the instigator of revolutionary activities. On this account the Contess Valérie de Gasparin wrote the novel *l'Hégélien*, in which a young Hegelian, with the arrogance of a God fighting as a revolutionary, reenters Germany in 1849 to join his comrades in arms, but soon the news of his disappearance surf as if the time for revolutions was long gone¹⁵⁸. The criticism of Hegel put forward by the socialists is fragmentary. In France, for instance, Pierre Leroux will dismiss Hegel for his religiosity and identified him as a pantheist, whereas some others will accept and integrate this pantheism¹⁵⁹, particularly Saint-Simonists¹⁶⁰. A complete criticism of Hegel by the socialists would be coming from Marx, Engels, Ruge and other Germans who were aware of the communist movement in France but they would follow Hegel on many points, for instance, against Schelling and other Hegel detractors, by which Leroux was in a way seduced in his critique of Hegel, a fact deplored by Marx¹⁶¹.

When Oliveira Martins speaks in the context of German political developments and Hegel, he names Karl Marx as being part of these issues but does not develop any further on the topic:

“What does it mean [when] Berlin elects [as] its representatives the enemies of the empire at the time [this empire] was acclaimed victorious in Paris? What does it mean the figure of Karl Marx, contemporaneous of Moltke? What does it mean Bebel in the parliament and Jacoby that the empire cannot punish? All these phenomena mean that next to France, and next to Spain, the Latins and the Germans start to glimpse the end of humanity in virtue of which they are solidary, and to comprehend socialism as the doctrine of liberty and equality.”¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ See Mary Pickering, *Auguste Comte: an intellectual biography, volume I*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, p.278.

¹⁵⁸ See Valérie de Gasparin, “L’Hégélien” in *Les Horizons prochains*, Paris, 1858, p.113-136.

¹⁵⁹ See Jacques D’Hondt, “Hegel et les socialistes” in *Op. cit.* pp.9-12.

¹⁶⁰ See idem, *ibidem*, pp.14-19.

¹⁶¹ See idem, *ibidem*, p.9.

¹⁶² “O que significa Berlim eleger seus representantes os inimigos do império na hora em que era aclamado vitorioso em Paris? Que significa a personalidade de Carlos Marx, contemporaneo de Moltke ? Que significa Bebel no parlamento e Jacoby que o império não pode castigar? Todos estes fenómenos significam ao lado dos da França, ao lado dos da Espanha, que latinos e germanos começam a entrever o fundo humano em virtude

Here, Karl Marx is part of that group of socialists but it seems that he was not aware of any Marx's or Engels's criticism, the only book of Marx that he had in his library is the response of Marx to Proudhon in his *Misère de la philosophie*¹⁶³. It seems he had at some point *The Capital* of Karl Marx¹⁶⁴, but judging by his adherence to Proudhon's thesis at that time, Marx was not in his intellectual horizon, neither would his socialist ideas be later inclined in this direction. After 1848 Hegel is relegated to a dead dog, and most of the adherents of *Kathedersozialismus* would renegade any ideas close to dialectics.

To what is due part to Oliveira Martins, he is more inclined towards the critique of Hegel from the liberal field, instead of a socialist one, while at the same time sharing most of Proudhon's beliefs on Hegel. The little he read from Vera reinforced some of Proudhon's theses, of an essentialist transcendental Hegel. The sources of Oliveira Martins in respect to Germany are mostly of French origin, a fact that he himself, in early (1870) recognizes:

"In 1838 the introduction of the French spirit was direct, today the introduction of the German spirit is accomplished for the most part by means of a reflex produced in France. We know Germany through France. What comes to us, if not broken, comes perturbed by a transplantation in a strange country."¹⁶⁵

This is the thesis defended by Álvaro Manuel Machado, in his essay *O iberismo e a França como cultura intermediária em Oliveira Martins* where the Iberism of Teófilo Braga and Antero de Quental are seen as a product of the attraction for the German culture. But with France, as a culture of transition, this acquisition acquires different colors, giving it a "different personality" from that which it had in the original culture¹⁶⁶. In some of Oliveira Martins's assertions this idea is present and the exposition seems to support this thesis. But how much did Oliveira Martins owe to other cultures? To Spain and England? It is not a secret that he exchanged ideas with intellectuals from the other side of the border¹⁶⁷, and many of the German translations he read were actually in English rather than in French. Going deep into this question would perhaps fill another couple of pages and prolong this

do qual são solidários, e a compreender o Socialismo como a doutrina da Liberdade e da Igualdade " J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, op. cit. p.152.

¹⁶³ See Paula Fernanda Martins, op. cit. p.253.

¹⁶⁴ See idem, ibidem, p.8.

¹⁶⁵ "Em 1838 a introdução do espirito francês era directa, hoje a introdução do espírito alemão efectua-se a máxima parte por via do reflexo produzido em França. Conhecemos a Alemanha através da França. O que nos chega vem, se não avariado, transtornado por uma transplatação em país estranho." J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Jornal*, Guimarães & C. Editores, Lisboa, 1960, p.57.

¹⁶⁶ See Álvaro Manuel Machado "O Iberismo e a França como cultura intermediária em Oliveira Martins" in *Revista da faculdade de ciencias sociais e humanas*, nº2, Lisboa, 1988, pp.93-94.

¹⁶⁷ See for an overview on the Hegelianism in Spain: Manuel Pizan, *Los Hegelianos en España*, Cuadernos para el Dialogo, Madrid, 1973.

section more than it should or even make it more limited than what it already is. For this reason this study circumscribes itself to the French sources, from where most of Hegel's ideas reached Portugal.

2.3 How he integrated Hegel

The significance of Oliveira Martins's Germanism in light of Hegel becomes apparent by having a closer look at the general lines of this integration of Hegel. The positive acquisition Oliveira Martins sees in Hegel, as emanating from German philosophy, is the metaphysical speculation in which Hegel is the closing chapter. In *Teoria do Socialismo* the relationship between each representative of the German idealism is so evident that the absolute I as the destruction of individual subjectivity, which for Oliveira Martins is a negative outcome, is evoked by Oliveira Martins interchangeably when speaking both of Fichte and of Hegel. The difference is that Hegel was able to combine, with the help of Schelling's absolute system, the individual and the collective in absolute identity. But the individual still lacks value without the universality of the spirit, through "the State" which "is the present God". Therefore the individual is subsumed in the state, still carrying the abstractness first seen in Fichte, but further enriched by the relationship put in evidence through their identity.

For him the solution to the problem is a synthesis of the Latin and Germanic characters, the Latin character tends to accentuate multiplicity and the individual as the basis of society and has therefore a transitory fundament, whereas the Germanic character tends to accentuate the unity and the metaphysical notion of the spirit as having an eternal fundament. The Latin world is "slave of the flesh"¹⁶⁸, only capable of unifying itself by a common conception of natural liberty, and the contractualist theories express this attempt of holding together the liberty of all against all. Whereas the Germanic world disengaging from nature, putting reason outside the first, falls into the arms of "fantastic speculation" which "determines the transcendent absolute", leaving us with an incomplete notion of totality. The Latin is a man of action, the Germanic is a man of contemplation, and, having shown their flaws, some kind of juncture is demanded. Such synthesis could only have come from France, where both Germanic and Latin characters come together. "It is demanded that we equally run away from the Germanism and from Latinism"¹⁶⁹, France is this middle point between both worlds, and the solution is precisely in the middle term. Proudhon is, according to Oliveira Martins, the one that manages this synthesis. As a result he is the speaker for this middle term.

Hegel is, so to say, the peak of this German metaphysical speculation, which has built for the first time a scientific metaphysical psychology able to rationalize society's entirety. From early on, Oliveira Martins seems to endorse the view of society as an *organism*, because the unity present in society should not be a mere reunion of forces as in a mechanism but rather an organic whole. The earlier form can also constitute an *organization* but not an *organic unity*. He gives as an example, the

¹⁶⁸ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, op. cit. p.78.

¹⁶⁹ "cumpre portanto fugir igualmente do germanismo e do latinismo" J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, op. cit. pp.95-96.

Anglo-Saxon world, where these types of “federations are born from a reunion of individualities distancing themselves from the brotherhoods as we have seen them, expressing the sentiment of a superior solidarity. They are individualities that affirm themselves through communication, [while] the English charters breathe a completely different spirit. They are individualities that are opposed by antagonism, by egoism, the organization is an equilibrium not a harmony”¹⁷⁰. The alterations of such types of federations will only be apparent because “there isn’t, like in the European movements, a Revolution. That is, a metaphysical alteration of the social organism”¹⁷¹, but such a mechanism as constituted in a political mechanism can later self-develop into an organic form because “The machine which serves the conservation of the body, also serves the conservation of the spirit: nature is one”¹⁷².

Even though Martins gives Hegel a prominent place in metaphysics, he criticizes nonetheless his organicism for its holistic deviation which imprisons the particular in the whole, in what he thinks is “transcendent character common to all Germanic systems”¹⁷³. This position derives from the conception he has of evolution as a law that has complete autonomy from the spirit and from nature. Yet, it is in the two and gives accordance and comprehension to both. One arrives at the moral law by this same evolution, and paradoxically we become the conscious of evolution from the moral conclusion of our era¹⁷⁴. Yet again, when the moral law is admitted to live outside Man, in the spirit, in the state or in some other expression of the whole, the particular is eclipsed because it will rule it as an element of superior order. He prefers to see instead an entity above these two, the living organism, an immanent holism which embraces them.

His organicism, however, is also close to the mysticism of the proponents of a natural religion, and it is not surprising that he adheres to a vitalism in order to explain social phenomenon:

“Nations are in effect, collective beings, and their development is in everything analogous to the individual beings. Biology, or natural sciences, embraces also the history of the peoples. The organs of the social body present themselves first as a rudimentary sketch: the ensemble possess only the character of aggregation. As action and reaction of the diverse elements forces each one of them to define themselves, to specialize, a principle of common coordination emerges, a kind of social vital

¹⁷⁰ “as federações que nascem desta reunião de individualidades distanciam-se da mesma: as *hermandades* como as vimos, exprimem o sentimento de uma solidariedade superior, são individualidades que se afirmam pela comunicação; as cartas inglesas respiram completamente outro espírito, são individualidades que se opõem pelo antagonismo, pelo egoísmo; a organização é um equilíbrio não uma harmonia” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.157.

¹⁷¹ “não há, como nos movimentos europeus, Revolução, isto é, alteração metafísica no organismo” *idem*, *ibidem*. p.163.

¹⁷² “a máquina que serve à conservação do corpo, serve à do espírito: a natureza é una” *idem*, *ibidem*, p.164.

¹⁷³ See *idem*, *ibidem*, p.80.

¹⁷⁴ See *idem*, *ibidem*, pp.3-4.

principle, from the primitive cellular aggregate emerges likewise also the organism.”¹⁷⁵

This biological approach was popular in Germany at that time, especially among the Katheder Socialists, who were admired by Oliveira Martins. The mystical tendencies were also partially inspired by Haeckel, who Oliveira Martins had read, with his proposal of uniting science and religious mysticism in a monist natural religion. These mystic-vitalistic tendencies had also been uncovered by Engels in *Dübing*¹⁷⁶, as a representative of the Katheder socialists when he refers to the “social molecule” of *Dübing*. This vitalist explanation comes both from Haeckel and from a strain of psychology which adhered to a vital force, a spirit or energy in order to explain social phenomenon.

This vitalist tendency in its earlier form, though, can be traced back to Jacobi and his philosophy of life, which inspires the modern forms. Fichte shelters some of these prepositions and like Jacobi he points to faith as holding the identity within ourselves, giving trust to our consciousness from which knowledge can arise. While both Jacobi and Fichte attempt to surpass the Kantian thing-in-itself and as a substitute they set out another element from without. This vital principle is something that comes from without the object proper. Hegel will be critical of such a position because “this subjective element is supposed to constitute the essential vitality and truth both in the exposition of one’s own intuition of the Universe and its [re]production in others” instead of the content of the object. On the basis of this subjectivism he will reject vitalism. For Fichte, this faith, by revealing facts to the consciousness, makes it aware of what is lacking in the knowing subject in ideality instead of experience. Hence “this idealism is the true inversion of the formal knowledge”¹⁷⁷ but it still remains formal as knowledge absolutely opposed to empirical reality, the non-ego limiting the ego by the latter’s own act. The knowing is then set out by feelings and sensations, “the only way in which reality can occur”¹⁷⁸. The positive achievement of Fichte is that he made the first attempt to elaborate a deduction of the categories of thought but only from a standpoint of consciousness¹⁷⁹.

One could say that Fichte’s merit, according to Hegel, is the first draft of a system, even if we

¹⁷⁵ “As nações são com efeito, seres colectivos, e o seu desenvolvimento é em tudo análogo ao dos seres individuais. A biologia, ou as ciências da vida, abraça também a historia dos povos. Os órgãos do corpo social, apresentam-se, primeiro, como esboços rudimentares: e o conjunto possui apenas o carácter de agregação. À medida que a acção e a reacção dos diversos elementos obriga cada um deles a definir-se e a especializar-se, vai aparecendo o princípio de coordenação comum, espécie de princípio vital social, assim também da primitiva agregação celular sai o organismo” Oliveira Martins, *História da Civilização Ibérica*, prefácio de Fidelino Figueiredo, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1994, pp.211-212.

¹⁷⁶ See Marx and Engels Collected works, *Anti-Dühring*, Volumes 25, *Op. cit.* p.90 / Marx und Engels Werke, *Anti-Dühring*, Volume 20, *op. cit.* p.67-68

¹⁷⁷ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, translated by Walter Cerf and H.S Harris, State University Press, Albany, 1977, p.160 / “Diese Idealismus ist daher die wahrhafte Umkehrung des formalen Wissens” G.W.F. Hegel, Werke, vol. 2, *Op. cit.* p.401.

¹⁷⁸ See idem, *ibidem*, p.164 / “in dem Fichteschen Idealismus allein vorkommen kann” idem, *ibidem*, p.406.

¹⁷⁹ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesung über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Werke, vol. 20, *op. Cit.* p.401.

cannot yet properly speak of a system; facing the difficulty that it proceeds from the part instead of the whole and is unable to transcend this partiality. For Hegel the way of conceiving a system is through the dialectical method, which brings us to the understanding of dialectics by Oliveira Martins. Fichte was the first that, following Kant, used this method in a systematic way.

There is not always a direct reference to dialectics in Oliveira Martins. When he deals with the subject¹⁸⁰, he uses the expression particularly while referring to Proudhon “the powerful dialectician.” It seems that when he speaks of dialectics he also understands it in the terms of Aristoteles, as a probabilistic knowledge and it is as such an argumentative enterprise. In this way, dialectics is the capacity to show one’s rational power and affirms his hypothesis, which given the circumstances could also be used as a polemical tool. Nevertheless dialectical categories are dealt with, such as the category of contradiction. Even the preconceived idea of dialectics, as synonym with triadic progression, a schematism which Hegel himself refuses, is treated by Oliveira Martins:

“Behold there how the logical process of the Hegelian contradiction, by which we have been judging the economic problems, gives us in this case the solution to the problem, classifying the moments of the formation of the idea which are: thesis, the communism, or collective propriety, preached by Christianity and to a certain extent put in practice by the monarchies of divine right; antithesis, the individualism or the atomistic propriety; preached by the free-traders and to a certain extent realized by the representative monarchies. Absorbing in itself thesis and antithesis, Socialism comes to determine the exact place of the Individual and Property, of Society and Capital”¹⁸¹

This formulation is more akin to Fichte, originating from his *Wissenschaftlehre* (1794):

“Just as there can be no antithesis without synthesis, no synthesis without antithesis, so there can be neither a thesis – an absolute positioning whereby A(the self) is neither equated nor opposed to any other but is just absolutely posited. This, as applied to our system, is what gives strength and completeness to the whole, it must be a system, and it must be one, the opposites must be united, so long as opposition remains, until absolute unity is effected; a thing, indeed – as it appear in due course

¹⁸⁰ See W. Kreutzer who notices this fact in his essay “Oliveira Martins e o pensamento Alemão na sua época”, but this correction should be made: Oliveira Martins uses in fact such vocabulary, but dialectic has a different meaning from that of Hegel, and the triad progression model is used throughout even if the common place vocabulary is mostly not used, this vocabulary still appears in other texts as is further made notice. “Oliveira Martins e o pensamento alemão da sua época” in *op. cit.* p.71-72.

¹⁸¹ “Eis ai como o processo lógico da contradição hegeliana, pelo qual temos ido julgando os problemas económicos, nos dá neste caso ainda a solução para o problema, classificando os momentos da formação da ideia que são: tese, o comunismo, ou propriedade colectiva, pregado pelo cristianismo e até certo ponto posto em prática pelas monarquias de direito divino; antítese, o individualismo ou a propriedade atomística; pregado pelos livre-cambistas e até certo ponto realizada pelas monarquias representativas. Absorvendo em si a tese e a antítese, o Socialismo vem determinar o lugar exacto do Indivíduo e da Propriedade, da Sociedade e do Capital.” Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, *op. cit.* pp.152-153.

– which could be brought about only by a completed approximation to infinity, which itself is impossible. – The necessity of opposing and uniting in the manner prescribed rests directly on the third principle; the necessity of combination in general, on the first, highest, absolutely unconditioned principle. The form of the system is based on the highest synthesis, that there should be a system at all, on the absolute thesis.”¹⁸².

Hegel does not renege this triadic progression, his method is in fact built on it, but he does not regard it merely as an external progression. It is simply a method of arriving at the truth, of positing the universal in the subject and then moving in an internal self-development until the need for externalization. The contradiction between concept and reality is in the subject transcended in its concrete moment, the negative of the negative “is this sublating of the contradiction, and it too, just like contradiction, is not an act of external reflection, for it is on the contrary the *innermost, objective moment* of the life of spirit by virtue of which a *subject* is a *person*, is free”¹⁸³. It is a subjectiveness that conserves the object, it does not abstract from its internal relation with the object, but the triplicity of the dialectical method is only “the superficial, external side of cognition”¹⁸⁴. This is where the critique of Kant begins, because he has taken the immediate simple universal, which to the other appears as the particular, or the subject passing on to the other; as an empty negativity, as progressing in the determinations of the understanding where identity is lost, so “it lacks the essential moment of negativity” and the summary of the critique goes as follows:

“Formalism, it is true, has also seized hold of triplicity, attending to its empty *schema*; the shallow nonsense and the barrenness of the so-called *construction* of modern philosophy, that consists in nothing but fastening that schema everywhere for the sake of external order, with no concept or immanent determination, has rendered that form tedious and has given it a bad name. Yet the

¹⁸² See J.G. Fichte, *The science of knowledge: with the first and second introductions*, edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge University press, 1991, pp.113-114. / “So wenig Antithesis ohne Synthesis, oder Synthesis ohne Antithesis möglich ist; eben so wenig sind beide möglich ohne Thesis: ohne ein Setzen schlechthin, durch welches ein A (das Ich) keinem [/] andern gleich und keinem anderen entgegengesetzt, sondern bloß schlechthin gesetzt wird. Auf unser System bezogen giebt diese dem Ganzen Haltbarkeit und Vollendung; es muß ein System und ein System seynm das Entgegengesetzt muß verbunden werden, so lange noch etwas Entgegengesetzt ist, bis die absolute Einheit hervorgebracht sey; welche freilich, wie sich zu seiner Zeit zeigen wird, nur durch eine geendete Annäherung zum Unendlichen hervorgebracht werden könnte, welche an sich unmöglich ist. – Die Notwendigkeit, auf die bestimmte Art entgegengesetzt, und zu verbinden, beruht unmittelbar auf dem dritten Grundsatzte: die Notwendigkeit, überhaupt zu verbinden, auf dem ersten, höchste Synthesis, daß überhaupt ein System seyn solle, auf die absolute Thesis.“ J.G. Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, Gesamtausgabe, Werke Band 2*, Der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, Herausgegeben von Reinhard Lauth und Hans Jacob unter Mitwirkung von Manfred Zahn, Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1965, p.276.

¹⁸³ See G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic, op. cit.* pp.745-746. / “ist jenes Widerspruch ein Tun einer äußerlichen Reflexion, sondern das innerste, objektiviste Moment des Lebens und Geistes, wodurch ein Subjekt, Person, Freies ist.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II, Werke, Vol 6, op. cit.* p.563.

¹⁸⁴ See idem, *ibidem*, p.746. / “ist zwar ganz nur die oberflächliche, äusserliche Seite der Weise des Erkennes“ idem, *ibidem*, p.564.

insipidity of this use cannot rob it of its inner worth, and the fact that the shape of reason was discovered, albeit without conceptual comprehension at first, is always to be highly valued”¹⁸⁵

For Hegel, the negation of the first term implies an identity, an identity as negation, with the second term, so that “the concept that has realized itself through its otherness and through sublation of this reality has rejoined itself and has restored its absolute reality, its *simple* self-reference. This *result* is therefore the truth”¹⁸⁶ and there is in this result or the third term is both “immediacy and mediation” in unity, therefore, these forms of judgement alone are not capable of grasping it because their unity is a “self-mediating movement and activity” so that the concept that at first was in itself an immediate Universal has become concrete, in and for itself, and from this moment on the method expands into system instead of using the triad schema in particulars like Kant.

The question that poses itself is how Oliveira Martins understood the dialectical method as set by Hegel, or how Oliveira Martins names it, the logical process of the contradiction. Although this understanding could have come from Hegel even if still embedded in the translation shortcomings pointed out earlier, he understands the logical process as it was set forth by Proudhon. This becomes evident when he further exposes his idea of the evolution and revolution as a movement of the contradiction between thesis and antithesis, the “*to be or not to be*, of the Hegelian contradiction” in accordance with the serial method of Proudhon, as established in his *De la Création de l’Ordre dans l’Humanité*. As pointed out in the previous section, contradictions are seen in serial units hierarchically organized, to which for Oliveira Martins such series boil down to: “Evolution and Revolution, thesis and antithesis when considered externally, in a superior syntheses when considered in themselves. [They] both work, as the poles of an autonomous planet, of a series, of an independent molecule, the Society, composing another series”¹⁸⁷. On an historical level, according to Proudhon “the glory of great men has always consisted in discovering the law of divisions, of groups, and of series”¹⁸⁸ completing the

¹⁸⁵ See idem, *ibidem*, p.747. / “Der Formalismus hat sich zwar der Triplizität gleichfalls bemächtigt und sich na das leere Schema derselben gehalten, der seichte Unfug und das Kahle des modernen philosophischen sogenannten Konstruierens, das in nichts besteht, als jenes formelle Schema ohne Begriff und immanente Bestimmung überal anzuhängen und zu einen äußerlich Ordnen zu gebrauchen, hat jene Form langweilig und übel berüchtigt gemacht. Durch die Schalheit dieses Gebrauchs aber kann sie an ihrem inneren Werte noch verlieren, und es ist immer hoch zu schätzen, daß zunächst auch nur die unbegriffene Gestalt des Vernünftigen aufgefunden worden.” idem, *ibidem*, p.565.

¹⁸⁶ See idem, *ibidem*, p.747. / “Der Begriff, der sich durch das Anderssein realisiert und durch Aufheben dieser Realität mit sich zusammengegangen [ist] und seine absolute Realität, seine einfache Beziehung auf sich hergestellt hat. Dies Resultat ist daher die Wahrheit.” idem, *ibidem*, p.565.

¹⁸⁷ “Resumindo-se portanto ambas, Evolução e Revolução, tese e antítese quando consideradas exteriormente, numa síntese superior quando consideradas em si, servem ambas, como pólos de um planeta autónomo, de uma série; de uma molécula independente, a Sociedade, a compor outra série” Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, *op. cit.* pp.68.

¹⁸⁸ “la gloire des grands hommes a toujours consisté à découvrir la loi des divisions, des groups et des séries” P.J. Proudhon, *De la création l’ordre dans l’Humanité: ou, Principes d’organisation politique*, *op. cit.* p.134.

series.

In Oliveira Martins this serialist dialectics takes the form of an equilibrium, or rather a harmony because he is critic of the notion of equilibrium, and the “to be or not to be” turns out to be an apparent contradiction, merely a logical equivoque. In the manner of Kant we are looking for antinomies in order to get rid of them, by not thinking them in their contradictoriness, only positing them in the mind, unresolved. Precisely that which Hegel praised in Kant but at the same time criticize for its formalism and external mode of cognition. The serialist dialectics came as an extension from Proudhon but let’s see what this method consists of in Oliveira Martins.

The basic unit of this dialectic is the series, while dialectic as a series itself, is the logical series governing the other series. A series may arise from other series when it gains independence from the movement that engendered it, the example given is the following:

“A train goes down a ramp at great speed; the speed is the effect of the force of steam, which is the main cause. But in a given moment, the acquired speed, constitutes an independent force, as a series, and even though the train has changed the steam direction(Lechatelier machine), even though [it] breaks, it runs off, moves up ramps, runs in the plains, until, if it does not find in its fantastical ride an obstacle that would destroy him, stops. The speed that above was the effect has then become the cause (...) this is the case in the economical question of our days. It comes, it is truth, from an old moral vice, but it has acquired autonomy, it has constituted itself as an independent series”¹⁸⁹

But each of these series are constituted by various terms, and the series has to pass through all the terms until a new series can begin, the basic terms are the logical terms which constitute the dialectical series. He organizes four main series as examples and they progress through their historical antecedents, as such the 18th century was philosophically atheist and materialist, then comes the 19th century as the antithesis, with deism and spiritualism reestablished. The modern idea, however, has both atheist and deist elements, god is venerated in the ideal, while this ideal is based on the human consciousness. The following series of the political, poetical and economical type have a similar progression, with the political progression mentioned before, of communism – liberalism – socialism suffering a slight change, or in a strict sense: only the political organization per se is considered. In this manner liberalism is substituted by nationalism and socialism is substituted by federalism. In the Poetic

¹⁸⁹ “Um trem da caminho de ferro marcha a grande velocidade descendo uma rampa; a velocidade é o efeito da força do vapor que é a causa principal. Mas, num certo momento, a velocidade adquirida constitue-se como força independente, como série, e o trem, embora o câmbio de direcção do vapor(Aparelho Lechatelier), embora os freios, foge, desce, sobe rampas, corre no chão plano, até que, se não encontrou no meio da sua marcha fantástica um obstáculo que o destruisse, pára. A velocidade, que além era efeito torna-se causa (...) Pois este é o caso da questão económica dos nossos dias. Vem, é verdade, de um vício moral antigo; mas adquiriu autonomia, constituiu-se independentemente como série” *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, op. cit. pp.76-77.

series, the 18th century man was understood abstractly and nation had faded away. In the next century when man makes of passions and feelings an exact reality, he rediscovers nation through traditions and legends, making the idea of humanity disappear in the 19th century. The modern idea is a junction of both these classical and romantic elements, having at the same time this sentiment of reality, given by passion and feelings, and the Ideal as concretization of this reality. Finally economically the Idea was first expressed in the monarchies as protectionism, after 1789 capital and interest are set free and we pass to the exact opposite, free-trade, with the state abandoning the economic sphere. Nowadays we have the state circumscribed to its sphere of action, which is that of collective nature without at the same time intervening in the sphere of individual liberty.

This conception of series as the principle of motion in the laws of coordination of the organism, also has a biologist's twist when he explains the organization/constitution of society:

“But if the organ is a series of cells, free, autonomous between each other, in virtue of collective reason that gives it unity and totality; - but subordinated out of itself to the series of organs that constitute men, free, autonomous in itself, in virtue of collective reason that gives him unity and force; but subordinated out of itself to the series of men that constitute society, free, autonomous, real also in itself; - we find the key of this problem in the federative constitution, inside of which the natural series finds its real mold and the liberty of the Individual and the state is its guarantee”¹⁹⁰.

The bulk of Hegel's ideas in Oliveira Martins was under the influence of Proudhon, who had a very deficient contact with Hegel, recognized by himself in 1843:

“I got to know the Critique of Pure Reason only through mediocre analyses, and I had barely heard of Hegel, when [I was] preoccupied with trinitarian ideas, I constructed the system of which I will report the fundamental part. It was for me like a preparation for the serial theory, that under various names I kept pursuing, and of which I finally acquired intelligence the day when I, fatigued with the systems where I found myself somewhat imprisoned, formed the project, at wide, not to abandon but to merge all the systems into each other. Then I understood, at once, the independence of the diverse orders of series and the impossibility of a universal science; the laws of the simple series, and the elements of the synthesis”¹⁹¹.

¹⁹⁰ “Mas se o órgão é uma série de células, livre, autónoma em si, em virtude da razão colectiva que lhe dá unidade e todo; - mas subordinada fora de si à série de órgãos que constitui o homem, livre, autónomo em si, em virtude da razão colectiva que lhe dá unidade e força; mas subordinada fora de si à série de homens que constituem a sociedade, livre, autónoma, real também em si; - encontramos a chave d'este problema na constituição federativa, dentro do qual a série natural acha o seu molde real, a liberdade do Indivíduo a sua garantia, a liberdade do estado igualmente a sua.” idem, ibidem, pp.53-54.

¹⁹¹ “Je ne connaissais la *Critique de la raison pure* que par de médiocres analyses, et j'avais à peine entendu parler de Hégel, lorsque, préoccupé d'idées trinitaires, je construisais le système dont je viens de rapporter la partie fondamentale. Ce fut pour moi comme une préparation à la théorie sérielle, que sous des noms divers je

In a succession of letters to Schweizer in 1865 for an article on Proudhon, Marx will furnish us similar information, with Kant being “at the time, the only German philosopher whose work he had read, in translations”¹⁹² and in his earlier books the treatment of the antinomies are done in a Kantian style “leaving the impression that to him, has to Kant, the resolution of the antinomies is something ‘beyond’ human understanding”¹⁹³ Proudhon was at that time in contact with a group of German political émigrés which Marx was part of, as well as Ruge, Karl Grün, Bakunine etc... all of which had studied Hegel. From them he is given some insight of the Hegel, which he had at that time “barely heard of” as pointed out in *De la création l'ordre dans l'Humanité*. Marx says that to a certain extent he was one of those who cherished Proudhon interest in Hegelian philosophy:

“In the course of lengthy debates often lasting all night, I infected him very much to his detriment with Hegelianism, which, owing to his lack of German, he could not study properly. After my expulsion from Paris Herr Karl Grün continued what I had begun. As a teacher of German philosophy he also had the advantage over me that he himself understood nothing about it”¹⁹⁴

The *Philosophie de la misère ou Système des contradictions économiques* contains the attempt at presenting the system of the economic categories dialectically. This was the Hegelian turn that Marx identifies in Proudhon, where Kant’s antinomies switched into the Hegelian contradictions were introduced as a means of development, still carrying the main features of Kant’s way of viewing contradiction. According to Marx, however, he never really “penetrated into the secret of scientific dialectics” still ingrained in pre-existent eternal ideas which severed his knowledge of political economy. Marx still recognizes in Proudhon “a natural inclination for dialectics” but he could never really grasped it in its scientific form viz: Hegelian dialectics.

The main difference between both dialectics, which will affect Proudhon and Oliveira Martins dialectics, is that serial dialectics views the contradiction as two poles, quite external to each other. This way of viewing the antinomies is similar to that of Kant, of which he has, according to Hegel, turned

ne cessais de poursuivre, et dont j’acquis enfin l’intelligence le jour où, fatigué de systèmes où je me trouvais comme emprisonné, je formai le projet, pour avoir le large, non d’abandonner mais de résoudre les uns dans les autres tous les systèmes. Alors je compris, d’un seul coup, l’indépendance des divers ordres de séries et l’impossibilité d’une science universelle; les lois de la série simple, et les éléments de la synthèse.” P.J. Proudhon, *De la création l'ordre dans l'Humanité: ou, Principes d'organisation politique*, op. cit. P.240.

¹⁹² See *Marx and Engels Collected works*, On Proudhon, vol. 20, op. cit. p.27. / “es war dies der einzige deutsche Philosoph, den er damals aus Übersetzungen kannte” *Karl Marx und Frederick Engels Werke*, Über Proudhon, vol. 16, Op. cit. p.26.

¹⁹³ See idem, ibidem, p.27. / “Läßt den starken Eindruck zurück, daß ihm, wie Kant, die Lösung der Antinomien für etwas gilt, das ‘jenseits’ des menschlichen Verstandes fällt” idem, ibidem, p.26.

¹⁹⁴ See idem, ibidem, p.28. / “Während langer, oft übernächtiger Debatten infiziert ich ihn zu seinem großen Schaden mit Hegelianismus, den er doch bei seiner Unkenntnis der deutschen Sprache nicht ordentlich studieren konnte. Was ich begann, setzte nach meiner Ausweisung aus Paris Herr Karl Grün fort. Der hate als Lehrer der deutschen Philosophie noch den Vorzug vor mir, daß er selbst nicht davon verstand.” idem, ibidem, p.27.

these objective propositions into subjective maxims and uses “one or the other maxim as occasion demands, indeed, according to whether it deems them fitting to given objects” without accounting for their truth either in the object or in the subject as cognitive forms¹⁹⁵. This is why Oliveira Martins says revolution does not imply a counter-revolution, revolution is taken by itself and reaction is a counter-balance coming from the outside. When they are taken together in this external form, they have their resolution in a superior term that embraces both: reform. In an attempt to consider them in their unity, the oppositions remain but are cancelled by each side of the equation. In this manner for instance, the excesses of revolution would be seen as something to be counterbalanced by reaction, in such a way that both would have to reach a compromise, or there would be the risk of compromising the rational liberty. Instead of viewing the excesses of the revolution, as a reflex of the acceleration in the resolution of internal oppositions, of which reaction is in an antagonistic relation with revolution and the external oppositions are in fact internal to the content of the object. The problem to him only appears in the manifestation of the object rather than the object itself, in this manner they can live alongside each other as long as their manifestation is regulated by a higher term, the reform is the equation revolution-reaction in harmony, or perfectly balanced. Through this external relation one of the terms is allowed to subsist without its corresponding other, revolution is allowed to exist without reaction, *bourgeoisie* without proletariat and so on.

For Kant too the contradictory nature was not part of the objects but it was rather in our apprehension or the thought forms of the manifestation of these objects and according to Hegel: Kant has shown “an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradictions from it and then to transfer the contradictions to the spirit, to reason. Yet, worse than that is the fact that there, he lets them “remain unresolved”. However, in a way he praises such effort because for Hegel, only in the spirit they can have their resolution, as the world is unable to endure contradiction like the spirit. The world is made of contradictions and for this reason condemned to be an ever coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be¹⁹⁶. This is why dialectics acquires in Kant an external form, meaning that, he does not see the contradictions in the content, because the object itself can never be apprehended, they remain rather on a formal level. Fichte will attempt their resolution but still leaves it exterior to the content. The object in Hegel is conceptual as opposed to the non-conceptualism of Kant. The method exposed in the logic is the way by which the object is elevated to the concept.

To be fair, Hegel does not say Kantian transcendental dialectics is external, it is only so in relation to the content of its object, it still relates subjectively on a formal level to this object. The

¹⁹⁵ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, *Op. cit.* p.655. / “welches auf gelegentliche Veranlassung die eine oder andere Maxime anwendet, je nachdem es sie für gegebene Objekte für passend hält“ G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II, Werke, Vol 6, Op. cit.* p.443.

¹⁹⁶ See G.W.F. Hegel, *idem, ibidem*, p.201. / G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I, Werke, vol. 5, op. cit.* p.276.

philosophy of Kant is one of “external reflection” in so far as it does not consider things-in-themselves and Hegel makes notice of Plato’s cognitive demand that objects should be considered in and for themselves, from which the determinate elements are immanent.

In Oliveira Martins there is no specific treatment of the epistemological processes at hand, but he is inclined to conceive the object in this way. Dialectics seems to follow this external way of comprehending its object, and the contradiction does not develop from the objects themselves but as a confrontation with something from without, while still occupying itself with the object what is immanent in it is left unnoticed. This is the case with the example shown earlier, when the 18th century would come into opposition with the 19th century and come into a synthesis, maintaining a selection of elements from both opposed terms. Instead of seeing the 18th century itself self-contradictory propelling the forms the 19th century acquired, or in other words that the 19th century was internally worked in the 18th century and then the modern Idea is this self-movement of the concept.

Why would historical development not be seen as partially given in the previous term? The treatment of history in such a way is not absolute, many times he would pick on present given conditions and speculate on the possible developments of Portugal’s economy or political situation, but in general this is avoided when dealing with history. One possible reason for following this method of external reflection is because of Oliveira Martins’s defense of chance in history. This is a recurrent theme in Oliveira Martins that history has surprises and that destiny plays us tricks. The problem is not whether history is deterministic, as both in Hegel and Oliveira Martins that is not the case, but it has to do with foreseeing in something that which annuls it and for this reason determines its development. For Hegel this determination is only truly cognizable after the success but Oliveira Martins tends to pay notice to the improbable in history, even after the known facts. While given the circumstances he adheres to a fatality of history, he still recognizes that something could have been different. In nature, this is easily explained as it lies out of the moral freedom that man is capable of exerting, but it is much more difficult when it comes to man as Oliveira Martins follows the postulate of Vico that the world is the work of man.

This self-producing system, however, very often slips from humanity’s control, giving place to distorted moral customs, which reflect on various human activities. The moral laws are deduced from the taking consciousness of the postulate mentioned before, of which an ideal follows, this ideal is what then governs subsequent development, but because this course can be set astray, the ideal or moral freedom is only and regulatory principle. Man arrives at the knowledge of the law in the following way:

“Reflection exerting itself on the moral subject and on nature, will give, in virtue of successive

periods and deducing one from the other, the knowledge of the law”¹⁹⁷

The moral law is reached by being conscious of it, to be free is to have knowledge of the moral law. The truth of things and their subsequent development does not lie in things themselves but in this knowledge.

The immanent dialect from the object is transferred onto the subject and the object loses its ontological foundational statute. The immanence comes from a principle from above, the moral law, not from the objects. Oliveira Martins will be critical of the transcendentalism of Kant in the process of universalization for its individual subjectivism, as for him the moral law in Kant proceeds from an individual phenomenon: reason. However, he still follows the same Kantian construction, but turns this individual subjective moral law into a collective subjectivism, that is, the moral law proceeds from human consciousness in the universal phenomenon of justice. The moral law in its universalizing process is no longer transcendent but becomes rather immanent to men, whereas before it needed another figure capable of operating this universalizing function, the transcendence in reason.

Now for Oliveira Martins the principle of development like in Kant proceeds from a moral imperative. In this way, contradictions associated with things should be superseded not because of their contradictoriness but because they ought not to have them. A moral aspect rules over the object but leaves it untouched. The being is never grasped, thought is trapped in its own limits. Hegel in order to solve this problem points to a transcendence of these limits of thought, by identifying being with thought. Independent of the implications of Hegel’s solution, what comes forward from Oliveira Martins’s dialectics, is that the contradiction is on a subjective domain, changes are operated on a mental level as the problem is in our cognitive nature, the objective practice of men is only seen in subjectivized mental forms, the bottom line is: things are free from contradiction and as such tend to remain contemplatively observed.

The call for changes and his actions as a social preacher are in nature theoretically oriented, as contradiction is above all a scandal to the moral consciousness, because this is what rules particular phenomena. The emphasis is towards the moral consciousness, which should be awakened and then phenomenal changes would follow. Hegel, even with all his idealism and the spiritualization of reality, emphasizes action as practice, or what he calls the practical idea, as a means to the realization of men’s ends¹⁹⁸. To produce these changes according to our ends implies the recognition of what is, instead of blaming a subjective incapacity to reach these ends and take reality, the objective world, as non-

¹⁹⁷ “A reflexão exercendo-se sobre o indivíduo moral e sobre a natureza, dará, em virtude de períodos sucessivos e deduzindo-se uns dos outros, o conhecimento da lei” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* P.38.

¹⁹⁸ See the Hegel chapters on Teleology and also “The idea of cognition”. G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, *op. cit.*

existent. This practice is objective in the sense that it is an external transition, it externalizes itself in the world and is thus an “external means against external actuality”¹⁹⁹. For Oliveira Martins decisive action takes place on subjective structure, an internal principle to be comprehended or improved.

As one can see, this dialectic is closer to Kant or Fichte than to Hegel. The serial dialectics of Proudhon even talks about the antinomies, vocabulary of Kant, when speaking of contradictions and unsurprisingly its main features are similar to Kant’s transcendental dialectics. The history of dialectics and the role of Kant in rediscovering dialectics is not ignored by Hegel, but dialectics has taken different shapes throughout time and is also three-folded. The three moments are elucidated when Hegel talks about Heraclitus, the first to give philosophy a speculative form, even if he gave it a form closer to a natural one and for this reason still belongs “to the ionic school of natural philosophers”. These moments are the following:

“(a) the external dialectic, a reasoning which goes over and over again without reaching the soul of the thing; (b) immanent dialect of the object, but falling within the contemplation of the subject; (g) the objectivity of Heraclitus which takes itself as principle.”²⁰⁰

Kant’s dialectic does not go past the second moment, the negative moment, from which an infinite follows but it is a “wrong or negative infinity”. The result is an infinite that only expresses the need of the elimination of the finite in an ought-to-be²⁰¹.

The dialectics of Oliveira Martins as originating from Proudhon, views the two moments of the dialectical movement as discrete elements. This will have different implications as for instance in terms of the principle of development, in how contradictions are overcome, the relation of universal and particular. But the preoccupation with these matters also brings confluences in a variety of issues. To be conscious of these differences is important, but what appears relevant is that this shows us how German idealism was also considered in the landmark of other cultures. Oliveira Martins knew Germany’s level of engagement in these metaphysical questions and for this reason he holds this culture in great esteem.

¹⁹⁹ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, *Op. cit.* P.732 / “äußerliches Mittel gegen die äußerliche Wirklichkeit richtet” G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, *Werke*, vol. 6, *op cit.* p.546.

²⁰⁰ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of philosophy 1825-6 Volume I: Greek Philosophy*, translated by E. S. Haldane, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., LTD, London, 1892, p.278-279. / “α) äußerliche Dialektik, Rasonieren, hin un her, nicht die Seele des Dinges selbst sich auflösend; β) immanente Dialektik des Gegenstandes, fallend aber in die Betrachtung des Subjekts; γ) Objektivität Heraklits, d.h die Dialektik selbst als Prinzip auffassen.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, *Werke*, vol. 18, *op. cit.* pp.319-320.

²⁰¹ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of philosophical sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Logic*, edited and translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p.149 / G.W.F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, *Werke*, vol. 8, *Op. cit.* p.199.

When looking at the points of contact between Hegel and Oliveira Martins, we can see that their thoughts are similarly structured, when dealing with certain problems. They share a number of concerns about the world and society, due to the affirmation of certain propositions in the way they think. The focus will be on these now.

The first is the recognition of different levels of reality, hence they require an open system capable of apprehending these levels in their relationship, as they only gain their full significance when they enter in a relation with the whole. In this sense for instance in Hegel the mechanism is a reality by itself but it still does not suffice to express the whole range of reality, it lacks the specific qualities of this mechanism, given by physics²⁰². In organic physics a higher level of reality is thus expressed, with life comprehending both previous dimensions, increased in its autonomy and level of self-determination. Oliveira Martins follows an identical way of organizing his series, the example given in the organization of the proletariat class, with its different moments in an ever more universal and at the same independent reality, is one of them:

“a) Public charity, shelters, nursing houses, hospitals, shelters, etc... either maintained by the state or by private subscriptions;

b) Private charity, domiciliary aid, with or without state subsidies, or simultaneously official and individual;

c) Mutual aids, class pawn broking for lack of work, for diseases, for death;

d) Economical funds, capitalization of economies put to interest;

e) Cooperative societies, of consumption, of production and credit, capitalistic or mutualistic organized

At this evolutive moment, the workers, comprehend the problem, because they reached a positive terrain, playing with scientific data. It is then that the worker’s society, organically constituted, presents itself in the realm of free-trade and economic competition with the

f) Societies of corporative resistance and nationals (trade’s unions) for the organization of strikes, the effective mode of contesting the price of labor

g) The international which is the universal trade’s union.

The reality of this series, in itself, and in each of its terms is uncontestable. The moment of illusion with charity was gone fast, and if, like the moralists, we have to consider charity as a noble human sentiment,

²⁰² For a notion of physics see Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature* which is quite different from contemporary understanding of physics or for a “summary” on this topic see Dieter Wandschneider, “Philosophy of Nature” in *Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel*, Edited by Allegra de Laurentis and Jeffrey Edwards, Bloomsbury, London, 2013, p.117.

as a publicist and economist, we are all to affirm that it is impotent, it is perverse, in regards with the problem of misery, socially considered.”²⁰³

As we can see this series is made of five moments which have their individual realities but at the same time are connected to one another, without following a strict triadic organization. The triadic progression, even if not absolute, is commonplace in Hegel, but the focal point is that it seeks to achieve an ultimate explanation that does not contain loose ends. One of the reasons why they all go under headings paired in three is that Hegel organized groups that could contain these moments together, sharing a common principle. In this manner the dialectical development given by Oliveira Martins could be for instance organized as follows: The public charity, individual charity and mutual aid would belong to the a level of social consciousness acquired by the proletariat, the economical fund and consumer cooperatives, would be the economical level and finally the trade unions and the International, the political level of the proletariat’s consciousness. The higher contains and develops all earlier moments, and some moments are more transitory than others, like the trade unions, which are still between an economic and political consciousness.

As we can see the way by which they relate levels of reality is similar but Hegel tends to look for the universal instead of leaving them destitute in their particularity. The triadic organization is not only symbolic, as for him this is the shape of rationality, but intends to reach an end like the top of a pyramid, which in its triangularity the most external limits are the three determining factors in the triangle’s constitution. In Hegel’s universalizing quest we remain in the immanence of things, so they have a moment of particularity but only to return to themselves from its otherness, in a three-folded movement. So in a way this organization in triads is a demand of universality, when considering things

²⁰³ “a) Caridade pública, asilos, hospitais, albergues, etc, ou mantidos pelo Estado ou por subscrições particulares;

b) Caridade privada, socorros domiciliários, com ou sem subsídio do Estado, ou simultaneamente oficiais e individuais;

c) Socorros mútuos, montepios de classe para a falta de trabalho, para as doenças, para a morte;

d) Caixas económicas, capitalização das economias postas a juro;

e) Sociedades cooperativas, de consumo, de produção e de crédito, ou capitalista ou mutualistamente organizadas.

Neste momento evolutivo os operários compreendem a questão, porque chegaram ao terreno positivo, a jogar com os dados científicos. É então que a sociedade operária, constituída organicamente, se apresenta no campo do livre-câmbio e da concorrência económica com as

f) Sociedades de resistência corporativas e nacionais (trade’s unions) para a organização da greve, modo efectivo do debater livremente o preço do trabalho;

(g) A Internacional que é a trade’s union universal.

A realidade desta série, em si, e em cada um dos seus termos é incontestável. O momento da illusão da caridade passou depressa; e se, como moralistas, temos de considerar a caridade como um nobre sentimento humano, como publicistas e economistas, somos todos a afirmar que ela é impotente, é perversa, perante o problema da miséria, socialmente considerado.”

J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, op. cit. pp.110-111.

in and for themselves.

The different levels of reality imply the acknowledgment of their relative truth. The absolute that we find in the whole dialectical movement, since this movement does not come to an end, is always relative, or what comes to be that the relative does not exclude the absolute. In his first book *Teoria do Socialismo* Oliveira Martins tends particularly to emphasize the absolute, in a way that evolution, especially of economy, is the “truth of the absolute consciousness”²⁰⁴. One gets the feeling of a fatality in the laws of development when they are considered as “scientific truths”, producing a lack of dynamicity in his theory by separating the relative from the absolute.

In Oliveira Martins’s correspondence we will find later what seems to be a different view on this matter when the topic of relative truths comes to be debated with Henrique de Barros Gomes:

“Socialism, my friend, is the most objective conception, or the most critical, of the nature of man and society, and in this sense it is the truth, not an absolute truth that can be defined subjectively for the individual, but a relative and scientific one”²⁰⁵

Since there exist relative truths, the problem that poses itself is how we coordinate them, not as a junction of parts, but in a structured whole. This is when Oliveira Martins, following Antero de Quental, already from early on points to a moral principle as the source of coordination. The figure of the universal is a subjectivized principle that leaves the object outside of it. This universal is a complex that encompasses within it the various moments of this moral principle, as well as the different forms it can acquire.

The highest form of the universal is in Hegel also subjective, but it is a subjectivity that has got hold of the object. The individualized moments of the universal have some truth in themselves, they contain the notion of totality and in a way they are also a complex. The absolute, or the structured whole as universal, is then a complex of complexes.

To capture totality in the different levels of reality is the struggle which Oliveira Martins and Hegel waged, while at the same time coordinating the relative moments, attending at their complexity. Their solutions were, however, quite different.

They share the same problem of considering the universal. But it appears as if Oliveira Martins wants to keep in this totality the same type of relations the particular as with itself, as the critique of

²⁰⁴ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.282.

²⁰⁵ “O socialismo, meu amigo, é a concepção mais objectiva, ou mais critica, da natureza do homem e da sociedade, e n’este sentido é a verdade, não uma verdade absoluta que se define subjectivamente para o indivíduo, mas sim uma relativa e realista ou científica” July of 1886 letter to Henrique de Barros Gomes, J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Correspondência*, *op. cit.* p.90-91.

Hegel stems from the subject not having the same type of individualized relations when integrated in the whole. He proceeds in proposing a societies' collective with individualized relations, because through the state the subject is no longer in an individual relation, his dialectic presents us a collective that preserves the individual forms of relation.

This solution is not without problems and they become apparent in the years that followed. This initial position is partially inspired by Proudhon, as this kind of individualized relations is a criterion Proudhon adopts. He will later drop Proudhon and grow closer to German thought, but it remains to be seen whether he considered the relations of the whole with the parts in a Hegelian way or if he abandons the consideration of the whole all together.

What comes forward is that with time, the French culture is no longer this higher synthesis of the German and Latin characters. The German culture acquires a higher value than what comes from France, in this second moment French culture becomes just a culture of transition as earlier formulated. And to this effect already in the 1875 text *Povos Peninsulares e Civilização Moderna*, we see him moving in this direction when he says:

“Next to Germany, hero of the vague and mystical thought, advanced sentinel that reveals to the world the first lights that uncertain blink in the distance horizon, we are the heroes of action and love, of haughty independence and ardent heart. Between us and [Germany], France, the less original and less strong, has its historical role of mediation”²⁰⁶

The absolute in the mystical thought of the Germans, independent and absolutely free, seems then something that has had its practical realization in the Latin world. Oliveira Martins will, however, later operate a separation of the absolute, as something to do with metaphysics, from phenomena, being therefore not applicable to the sciences of phenomena.²⁰⁷ This absolute is first revealed by religion but with modern times and with Hegel the absolute “acts on a purely rational sphere”²⁰⁸, leaving room for the sciences of particular phenomenon, free of this interference of the absolute, allowing in this way the gradual disappearance of superstition and the belief in miracles. But the absolute still has its function in unifying that which is given positively by traditional sciences, and after his attack on mysticism and the separation of the absolute from the partial, he appears to go back and

²⁰⁶ “Ao lado da Alemanha, herói do pensamento misterioso e vago, sentinela avançada que revela ao mundo as primeiras luzes que indecisas tremulam no horizonte longínquo, somos nós os heróis da acção e do amor, da independência altiva e do coração ardente. Entre nós e ela, a França, menos original e menos forte, tem o seu papel histórico de medianeira” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Os Povos Peninsulares e Civilização moderna, Páginas desconhecidas*, Introdução, coordenação e notas de Lopes d’Oliveira, Seara Nova, Lisboa, 1948, p.74.

²⁰⁷ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã, op. cit.* p.2.

²⁰⁸ See idem, *ibidem* p.75.

defends the absolute as having the power to reveal hidden secrets or the rationale of things²⁰⁹.

In this conception of the absolute, the whole, as a phenomenon of the mind, still acts externally in the unification of the parts. Their individual forms of relation, in the consideration of the whole, subsist. This conception with regards to the state, has the consequences of considering the state as the structure capable of maintaining these individual forms of relation. Carlos Mauricio notes that to the problem of “the antinomy between collective will and individual consciousness, the solution was found by Martins in Hegel and state socialism”²¹⁰. However, for Hegel the state had above all the function of bringing particular interests to the level of general interests as Marx makes notice of²¹¹. While for Oliveira Martins, the function he attributes to the state is more inclined towards the protection of individuals or a harmony between the parts as a collective, instead of integrating the parts in universal relations. The proposals of Oliveira Martins and those of Hegel are naturally similar because they consider bureaucracy, the state, and social policy fundamental to achieve their goals, but they come from different assumptions.

²⁰⁹ See Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, gently provided to me by Prof. Dr. Sergio Campos Matos, BNP, 5° box, document n°98.

²¹⁰ “a antinómia entre vontade colectiva e a consciência individual. A solução encontrou-a Martins em Hegel e no socialismo de Estado.” Carlos Mauricio, *A invenção de Oliveira Martins: Política, historiografia e identidade nacional no Portugal Contemporâneo (1867-1960)*, Temas Portugueses, Imprensa Nacional - Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 2005, p.240.

²¹¹ “The ‘general interest’ can maintain itself against the particular interest as ‘something particular’ only so long as the particular itself against the general is ‘something general’.” Marx and Engels Collected Works, *On Proudhon*, vol. 20, *Op. cit.* P.46. / “das ‘allgemeine interesse’ kann sich dam Besondern gegenüber nur al sein ‘Besonderes’ halten, solange sich das Besondere dem Allgemeinen gegenüber al sein ‘Allgemeines’ halt” *Karl Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Über Proudhon*, vol. 1, *op. cit.* p.248.

3. Social and Political Thought

3.1 The Socialist movement

During the 19th century the socialist project had many different appearances, each brand of socialism mutually influenced one another and as a whole, it has even penetrated in the political considerations of the most vehement adversaries. Socialism as a movement is perhaps best clearly delineated by Karl Marx, who defined different types of socialism and showed how widely spread the socialist ideas were. He summarized their insufficiencies and proposed his *scientific socialism* as the socialism capable of providing the emancipation of humanity. Oliveira Martins too is well aware of the different types of socialism which cannot be univocally classified but for him share a common concern: the moral problem of the 19th century expressed in the realm of politics²¹².

The Portuguese liberal revolution and subsequent revolts were part of a series of social struggles that ran across Europe, in which some socialist elements could already be found, but could not be yet unequivocally classified as being socialist²¹³. In these partially opposed tendencies in the years that followed, Proudhon was the main theoretical source for many of the intellectuals in Portugal that took part or sympathized with the socialist cause.

This is especially true for Oliveira Martins, as one can easily deduce from the previous chapter where Proudhon's theoretical paternity is shown. But this also holds true in terms of more practical considerations. António Sérgio, who had an interest above all in the social thought of Oliveira Martins rather than his philosophical-theoretical work, says that "The <<socialism>> of Martins is that of his master Proudhon"²¹⁴. It is undoubtedly true that his first writings were under the influence of Proudhon, but his friend and intellectual partner Antero de Quental, was much more inclined to follow Proudhon's line of thought than Oliveira Martins himself, who will progressively move away from Proudhon, while still maintaining his main tenets concerning the nature of classes and the social revolution. He modifies some of Proudhon's propositions about the means to achieve this, recognizing the role of the state as auxiliary to this goal, abandoning the federalism of Proudhonian inspiration.

This fact is noticeable on the advertencies Antero de Quental makes to Oliveira Martins in his correspondence:

²¹² See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Socialismo e Democracia, Política e história*, vol. 1, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1957, pp.182-183.

²¹³ For a throughout exposition of this phenomenon, which was not here undertaken, the reader is redirected to António Pedro Mesquita study "O pensamento socialista em Portugal no século XIX" in *Revista estudos filosóficos*, nº3, 2009, pp.76-107.

²¹⁴ "o <<socialismo>> do Martins é o do Proudhon seu mestre" António Sérgio, *Sobre o Socialismo de Oliveira Martins, Ensaios VIII*, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1958, p.201

“It is to be believed, that if Proudhon could have had opened in your ardent career a parenthesis consecrated to the serene and unconcerned study of history, it would have corrected much of what it had of rigid, absolute and one sided in your opinions. Long live history, but history as a means not as an end. That is my sentence!”²¹⁵

Antero de Quental refers to his partisanship positions in relation to history but such a critique can also be read in relation to him being a strict follower of Proudhon. The study of Proudhon can be traced back to the period of 1870-73 when they exchanged a considerable amount of correspondence about the conditions for socialism in Portugal. At that time Antero de Quental thought that what was to be done by the Portuguese socialists was fundamentally a job of critique, because the conditions for a true revolution were not met. Doing something else was going along the fantasies proposed by some fringes, in what could be seen both as a recognition of the relative underdevelopment of Portugal’s socio-economic structures, especially in term of its industry, but also as a critique of utopism²¹⁶.

The Casino Conferences (1871) were one of the practical results of this critical effort. It is at this particular point in time when they studied Hegel’s work as a theoretical reference for their social intervention. The question of “method” is inclusively discussed at length with Oliveira Martins in their correspondence²¹⁷.

The discussions between Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins seem to reflect almost immediately in the works Oliveira Martins produced right after. The exposition of Proudhon’s serialism in the book *Portugal e o Socialismo* is a perfect example. On the 27 of December of 1872, just a couple of months before the book’s publication, we have a metaphysical consideration around the validity of Hegel’s method in relation to particular phenomenon, which Antero de Quental denied because this realm is for experimental rather than theoretical sciences²¹⁸.

There we see the serialism of Proudhon mentioned together with Hegel by Antero de Quental:

²¹⁵ “É de crer que se Proudhon tivesse podido abrir na sua carreira ardente um parêntesis consagrado ao estudo sereno e despreocupado da história, teria corrigido muito o que havia de rígido, absoluto e one sided nas suas opiniões. Viva pois a história, mas a história como meio e não como fim. Tal é a minha sentença!” 26 of February 1877 letter from Antero de Quental to Oliveira Martins, Antero de Quental, *Cartas*, vol. 2, *op. cit.* p.15.

²¹⁶ See the letters where this is debated, *idem*, *ibidem* pp.15-16.

²¹⁷ See *idem*, *ibidem*, pp.162-165.

²¹⁸ This will also be Oliveira Martins’s initial preposition in *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã*, *op. cit.* pp.1-5.

“after this let it be known, that my doctrine of evolution is in great measure the one of Hegel, to which I combine the idea of proudhonian series”²¹⁹

What is interesting to notice is that it sounds as if Oliveira Martins was not completely aware of Hegel’s method in relation to Proudhon’s serialism but became part of his own theories from these discussions with Antero de Quental. In *Portugal e o Socialismo* we will have the exposition of this idea of series combined with Hegel’s method.

The Casino Conferences were already under such philosophical influences, mainly by the hands of Antero de Quental, where Proudhon and, judging by Antero de Quental’s correspondence, probably also Hegel were object of reflection by the organizers of the conferences²²⁰. But the concerns of those involved were not directly related to Hegel or philosophy but rather about historical, political and literary problems. The “canceled” conference of Jaime Batalha Reis about socialism was to be a critical analysis of Proudhon.

In his 1872 book *Teoria do Socialismo*, Oliveira Martins professes this same spirit and, while reflecting on the division of labour and the organization of functions proposed by Proudhon, the series of Proudhon and some allusions to its origins are already mentioned, but no reference to dialectics or an exposition of Hegel’s method is to be found:

“Function is what Fourier and Proudhon called series, and, [when] referred to the individual Langlous denominates synthetic worker. The prominent present example of the law of the division of work and of the series, of the parcelar and synthetic worker, of the producer and the man, economically active and juridically free, is agriculture. Each one of its operations is a series; the worker, is synthetic because he is capable of exercising the different functions successively. The work is divided because the operations are executed independently, isolated; it is federative because the product results from the reunion of these operations, autonomous in themselves. The function in work is therefore the reunion of specialities, composition and method. The synthesis in the worker is the aptitude in the exercise of successive and combined functions.”²²¹

²¹⁹ “depois d’isto fica V. sabendo que a minha doutrina da Evolução é em grande parte a de Hegel, com a qual combino a idea da *série* proudhoniana.” 26 December [1872], *Cartas Inéditas de Antero de Quental a Oliveira Martins*, op. cit. p.165.

²²⁰ See Eça de Queiroz, *Um Génio que era um Santo, Notas Contemporâneas*, 3rd ed., edição <<Livros do Brasil>>, Lisboa, [s.d], p.268.

²²¹ “Função é o que Fourier e depois Proudhon chamaram série, e, referida ao individuo Langlois denomina trabalhador sintético. O exemplo actual mais prominente da lei da divisão do trabalho e da série, do trabalhador parcelário e sintético, do produtor e do homem, activo economicamente e juridicamente livre, é a agricultura. Cada uma das suas operações é uma série; e o trabalhador é sintético porque é capaz do exercício das diferentes funções sucessivamente. O trabalho é dividido porque as operações se executam independente, isoladamente; é federado porque da reunião dessas operações, autónomas em sí, resulta o produto. A função no trabalho é portanto a reunião de especialidades, composição e método. A síntese no trabalhador é a

Later in *Portugal e o Socialismo* the dialectic of Hegel is made notice of but still very much taken on Proudhon's terms, closer to Kant's understanding of antinomies, instead of the Hegelian notion of dialectics, as seen earlier. But at any rate it exhibits an interest in Hegel, where our point is also to show that the inclusion of Hegel in this serial dialectics is likely to have come from Antero de Quental.

The Proudhonism of Oliveira Martins should then be taken with a grain of salt. He was a genuine Proudhonian in this earlier period just like most of the socialists, but even then he still entertained a political solution that entailed the state as a determining factor in the organization of economy. He argues against free-trade and says that actually "the truth contradicts every day in science and in politics this doctrine, [of] the absolute non-intervention of the state in the acts of commerce and banking"²²² and the accusation of the state disorganizing the economy "remains to be seen whether disorganizing is not correcting it"²²³. While earlier in this same text he had criticized the monarchy and its pauperist policies in what concerns the creation of wealth and national production, he still views the state as an equalizing force and an ally of socialism.

Oliveira Martins has this tendency towards continuity and reform, where equality is a kind of fatality brought about naturally by the moral constitution of men. The pauperism in England and other northern rich protestant nations is different from that of southern monarchies which is more equal in the distribution of wealth but is in general poorer. He prefers this highness of spirit rather than, according to him, the more animal nature peculiar to the Anglo-saxons²²⁴, and these views will be maintained as is noticeable by the content of his last book on England.

The deviation from equality is attributed to European colonialism, with its roots in the crusades, in which the character of some European nations (such as England and Netherlands) gave accent to a spirit of commercial enterprise. This idea of a development towards equality leads him to such generalizations as this: If Europe did not had the crusades we would have socialism already in Europa, but this advent brought us modern science²²⁵.

aptidão de exercício em funções sucessivas e combinadas." J. P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* pp.317-318.

²²² "a verdade contradiz todos os dias na ciência e na política esta doutrina, na absoluta não intervenção do estado nos actos da vida comercial e bancária." idem, *ibidem* p.247.

²²³ "Cumpro saber porém se desorganiza-lo não será corrigi-lo" idem, *ibidem*, p.248.

²²⁴ "between the meridional poverty and sobriety, and the wealth and misery of the north choose! I choose the first" / "entre a sobriedade e a pobreza meridional, e o luxo e a miséria do norte escolhei! Eu escolho as primeiras" idem, *ibidem*, p.237.

²²⁵ See idem, *ibidem*, p.249.

This is regress from the tendency of equality. The regression has on the one hand its origin in the inability of society to find a resolution to its problems, but it also has a justification in the universalization of less developed nations by lowering itself and bringing them on to this path.

When he analyses the systems of production and finances of the state of Rome, the downfall is attributed to the development of a systematic capitalism on the fringes of the republic that reached the center of it, Rome, where a plebeian and populist communist tradition endured. The capitalism of the outer provinces fought its way into Rome and due to the democratic sentiment of the people gave rise to Caesarism. The nepotistic tendencies, which precluded the instability of the institutions of the Roman state, are something that derives from this capitalistic tendency, in which for example “the banks” were substituting the functions of the state, because the redistributive instruments of wealth were not able to thwart the tendency for the centralization of property.

It is then according to Oliveira Martins that from this inequality the antithesis capitalism-socialism first appears and the social organism is deviated from the normal course of equalization²²⁶. The resolution to this problem in Rome was found in a mixed aristocratic system when the republic evolved into an empire, anticipating a downfall. In all of these considerations Oliveira Martins always draws parallels to the contemporaneous social problems.

“The ancient democracy was transformed into a Carthaginian alike society, an oligarchy of the rich, plowing the land with slaves, usurpating the best of public income, giving bread-charity to the hungry mob of the capital – a pure capitalism, like the one of Western Europe in the 19th century.”²²⁷

While the caesaristic solution was similar to the one underway in Germany:

“Was there not someone, without military satrap ambitions without follies of demagogues, lastimating so great evils searching for its remedies? There was. There was in the senate a party of reform, similar to the autocratic-socialists of the Germany of today. Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus The African (570-1625) was its Bismarck.”²²⁸

The monarchies of the Middle Ages were the outcome of Rome’s failure and through them the tendency towards equality was again reestablished but enlarged, later re-centering itself again while

²²⁶ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *História da República Romana*, vol. 1, 5th ed., Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1965, p.433.

²²⁷ “A antiga democracia rural estava transformada numa sociedade como a cartaginesa: uma oligarquia de ricos lavrando a terra com escravos, usurpando o melhor dos rendimentos públicos, dando de esmola pão à plebe faminta da capital — um capitalismo puro, como o do ocidente europeu no XIX século.” idem, ibidem, p.440.

²²⁸ “Não haveria quem, sem ambições de sátrapa militar, sem loucuras de demagogo, lastimasse tão grandes males buscando-lhes o remédio? Havia. Havia no Senado um partido de reforma, semelhante aos socialistas-autocráticos da Alemanha de hoje. Públio Cornélio Cipião Emiliano Africano (570-625) era o seu Bismarck.” idem, ibidem, p.440.

moving to other parts of the world with the European maritime expansion. The problem that posed itself in the Roman republic was not completely resolved as it lacked the instruments to do so, because it had not yet acquired a universalist character which the regress of Middle Ages would be maturing, giving place to science and modern socialism.

The socialism of Oliveira Martins and the circles he took part was closer to the libertarian socialism of Proudhon, which favoured small independent property owners. But why was Proudhon a theoretical reference to Oliveira Martins and his generation?

Proudhons' appeal to them is understandable as his political solutions had in mind for the most part the small *bourgeoisie* and its interests, of which this group was mainly composed of. The psychology of class is well reflected in the political theory and activities proposed by Proudhon. The underlying contradiction is how to maintain the basis of present society but eliminate the undesired effects, how to conserve and destroy the social order. He defends order and revolution at the same time. The balance in the end tilts towards conserving, because in the relations of property, the proprietaries, even if small, do not want to lose their possessions. The orderly transition is to avoid the risks, they are afraid of taking risks, to fail and be left in misery like the proletariat.

Just because someone belongs to a certain class, this does not mean they will automatically support the interests and the ideas of the class they belong to. But the acceptance of certain ideas of class by one class or another is related to how they appeal to the interests of the class at hand. Solely appealing to the interests of class in explaining the ideas of these men is not only simplistic but incorrect. The idea of classes, however, certainly plays a role in their thoughts, especially when they are speaking to the reader.

This fact is noticeable if we look at the addressee of Proudhon's *Idée générale de la Révolution au dix-neuvième siècle* which is actually the *bourgeoisie*. Even though the goal is revolution and the improvement of the working class, the leader of such a revolution should be the *bourgeoisie*. The proletariat is seen as the class that is uneducated and easily deceived, not the best fit for the advancement of freedom²²⁹. The ideas they propose meet for the most part the demands of the *petit-*

²²⁹ "such is the ignorance in which it has been kept as to the true cause of its sufferings, that it is hardly since February that it has begun to stammer the word, credit" and later towards the end we are told that "it must be admitted that, although the laboring class, by its numerical preponderance, and by the irresistible pressure which it is able to exercise upon the decisions of an assembly, is quite capable, with the aid of a few enlightened citizens, of bring about the first part of the revolutionary programme, social liquidation and the settlement of property and land; it is nevertheless, by the narrowness of its views and its inexperience in business, incapable of carrying on such large interests of commerce and great industry; and in consequence cannot attain its true destiny" J. P. Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*, translated by John Beverly Robinson, Dover Publications, New York, 2004, p.55 et 223 / "telle est l'ignorance où elle a été entretenue sur la cause réelle de ses souffrances, que c'est à peine si, depuis février, elle commence à bégayer le mot de credit" "Il faut le reconnaître: si la classe travailleuse, par sa force numerique et par la

bourgeoisie. He defends the alliance between sections of the *bourgeoisie* and the proletariat, but he still does not condemn the capitulation to the enemy, which has often happened as a way of advancing *petit-bourgeois* interests even if they show themselves partial.

The classes and their different interests, how the collective should be above the individual against abstract freedom, that is precisely Hegel's idea and probably one of the main initial sources of disagreement between Hegel and Oliveira Martins who prefers to follow the individualistic tendencies of Proudhon. The critique of Hegel is related to the state, where according to Oliveira Martins, he is the supporter of an authoritarian bureaucracy. The bottom line lies in the collective having a greater importance than the individual, a truer reality, which Oliveira Martins denies.

From early on Oliveira Martins will follow Proudhon's prerogatives. The social revolution demanded was one of reform. The structures of society were to be maintained. The individual is sacred and property is seen as the freedom of enjoyment of one's individual sphere, without being bothered by others²³⁰. The problem is one of redistribution, in which equality could come about by the advancements of the moral law, setting itself against nature, which in reality makes man unequal²³¹. To bring about equality in an orderly manner is a demand for everyone, even those who were not conscious of it. Mainly the workers and sections of the people whose moral development was not to the standards of culture.

Marx' response to Proudhon deals precisely with this matter, when he speaks of the intellectuals who feel themselves as impartial, because they in a way value the *bourgeois* order. They feel at home in this "order" but at the same time they see its shortcomings and faults, of which Marx will be caustic about. Proudhon "in his heart of hearts he prides himself on his impartiality and on having found the correct balance, allegedly distinct from the happy medium. A *petit bourgeois* of this kind defies *contradiction*, for contradiction is the very basis of his being"²³². They wanted to maintain

pression irrésistible qu'elle peut exercer sur les décisions d'une assemblée, est parfaitement à même, avec le concours de quelques citoyens éclairés, de réaliser la première partie du programma révolutionnaire, la liquidation sociale et la constitution de la propriété foncière; elle est encore, par l'insuffisance de ses vues et son inexpérience des affaires, incapable de gérer d'aussi grands intérêts que ceux du commerce et de la haute industrie, et conséquemment au-dessous de sa propre destinée" P.J. Proudhon, *Idée Générale de la Révolution au XIX-siècle*, Garnier Frères Libraires, Paris, 1851, p.49 et p.257-258

²³⁰ "We do not attack property, property is sacred, just like man who is [also] sacred, we attack crime" / "Nós não atacamos a propriedade, a propriedade é santa, como é santo o homem, atacamos sim o crime." J. P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, op. cit. p.196.

²³¹ See in this respect Norberto Cunha "Sobre a natureza humana e as suas desigualdades em Oliveira Martins" in *Diacrítica*, n°10, Dir. Vitor Manuel de Aguiar da Silva, Revista do Centro de Estudos Humanísticos, Braga, 1999, p.260-336.

²³² See *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, letter to Annenkov, 28 December 1846, Vol 38, Op. cit. p.105. / "Im innersten seines Gewissens schmeichelt er sich, unparteiisch zu sein, das rechte Gleichgewicht gefunden zu haben, das den Anspruch erhebt, etwas anderes zu sein als des rechte juste-milieu. Ein solcher Kleinbürger

their existence as an independent class but they were being completely taken out of circulation by the concentration of capital, with a subsequent proletarianization. They were the ones from the *bourgeois* class capable of seeing the impending social revolution.

For these reasons they saw themselves as the ones who were most fit to do comprehensive reforms, they were so to say, the forefront of the “*bourgeoisie* order” aspirations of perpetuation in power. The ones who thought they were able to acquaint themselves with the new forms by which the revolution would have a “rational” realization. They are the theoreticians, or so to say the professors of the proletariat:

“The mob and the fanatics, [in] preaching the vital-competition, obey animal instincts which announce their certain victory of [those] who have for themselves the numbers, therefore the strength. It is the task of the philosopher to set their path, direct them as much as possible in human matters.”²³³

The socialist movement and the strikes are classified as part of this competition for wages, therefore, for him a greater part of the working class, especially the British working class, is indeed included in this group that defends the principles of competition embedded in capitalism. The idea of “plebes” is not completely coincident with the working class when he broadly defines it as those who defend competition. It also includes broad sections of the *bourgeoisie* and the capitalists.

To this effect one finds in Oliveira Martins a paternalistic tendency and, although he denies the effectiveness of paternalist socialism, he still practices it to a great extent. The argument is that he does not find the workers capable of their own emancipation; he believes they need guidance, and takes this anarchism of the plebeians very low and in general mistrusts the proletariat.

“The proletariat is the black wave of frantic ravenous people which put the future of civilization at risk, trusting it in incapable or greedy hands”²³⁴ whereas the actual problem is in the regime of competition where “the proletarian of today is the capitalist of tomorrow”²³⁵. This is when the men of ideas, the philosophers, enter the scene to guide the development of societies and where we find Proudhon, Lassalle, Hegel and so forth.

vergöttlicht den Widerspruch, weil der Widerspruch der Kern seines Wesens ist.“ *Karls Marx und Friedrich Engels Werke*, Brief an Pawel Wassiljewitsch Annenkow, *Band 27, op. cit.* p.462.

²³³ “As plebes e os energúmenos, pregando a concorrência-vital, obedecem a instintos animais que lhes anunciam a vitória certa de quem tem por sí o número, e portanto a força. Cumpre ao filósofo encaminha-la, dirigi-la tanto quanto é possível nas coisas humanas.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Política e Economia Nacional*, 2nd ed., Guimarães Editores & C^a, Lisboa, 1954, p.101.

²³⁴ “O proletariado é a onda negra de gente faminta e desvairada que põe em risco o futuro da civilização confiado a mãos ou inábeis ou ávidas” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, 5th ed., Guimarães Editores & C^a, Lisboa, 1955, p.223.

²³⁵ “o proletário de ontem é o capitalista de amanhã” idem, ibidem, p.223.

The presence of Hegel in this socialist thought, besides Oliveira Martins and Antero de Quental, also comes from Jose Fontana and the Socialist international. Although the anarchist tendency will have more influence in Portugal, Fontana still exchanged letters with Marx. He will also give lectures about Oliveira Martins's *Portugal e o Socialismo*, where Hegel has more predominance, to groups of workers. Additionally Lassalle gains some acceptance through Antero de Quental²³⁶, even though Proudhon will always be the main reference, where the thought of Hegel is more diluted. Other secondary figures will help to spread Proudhon's ideas, such as Amorim Viana who made a critical synthesis of Proudhon's *Contradições Economicas (filosofia da miséria)* or Eduardo Maia which was initial a Proudhonist and took part in the socialist movement.

The Casino Conferences, as earlier mentioned, were the culmination of these activities, which were made famous more due to their censorship. This movement initiated by a group of intellectuals, although with some affiliations with the Socialist International, had no direct participation of the workers as advocated by the International. José Fontana was able to take some workers along with him to the conferences²³⁷, but they were for the most part frequented by intellectuals and members of the *bourgeoisie*.

The relation of Hegel to revolutionary socialist theory is enormous and the circulation of these ideas also reached Portugal. They will more easily penetrate the literate sections of society which were for the most part *bourgeois* oriented and therefore tended for reformism. From Bakunine to Marx, passing through Proudhon and Lassalle they all integrated in different ways Hegelian philosophical prepositions. Traces of Hegel could then be found in various tendencies but Oliveira Martins, due to his more systematic theoretical writings, deals with the subject in further detail.

The dialectic of Hegel with the metaphysical speculations around contradiction, later also the role of the state in society, will be integrated in his own socialist theory. In the economic studies he engages, the idea of economic contradictions and their resolution, inspired on Proudhon, will have an enduring presence, although we will later notice that those contradictions do not belong to economy but are the product of the moral vices, a preposition already advanced in *Portugal e o Socialismo* but only in his economic writings categorically affirmed.

In a study of Oliveira Martins's socialism by Augusto Santos Silva, we find the assertion that in Oliveira Martins economy has fundamentally a financial aspect. Indeed in his *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)* this aspect of economy goes under the name of chrematistics and follows

²³⁶ "Fui durante uns 7 ou 8 anos uma espécie de pequeno Lassalle" 14 of May of 1887 letter to Wihlelm Storck, *Cartas*, vol. 3, *op. cit.* p.93.

²³⁷ See João Gaspar Simões, *op. cit.* p.51.

Santos Silva's description, while political economy is something that has to do with moral or religion and is to be separated from economy properly which is something instinctive²³⁸.

The short-comings of Portugal in terms of industrial development is noticed by Oliveira Martins, who will say that capitalism in Portugal had taken the form of state capitalism, where the interests of a minority were defended in the highest levels of political power. He had experienced this fact first-hand when he worked in the railway construction and is well aware of the subsequent interests that arouse around the economic exploration of the rail services²³⁹. The industrial development of Portugal was heavily backed up by the state. Because, besides the lack of capital, the *bourgeoisie* was not willing to take the risks of investing capital with the prospects of losing it. Oliveira Martins had proposed in his *Portugal e o Socialismo* the taking of risks by the state but in practice what happened was that losses were nationalized and profits privatized²⁴⁰.

Without going further into theoretical economic considerations, the success of any capitalist venture presupposes a demand for the things being produced, but Portugal with its marginal internal market was not capable of maintaining a competitive internal production, prices were being pressured by more industrialized nations. The state took the risks the *bourgeoisie* was not willing to take.

As a result the loans the state had to take, effectively gave immeasurable power to the bankers and economic policy was hostage to their interest. Oliveira Martins and the small *bourgeoisie*, the ones that were able to take loans, were upset at the high interest rates. They felt betrayed by the state, as their interests were not being defended by the state. The idea of free credit that is central to Proudhon and Oliveira Martins relates to this problem. Therefore, as many have noticed, the sources of Oliveira Martins are mainly reformist:

"If we looked at the bibliography consulted by our author, we would arrive for sure at the same conclusion as Flausino Torres: Oliveira Martins read preferably the reformists"²⁴¹

²³⁸ "the analysis of character, presents us next to that instinct, [the instinct of] equality which inspires religion and jurisprudence" / "A análise do carácter apresenta-nos, ao lado desse instinto, o da igualdade que inspira o foro da religião, e o da jurisprudência" J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, *op. cit.* p.216.

²³⁹ See for instance his multiple articles on this subject in the newspaper O Repórter, J.P. Oliveira Martins, *O Repórter*, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1957, pp.56-66.

²⁴⁰ "with no shame, they insinuate that the treasury should pay them for the losses of the company that had thrown itself fearless, and that it should even thank them for their patriotic dedication" / "Para o cúmulo do deslante, insinuaram que o Tesouro lhes deve pagar os prejuizos da empresa que se lançaram temerariamente, e agradecer-lhes ainda por cima a sua dedicação patriótica." J. P Oliveira Martins, *A Província*, vol. 1, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1958, p.180.

²⁴¹ "Se recensássemos a bibliografia consultada pelo nosso autor, chegaríamos decerto à mesma conclusão de Flausino Torres: Oliveira Martins leu preferentemente os reformistas." Augusto Santos Silva, *Oliveira Martins e o Socialismo*, Afrontamento, Braga, 1979, p.91.

To this effect even Proudhon loses importance and the spirit of compromise, although already present in Proudhon, is completely accepted by Oliveira Martins and Proudhon is renegaded:

"The individual liberty in the communes of Karl Marx and Proudhon would be incomparably less than those of the current nations"²⁴²

It is then impossible to have work without capital, without profit, without this "normal form" of economic development, which is the instinct of the affirmation of personality. In this sense we advance towards equality but there is a natural inequality that cannot be eliminated, only educated. The strikes are precisely the contrary of this struggle for equality because man looks at money and not equality, or in other words it is a sub-product of the rich²⁴³.

With time Oliveira Martins will abandon Proudhon's type of socialism, with its individualistic premises and come close to Katheder socialism, having many points of contact with Proudhon, one of them being the notion that politics and power relations should be one left for specialists. Besides the moral premises, with the state ruled by the imperative of justice, were still those we have in Proudhon²⁴⁴.

The direct involvement of Oliveira Martins in the socialist cause was marginal; he had a more active involvement within the government and the status quo, attempting to reform society from above. This is also in accordance with the preposition advanced by Augusto Santos Silva that Oliveira Martins's involvement with the socialist cause was an ideal one, not directly involved in directing the movement but setting the ideas and lines of development²⁴⁵. As a point of interest it should be noted that Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins will produce a biography of Oliveira Martins with the title *Oliveira Martins: Um combate de ideias (Oliveira Martins: A struggle of ideas)*. This spirit of reformism will still lead him into positions of power within the government, although the reforms he envisioned were mostly unsuccessful.

The bureaucracy of the state becomes with time in Oliveira Martins the favoured means to reach this reform. He does not trust on the poor sections of society directly affected as "the products of capitalism", but precisely those who have an affinity with the "order", mitigated by some notion of impartiality. The monarchy is then seen by Oliveira Martins as capable of holding this balance, because the king is interested in an equilibrium and not in powerful individual interests who could contest the

²⁴² "a liberdade individual nas comunas de Karl Marx e de Proudhon seria incomparavelmente menor do que é nas nações actuais." J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Política e Economia Nacional*, op. cit. p.93.

²⁴³ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime de riquezas*, Op. cit. pp.213-218.

²⁴⁴ See Fernando Catroga who makes reference to this continuity in Oliveira Martins's thought, Fernando Catroga, "O problema Político em Antero de Quental – Um confronto com Oliveira Martins –" in *Revista de História das Ideias*, op. cit. pp.380-381.

²⁴⁵ See Augusto Santos Silva, op. cit. pp.87-88.

national interests embodied in the monarch's power²⁴⁶. From an individualistic kind of socialism he advances to a collectivistic one, but still on reformist lines.

²⁴⁶ See for instance his 5-10-1887 article in *A Província*: "with effect, this people, apathetic by temperament, melancholic by nature, pessimistic by spirit, mistreated by politic, without beliefs or hopes in anyone, embraces the monarchic tradition, and the good instinctive sense tells it that a solidarity of interests unites it with its kings" ... "[We have] on the one hand, the strength that there is the throne, and on the other hand, the passive hope, the warm sympathy in the people. We desire above all, for the fortune of our land, a direct handshake between the king and the people" / "com efeito, este povo, apático por temperamento, melancólico por índole, pessimista por génio, maltratado pela política, sem crenças nem esperanças em quem quer que seja, abraça-se à tradição monárquica, e o bom senso instintivo diz-lhe que uma solidariedade de interesse o liga aos seus reis" ... "de um lado, a força que há no trono, e do outro, a esperança passiva, a simpatia calorosa que há no povo, desejamos sobretudo, para a fortuna da nossa terra, um aperto de mão directo entre o rei o povo." J. P. Oliveira Martins, *A Província*, vol. 5, *op. cit.* p.74 et 76.

3.2 Political Theoretician and Social Preacher

The political theory of Oliveira Martins has changed since his early texts on socialism, there he said that it is not possible to “divide in two the life of humanity, a make room for monarchy and democracy inside the same economic way”²⁴⁷. The organic conception of society was at the center of his theoretical speculations; however, the finished product of these reflections had a long maturing process. In the 1878 booklet *As Eleições* we have the first draft of his organic political system of representation. The critiques of parliamentarism and of liberal democracy traditions are already present in this first book and they will become harsher with the degradation of the political life.

This initial positioning will be quite different from what he writes in 1887: “Nowadays the Monarchies are either democratic or they cannot be”²⁴⁸, the monarchy is no longer contrary to democracy but is in fact the only possible hodiernal way in which a monarchical system can be inscribed. The republican federalism of his youth is with time relegated in favour of a constitutional monarchy, which is more akin to the democracy he preconizes of estates and class representation rather than the tendentious unilateral predominance of a class, or even worse, individualized interests.

The move will culminate with him joining the monarchical *Partido Progressista* (Progressive Party) in 1885, where together with the faction *Vida Nova* of this party, he advocates the democratization of monarchy through a series of reforms which run closely to the organic democracy he envisages in his 1878 booklet. The failure of this reformist group will lead him to the Caesarism he criticizes in his *Teoria do Socialismo* and identifies with Prussian politics, according to him inspired on Hegel’s philosophy. In the 1870s he will extend this critique to Fontes Pereira de Melo’s governments, identifying his government with the Caesarism of aristocratic interests, of cronyism and general corruption.

The idea of a democratic Caesarism emerges in the 1880s, where a temporary dictatorship was seen as the last resort to restore order in face of anarchic liberalism, in which the monarchic system would be reforming itself and advance popular democratic aspirations²⁴⁹. This idea of a benevolent dictatorship capable of imposing and perform the needed reforms, will also be shared by the group of intellectuals self-named *os Vencidos da Vida* (the defeated from life)²⁵⁰. This suspension of liberal

²⁴⁷ “dividir em duas a vida da humanidade, e fazer caber monarquia e democracia dentro do mesmo modo de ser económico!” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.175.

²⁴⁸ “Hoje em dia as monarquias ou hão-de ser democráticas, ou não podem ser” 5 de outubro 1887, J. P Oliveira Martins, *A Província*, vol. 5, *op. cit.* p.76

²⁴⁹ See Jose Tengarrinha “Oliveira Martins: uma estratégia de Desenvolvimento para Portugal?” in *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra*, vol. 18, *op. cit.* pp.106-107.

²⁵⁰ See Sérgio Campo Matos, “A ideia de ditadura no círculo dos vencidos da vida” in *Clio*, Centro de História da Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 5, Lisboa, 2000, pp.73-91.

democracy is what Silva Cordeiro will denominate the Germanism in politics, tracing its origin to Oliveira Martins and his Caesaristic solution.

One of problems we are faced with is that this Caesarism Oliveira Martins will be accused of, in his more youthful writings he will make this same accusation to Hegel, the Berlin philosopher of Prussian militarism²⁵¹. Should this then be seen as a turn or an approximation to Hegel in terms of politics? Such a formulation is incomplete in the sense that, first in terms of politics and even on broader views about Hegel it remains to be seen whether they were the same as before, as his own views on politics had changed, increasingly favouring collective instead of individualistic premises. Second, because the freedom and liberties proposed by Hegel, although personified in the monarch, have their support in institutions and have their truth in the constitution of the state rather than in the monarch. While the critique of Hegel that Oliveira Martins first had contact with, comes from liberal fields that are against “the state apparatus” of Hegel, because it limits individual freedoms of liberal democracy.

The political constitution Hegel envisaged should then be put in context with its historic moment, where the monarch is the prevailing political body of the state per se and direct democracy or elective monarchical systems were actually detrimental to real freedom (with the near examples of England and Poland). Democracy rested rather on other governmental institutions constitutionally established and bodies of civil society, like the corporations which were closer to the real individual, instead of the abstractly elected representatives of particularized interests. Hegel is very critical of the monarchical forms which had their epitome in Middle Ages²⁵². Therefore, the monarchical principle he defends rests on the basis of some universal principles, which, although far from a liberal democracy, do not place an authority above the laws and the constitution. It is actually the constitution and the historical development of monarchy that make the monarch lawful.

Oliveira Martins relates the state authority imposed by the Prussian political system with its Caesaristic tendencies directly to Hegel as he had read him through Lerminier, Ahrens and other liberals. The Caesarism that such a system entails is not the solution for modern problems, as we are told that Caesarism is only a transitory, phenomenal solution, not an organic one²⁵³. The understanding of the state’s role in Hegel and other political theorists he sees as following the same line, although initially negatively seen, will later find some acceptance, not only in terms of the state’s organizing function but also as the face of socialism, which through reform could implement a more democratic regime.

²⁵¹ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, op. cit. p.150.

²⁵² See G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, op. cit. p.188.

²⁵³ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, op. cit. p.276.

In Oliveira Martins the idea of Caesarism relates to the furthering of the state's power. This is also undoubtedly a theme close to Hegel and his critics, but the strong or even repressive state power associated with Prussian politics is not derivative of Hegel's political theory. It is true that Hegel does not defend a liberal society of abstract freedom, but he also criticizes the rests of feudalism still present in Germany and the freedom of the estates with their reactionary traditional laws based on serfdom and dependence mechanisms of the Middle Ages. For this reason Hegel sides with the King, supporting the central power delineation of the main lines of political organization. This was on the whole a progressive political positioning given the conditions of Germany, the subsequent developments and the affirmation of a strong central government under Prussian leadership are something quite different from Hegel's own political theory which allowed for a great degree of local autonomy.

Hegel will in fact criticize the centralism of France where everything is "determined by this authority, and all these aspects [everything we have excluded from the necessary concept of political authority] are drawn into it even in their smallest ramifications. "²⁵⁴ a move that means "carping at all independent activity on the part of the citizens" where "the appointment of every village schoolmaster, the expenditure of every penny on a pane of glass in the village school or the parish council chamber, the appointment of every toll-clerk, bailiff, or village magistrate should be directly instigated and effected by the highest governmental authority"²⁵⁵

The Prussian State with its reactionary and conservative features is something condemned by Hegel²⁵⁶, even if Oliveira Martins initially associates him with this development. However, a temporary dictatorship later becomes acceptable for Oliveira Martins in moments of crisis, precisely based on the example of Prussia, even though he is generally against Caesarist repression because it is unable to resolve the fundamental problems:

"Can this regime of compression and repression last? Nobody believes so. It would last and be efficient, if on the other side the protective laws, that, honors be made to the great chancellor, disciple of Hegel, Bluntschili and Schäffle, [which] he promotes tirelessly, could cure the disease; but there are two parallel origins for anarchism, one of which is the evident uneasiness of the working classes, curable without doubt by means of the socialist laws, the other is the democratic sentiment of rebellion, with origin in the individualist doctrines of which the protective laws do nothing else than exacerbate"²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Political Writings*, translated by H.B Nisbet, edited by Laurance Dickey and H.B Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.21.

²⁵⁵ See idem, *ibidem*, pp.22-23.

²⁵⁶ See on this subject T.M. Knox, "Hegel and Prussianism" in *Philosophy*, vol. 15, no. 57 (Jan., 1940), pp. 51-63.

²⁵⁷ "Poderá durar este regime de compressão e repressão? Ninguém o creia. Duraria e seria eficaz, se por outro lado as leis protectoras, que, honra seja feita ao grande chanceler, discípulo de Hegel, de Bluntschili e de

But he still sees dictatorship as a means to solve social revolts by instituting a strong power that in a short period would be capable of curtailing liberalism, the origin of this anarchic democratic sentiment.

A new reading of Hegel also affirms itself in the extract above, where Hegel's political theory seems to be object of praise on these later texts, when Oliveira Martins is concerned with reform and makes an approximation to state socialism. It is, however, not clear if this praise originates from this acceptability of Caesarism in moments of crisis or from another understanding of Hegel, one in which the state does not have the restrictive and absolutist characters condemned earlier.

The association of Hegel with state socialism is commonplace among the liberals, who followed a path similar to Rudolf Haym's condemnation of Hegel²⁵⁸. The support for this assertion could be looked for in the examples of Lassalle and the Bismarckian reforms²⁵⁹, but the main references of Oliveira Martins and the proponents of state socialism were actually limited in their Hegelianism, some even reasserting the liberal mantra of Haym, as in the case of Bluntschli, who, although often said to be a follower of Hegel, says:

“Even Hegel in his theory of Law (Rechtslehre) paid more regard to the historical formation of states than the earlier theorists of natural law. He supposed indeed that he found in the history of the world a dialectical process of reason. The “existing” appeared to him “rational”. His theory glorified especially the Prussian state, as it then existed, still absolute although governed in a spirit of public duty. He defended the power of the monarchy, and did not care for the advance of constitutional freedom. But he emphasised the moral significance of the State, and in opposition to the wretched idea that it was only a necessary evil, he praised it, as the highest and noblest realization of the idea of Right”²⁶⁰

The lack of a critical distance from the ideas in vogue leads him to a reading of Hegel, which besides having no direct support in Hegel's philosophy also lacks historical justification, when it portrays him as an apologist of Prussian monarchy in its absolutist undertones.

Bluntschli will adhere to the ideas of a *Völkerpsychologie* in order to explain the workings of the state, favouring empirical methods as opposed to the logical abstractions he sees in Hegel. To him

Schafle[sic], ele promove infatigavelmente, conseguissem curar a doença; mas no anarquismo há duas origens paralelas, uma das quais é o mal-estar evidente das classes operárias, curável sem dúvida por meio das leis socialistas, e a outra é o sintoma democrático de rebelião, originado nas doutrinas individualistas e que as leis protectors não fazem se não exarcebar.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Jornal, Op. cit.* p.240.

²⁵⁸ It is Haym who accuses Hegel of taking the real for the rational: “wirklich wird, was vernünftig ist, und das Wirkliche vernünftig wird” Rudolf Haym, *Hegel in seine Zeit: Vorlesung über Entstehung und Entwicklung Wesen und Wert der Hegelsche Philosophie*, Verlag von Rudolph Gaertner, Berlin, 1857, p.365.

²⁵⁹ See Domenico Losurdo, *Zwischen Hegel und Bismarck*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1993, p.307-309.

²⁶⁰ See J.K. Bluntschli, *The theory of State*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892, p.73.

the state in Hegel is not the living organism, a personal being, like the adherents of this movement proposed; therefore the organic conception in Hegel is incomplete.

Schäffle will also furnish us with a similar critique of a Hegelian panlogistic distortion of the social reality:

“It would be a great evil if the Platonic ideal state or a Fichtean closed commercial state could be imposed by the philosophers, if the social world of Hegel could be panlogistically constructed.”²⁶¹

The state as this individual organism would then constitute the moralizing element of society and it was to be used as an ideological tool to rally support for Bismarck’s reforms²⁶².

A letter from Henrique de Barros in 1886 attested to the fact that these were some of the theorists discussed by them, consisting on a whole mainly by advocates of state socialism, including Schäffle²⁶³, supporting the strengthening of the state’s role in economy and society in general.

The state in Oliveira Martins always had a central role, but earlier the state was less affirmative and the individual occupied a greater part of his political views. Fernando Catroga speaks of a humanitarian universalism that characterized this earlier phase²⁶⁴, in which men shared a spiritual principle constant and identical in all human beings. In the last chapter of his *Portugal e o Socialismo*

²⁶¹ “Es wäre ein großes Uebel, wenn der Platonische Idealstaat oder ein Fichtescher geschlossener Handelsstaat von den Philosophen oktroyert, wenn die soziale Welt von einem Hegel panlogistisch konstruiert werden könnte” Albert Schäffle, *Abriss der Soziologie*, H. Laupp, Tübingen, 1906, p.74.

²⁶² See in this respect Engels preface to the German Edition of *The poverty of Philosophy*, where he speaks of Robertus economic theory, which could well apply to other catheder socialists who make “simply an application of morality to economics” where “The transition to Utopia is now made in the turn of a hand. The ‘measures’, which ensure exchange of commodities according to labour value as the invariable rule, cause no difficulty. The other Utopians of this tendency, from Gray to Proudhon, rack their brains to invent social institutions which would achieve this aim. They attempt at least to solve the economic question in an economic way through the action of the owners themselves who exchange the commodities. For Rodbertus it is much easier. As a good Prussian he appeals to the state: a decree of the state authority orders the reform.” but as a conclusion the exploitation of wage labour remains as he “refers the whole matter to the decision of the bureaucracy, which determines from above the share of the worker in his own product and graciously permits him to have it.” Marx and Engels *Collected Works, preface to the first German edition of The Poverty of Philosophy, vol. 26, op. cit. p.281 et 287 et 289.* / “sie ist einfact eine Anwendung der Moral auf die Ökonomie“ ... “Der Übergang zur Utopie ist nun im Handumdrehen gemacht. Die „Vorkehrungen“, die den Warenaustausch nach Arbeitswert als ausnahmslose Regel sicherstellen, machen keine Schwierigkeit. Die überigen Utopisten dieser Richtung, von Gray bis Proudhon, plagen sich damit ab, gesellschaftliche Einrichtungen auszuklügeln, die diesen Zweck verwirklichen sollen. Sie versuchen wenigstens, die ökonomische Frage auf ökonomischem Wege, durch Aktion der austauschenden Warenbesitzer selbst, zu lösen. Rodbertus hat es viel leichter. Als guter Preuße appelliert er an den Staat: Ein Dekret der Staatsgewalt befiehlt die Reform.“ ... “[in Rodbertus] die ganze Sache in das Befinden der Bürokratie legt, die dem Arbeiter seinem Anteil an seinem eigenen Produkt von oben herab bestimmt und in Gnaden zukommen läßt“ Marx und Engels *Werke, Vorwort [zur ersten deutschen Ausgabe von Karl Marx’ Schrift „Das Elend der Philosophie“], Volume 21, op. cit. p.178 et 181-182 et 185,*

²⁶³ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Correspondência, op. cit. p.92.*

²⁶⁴ See Fernando Catroga, “A historiografia de Oliveira Martins” in *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra*, vol. 18, *op. cit. p.413.*

we have a draft of these ideas, where the authority of the state was a federal contract between the state and the individual, as they become a united collective²⁶⁵.

The socialism he proposed then was along the lines of a cooperativism between the state and the individual workers, which, with the help of the state, would expand individual liberty to every citizen and form a “universal assembly of the propriety owners”²⁶⁶. This idea of propriety and freedom is another common feature he shares with Hegel²⁶⁷. We have already in *Teoria do Socialismo* property as the “juridical affirmation of the moral individuality of men”²⁶⁸, but later the idea that property is the expansion of personality²⁶⁹, is *ipsum verbum* what Hegel furnishes us with in his *Philosophy of Right*²⁷⁰.

We will see, however, from around the 1880s instead a concern around such liberty, in which liberty instead of being expanded should be tamed. We have rather an excess of individual liberty; the state should regain its authority as against individual liberty.

Oliveira Martins starts speaking of the “restoration” of state authority and of a movement in Europe which moves in this direction²⁷¹. The vocabulary used is meaningful and anticipates the later developments in support of monarchy, which besides its historic significance as with Portugal’s restoration of independence in 1640, also appeals to a stronger state control. However, this is obviously not meant as support of a return to absolutism but rather of a legitimate intervention and even direction of the state’s in economic affairs.

This is a theoretical problem that comes down to the equation authority-liberty, which occupied Oliveira Martins’s meditations from early on. The problem of liberty, the individual and his relations in society always had in Oliveira Martins a measure, found in justice (or in equality), from

²⁶⁵ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, op. cit. pp.253-254.

²⁶⁶ “a assembleia universal dos proprietários” idem, ibidem, p.255.

²⁶⁷ “A afirmação da personalidade livre pela definição e segurança da propriedade” idem, ibidem, p.153.

²⁶⁸ “Afirmação jurídica da individualidade moral do homem” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, op. cit. p.180.

²⁶⁹ “The expansion of personality is the historical process of the formation of wealth” / “A expansão da personalidade é o processo histórico da formação da riqueza” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, op. cit. p.202.

²⁷⁰ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, op. cit. p.45. / G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke*, vol. 7, op. cit. p.114-115.

²⁷¹ “The regulatory authority of the state, on circulation and work, so circumscribed and defined, is conserved; and if today, with a doctrinarian frenzy we have let it be obliterated, it appears all around Europe the symptomatic facts of a restoration each day more urgent to mitigate the orgies of capitalism and prevent the dire consequences of the misery of millions of men” / “A autoridade reguladora do Estado, na circulação e no trabalho, circunscrita sim e definida, conservou-se; e se hoje, com o desvairamento doutrinário a temos deixado obliterar, surgem por toda a Europa os factos sintomáticos de uma restauração cada dia mais urgente para mitigar as orgias do capitalismo e prevenir as consequências funestas da miséria de milhões de homens.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, op. cit. p.186.

which they balance their magnitude. But the balance tends to move towards authority as earlier mentioned because:

“Jurists and economists conceived as antithesis liberty and authority, without being yet able to conceive that only in the social order, of which the criterion is equality, liberty can exist. The former was confused with independence and isolation and authority with tyranny and abuse”²⁷²

Those who made “sentiments and pains” from these ideas, no longer had authority as a mediator between liberty and equality. A problem that affected both the liberal and socialist doctrines in the radical forms they assumed:

“Could there be an absolute norm, constant mould, on the whole variety? No, therefore it is equally chimerical the communist city and the city of individualism; they are equivalent abstractions. But it is a fact that, if we observe summarily the passage of time, we see in the economy of the peoples the same that is seen in jurisprudence, the separation of powers, delimitation of functions, the respective spheres of individual and state become distinguished”²⁷³

The antithetical relation between liberty and authority is first said “to be resolved in a scientific synthesis” of a “philosophical movement” which accomplished “the fusing in one of the antithetical ideas – liberty-authority – by the comprehension of the common norm, [which is] one and the same in all humanity, [that is] Justice”²⁷⁴. But later the synthesis turns out not to be so easily accomplished, precisely because the two ideas are conceived as antithetical when in reality they are not, as liberty without authority is anarchy, which in fact the main problem of society at that time. For this reason we will hear him defending authority and condemning the excesses of liberty.

This is a theme that relates to Hegel and has been extended into our days and especially relates to Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive liberty²⁷⁵, which indeed has its origins in Hegel where the negative liberty is the sphere of one’s own private life and positive liberty the sphere

²⁷² “Juristas e economistas concebiam como antítese a liberdade e a autoridade, sem poderem conceber ainda que só na ordem social, cujo critério é a igualdade, pode existir liberdade. A esta confundiam-na com a independência e o isolamento, à autoridade com a tirania e o abuso” idem, ibidem, p.XII-XIII

²⁷³ “Pode haver norma absoluta, molde constante, na variedade omnimoda? Não. Por isso são igualmente chimericas a cidade comunista e a cidade do individualismo: são abstracções equivalentes. Mas é facto que, se observamos sumariamente o decorrer dos tempos, vemos na economia dos povos o mesmo que se vê na jurisprudência: separam-se os poderes, delimitam-se as funções, distinguem-se as esferas respectivas do Indivíduo e do Estado.” idem, ibidem, p.172.

²⁷⁴ “Tal é a antítese determinada pelo movimento filosófico, que se resolve na síntese científica, pela qual a autoridade se humaniza no *eu* e, pela identidade da força e da matéria, do verbo e da carne, do espírito e da natureza, se torna uma verdade natural e moral; fundindo numa só as ideias antitéticas - liberdade-autoridade - pela compreensão da norma comum, uma e a mesma em toda a humanidade, a Justiça.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.9.

²⁷⁵ See Isaiah Berlin, *Liberty*, edited by Henry Hardy with an essay on Berlin and his critics by Jan Jarry, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp.166-217.

of collective life²⁷⁶. Negative and positive liberty or freedom are directly related to Hegel's concept of will, where they find their resolution. Negative freedom is the first moment of freedom or the moment of universality, where every limit is "dissolved" and is thus similar to Berlin's concept of negative freedom²⁷⁷. The second moment is the transition to a defined object, or in other words, when my inner-freedom enters in a relation with something from outside²⁷⁸. The will is the unity of these two moments but an individual will is still not true freedom because in order to realize his freedom the subject needs an ethical community where it can express its subjectivity in a rational manner²⁷⁹.

Although this criticism of authority belongs to the first period of libertarian socialism, we still find him at that time, in an 1868 newspaper article, writing that "the authority is the sum of the parts of individual liberty sacrificed (necessarily) to the security of collective life"²⁸⁰. Authority is then a

²⁷⁶ See on this subject Miguel Saralegui, "The Hegelian origin of the Distinction between negative and positive freedom" in *Hegel-Jahrbuch 2008, Hegels politische philosophie, Ersteil*, edited by Andreas Arndt, Paul Cruysberghs, and Andrzej Pryleski, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2008, pp.69-75.

²⁷⁷ "The will contains α) the element of pure indeterminateness, or that pure reflection of the ego into itself which involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content either immediately presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or given and determined by any means whatever. This is the unrestricted infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thought of oneself" G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, *op. cit.* p.21. / "Das Wille enthält α) das Element der Reinen Unbestimmtheit oder der reinen Reflexion des Ich in sich, in welcher jede Beschränkung, jeder durch die Natur, die Bedürfnisse, Begierden und Triebe unmittelbar vorhandene oder, wodurch es sei, gegebene und bestimmte Inhalt aufgelöst ist; die schrankenlose Unendlichkeit der absoluten Abstraktion oder Allgemeinheit, das reine Denken seiner selbst." G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke*, vol. 7, *op. cit.* p.49.

²⁷⁸ "At the same time, the ego is also the transition from the undifferentiated indeterminacy to the differentiation, determination, and positing of a determinacy as a content and object. Now further this content may either be given by nature or engendered by the concept of the mind through this positing of itself as something determinate, the ego steps in principle into the determinate existence. This is the absolute moment, the finitude or particularization of the ego" idem, *ibidem*, p.22. / "Ebenso ist Ich das Übergehen unterschiedsloser Unbestimmtheit zur Unterscheidung, Bestimmen und Setzen einer Bestimmtheit al seines Inhalts und Gegenstands. – Dieser Inhalt sei nun weiter als durch die Natur gegeben oder aus dem Begriffe des Geistes erzeugt. Durch dies Setzen seiner selbst als eines *bestimmten* tritt Ich in das *Dasein* überhaupt; - das absolute Moment der *Endlichkeit* oder *Besonderung* des Ich" idem, *ibidem*, p.52.

²⁷⁹ "The man in the street thinks he is free if it is open to him to act as he pleases, but this very arbitrariness implies that he is not free. When I will what is rational, then I am acting not as a particular individual but in accordance with the concept of ethics in general." idem, *ibidem*, p.230. / "Der gewöhnliche Mensch glaubt frei zu sein, wenn ihm willkürlich zu handeln erlaubt ist, aber gerade in der Willkür liegt daß er nicht frei ist. Wenn ich das Vernünftige will, so handle ich nicht als partikulares Individuum, sondern nach den Begriffen dar Sittlichkeit überhaupt" idem, *ibidem*, p.54.

The criticism of Isaiah Berlin's with regards to positive freedom has been object of critical evaluations and the meaning he attributes both to negative and positive freedom with regards to Hegel has been questioned in Paul Franco's: *Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom*, Yale University Press, Connecticut, 1999, p.180-182 Robert B. Pippin also addresses these problems and expands this criticism on to Popper and Russell, where the argument is that in the relation between subject and the object, the first term is reduced to the second term, which is precisely one of the initial criticisms of Oliveira Martins in relation to Hegel's theory of state, to which the individual is lost or has no reality without the state. Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Practical Philosophy*, Rational Agency, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p.26.

²⁸⁰ "A autoridade é a soma de parcelas de liberdade individual sacrificadas (necessariamente) à segurança da vida colectiva." J.P. Oliveira Martins, *A Democracia em Portugal, Política e história*, vol. 2, *op. cit.* p.2.

necessity for the common good and is not completely dismissed by him, even if the last expression of this liberty is “individualism and the federation, the autonomy of the cell and the gland”²⁸¹.

In this text he laments the insufficiencies of the democratic advancement of liberty, but he still holds democracy as the basis of this advancement. The later development towards Caesarism thwarts these democratic sentiments, argues Silva Cordeiro, who accuses him of already having these anti-democratic tendencies since his youth. But one must not forget that Silva Cordeiro is a liberal, little inclined to accept the state as a means to curtail the excess of liberalism as he in fact praises some of those advancements. Although the political filiation of Silva Cordeira is more complex because he is also critical of liberalism and defends a weak-protectionism, but still close to the lines of free-trade liberalism. He is thus critical of what he calls romantic liberalism, which imitated the liberal regimes of other countries and applied those models to Portugal, copying their laws without paying attention to the history and national character of Portugal which required an adaptation of those laws²⁸². We see here and there some harsher phraseology on liberalism as for example when he speaks about Herculano:

“Maybe the great master, staying in the middle way of conversion, would dismiss liberalism, which has been in Portugal little less than a system of exploitation, instituted in favour of a dozen of politicians colluded with another dozen of bankers”²⁸³

From this excerpt it should be reinforced that the notion that liberalism had taken on this form is not because of liberalism itself but because of the way it was implemented in Portugal. However, judging by his conclusion, we have had some success in nationalizing this liberal regime, in which “this glory of Mouzinho is very solid, genuine like the best in history”²⁸⁴. But some skepticism remains as to whether we can take advantage of this, and as such he proposes educational reforms, in order to curb the root cause of crises, or in other words the moral crisis which is the substrate of all crises. His political positioning is thus typical of the mixed positions of the liberal-conservatives.

From the critique of liberalism he goes on to the critique of Oliveira Martins’s Caesarism:

²⁸¹ See idem, *ibidem*, p.9.

²⁸² “The grafting of the liberal regime by legislators, statesmen and literates has been made by the love of art, copying french laws.” / “A enxertia do regime liberal fizeram-na legisladores, estadistas e literatos copiando leis francesas por amor da arte” Joaquim António da Silva Cordeiro, *A Crise em seus aspectos morais*, *op. cit.* p.25.

²⁸³ “talvez que o grande mestre, ficando a meio do caminho da conversão, mandasse bugiar o liberalismo que pouco mais tem sido, em Portugal, que um sistema de exploração, instituído a favor de uma dúzia de políticos conluiados com outra dúzia de banqueiros.” idem, *ibidem*, p.21.

²⁸⁴ “Esta glória do Mouzinho é bem sólida, genuína como as que melhor o são na história” idem, *ibidem*, p.210.

“If in Herculano we had the doctor of individual liberalism, we will see in Oliveira Martins, the theorist of Caesarism, as the only solution for the chaos of Portuguese society”²⁸⁵

There is no direct mentioning of the presence of Hegel in Oliveira Martins. However, it is apparent that he takes Hegel for a metaphysician and mystic, far from modern German science²⁸⁶. But Silva Cordeiro still directly relates him to the German political tradition, particularly to Mommsen where Caesar is for him too, the ideal state man, reaffirming that again as an early tendency in Oliveira Martins:

“So is the preoccupation no less visible in Oliveira Martins: it is this tendency itself that first appears outlined in the first works of his youth. The first book that he publishes is a historical novel about an episode of the <<loss of our independence in 1580>> with the title – *Febo Moniz ou o último dos portugueses*”²⁸⁷

In what relates to Rome, Silva Cordeiro is very clear in condemning Catiline, Marius, Sulla and supporting Cicero instead²⁸⁸. The views of Hegel and Oliveira Martins on Rome shared some important features, especially in their support of the people’s party, represented by the Gracchus who Hegel holds as having “the higher sanction of the World-Spirit”²⁸⁹. Oliveira Martins also considers the Gracchus as those who have opened “the new wave of socialist revolutions in Rome”²⁹⁰.

The main difference between Hegel and Oliveira Martins in this respect is the more conservative and prudent view of the plebeians on the part of Oliveira Martins, which he considers as those who had “lower instincts” and could not really win in their struggle against the patricians because “to win and to rule is impossible for those who know only how to rebel and revenge themselves”²⁹¹. While allying themselves with different tyrants, they break the old distinctions but create new ones. The social problems remain until the need for a stronger figure arises, who would be capable of instituting authority and advance the cause of liberty, which is then put on the hands of Caesar. In

²⁸⁵ “Se em Herculano tivemos o doutor do liberalismo individualista, vamos agora ver em Oliveira Martins, o teórico do cesarismo, como a única solução possível ao caos da sociedade portuguesa” idem, *ibidem*, p.124

²⁸⁶ See idem, *ibidem*, p.124.

²⁸⁷ “Tal preocupação não é menos visível em Oliveira: é mesmo essa tendência a que primeiro nos aparece esboçada nas obras da sua mocidade. O primeiro livro que publica é um romance histórico sobre um episódio da <<perda da nossa autonomia em 1580>> com o título – *Febo Moniz ou o último dos portugueses*” idem, *ibidem*, p.128.

²⁸⁸ See idem, *ibidem*, p.152.

²⁸⁹ See G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, preface by Charles Hegel, Introduction by the translator J. Sibree, introduction to Dover Edition by C.J. Friedrich, Dover Publications inc, New York, 1956[reprint 2004], p.310. / “hat die höhere Berechtigung des Weltgeistes” G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, *op. cit.* p.377.

²⁹⁰ “a nova era das revoluções socialistas de Roma” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *História da República Romana*, *op. cit.* p.429.

²⁹¹ “Vencer e mandar é impossível a quem somente sabe insurgir-se e vingar-se” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *História da República Romana*, *op. cit.* p.413.

Hegel the focus is on the struggle of the plebeians for equality rather than this aspect set forward by Oliveira Martins, sharing however with Oliveira Martins the praise of Caesar who “judged by the great scope of history, did the Right, since he furnished a mediating element, and that kind of political bond which men’s conditions required”²⁹²

The reestablishment of authority grounded on democratic objectives is one of the arguments supporting Caesar’s power struggle. In Hegel we have an identical condemnation of the republic, where decisions lie on the sphere of private authority instead of popular authority²⁹³. This appeal for stability and security had a very clear audience in Oliveira Martins, as the sense of order was something praised above all by the middle class.

The second aspect that should be emphasized and which refers directly to his political activities is how Oliveira Martins is not merely a political theorist. He also speaks in a familiar tone to those who want to reform society, which with its basis on morality resembles the work of a preacher who tries to convince the other to join his creed on the grounds of his superior spiritual or moral precepts. The social problems occupy the center of his political theory, where such a social preaching is the closest we can find of a unity between his theory with practice.

The reform he preconizes has a more ready acceptance among the small *bourgeoisie* and this is also the case in Proudhon as he rightly notes:

“Only in the field, illuminated with the almost defined perception of reality, Proudhon, the political prophet, preached reform since 1840; it was the small *bourgeoisie* to whom he spoke”²⁹⁴

Being such a prolific writer as Oliveira Martins was meant that he had a public. He, more than anyone, had a preoccupation over his readership, with very practical questions about those who could read him and their level of instruction²⁹⁵. The educated *bourgeoisie* sections of society were his

²⁹² See G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, (Dover Edition), *op. cit.* p.312. / “Cäser hat weltgeschichtlich das Rechte getan, indem er die Vermittlung und die Art und Weise das Zusammenhalts, der notwendig war, hervorbrachte.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol.12, *op. cit.* p.379.

²⁹³ “We see, especially from Cicero’s writings, how all public affairs were decided by the private authority of the more eminent citizens —by their power, their wealth; and what tumultuary proceedings marked all political transactions. In the republic, therefore, there was no longer any security; that could be looked for only in a single will.” *idem*, *ibidem*, p.379. / “Besonders aus Ciceros Schriften kommt man zu dieser Anschauung, wie alle öffentlichen Angelegenheiten durch die Privatautorität der Vornehmen, dur ihre Macht, ihren Reichtum entschieden wurden, wie alles tumultuarisch geschehen ist. In der Republik war somit kein Halt mehr, welcher nur noch im Willen eines einzigen Individuums konnte gefunden werden.” *idem*, *ibidem*, p.379.

²⁹⁴ “Só em campo, iluminado com uma percepção quase definida da realidade, Proudhon, o profeta político, desde 1840 que pregava a Reforma; era à pequena burguesia a quem se dirigia” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.97.

²⁹⁵ This is one of the reasons he starts his project *Biblioteca das Ciências Sociais* in order to raise the level of knowledge of his countrymen, or in other words, of his readers.

audience, as Augusto Santos Silva rightly notices, which besides the extract of *Portugal e o socialismo* he quotes²⁹⁶, it is also clear in other multiple parts of this book that when he speaks directly to the public, he is in fact speaking to the middle classes²⁹⁷.

When the socialism of state gains acceptance then these sections of society by themselves were not enough for a government, even though he believed the initiation of ever more inclusive classes in the political process was a democratic demand. The men of state are then needed to educate them on the affairs of the state:

“Therefore in this and other cases it is to be seen that the voices of those interested are not enough to form the thought of government. The statesman is obliged to know more, to see better. More than once the industrialist does not know what he wants, and many more times what he should want, if as such the task of the government is protection – protection in general and I mean not the boogiemán of customs – the obligation of the statesman is to teach, clarify, support, direct.”²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ “When he summons directly the reader in *Portugal e o socialismo* (<<What do I propose you?>>), it is the proprietor, the merchant, the industrial who is questioned, the have the function of narratee” / “Quando no *Portugal e o socialismo* interpela directamente o leitor (<<Que te proponho?>>), são o proprietário, o comerciante, o industrial, quem é interrogado, são eles que desempenham a função de narratário” Augusto Santos Silva, *op. cit.* p.72.

²⁹⁷ “It cannot be the predominance of the manufacturing classes, but the fertile concourse, of the workers and the peasants with the small *bourgeoisie*, shopkeepers, land growers, land renters, small agricultural owners, industrialists [also] with the scientific workers, doctors, law-makers, economists, mathematics, architects, engineers, publicists, etc.” / “Não pode ser o domínio das classes fabris, mas sim o concurso fértil, dos operários e dos camponeses com a pequena burguesia, logistas, foreiros, rendeiros, pequenos proprietários agrícolas, industriais, com os operários da ciência, médicos, legistas, economistas, matemáticos, arquitectos, engenheiros, publicistas, etc.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.101.

“The individual propriety of land, however, is only compatible with a system that, mobilizing it, divides it in the maximal number of parcels, up to the ideal point by which each family (semi-propertied, semi-*bourgeoisie*) possess its share” / “A propriedade individual da terra, porém, só é compatível com um sistema que, mobilizando-a, a divide no máximo número de parcelas, até o ponto ideal de cada família (semiproprietária, semiburguesa) possuir o seu quinhão.” *idem*, *ibidem*, pp.227.

“So here is what I proposed to you propertied reader, [actually] what socialism proposes. If you accept it then the cause of progress will be won in the 19th century. If you reject it, if you oppose it, if you fight it, then tremble with the fearful insurrection of the hungry demagoguery, tremble with confusion and ruin; think well what is most worth it, whether the sacrifice of some egotistic enjoyments that after all have no other use than to corrupt and sterilize you[*bourgeoisie*]! Or the retrocess of some centuries, the destruction of the great drama in which you were a glorious actor, and which fills modern history from the 9th century upon until the the 18th century. ” / “Eis aí, leitor proprietário, o que o socialismo te propõe. Se o aceitares a causa do progresso estará ganha no século XIX. Se o rejeitares, se te oposes a ele, se o combateres, treme da insurreição temível da demagogia faminta, treme da confusão, da ruína; pensa bem qual valerá mais, se o sacrifício de uns gozos egoístas que afinal não servem mais do que para corromper-te esterlizar-te, burguesia! Ou um retrocesso de alguns séculos, a destruição do grande drama em que foste glorioso actor, e que enche a história moderna desde o século XII até o século XVIII.” *idem*, *ibidem*, pp.235-236.

²⁹⁸ “Ora neste e noutros casos se vê como as vozes dos interessados não bastam para formar um pensamento de governo. O estadista é obrigado a saber mais, a vêr melhor. Mais de um vez o industrial não sabe o que quer, e muitas mais o que deve querer, ora se o papel do governo é protecção – protecção em geral e não agora o papão famoso das alfândegas – a obrigação do estadista é ensinar, esclarecer, amparar, dirigir.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Política e Economia Nacional*, *op. cit.* p.114.

This conclusion is essentially picked up from the thought of the numerous theorists of state socialism he cites in the third chapter of the first part of his *Economía e Política Nacional*. The praise of Germany is then evident, but he does various revisions over the years, as it was noticed before, when he warns us that German ideas coming to us through French culture are “distorted”²⁹⁹. The enthusiasm for the French solutions, as coming from Proudhon, tends to fade away and Germany becomes so to say the great spiritual guide of humanity.

He has a notion that German philosophy, and in our case the philosophy of Hegel, may have been suffering from this passage through France. In practice, the critiques of Hegel in France, besides the element of national rivalries, exist mainly due to a considerable number of implications the liberals could not accept. The liberal saw certain prerogatives in Hegel, which could be said to be progressive, as an interference of the state with individual liberty³⁰⁰.

²⁹⁹ See page 59 of the present work.

³⁰⁰ See Domenico Losurdo, *Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns*, translated from the Italian by Marela and Jon Morris, Duke University Press, London, 2004, pp.78-83.

3.3 The political program for Portugal

With the previous theoretical fundamentals as presuppositions, Oliveira Martins will elaborate a political program for Portugal. This undertaking emanates from concerns over Portugal's current social situation and democratic preoccupations for which he advocated improvements. Hegel also had identical political concerns about Germany and one could say, economically speaking, that the situation of Germany, at the start of the 19th century and of Portugal at the end of this same century, shared some similarities in its struggle for industrialization. But politically they had marked differences. The fragmentation of Germany was a problem that imposed itself on the political arena, making dialogue between various interlocutors a necessity. It is conceivable that the impositions of the new national realities which emerged in the modern world have led to the so called political realism which made the elites more willing to reform than those of Portugal.

This will also become evident to Oliveira Martins who praises the German spirit of reform, an outcome which in a way he also envisaged for Portugal, but which is for him something unattainable for the "Latin race", because this spirit of compromise is not in its temperament but rather one of radicalism. This is not the only reason, but it is one that refers to nature as an unavoidable problem, the sectarian or even fanatical positions unleash destructive powers and make revolution a necessity, while on the contrary "without [also] going out of tradition, Germanic Europe could solve its class problems and abolish the rests of feudalism"³⁰¹.

The more direct object of our work is Hegel, however, in the political proposals of Oliveira Martins a nexus connecting them to Hegel is not completely devisable, everything in a way or another is always related, but some relations are more remote than others. This is the case here, Hegel will resonate on a theoretical level, but this is not always true in more practical terms and the reasons for that are understandable. The conditions of Germany and the historical period which Hegel lived in are different from the ones of Portugal, where parliamentary political institutions according to Anglo-Saxon models were in place³⁰², along with other specific problems pertaining to Portugal such as its debt crisis, regional differentiations peculiar to the country, besides its colonial territories make it a

³⁰¹ "sem também sair da tradição, a Europa Germânica pôde resolver as questões de classe e abolir os restos do feudalismo" J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, reimpressão 9th ed., vol. 1, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1986, p.369.

³⁰² "A vice of the contemporary moral evolution of the latin peoples, combined with a system of interests created by the industry and modern commerce, produced an anglomania that has politically been called parliamentary monarchy and economically free-trade" / "Um vício da evolução moral contemporânea dos povos latinos, combinado com um sistema de interesses criado pela indústria e pelo comércio modernos, produziu a anglomania, que politicamente se foi chamando monarquia parlamentar e economicamente livre-câmbio." J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Socialismo e democracia, Política e História*, vol. 1, Guimarães editores, Lisboa, 1957, p.184.

particular case. Besides, the echoes of the French revolution still chimed high on German soil, whereas in Portugal the French invasions had different consequences and not such a lasting influence.

The problems Oliveira Martins proposes to answer only secondarily relate to Hegel and Germany. This does not mean such an effort is entirely out of question, some parallels could still be drawn between Hegel and Oliveira Martins and more often than not, some of the issues raised by Oliveira Martins are of the same nature, but a more direct relation cannot be forced on the subject. Therefore, if we make a relation between both authors and their political discourses, it should be made with caution and should contextualize the ideas and historical moments those authors are integrated in.

Oliveira Martins praises the German temperament and was interested in German political theorists (Bluntschli, Schäffle and other Katheder socialists) and as a result his political program contains many of the issues raised by them, in relation to the theory of state, which are in part heir to Hegel's politico-juridical theory. In Oliveira Martins's political program one should differentiate between practical measures in the sense of more immediate political outcomes and long term systematic reforms, which affect the political institutions as a whole.

The second group of political reforms possesses more Hegelian undertones, with its preoccupations over the political evolution of Portugal towards liberalism and an increasingly individualist or atomistic conception of society. While in the first group of political measures he attempts to solve immediate problems, of which some are raised by the conception of society brought about by liberalism, with the overexposure of Portugal's economy in the markets, worsening its chronic underdevelopment. These two types of political measures interpenetrate each other and are as such difficult to separate. However a differentiation helps our exposition and its comprehensive efforts.

We can find the aggregate of Oliveira Martins's political proposals for Portugal, as part of the first group of political reforms, in the bill he submits to the parliament in 1887. They are mainly economic and administrative reforms focused on agriculture and the social constitution of the countryside of Portugal. Although in his earlier books on socialism industry occupies a greater part of his concerns, here he seems to make notice of the fact that industry is still incipient and focuses on other structural and historical problems. The debate around Portugal's industry was very much alive, running side by side with the question of the essential nature of Portuguese economy, which Oliveira Martins answers in the following terms in 1888:

“It has been said for a long time and has become a dogma that we are essentially an agricultural country. Admirable discovery when wheat cannot be cultivated and soon there will be no destiny for wine! There are no essentially countries of anything. Every nation is essentially everything.”³⁰³

In his 1885 book *Economia e Política Nacional* Oliveira Martins deals with the Portuguese industry at length, but we can already notice in this book that the focus is more on the establishment of an industry and the failure of the Portuguese industry to develop rather than the present situation. Industry is not exclusive to modernity, according to him Portugal had its industry in the past, but it was destroyed by the “crimes” of liberalism³⁰⁴. Therefore, it is now necessary to reconstitute this industry³⁰⁵. The productive forces of Portugal have been crushed with agriculture as the “only exception” left out of this frenzy, but certainly also walks in this same direction³⁰⁶. It is as if he is trying to say that industrial development and agriculture are actually related in how each of them can be stimulated or hindered, the idea that industry “is an exotic plant” and that the protectionism of the state is too great of a price to be paid by the consumers is opposed by Oliveira Martins³⁰⁷. For him the productive forces of a country are solidary to one another.

The lack of industrial enterprises is something which has not so much to do with industry itself but is a result of wider political decisions. Industry is subsidiary to agriculture and artisanship, therefore, if we let “the people economize, let them live, have them protected by the state like it protects the institutions of capitalism, and we will see multiplying the examples of the North of England industrial and coal Company, where the different cooperative societies are great share-holders”³⁰⁸. The industry that Portugal lacks is then something that develops out of agriculture and small

³⁰³ “Disse-se muito tempo e passou como dogma que eramos um país essencialmente agrícola. Admirável descoberta quando se não pode cultivar trigo e dentro em pouco se não há-de saber que destino dar ao vinho! Não há países essencialmente coisa nenhuma. Todas as nações são essencialmente tudo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *O Repórter*, vol. 1, op. cit. p.175.

³⁰⁴ “I understand also that portuguese liberalism is the accused of the crime of having abandoned all the historical portuguese industries to a miserable fate” / “entendo também que o liberalismo português é o reu do crime de ter abandonado a uma sorte miserável todas as indústrias históricas portuguesas” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Política e Economia Nacional*, op. cit. p.121.

³⁰⁵ See idem, ibidem p.124.

³⁰⁶ See idem, ibidem, p.17.

³⁰⁷ “In our respect, it is said that we are essentially an agricultural [land], that we have no raw materials, no coal, no iron; that industry therefore is an exocytic plant among us, only susceptible of acclimatation at the cost of great sacrifices for the consumer” / “A nosso respeito, dizem que somos essencialmente agricultores, que não temos matéria-prima, nem carvão, nem ferro; que a indústria portanto é uma planta exótica entre nós, apenas susceptível de aclimação á custa de sacrifícios graves do consumidor” idem, ibidem, p.115

³⁰⁸ “o povo economizar - permita-se-lhe viver, proteja-o o Estado como faz ás instituições do capitalismo, e veremos multiplicarem-se exemplos como o da North of England industrial and coal company, onde diferentes sociedades cooperativas são grandes accionistas” idem, ibidem, p.100.

workshops - or should have developed – and this requires stimulation and protection instead of looking for massive enterprises and factories³⁰⁹.

Already in 1881 when Oliveira Martins took part in an industrial inquiry sponsored by the government, this fact had become clear to him. The schism with Rodrigues de Freitas about what direction Portuguese industrial development should take, began shortly after and is related to Oliveira Martins's conclusions with Rodrigues de Freitas against an excessive protectionism. Both Oliveira Martins and Rodrigues de Freitas are critical of the restrictive view of an agricultural Portugal, but at the same time they cannot help recognizing that agriculture still plays the major role in economy³¹⁰. The difference between them is that Oliveira Martins tends to speak of the dehumanization of industry in detriment of the more artistic work of the artisan, or even the small industries where a more familiar environment is possible³¹¹. In terms of agriculture, Oliveira Martins is of the opinion that Portugal could only be said to be a modern nation when its agriculture becomes industrialized³¹², although a long development march should still be carried, especially in social terms, with the redistribution and organization of land.

This is the case with the landed interests of great dimensions of the southern estates, leaving the region's agricultural potential undeveloped with a substantial extension of land left unproductive, besides the impossibility of fixing people which leads to the desertification of these regions.

We find those proposals in a bill submitted to parliament labeled "rural development bill", which besides the projected legislation also contains a previous explanation due to the complexities of the proposed legislation. Oliveira Martins will later publish this same explanation and legislative proposals. The main proposal, even if not the most extensive, is the reuse of land that is uncultivated due to various factors, the most controversial would be the temporary expropriation of land declared as unproductive and where the land owner refused to work on his land³¹³. The most original proposal

³⁰⁹ "How diferente would it be, if they, [this] professor doctors, [instead of having decided] from the top of their chairs that industry is big factories, that small industries are condemned, without remembering themselves that big factories are born out of small workshops and that more than one colossal metallurgy of today was the shop of the blacksmith of yesterday." / "Como seria, porém, de outro modo, se eles, os professores doutorados, resolveram do alto das suas cadeiras que industria são grandes fabricas, que as pequenas indústrias estão condenadas; sem se lembrarem que as grandes fábricas nascem das pequenas oficinas e que mais de uma metalurgia colossal de hoje era ontem uma loja de ferreiro." idem, ibidem, p.111.

³¹⁰ See Manuel Ferreira Rodrigues, "Rodrigues de Freitas e a Industria. Um confronto com Oliveira Martins" in *Rodrigues de Freitas – A Obra e os Contextos. Actas de colóquio*, CLC-FLUP, Porto, 1997, pp.67-68.

³¹¹ See José M. Amado Mendes, "Oliveira Martins e a indústria" in *Estudos Aveirenses*, n°4, ISCIA, Aveiro, 1995, pp.26-28.

³¹² "A nation does not deserve economically such a name[of developed nation], until it has not gotten out of an exclusive agricultural period to an industrial period" / "uma nação não merece economicamente tal nome, enquanto não consegue sair do período exclusivamente agrícola para o agrícola industrial" J.P. Oliveira Martins, *A província*, vol. 2, op. cit. p.56.

³¹³ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Fomento Rural e Emigração*, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1994, p.106.

would probably be the internal colonization of this unproductive land by settlers, who could then make it productive, drafting laws for the organization of this emigration in terms of benefits given by the state, sanitation and distribution of water.

The Portuguese emigration is probably one of his main concerns when he proposes this bill. In 1885 Oliveira Martins had already written about this draining of “human cattle” fleeing abroad to Brazil and other countries in search of better opportunities³¹⁴, and he will further expose this issue in a series of articles in the *Jornal do Comércio* newspaper³¹⁵. The possibility of this migration to depopulated areas of Portugal had already been advanced by Severim de Faria in the 17th century and in the following century by Álvares da Silva, which Oliveira Martins pays tribute to in his more systematic proposal in that direction³¹⁶.

The first proposed legislative measure of this bill is actually the creation of a rural bank, bringing the centrality he attributes to credit in the development of socialism also to the development of rural life. Oliveira Martins had already studied the bank institutions of various countries in the late 1870s when he proposed the reorganization of the bank of Portugal in order to adopt the modern financial operations. The potentialities of credit should be reinforced as a means to redistribute the riches and credit is “this flower that has ripen from the tree of wealth, this last and incomparable invention of men”³¹⁷. But the distributive function can act inversely and deepen inequalities. The banks and their operations should then be regulated by the government and this is what he attempts here with the creation of this rural bank.

The bill contains also various other measures which constitute the greater part of it, such as the watering systems and irrigation methods, bridges and navigation channels, regulations regarding fish ponds, the reforestation and conservation of designated areas, forest patrolling and legislation on hunting and fishing activities, and finally the indivisibility of land. This last proposal is also a relevant piece of legislation because for Oliveira Martins the causes for emigration are also related to the excessive division of land in the northern regions of Portugal, in which “the large estates are nefarious for the rural economy of a country, the excessive division and even more the fragmentation of strips of land belonging to the same owner, have become an equal evil”. Making this land less able to provide

³¹⁴ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Política e Economia Nacional*, *op. cit.* pp.160-176.

³¹⁵ See for instance J.P. Oliveira Martins, *O jornal*, *op. cit.* p.189.

See also Sergio Campos Matos introduction to a series of articles where these problems are dealt with by Oliveira Martins: Sérgio Campos Matos, Portugal e o Brasil, Introdução e notas de Sérgio Campos Matos, fixação de texto de Bruno Eiras e Sérgio Campos Matos, Maia, 2005, pp.29-32.

³¹⁶ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Fomento Rural e Emigração*, *op. cit.* p.39-40.

³¹⁷ “essa flor da árvore da riqueza desabrochada, essa última e incomparável invenção dos homens” J.P. Oliveira, Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, *op. cit.* p.208.

dividends to its owners and the legislation in cause attempts to correct this problem by identifying the cases in which this land distribution is in conflict with the “social and economic utility”³¹⁸.

Oliveira Martins endeavors to bring about freedom detached from particular interests and although he is critical of an aristocratic dominance, he still trusts the universal aspect that is to be brought about by an highness of spirit, a patrician mindset that is able to raise against its own limits and class interests. Propriety as an element of freedom is to be enjoyed by everyone without distinction. Hegel also makes this freedom for everyone object of his meditations. Focusing on the religious aspect, Hegel speaks of the past state of Christendom:

“divided into two classes, one which had appropriated the rights and administration of that freedom which was conferred on us all by Christ, while the other, reduced to servitude, was the property of [those who enjoyed] this same freedom”³¹⁹.

Although this struggle had a religious aspect, Hegel is quite clear in recognizing that it also had other fundamentals, it was also a political and a class struggle where the basic issues still remain. The princes gave the ideological-religious freedom the people fought for, but the political dominance and the oppression at their hands remained, the political-economic freedom still lagged behind. Engels will also furnish a similar interpretation of these religious wars of the Middle Ages, suggesting that vested in religion, late Middle Ages is a period of intense class struggle³²⁰. The economic undertones of this religious revolt are also noticed by Oliveira Martins, who says they acquired this religious character because revolution “found society in the religious period”³²¹.

The bill proposed in parliament was cautious and the prospect of changes had a fundament on the national interest even if it had some democratic overtones. It was not a radical or a class based reform, but it was still a failure:

³¹⁸ “the latifundia are nefarious to the rural economy of a country, the excessive division of land [however] and maybe even more the fragmentation of land pieces of the same owner, are an equal evil” ... “social and economical utility” / “os latifúndios são nefastos para a economia rural de um país, a excessiva divisão e mais ainda talvez a fragmentação das courelas de um mesmo dono, se tornam um mal igualmente grave” ... “utilidade social e económica” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Fomento Rural e Emigração*, op. cit. p.54 et 62.

³¹⁹ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Political Writings*, op. cit. p.187.

³²⁰ “Even the so-called religious wars of the sixteenth century mainly concerned very positive material class interests; those wars were class wars, too, just as the later collisions in England and France” *Marx and Engels Collected works, The Peasant War in Germany*, vol. 10, op. cit. p.412. / “Auch in den sogenannten Religionskriegen des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts handelt es sich vor allem um sehr positive materielle Klasseninteressen, und diese Kriege waren Klassenkämpfen, ebensogut wie die späteren inneren Kollisionen in England und Frankreich” *Karl Marx und Frederich Engels Werke, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*, vol. 7, op. cit. p.343.

³²¹ “encontrou a sociedade no período religioso” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, op. cit. p.102.

“The chamber of deputies buried the project in the pages of “Diário da Corte” and... moved on”³²²

The reforms collided with powerful interests that were against such a political direction. The political system and the parties facilitated the continued dominance of these elites, together with some sense of independence of spirit which isolated him, as well as a culture of meritocracy Oliveira Martins defended, that may not be completely capable of attesting the complexities of society and what this merit amounts to. In any case these tendencies led him to move away from democracy, doubting the possibilities of an inclusive political culture, as in the 1891 republican revolt in Porto where he accuses the implicated of anarchic and selfish self-interest and proposes the youth a third way of solving the Portuguese problems³²³. One that respects the “free institutions”, requiring the redemption of our mistakes through what is already in place, although the means to achieve this seem to come less and less from the elective and democratic institutions but rather from other forces capable of countering the vested interests.

Since at least the beginning of 1880s the monarch as a possible counter-balance power is sketched out in his *Portugal Contemporâneo*. The monarchy could advance the democratic cause as it had historically done³²⁴. Tyrannies can “both exist in absolutism or in democracy, either in representative or arbitrary regimes”³²⁵ and for this reason the system of government was not vest with much importance. His understanding of democracy was based on his organic understanding of society rather than individual liberties. The monarchy as a force of moderation was also recognized by Hegel in his commentary *On the English reform bill* where the weak monarchy there in place “lacks the power which, in other states, has facilitated the transition, without convulsions, violence, and robbery, from earlier legislation based solely on positive right to one based on principles of real freedom”³²⁶.

It is true that Hegel defends a hereditary constitutional monarchy in his *Philosophy of Right*, but the fundament is based on the historical development of Europe’s political institutions, which

³²² “A câmara sepultou o projecto nas páginas do “Diário das Cortes” e passou adiante” Joel Serrão, <<Martins, Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira>>, Dicionário de História de Portugal, dir. Joel Serrão, vol. 2, Iniciativas Editoriais, Lisboa, 1965, p.963.

³²³ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Fomento Rural e Emigração*, op. cit. p.227.

³²⁴ “In no part became the state so much of a defined thing as in old Rome and the modern latin monarchies created in its image, less corrupt with aristocratic ideas; and also nowhere else had, the state, republic, empire or monarchy, such a democratic character” / “Em parte nenhuma o Estado chegou a ser uma coisa mais definida do que na velha Roma e nas modernas monarquias latinas criadas à sua imagem, pouco eivadas de ideias aristocráticas; e em parte alguma, também, o estado, república, império ou monarquia, teve um carácter mais democrático.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, vol. 2, op. cit. p.369.

³²⁵ “A tirania, pois, que tanto pode existir nos absolutismos como nas democracias, tanto nos regimes representativos como nos arbitrários” idem, ibidem, p.178.

³²⁶ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Political Writings*, op. cit. p.269.

should be read in light of the conditions Germany was to be found³²⁷, not only based on the moderation argument but also on his perspective of profound reforms which run counter to particular interests. In his understanding such reforms are more efficient and less troublesome when they come from the centers of power. Efficient because a fully developed constitution does not depend on the monarch's personal qualities and only a monarchy based on a rational system of institutions is capable of maintaining its independence, while elective systems, either republican or monarchical, are generally dependent on the support of powerful individual interests, it is the aristocracy who truly rules in such a system of government³²⁸.

That is the case in England where the barons were the true historical power behind monarchy and where a political gentry formed itself around these particular interests. It is also more efficient because it changes the institutions rather than engaging in superficial and ideological cosmetics. It is finally less troublesome because it allows the peaceful transition from particular to universal interests, without revolution. This is his concern over England's reform bill where radicals could endanger the system by looking for support in the people and inaugurate a revolution rather than a reform.

Whether this would be a good or bad outcome is not so straight forward in Hegel as he is very critical of the English political system, but based on his support of the French Revolution, it seems it depends on the outcome such a revolution would bring about. It depends on whether the people would side with particular or general interests, but he seems to be sceptic about the people's discernment and the political culture of this new class reaching power, he thus leaves this English precedent as "dangerous".

In his *Lectures on Philosophy of History* Hegel had already presented the king as a better candidate for the advancement of general freedom, as he had done in the past and still in the present³²⁹. In this way, it would be legitimate to suppose that he is more inclined towards this solution as safer than the one that was underway in England, which amounted to risks. However it also does not seem the king could gain the power to reform the aristocratic character of England's political system. Hegel is not against revolution, as some reading may claim, but rather against fruitless efforts that fail to produce fundamental changes and tackle problems concretely. He favours prudent and

³²⁷ See on this subject Bernard Yack's argument against the deduction of constitutional monarchy from some sort of logical principles, arguing rather that constitutional monarchy's rational fundament was to be found historically. Bernard Yack, "The Rationality of Hegel's Concept of Monarchy" in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 74, No. 3, 1980, pp.711-712.

³²⁸ See in this respect Domenico Losurdo's book: *Freedom of the moderns*, op. cit. pp.113-116.

³²⁹ "So verdankt das Volk überall, auch in neueren Zeiten, dem Könige die Befreiung von der Unterdrückung der Aristokraten. In England besteht Aristokratie, weil die königliche Macht unbedeutend ist." G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 8-2, Auf Grund des aufbehaltenen handschriftlichen Materials neu herausgegeben von Georg Lasson, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1919, p.696.

slow reforms but does not deny the role of revolutions when they become necessary. Conservative traces attributed to Hegel should be searched elsewhere and Engels will indeed say:

“Hegel himself, despite the fairly frequent outbursts of revolutionary wrath in his works, seemed on the whole to be more inclined to the conservative side”³³⁰

This conservative side of Hegel which Engels speaks of is then an inclination, not something definitive. The closer appeal for reform rather than a more striking and active social engagement explains such a judgment on Hegel, besides of course his respect for institutions and on a whole acceptance of some of liberalism tenets of private property, even if possessing some notion of a collective well-being.

As for Oliveira Martins, he will be most vocal in his support for a dictatorship in the second edition of *Portugal Contemporâneo*(1883), which with the political system in place would also entail the strengthening of the monarchy (under a new monarch) to support such a government. He encourages the making of “this ultimate experiment”³³¹, later (particularly when a new monarch comes in power) running closer to the king and, according to some, proposes the aggrandizement of the king.

He shares the conviction with Hegel that parliamentarism is dominated by an aristocracy, especially in relation to England and the earlier Roman senate³³². When representation of the people becomes democratic then the parliament also becomes the center of this plebeian struggle between particular interests, which at first were outside of it. But because per essence “parliamentarism is aristocratic” the resulting government will evolve towards something diverse, that is, towards Caesarism³³³.

The critique of *bourgeois* civil society in Hegel also implies the notion of particular interests or contradictory interests, still possessing the arbitrariness of the state of nature³³⁴. By dragging these

³³⁰ See *Marx and Engels collected works, Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German Philosophy*, vol. 26, *op. cit.* p.363. / “Hegel selbst schien, trotz der ziemlich häufigen revolutionären Zornesausbrüche in seinen Werken, im ganzen mehr zu konservativen Seite zu neigen” *Karl Marx und Frederich Engels Werke*, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie, vol. 21, *op. cit.* p.271.

³³¹ “Faça-se pois essa derradeira experiência” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, vol. 1, *op. cit.* p.21.

³³² See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Crítica do parlamentarismo, Dispersos*, *op. cit.* pp.70-72.

³³³ “The parliamentarism is aristocratic. In so far as the representation of a people democratizes itself, the parliamentarism will be succeeded by a diverse type of government, the kind of which The United States and Germany propose as two species of rudiments” / “O Parlamentarismo é aristocrático. Desde que a representação de um povo se democratiza, ao parlamentarismo há-de suceder um tipo diverso de governo, tipo de que os Estados-unidos e a Alemanha propõem duas espécies de rudimentos.” *idem, ibidem*, p.72.

³³⁴ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, *op. cit.* p.130. / Dem in der Idee enthaltenen objektiven Rechte der Besonderheit des Geistes, welches die von der Natur - dem Elemente der Ungleichheit - gesetzte Ungleichheit der Menschen in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft nicht nur nicht aufhebt, sondern aus dem Geiste produziert, sie zu einer Ungleichheit der Geschicklichkeit, des Vermögens und selbst der intellektuellen und moralischen Bildung erhebt, die Forderung der Gleichheit entgegen [zu] setzen, gehört dem leeren Verstande an, der dies

contradictions into the political institutions the *bourgeois* civil society “stands opposed to the Idea of ethical life”³³⁵. In Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, the civil society still has some representation in the legislative bodies, although not in its atomistic form³³⁶. The *bourgeois* civil society relation with the state is, however, on a whole critical, as for instance when he speaks of the sacrifice of particular interests to the sovereignty of the state:

“An entirely distorted account of the demand for this sacrifice results from regarding the state as a mere civil society and from regarding its final end as only the security of individual life and property. This security cannot possibly be obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured.”³³⁷

These long-term reforms proposed by Oliveira Martins are those which do not relate to particular rights or laws but to the institutions. We have seen that from the early social-economic theories he moves in the direction of a theory of the state in which the state takes part and organizes the social and economic elements. The organic political representation he envisages and the class instead of individual representation, were similar to the idea of corporate organization of estates [Stände] in Hegel.

The tendency, however, is to move to more conservative positions similar to that of Lassale’s socialism. The modern sense of classes is something accepted by Hegel and he does not con-fuse them with estates which were merged together with the classes in earlier times³³⁸. Oliveira Martins on the contrary oscillates to the later version where the elimination of these estates is the root cause of modern problems³³⁹. He does not defend a return to these old social-political form but rather puts himself in a middle-point where “some flatter themselves for the return of old banquets, others defend

sein Abstraktum und sein Sollen für das Reelle und Vernünftige nimmt. G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke*, vol. 7, *op. cit.* p.354.

³³⁵ See idem, *ibidem*, p.186. / “Diese Ansicht” ... “geht von” ... “einer Bestimmung [aus], die, wie längst betrachtet worden, in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft als erste gilt oder vielmehr sich nur geltend machen will, aber weder das Prinzip der Familie, noch weniger des Staats ist, überhaupt der Idee der Sittlichkeit entgegensteht.” Idem, *ibidem*, p.453.

³³⁶ See “This is all the more the case since the Idea of the state is precisely the supersession of the clash between right (i.e. empty abstract freedom) and welfare (i.e. the particular content which fills that void), and it is when states become concrete wholes that they first attain recognition.” idem, *ibidem*, p.214. / die Idee des Staats eben dies ist, daß in ihr der Gegensatz von dem Rechte als abstrakter Freiheit und vom erfüllenden besonderen Inhalte, dem Wohl, aufgehoben sei und die erste Anerkennung der Staaten (§ 331) auf sie als konkrete Ganze geht. idem, *ibidem*, p.50.1

³³⁷ See idem, *ibidem*, p.209. / “Es gibt eine sehr schiefe Berechnung, wenn bei der Forderung dieser Aufopferung der Staat nur als bürgerliche Gesellschaft und als sein Endzweck nur die Sicherung des Lebens und Eigentums der Individuen betrachtet wird; denn diese Sicherheit wird nicht durch die Aufopferung dessen erreicht, was gesichert werden soll” idem, *ibidem*, p.492

³³⁸ See idem, *ibidem*, p.198. / idem, *ibidem*, p.474.

³³⁹ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *As Eleições, Política e História*, vol. 1, *op. cit.* pp.300-301.

the current debauchery even others expect future parties” ... “what must be done? Renegade them all”³⁴⁰.

That was what he wrote in his *Eleições* of 1878, but still on this same booklet he preconizes a partial recovery of the past:

“Let’s hear, respect, and learn from the men of the past”³⁴¹

But again as mentioned earlier this has a counter-balance:

“The old institutions will not come back because they are old: their forms can be reestablished, the spirit, however, will be diverse”³⁴²

It is clear that Oliveira Martins had given up on revolution (even if reformist), but aligning himself with the conservative interests? This seems to be moving further away from the popular and democratic interests he had defended, or does it? In fact he thinks the poorer popular extracts are more naturally aligned with the conservatives and warns them against the dangers they pose³⁴³. From such a reading this would then imply an approximation to those popular sections.

From this transition text *As Eleições*, we can already find the relation between the king and the people and a critique of those who preconize “a king which is not a king”³⁴⁴. The more open support for the king would only come in the 1889 with the new monarch. His conviction of the inability of the popular poor extracts of society to make a good government is expanded to the middle classes which he had earlier praised as the paladins of order and gradual reforms³⁴⁵. Although he initially criticizes aristocratic oriented governments (in line with Hegel), the plebeian values always excite a stronger despise.

³⁴⁰ “uns suspiram pela volta dos antigos banquetes, outros defendem as bambochatas actuais outros esperam Kermesses futuras” ... “O que resta fazer ? Renegá-los a todos” idem, ibidem, p.299.

³⁴¹ “Ouçamos, respeitemos, e aprendamos com os homens do passado” idem, ibidem, p.300.

³⁴² “As antigas instituições não hão-de tornar por isso mesmo que são antigas: poderão restabelecer-lhes as formas, o espírito será outro e diverso.” idem, ibidem, p.300.

³⁴³ “Remember this conservatives! If you arm against us the rural plebeians, they will be ones on the next day who will deploy you, brutally, animalistic, in order to raise upon the ruins of a society, the communism of primitive eras” / “Lembraí-vos disto, conservadores! Se armardes contra nós as plebes rurais, serão elas quem no dia seguinte ao da vitória vos espolarão a vós, brutal, animalmente, para levantarem, sobre as ruínas de uma sociedade, o comunismo das eras primitivas” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, op. cit. pp.90-91.

³⁴⁴ “um rei que não é rei” idem, ibidem, p.297.

³⁴⁵ “In all the latin countries that are artistic by temperament, the government of the middle class has been a fiasco. [The middle class] is less aesthetical susceptibel. Beauty [can only be found] either in the refinement obtained by selection and hereditary of the aristocracy, or in the manifestations of the simple people” / “Em todos os países latinos que são artistas por temperamento, o governo da classe média fez fiasco. Ela é menos susceptível de estética. A beleza só encontra ou no requinte obtido por seleção e hereditariedade nas aristocracias, ou nas manifestações do povo simples.” Letter to Conde de Sabugosa, J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Correspondência*, op. cit. p.248.

As a result, the notion of a highness of spirit and moral socialism from his earlier texts moves closer to a more traditionalist view:

“The heirs of the old heroic families are still the best of what Portugal has, for their pride, character and above all because of the sentiment inherited from portuguese history” ... “we should appeal to the representatives of the aristocracy of race, that have a innate nobleness, a distinction and a moral superiority inaccessible to the *bourgeoisie*”³⁴⁶

Although it should be noted that this apparent contradiction is still something inherited from his middle-class alignment where the tension between tradition and progress was already present. This later move should also be put in context with his political activity, where his reformist failures in the framework of parliamentary liberal democracy gave rise to ever growing pessimist views and a reading of Eduard von Hartmann, Schopenhauer or Nietzsche, where in these last two such aristocratic views come forward. These will also affect his theory of history and the historical narrative thematic as we will see in the next chapter.

³⁴⁶ “Os herdeiros das velhas famílias heroicas são ainda o que Portugal tem de melhor, pelo brio, pelo carácter e sobretudo pelo sentimento herdado da vida histórica portuguesa” ... “devíamos apelar para os representantes da aristocracia de raça, que têm uma nobreza ingénita, uma distinção e uma superioridade moral inacessíveis á burguesia” Letter to Conde de Sabugosa, J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Correspondência, op. cit.* p.247.

4. Historiography and Philosophy of History

4.1 The models in History

The problem of models in history poses itself when we look at the different approaches and accommodations of history in various theories. This is particularly expressed in words such as: development, progress, revolution, tradition etc. These models can go under different headings, but what is common to them is that they are theoretical modalities and uses of history that look into the historicity of reality. Some of the models attempt to bridge what they understand is a gap between social and natural sciences, such as those of Carl Hempel covering model of explanation of history coming from the logical positivist/empiricist field. This issue was raised especially at the end of nineteenth century as an extension of the debate around the statute of the discipline of history and is closely related to Germany and the historicist models³⁴⁷. What would then be the mode by which Oliveira Martins viewed history? Did he also had a model? We are told by Fernando Catroga that with regards to this particular problem, Oliveira Martins denied history the complete quality of a science, history as a discipline is rather closer to art³⁴⁸. Sergio Campos Matos also touches upon this issue in his book *Consciência Histórica e Nacionalismo* when he looks at Oliveira Martins's fiction - a genre he initially practiced - and history; drawing parallels between both³⁴⁹.

The debate around history as art or science, however, is one that is more concerned with historiography. What is here proposed, however, is to look at history in the light of the consideration of history itself, not what its organization/compartmentalization is in thought, how it should be written or other methodological and literary considerations. In this respect, a simple example that touches upon this issue would be the common place ideas of history as: cyclical, prophetic, having world ages, linear, a living and decaying organism. Only then do we begin to speak of history as it unfolds and actually some of the views expressed by these words are present and even co-existent in different theoretical models, particular within that of Oliveira Martins.

One of the critiques drawn to the notion of models is its schematics and aprioristic conceptions. Within this particularly Hegel will be critical of Kant's rational apriorism and adopts an historical explanative mode or what comes to be the dialectical method³⁵⁰. But as we have seen earlier, Hegel is accused of this same theoretical dryness with his hypostatization of reason in ever present logical categories, synthetized in the well-known formula, albeit maybe not of Hegel's own making,

³⁴⁷ See Beiser for a recent outlook on this topic. Frederick C. Beiser, *The German historicist tradition*, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p.7-10.

³⁴⁸ See Fernando Catroga, "A historiografia de Oliveira Martins: entre as artes e as ciencias" in *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra*, vol. 18, *op. cit.* p.399 et pp.404-410.

³⁴⁹ See Sergio Campos Matos, *Consciência histórica e nacionalismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX, op. cit.* pp.195-214.

³⁵⁰ See also Beiser who, although "cautious" about the dialectical method, shares this view, Frederick C. Beiser, *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, p.273.

that “what is rational is the real and what is real is the rational”³⁵¹. This is the panlogist critique of a closed system with definitive logical categories and reality as readymade and emanating from this essential figure embodied in the domain of the logic or the syllogism which all reality is³⁵². Besides this panlogistic critique, which it could be called the panlogism of the system, there are also other understandings of what Hegel’s panlogism consists of. Marx’s critique is a panlogism of impersonal reason, and the point is not whether or not everything is rational but if reason can subsist outside the “real” subject. In this panlogism, reason lends itself to humans and they become interpreters of reason in reality, or to be more rigorous, the philosopher does³⁵³.

The panlogistic critique of Hegel should therefore be looked upon carefully or it should be even questioned whether such a consideration in this manner makes sense. It is not uncommon to simply take the logic of Hegel and attribute to it something which is not there when we are told that all that exists is the rational, or that existence is a mere deduction of logical categories. When Hegel speaks of reason in the world, he looks for a rational explanation of the world history, and this type of meditation is clearly out of the exclusive domain of logic. He attempts to have both the consideration of this history in terms of logic and in terms of its phenomenal appearance, conceptualizing historical or empirical data in logic categories. The forms by which reason or the idea reaches the world are:

“The first and purest form distinctive to it through which the idea reveals itself is pure thought itself, and thus the idea is considered in terms of logic. Another form is the one in which the idea immerses itself, that of physical nature. Finally, the third form is that of spirit in general.”³⁵⁴

The first form is the logical form and it “reveals itself” in the domain of pure thought, but instead of being some sort of foundation for other subsequent forms, it is, on the contrary, the most simple, because only when the idea realizes itself as spirit does it become actual/real.

³⁵¹ See Rudolf Haym who takes Hegel in this sense, although quoting directly from Hegel he takes for real[wirklich] that which exists, while translators were more careful to translate *wirklich* as actuality or reality, which in Hegel does not constitute in effect all that exists. Rudolf Haym, *Hegel in seine Zeit*, *op. cit.* pp.390-391. Engel would later be giving this interpretation a more literal formulation in *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, different from Hegel sentence in his Philosophy of Right but closer to the sense it was attributed to it, by Haym and other liberals, that all that is real should be taken as is and accepted as rational, and goes as “All that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real.” *Marx and Engels Collected works, Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German Philosophy*, Vol. 26, *op. cit.* p.358. / “Alles was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig, und alles was vernünftig ist, ist wirklich”. Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, vol. 21, *op. cit.* p.266.

³⁵² See for instance Clark Butler who pays close attention at this panlogistic interpretative tradition, as exemplified by Duboc’s, the owner of a hats factory, exchange of letters with Hegel. Butler proposes that Hegel’s non-panlogism is first made clear in a letter to Karl Daub and later in his philosophy of nature. G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel: the letters*, translated by Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, with commentary by Clark Butler, Indiana University Press, 1984, pp.540-541.

³⁵³ See for this other panlogistic critique, *Marx and Engels Collected Works, The poverty of Philosophy*, vol. 6, *op. cit.* pp.162-166. / Marx und Engels *Werke, Das Elend der Philosophie*, vol. 4, *op. cit.* p.125-130.

³⁵⁴ See G.W.F. Hegel, G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, *op. cit.* p.146.

The supposed apriorism comes from seeing in reality the development of a pre-existing ideal in the world, instead of seeing the rational which, as a universal of this world, self-develops immanently this same ideal in the rational community. Reason cannot have an existence by itself and this is quite clear in Hegel when he makes a distinction between existence [*Existenz*] and actuality [*Wirklichkeit*]. The actualization [*Verwirklichung*] needs precisely an outer existence [Existenz], once again it should be reminded that what is rational [*vernünftig*] is actual [*wirklich*], therefore reason is a union of essence [*Wesen*] and existence [Existenz] which is what constitutes actuality [*Wirklichkeit*]³⁵⁵. The a priori ideal complaint may be well grounded when Hegel makes the individual a predicate of this ideal, but it should also not be forgotten that what constitutes this ideal is to be found by the predicate or has in the proper subject its reality.

According to Fernando Catroga, Oliveira Martins will not be immune to this same reminder by Alexandre Herculano who complains about Oliveira Martins's apriorism. This complaint from Alexandre Herculano seems to be very early, as it looks like the letter Fernando Catroga refers to, speaks of an 1869 booklet from Oliveira Martins, leading therefore to the suspicion that it may be from around this date. In the letter we have more of a warning against synthesis when there is still so much to do on an analytical level. The a priori he criticizes is when a synthesis is done without a properly fundamented basis to support it. He still recognizes that "generalization, synthesis, are, in absolute, excellent things" but he finds them dangerous and an "abstruse synthetic and symbolic festooned with French nonsense"³⁵⁶, if done clumsily. Alexandre Herculano believes that these tendencies are French in their origin, Cousin perhaps? And confesses his mistrust of this type of generalization, which in his time of intellectual activity had already seen its dawn.

Sergio Campos Matos also alerts about Oliveira Martins's tendency towards abstract conceptions emanating from this same apriorism, which is something that, according to him, has its roots in Hegel, Herder and many other German philosophers, besides Proudhon, Michelet and Renan who had the same German's inclinations³⁵⁷. He suggests, however, that Alexandre Herculano's advice will, in time, have an effect on Oliveira Martins, particularly on the historical voluntarist ideas advocated by him. The utmost respect he had for Herculano is shared by his whole generation. Therefore, the words echoed by his "master" certainly had an effect on him. This is evident in his

³⁵⁵ See G.W.F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, op. cit. p.466 / G.W.F. Hegel, *Werke, Wissenschaft der Logik II*, vol. 6, op. cit. p.186.

³⁵⁶ "generalização, a síntese, são, em absoluto, coisas excelentes" ... "abstruso sintético e simbólico engrinaldada de maravilhas francesas" Alexandre Herculano, *Cartas*, vol. 2, Bertrand, Lisboa, [s.d.], p.34 et 36.

³⁵⁷ See Sérgio Campos Matos, *Consciência histórica e nacionalismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX*, Livros Horizonte, Lisboa, 2008, p.175

exchange of letters when he says that he “cries two times per day for the lack of our Master: Herculano was a man that warmed the heart and the intelligence.”³⁵⁸.

When we look at historical theory and discourse in Oliveira Martins, many of the issues raised are comprehended in the historicist model. Therefore, this study will now occupy itself with the considerations posed by this model and how they relate to Oliveira Martins. However, like in the case of panlogism dealt with earlier, historicism also has different models and in this sense is a model of models. What they have in common is the affirmation of history as playing the major role in the existence, making and explanation of reality. Because of the multiple attributes and uses given to this word, it has been the focus of polemics. Andre Lalande said that it should be abandoned all together³⁵⁹, or more recently John Cannon shares the same opinion³⁶⁰.

The use of this concept is indeed polysemous. It has been used in Christian religion’s biblical interpretation of historical events as the fulfillment of biblical prophecies, in law as the customs perpetuated by tradition, in economy as a reduction of this science to the history of economic activity, in politics with the figure of the nation understood as an individual in self-development. These are many of the negative meanings associated with this term. There is, however, also other positive meaning possible, which will mainly see in historicism the historicity which is present in reality and in each of these particular fields previously mentioned. Such views started to be the predominant ones after the so called crisis of historicism and came to be associated with Dilthey, Heidegger, and more recently Koselleck.

In respect to all the different historicist traditions, Carlo Antoni’s book *Lo Storicismo* has an introduction where he explores all these different meanings and goes on to develop the different types of historicism. He finds the historical-political use the most influential of them all and sees Germany as the birth place of modern historicism, which, although inspired by English and Italian political theorists, has at the same time departed from these. More recently in Italy it was used mainly politically in a battle between liberalism and fascism, with the accusations of historicism drawn against Croce and liberalism by the fascists. However, according to Antoni, German liberals and Meinecke in particular will also hold this same view of historicism, with nations as a product of a voluntary act and a moral construction, where in the liberal tradition:

³⁵⁸ “Duas vezes choro todos os dias a falta do nosso Mestre: Herculano era um homem que aquecia o coração e a inteligência” Letter to Bolhão Pato, J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Correspondência, op. cit.* p.22.

³⁵⁹ See Lalande who refers to this same subject but uses the term historism instead of historicism and writes the following: “Terme equivoque, appliqué quelquefois aussi à l’hégélianisme en tant qu’opposé au naturalisme. (Eisler, V°, 329.) à éviter comme la plupart des termes de ce genre, qui engenderent facilement des discussions verbales”, Andre Lalande, *Vocabulaire Technique et critique de la philosophie*, 15th ed., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1985, p.417.

³⁶⁰ See John Cannon, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Historians*, Blackwell, New York, 1988, p.192.

“Historicism is the break, operated by the German thought, of the western jusnaturalistic tradition”³⁶¹

However, Meinecke sees the risks for modern nations brought about by cultural fragmentation and moral relativism of values, while his historicism had an operative function in such contradictoriness³⁶², bringing his understanding of historicism closer to Croce³⁶³.

The historicist model will also be present in the political ideas associated with socialism. For Oliveira Martins such a break from natural law is rather socialist than liberal in its genesis, but then again some of these liberals who propose historicist models claim to follow some kind of a socialist liberalism. What is interesting in Antoni’s observations and which relates directly to Oliveira Martins and socialism, is his taking notice of a different reading that can be given to the socialist theory of historical materialism. Many reactionaries have justified a return to the golden age of free artisans, the roman guilds and its corporative organization, against the “factory spirit” of today, without forgetting that Niebuhr had actually traced the freedom to the old³⁶⁴. Oliveira Martins will be solidary to such views and by such impulses adopts a conservative socialism of the free worker. He is not against the spirit of modern age as compared to the old but still shares the conservative view of the role of property with regards to human freedom.

More recently the questions raised by historicism and the reflection on its nature led to affirm that within itself, historicism contained the issues that came to be debated at the end of the 19th century, namely the problem of making history a science³⁶⁵. Historicity gained prevalence afterwards in detriment of historicism that was seen as overly relativizing, while historicity absolutizes relativity³⁶⁶, and this historicity thesis of conceptual history is not strange to Hegel who “traced and conceptualized this process as the result of prior history”³⁶⁷. Even more recently, especially from the 1960s on, we have a new wave of historicism which reinterprets the common understanding of historicism, with its roots in Ricoeur, Foucault, Habermas and others. Such consideration falls outside the historicist models that are contemporary to Oliveira Martins. However, they may still have some operative value such as

³⁶¹ “lo storicismo è la rottura, operata dal pensiero Tedesco, della tradizione giusnaturalistica dell’Occidente” Carlo Antoni, Edizione Radio Italiana, [s.l.], 1957, p.12.

³⁶² See for Meinecke theory of historicism. Friederich Meineckes, *Die Entstehung des Historismus*, Leibniz Verlag, München, 1943.

³⁶³ See for the relation between Croce and Meineckes historicism, Robert A. Pois, “Two poles within historicism: Croce and Meinecke” in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 31, issue 2, 1970.

³⁶⁴ See Carlo Antoni, *op. cit.* pp.166-167.

³⁶⁵ See Reinhart Koselleck, *The practice of history*, Stantford University Press, 2002, p.X-XI.

³⁶⁶ See idem, *ibidem*, p.2.

³⁶⁷ See idem, *ibidem*, p.185.

in the case of Ankersmit who organizes historicist conceptual interpretations in terms of content rather than chronologically.

Frank Ankersmit organizes historicism into four fundamental conceptual meanings. The first is when one seeks in the past the nature of things. The second is the unique qualities embodied in each passage or phase of world history, which is close to what the word *Zeitgeist* expresses. The third follows up from the second and results in the condemnation of anachronism or the strange influence of something or someone to the uniqueness of each phase, the historian should thus look at the past in the spirit of this same past. The fourth is the discernment of patterns in the development of these phases of history and it also shows us how history comes together, hence this is the most dialectical, or speculative in a Hegelian sense, of the meanings of historicism³⁶⁸.

From these different meanings attributed to historicism, Oliveira Martins can be said to partially integrate them all, although there seems to be a tension between a philosophical consideration of history and the one given by empirical sciences. He condemns the intolerant idealism which does not leave history free, precisely because of its tendency to try and absorb it, valuing on this account reality as empirically given by the senses, seeing in the ideal principles the disorganization of the knowledge of history and its laws. He goes on by saying:

“Even when history could be said that it is itself the Man, even when, exaggerating the energy and individual action, we could suppose it independent and superior to the action of the conditions in which Man, the nations and the races appear in time on earth; not even circumscribed to the domain of human consciousness sovereignly free of exterior actions, would it be licit to consider the laws of history to be those that preside the spirit, because the human individual is practically incapable of manifesting the pure ideal. Such a man would be god, and there could be no more than one of these men”³⁶⁹

Here he does not deny history contains laws (even if later he will move closer in this direction), but it is just that these laws are of a different nature from those of the spirit. Even if he considers that the end of history is the manifestation of the spirit in its plenitude, he makes a division from what is the domain of natural sciences and that of spirit. The philosophy of history strictly speaking is the

³⁶⁸ See Frank Ankersmit, “Historicism” in *Encyclopedia of Political Theory*, Mark Bevir editor, Sage, California, 2010, p.642.

³⁶⁹ “Ainda quando a história se pudesse dizer que ela é o homem; ainda quando, exagerando a energia da acção individual, a supuséssemos independente ou superior à acção das condições em que os homens, as nações e as raças aparecem no tempo sobre a terra; nem mesmo circunscrita ao foro da consciência humana soberanamente livre das acções exteriores, seria lícito considerar leis da história as que presidem ao Espírito, porque o indivíduo humano é um ser incapaz de praticamente o manifestar puro e ideal. Um tal homem teria sido Deus, e não poderia haver mais de um homem assim.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *O Helenismo e Civiização Cristã*, op. cit. p.3.

consideration of the ends of history and in this regard Oliveira Martins follows the great teleological traditions of a philosophical consideration of history starting with Leibniz. Under the influence of the Enlightenment, they are the starting point of philosophy of history, later gaining different counters with German historicism and other critics of the Enlightenment such as Vico.

That is not all; he also considers that these laws are not absolute but can be redefined by natural elements not yet visible in history because they still remain unconscious, giving place to the fortuitous, however neither taking from “history the character of science, nor sending it to the domain of poetry”³⁷⁰. Therefore, history is only partially a science or it is not a pure science like logic. He will consequently settle his historiography from such prepositions.

³⁷⁰ “[tirar à biologia nem à] história o carácter de ciências, nem a lançá-las para o campo da poesia.” idem, ibidem, p.8.

4.2 Historiographic tradition

The question of which historiographic tradition Oliveira Martins belongs to is for the most part a difficult one. The first that comes to mind is romanticism. The difficulty comes from the task itself of classifying and restricting historians or philosophers to certain schools, when they are professed critics of many tenets advanced by these schools. This is the case with Hegel where some take him to be a romantic philosopher and in reality he was a strong critic of romantic philosophy and its account of history³⁷¹. This does not invalidate the fact that much of the points discussed by Hegel and Oliveira Martins are part of the debate that surrounded romanticism. These were not topics restricted to the romantics but were broader intellectual debates relating to existing problems.

It is indeed easy to create all-embracing classificatory schemes and position a person here or there according to an analysis that gives priority to some points in detriment of others. Oliveira Martins like Michelet, for instance, favoured the history of the people over the individual, even if the role of the elites is fundamental. In any case this could hardly be said to entirely conform to the romantic ideas, where individual action and heroism is above the collective. However, one could still defend Oliveira Martins's alignment with a kind of individual exceptionalism, when in light of a reversed hero theory he makes the hero collective and the individual embodies the collective interests of the people³⁷². According to Hegel the individual can also be the representative of an age or even of a certain social class.

On the other hand, already in the beginnings of such romanticism, particularly in Fichte who was one of its main inspirers, the relation between the individual and the collective is a preoccupation:

“Only as each of these peoples, left to itself and according to its own particularity, develops and takes shape – and as every individual within that people, in accordance with this common particularity as well as his own particularity, develops and takes shape- is the appearance of divinity reflected in its proper mirror as it should be, and only someone who lacked any sense of lawfulness and divine order, or was obdurately hostile to such law and order, would dare to interfere in this higher law of the spiritual world.”³⁷³

The people should develop by itself, in their own essentiality. The collective is seen as an individuality of wholes which does not eliminate the individuality of individuals. In some embryonic

³⁷¹ See for instance Gossman who puts Hegel in this category of romantic philosophers. Lionel Gossman, *Between history and literature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp.153-154.

³⁷² See for a study of Oliveira Martins's Theory of Heroes, particularly pages 183-184. Sergio Campos Matos, *Consciência Histórica e Nacionalismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX, op. cit.* pp.171-193.

³⁷³ See J.G. Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, translated with introduction and notes by Isaac Nakhimovskiy, Béla Kaposy, and Keith Tribe, Hackett Publishing Company inc., Indiana, 2013, pp.163-164.

form we can already find here the later collective individuality of the organicists and their social organism.

Nevertheless, romanticism can never be said to form a unified whole, as those who identified themselves as romantics shared heterogeneous ideas. What probably united them was their critique of enlightenment's cold rationalism. In this particular matter of individuality, we can contrast Humboldt liberal individualism with the aforementioned Michelet or, without going as far as to the restauracionist romantics, we can mention Heine with his critical undertones against individualism, when he criticizes Hegel's philosophy for its *hyubris* of a God-like individual vanity.

The question of whether Oliveira Martins can be considered a romantic can perhaps be best answered by one of his contemporaries and a source of inspiration, Ernest Renan, when he says "I was predestined to become what I am, a member of the romantic school, protesting against romanticism"³⁷⁴. Oliveira Martins will shelter his romantic-liberal predecessor's social reformism, but will alter it and contest some of their thesis, particularly those on history, philosophy and politics. He rejects liberalism as an historical epitome, recognizing its advances, with the liberal revolutions marking "the passage of historical and absolutist formulas to revolutionary and individualist formulas"³⁷⁵, denouncing, however, the theories of naturalistic individualism which emanated from the liberal ideas and had found place in these new conditions. For such reasons he does not see himself as "politically liberal"³⁷⁶.

The thought of attributing to Oliveira Martins a historiographic school, which his works would be part of, is also denied by Oliveira Martins who, besides praising his isolationism, also considers that in Portugal there is no lasting tendency or tradition that survived. There could, however, still exist some partisanship or a feeble school, which could attach its ideas to a work of history. For this reason Oliveira Martins's extols his *Portugal Contemporâneo* for being "a book of contemporary history strange to any school or parties" and "it is, concede me the vanity, a rare case"³⁷⁷. Therefore, he considers that in the work of the historian, the isolationism of an artist is beneficial and, by doing so, we can occupy ourselves with history and obey only reason, as an artist that obeys only aesthetics. The works of history are brought to light in the same way as works of art, but the independence of the writer of history enjoys another level of freedom, as he seems to think the "impassible thinker" is the one that is above any of the individual ideas, opinions, doctrines which are to be found in society. As a critic,

³⁷⁴ See Ernest Renan, *Recollections of my Youth*, [translated by Mynors Bright], Chapman and Hall, London 1897, p.65

³⁷⁵ "a passagem das formulas históricas e absolutistas para as formulas revolucionárias e individualistas", J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, vol. 1, *op. cit.* p.25

³⁷⁶ See *idem*, *ibidem*, pp.18-19.

³⁷⁷ "um livro de história contemporânea alheio a qualquer das escolas e partidos vivos, é, concendam-me esta vaidade, um caso raro" *idem*, *ibidem*, p. 23.

one must imagine to “find oneself before a dead or strange society, in order to freely judge it”. Otherwise to the “history that is cold, impassible as if dead and impersonal, the writer would substitute the particular life of his spirit, and instead of a realistic picture of a society, [he would] produce a subjective framework”³⁷⁸.

In the writing up of such history, we have on the one hand, the style of the narrative and on the other hand, the theory to which the style is subordinate. The fact that this theoretical framework will have an inflow on the style of writing is subjacent in how Oliveira Martins thinks history should be written, namely as a drama. This is no doubt the way in which Hegel thinks history is best portrayed. The aesthetic models influenced by this idea are almost always purely Hegelian and they tended to come from France. Although the philosophy of Hegel could hardly be said to have formed a school in France, his aesthetic theory was probably the most enduring and pervading of all aspects of his philosophy. Besides, these were the first translated works of Hegel to the French language and where there was a genuine interest for the propositions Hegel advances that prolonged itself through time. This is the case with Taine, where both his history and philosophy are deeply in debt to Hegel’s aesthetic theory, when he considers art as mode of knowledge and not simply a sensible or sentimental endeavor³⁷⁹. Some of the most known French historians will share a fragmentary Hegelianism, particularly with regards to this aesthetic aspect. That is the case with Renan, a close associate of Taine and they both will have an assiduous presence in Oliveira Martins’s historical reflections³⁸⁰.

The style of historical narratives was object of a deep reflection on the part of Oliveira Martins, above all because at a given moment in time, he set himself the task of divulging to the bulk of his countrymen the modern ideas and the new ways of making history. This is most evident in his appendix to *As Raças Humanas e a Civilização Primitiva* where the artistic way of writing history is seen as the form by which he can reach the people, letting them know the history of their fatherland³⁸¹. He set out to rise the general level of knowledge of his countrymen through art which he also believed, like Hegel, was endowed with such a quality. He then builds up his history along the lines of a popular reception of his work. But does it mean his history is a popular history, just as we have a popular philosophy, which Hegel will at first follow but will later flagellate and where worldly affairs and the gross of men are its main preoccupation? This depends on the better definition of an ill-defined historiographic type,

³⁷⁸ “achar-se perante uma sociedade morta ou estranha, para livremente a poder julgar” ... “A história que é fria, impassível e como que morta por ser impessoal, substituiria o escritor a vida particular do seu espírito; e em vez da pintura realista de uma sociedade, produziria um quadro subjectivo.” idem, ibidem, p.23-24.

³⁷⁹ See for a thorough look on this topic Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine, *Philosophie de l’Art*, Hermann co., Paris, 1964.

³⁸⁰ See G. Le Gentil, *Oliveira Martins (Algumas fontes da sua obra)*, op. cit. pp.51-52.

³⁸¹ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *As Raças Humanas e a Civilização Primitiva*, vol. 2, Guimarães Editores, Lisboa, 1955, pp.265.

which Oliveira Martins himself never troubled himself to give. If we attain to tenets that have the public reception as guiding lines of this historiography production and the style it is to follow, then we could say that it is at least oriented towards the people.

The debate around history as science or as art could then be seen in a new perspective, where art and history are not mutually exclusive. The errors or mistakes some may attribute to Oliveira Martins can hardly be said to be because of his “artistic way” of writing and, if they could, how do we make such differentiation? His revolt against the scientific attributions given to history has more to do with a tendency of his age to absolutize science in the relation between art and science, where the historians thought they would need an ultimate definition of their material in order to claim the independence of their discipline. Oliveira Martins, saving history from the interference of other fields of knowledge, mainly from the emerging social sciences with its empirical methods and also from philosophy with a tendency to absorb history in it, comes closer to the traditional scientific and natural disciplines as a source of historical knowledge.

For Oliveira Martins it seems as if the method of history is a scientific one, but the praxis of such a method is an artistic one. One completes what the other cannot give, the synthesis of both elements is visible in his “psychological process” of making history, where he would be provided with empirical data but at the same time would imagine the things as they would have happened. It was a visceral construction of the past where the author would literally have a flow of emotions. With the latter manifesting themselves even physically, he would go to tears in face of the exercise of such a dramatic process as he lived the pains of the past. The drama would also manifest in figures that went down in history as sad equivoques and who were precisely disliked by certain doctrinarians as in the case of D. Miguel when he portrays him in *Portugal Contemporâneo* as a victim of history and a Prince to which he is “sympathetic in his infortune”³⁸².

The theoretical side of his historiography also shares preoccupations with the famous historiographic debates in Germany and France around the value of subjective and objective frameworks, which anticipated some of the leading problems that were later articulated with the problem of judging history on its terms. These views as such are debatable and even earlier historians, as for example Ranke, emphasized such issues. However, can we be an “impassible critic” if this critique relies on modern elements of critique rather than in the existing conditions in the past like Hegel pays notice to? These concerns of a theoretical nature will have an effect on the style of narrative, as one will see something more or less coherent according to its capacity to accommodate, as a theoretical framework, the model one envisions.

³⁸² See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, vol. 1, *op. cit.* p.17.

In terms of style but to some extent also of method, Oliveira Martins can be said to be part of the romantic tradition, a trend with many appearances and difficult to circumscribe. The topic of historiographic traditions or trends was one that Hegel also studied and attempted to classify in his *Lectures on Philosophy of History*, this study will dwell itself into this problem in the next section.

4.3 History as a whole

The consideration of history as a whole is an heir of earlier philosophical concerns of the same nature, namely the relation between the whole and the parts. Hegel will probably be one of the first philosophers that looks at history in a systematic way with this notion of totality in mind. He has not only considered history as a whole but has also classified the different types of history and the practical implications of each of them, their methodologies, advocates and origins. The modern discipline of historiography is thus already to be found in Hegel's way of viewing history, arranging history according to the criteria each of the history types possesses. These divisions and subdivisions of history are to be found in his *Lectures on Philosophy of History*, where we find the three main types of history to be 1. Original history; 2. Reflective history; 3. Philosophical world history.

This section will look into Oliveira Martins in light of Hegel's *Lectures on Philosophy of History*, a book which Oliveira Martins had in his personal library and which he in all likelihood carefully studied. How each type of history identified by Hegel is looked upon by Oliveira Martins and whether or not he also practiced any of those types of history will be one of the points to be explored.

The first type, original history, is the writing of the events as they transpire, of which writers such as Herodotus and Thucydides are examples. These are writers who wrote the deeds which they experience first-hand; they participated in these events and belong "to the spirit of their age"³⁸³. They put into words as an intellectual representation that which they themselves experienced, leaving on second account the reports of others, which become subordinated or are even suppressed. Although this type of history can be said to constitute a source for other types of history, it should not be confused with sources in a broad sense because it still constitutes a historiographic type, unlike documents, fiction, poems and other sources which do not have the value of historiography.

This type of history is not very extensive because it is in general restricted to some contemporary period in which the historian has lived, and, since the time he has lived and the deeds narrated are the same, this historian cannot raise above himself, instead of reflecting on history: "he stands and lives in the material itself"³⁸⁴. Therefore, in this respect Oliveira Martins can also be said to have made original history, but only in a narrower sense could some of his work be said to constitute original history. A greater part of it does not emanate from the echelons of power or from some major historical event, but is politically oriented for immediacy and for this reason resembles more the work

³⁸³ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of history*, (Clarendon Press edition), *Op. cit.* p.133. / "dem Geiste derselben selbst zugehört [haben]" G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, *op. cit.* p.11.

³⁸⁴ See idem, *ibidem*, p.134. / "Er wird also zunächst keine Reflexionen anzubringen haben, denn er lebt im Geiste der Sache" G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, *op. cit.* p.546.

of a publicist, although Oliveira Martins's *Política e Economia Nacional* monograph is something that is close to this original history in Hegel's classification.

Though Hegel seems to be quite restrictive on the non-reflectiveness of this history, in any case this history type is still made up of reflections. These are reflections the age and not truly the own reflection of the historian. In this history, only persons who have lived it can be part of this historiographic type, hence only generals and statesmen can truly be historians of original history. What is also interesting to note is that Hegel also takes into account the class which the historical individual represents. The class is the true substrate of the historical events that unfold. For the above reasons original historians are not common, but we can still find them in our age and some examples are the numerous memoirs which have been produced in France of which Cardinal de Retz is a good example.

This historiographic type was highly valued by Oliveira Martins and plays a major role in his *História de Portugal*³⁸⁵. This type, like Hegel has defined it, is rare to find, but Oliveira Martins still read some original historians who took part in the events they themselves portrayed such as João Rocha Loureiro who testified the king's flight to Brazil and wrote a number of memories on his political involvement in the liberal cause³⁸⁶.

The second historiographic classification is reflexive history. This history goes beyond one's own time and is subdivided into four different types of history which are: 1. Compiled history; 2. Pragmatic history; 3. Critical history; 4. Special or particular history. The common ground which has its place in this historiographic kind is its claim of universality, but not yet in concrete, or at least not concrete enough, to be constituent of another class.

The most blatant example of compiled history is that of the chroniclers who did not live the said historical events they recorded but still wrote about them according to the spirit of their own age instead of the one portrayed in the event. The attempt to make the voices of those contemporaries heard falls in most cases short of its objective, so either way this historiography tends to be anachronistic because "the spirit of the time in which the historian writes is different from the spirit of the time that is to be described" or it tends to resort to generalities, of battles that could happen "at any time", enumerating a significant quantity of data but leaving out their concrete details by reducing

³⁸⁵ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *História de Portugal*, Edição Crítica, com introdução por Isabel de Faria e Albuquerque, Prefácio por Martim de Albuquerque, Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1988, pp.320-329.

³⁸⁶ See João Bernardo da Rocha, *Memórias a Dom João VI*, édition et commentaire par George Boisvert, Centro Cultural Português, Paris, 1973.

them to abstract representations or generalities. The distastes for apologetic history of chroniclers are well known in Oliveira Martins, as well as among the Portuguese liberals³⁸⁷.

The second type of reflexive history produces a present in the past as a means employed by the understanding in order to grasp this same past. This type of history makes the past ageless and turns out to be “a perpetual presence that sublates the past and renders the events contemporary”³⁸⁸. The occurrences of the past which are enlivening depend on the spirit of each author. In general, long procedural chains become the event, and therefore it is the universal that appears and not the particular. This historical narrative also draws lessons from history while it makes moral reflections and takes instructions from its study of history. From this tendency comes the praise of good examples in history. Hegel, however, criticizes the methods of moral history as an oversimplification that cannot account for a higher principle which occupies itself with the “fate of peoples and the overthrow of states”³⁸⁹. The critique he formulates in relation to this historiographic type is very similar to the one drawn against history in the debate of historicism that “History and experience teach that peoples generally have not learned from history”³⁹⁰. To support this assertion he also argues that “moral laws apply to simple interests and private circumstances, and these I do not need to learn from history”³⁹¹. As a critique of this history he accepts the role of great figures but only as a means to lead the people away from the prevalence of memory in conditions that have changed, to this extent he says that “memory has no power in the new situation of the present”³⁹² and warns against distortions brought about by this comparatist effort between past and present.

Hegel ends his reflection on this history type by holding an interesting view on the relation between French and German historiography:

³⁸⁷ “The merit or demerit of books of this nature is known, and, to a certain extent, the value itself that they have, as literary works more or less of pure carat, come from the ideas at the time dominant about the art of writing” / “O mérito e demérito de livros desta natureza são conhecidos, e, até certo ponto, o próprio valor que têm, como obras literárias de mais ou menos puro quilate, provém de ideias ao tempo dominantes sobre a arte de escrever” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *História de Portugal*, op. cit. p.321.

³⁸⁸ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of history*, (Clarendon Press edition), op. cit. p.137 / “Dies hebt die Vergangenheit auf und macht die Begebenheit gegenwärtig“ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, op. cit. p.16.

³⁸⁹ See idem, ibidem, p.138. / “so sind doch die Schicksale der Völker und Staaten deren Interessen, Zustände und Verwicklungen ein anderes Feld“ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, Op. cit. p.17.

³⁹⁰ See idem, ibidem, p.138. / “Was die Erfahrung aber die Geschichte lehren, ist dieses, daß Völker und Regierungen nirmals etwas aus der Gesichte gelernt und nach Lehren, due aus derselben zu ziehen gewesen wären, gehandelt haben“ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, Op. cit. p.17.

³⁹¹ See idem, ibidem, p.138.

³⁹² See idem, ibidem, p.138. / “Erinnerung hat keine Kraft gegen die Lebendigkeit und Freiheit“ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, Op. cit. p.17.

“We thus turn back to the simple proposition of merely narrating what happens with precision and truth. Precisely crafted description and narratives of this kind are of great merit; but for the most part they merely provide material for others. We Germans are satisfied with that and want to live in the past. The French by contrast generate descriptions themselves and seek to treat them with ingenuity; as a consequence they are to lesser extent thorough historians. They always see past in terms of the present.”³⁹³

Hegel’s reflection on this type of history is possibly the most interesting of them all. Here, we have his reflection of the relation between past and future laid out in opposition to a historiographic tendency of oversimplification. He sees the past and its historical value in relation to the “situation”, “condition”, “circumstance” of the present. We can see a great degree of possibilities open for the future and where the crystallization in particular moments is avoided. In fact “the idea” and its interpretation of itself, (meaning: we interpreting the idea that we embody) is the true interest of history, because what is interesting is the concrete and detailed reflection of reality which can only be given by such an interpretation. The idea thinking itself, is not, as it may sound, the idea in abstract, in a kind of ethereal realm free from humanity’s intervention. The idea only has existence in humanity and as such humanity is the real being of the idea, therefore when Hegel speaks of “the idea” that thinks itself, he is in fact talking above all about humanity thinking itself.

Some of Oliveira Martins’s reflections on history can be said to integrate this pragmatic history, such as the predominance he gives to moral examples, to great figures or the relation between past and future. In the first case the moral aspects of Oliveira Martins have already been stressed elsewhere, but in history this moralist attitude(it should be reiterate again) is still a main-vector as is made clear when he says:

“History is above all a moral lesson: here is the conclusion that, in our opinion, comes out of all the eminent progresses that have lately been made in the domain of social sciences. Reality is the best master of costumes, critique the best compass of intelligence, for this reason history demands above all the direct observation of primordial sources, true picture of the feelings, loyal description of the events and, next to this the impassive coldness of the critic, to coordinate, compare, in an objective or impersonal mode the system of generating sentiments and positive acts”³⁹⁴

³⁹³ See idem, ibidem, p.139. / “beziehen die Vergangenheit auf den gegenwärtigen Zustand” G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, *Op. cit.* p.18.

³⁹⁴ See Oliveira Martins “A história é sobretudo uma lição moral: eis a conclusão que, a nosso ver, sai de todos os eminentes progressos ultimamente realizados no foro das ciências sociais. A realidade é a melhor mestra dos costumes, a crítica a melhor bússola da inteligência: por isso a história exige sobretudo observação directa das fontes primordias, pintura verdadeira dos sentimentos, descrição fiel dos acontecimentos e, ao lado disto a frieza impassível do crítico, para coordenar, comparar, de um modo impessoal ou objectivo o sistema dos sentimentos geradores e dos acto positivos” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Historia de Portugal*, op. cit. p.21.

In such a description the moral realm seems to be the basis on which a critique should be made, in light of a specific objective criterion given by intelligence. In this manner Oliveira Martins is not strictly a follower of the pragmatic historiographic tradition, as defined by Hegel, but is closer to the critical historiography in the vein of Niebuhr or Ranke. He pays attention to this moral aspect but does not place it above history, making observations elsewhere against the out of place judgements made on history³⁹⁵, even if at the same time he sees moral examples as a way or as an inspiration to emulate the good that has been done, but always on different conditions and of another workmanship.

Hegel's critical historiography critique, when specifically dealt with, is short. There is no doubt Hegel owed much to this historiographic school. He recognizes the developments it has brought and its force in Germany, but in any case, he will make mainly negative appreciations when evaluating it. This historiographic school proposes to fight, what they understand as, an *a priori* construction of history. Hegel seems to accuse them precisely of this same *a priori* history because they take the past according to mental constructions that are arbitrary and subjective³⁹⁶. The fierce critique goes as follows:

“The so-called higher criticism has taken possession of history and has sought to supplant the more circumspect historiography; having abandoned the soil of history, it has made room for the most arbitrary representations, digressions, fantasies, and combinations. Attempts are made to bring these most arbitrary elements into history. This too is a way of bringing the present into the past. The present that is advanced in this way rests on subjective fancies that are all the more striking the less they have any basis.”³⁹⁷

The way in which Hegel criticizes this way of making history seems to be along the lines of how Alexandre Herculano reproaches the synthesis that has somewhat a baseless grounding. This critical history that Hegel refers to also endeavors to make this synthetic exercise and for this reason Hegel will say that this is more like a history of the narratives of history and its subsequent evaluation rather than history itself. But do we have sufficient analytical material - this was Alexandre Herculano's objection - to operate a synthesis of the history of the distant past? We probably do, but this is not the

³⁹⁵ See on this topic of anachronism and judgements in history, Sérgio Campos Matos, *Consciência Histórica e Nacionalismo: Portugal, séculos XIX e XX*, *op. cit.* pp.177-178.

³⁹⁶ See for instance on this matter also Houlgate who pays notice to this same fact. Stephen Houlgate, *A Companion to Hegel*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2011, p.345.

³⁹⁷ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of history*, (Clarendon Press edition), *op. cit.* p.139 / “Bei uns hat sich die sogenannte höhere Kritik wie der Philologie überhaupt, so auch der Gesichtsbücher bemächtigt. Diese höhere Kritik hat dann die Berechtigung abgeben sollen, allen möglichen unhistorischen Ausgeburten einer eitlen Einbildungskraft Eingang zu verschaffen. Dies ist die andre Weise, Gegenwart in der Geschichte zu gewinnen, indem man subjektive Einfälle an die Stelle geschichtlicher Daten setzt – Einfälle, die für uns so vortrefflicher gelten, je kühner sie sind“ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, *Werke*, vol. 12, *op. cit.* p.18-19.

point in Hegel's work. His objection is with regards to making certain subjective criterion, supported by a factual critique of the present, the sole aspect worthy of historical value.

A good example is the so called search for the facts and the critique of sources, which leave fundamental aspects of the imaginary of a people weakened in their historical consideration, just because they are considered, in light of the present historical sciences and critical analyses, to be false or misrepresented. This is how the present is drawn into the past as a measure of veracity and, although Hegel does not deny the merits of the critique of the past, he says such efforts cannot be considered historical in the strict sense because the history of a people is to a great extent constructed through their myths and under certain circumstances we can even learn more of a people from these myths.

In this historiography type, Hegel too, follows the same path and praises the French works in this field of history because they do not claim to have "[supplanted] the more circumspect field of historiography" or, in other words, they recognize their accomplishments not as history per se but as referring to historical criticism. In this critical historiography, the Germans are no longer trapped in the past; they have, on the contrary, trapped the past in their present or in their own subjective fancies. This seems at first an approximation to the French pragmatic historiography, but it actually appears as if German critical historiography sees the past with a present in it, as if the past could accommodate elements of it, while the French pragmatic historiography sees the past in terms of the present, or the past with the ingenuity of a present that accepts the past's claims.

The last kind of reflective history, special or particular history, as such makes the transition from reflective history to philosophical history. This history, says Hegel, is partially abstract but is at the same time within a universal outlook as an "extract" of this universality, involving a particular aspect of it. Hegel affirms that this type of reflective history has gained prominence "owing to today's culture". In this way modern culture brings to mind aspects of our own culture and individualizes them under certain aspects such as art, science, government and so on. While at the same time the history of each of these aspects is viewed in relation with the whole, putting forward a universal principle. The definition of this historiographic type brings to mind similarities with Hegel's own speculative philosophy, where the subject, the particular, is universalized or is brought into a relation with the universal.

This branch of special history has been made particularly popular in the histories of law and government. He admires such efforts when they are made in relation to the entire history of a people and do not fall short on the reflection of external material, as he sees an internal nexus that unites history with the universal. However, Hegel seems to think that this internal nexus is more frequently

only “sought or touched upon in its external circumstances”³⁹⁸, and, probably because of this, the concrete it may have does not yet suffice to differentiate it enough to have it outside of reflective history.

The treatment of history according to different aspects was also adopted by Oliveira Martins. The economical aspect of history was, for example, one of his particular interests and, as such, he has focused on economy in its different relations and expressions, with history as a whole in sight but under various considerations. He considered for instance economic phenomena in terms of western civilization, of Portugal, as a class oriented economy. He even considered economy in terms of specific economical aspects as in the case of chrematistic which, has a branch of it, he considered to be theoretical economics³⁹⁹. The admonishment of Hegel against external reflection could be in part raised against Oliveira Martins, as he often sees the stimulus coming from the outside instead of resulting from an internal maturing. This is the case with the “spirit of crusade” which for him remodeled in many ways Portuguese economy and on a greater scale that of Europe, as something alien to western civilization but coming from oriental elements that have found place in Christian faith.

In the passage to the philosophical world history, what is brought in new is the concrete universal. Its point of view is now the spiritual principle of peoples and the history of this principle. This is the principle that guides the world, it is the guiding of individual souls and the idea is this spiritual principle of peoples. He then distinguishes two modes of considering the concept of world history. One is the totality that each particular spiritual principle is and secondly these same spiritual principles of the peoples as the totality of one world spirit. All the aspects and viewpoints of the history of a people are interrelated, he admits this is often stated, yet how everything is interrelated frequently fails to be explained. Even when such an interconnection is shown, it remains mostly superficial. What he criticizes is the level of precision which is lacking in most cases and the point he wants to make is how each aspect of the spiritual principle does not have a linear development, but develops, in fact, on different degrees. What Hegel says here is that an aspect can be highly developed, but still play a minor role as an aspect of the culture of a people, because it still remains on a lower degree.

The position each aspect has in the spirit of a people can be grasped only spiritually, or in other words only through thought. It becomes subjacent again that this thought is not a transcendent principle as “we are the ones who grasp thought”⁴⁰⁰. Besides, this thought which is grasped by us is

³⁹⁸ See idem, *ibidem*, p.140. / “bloß in äußerlichen Verhältnissen gesucht wird” G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, vol. 12, *Op. cit.* p.19.

³⁹⁹ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, *op.cit.* pp.1-3.

⁴⁰⁰ See G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, (Clarendon Press edition), *op. cit.* p.141

also self-producing. The highest goal of the spirit is the thinking of itself and when it finally knows itself, the individual spirit demises and a different stage of world history emerges.

The transition of the spirit to another principle in a different people is self-engendered, the world advances to its consummation inside the spiritual process of self-completeness until it consumes and transfigures itself into something anew. In Oliveira Martins the spirit of a people also thinks itself, and the completion of the knowledge of its spiritual principle would also imply its demise, but this demise, contrary to Hegel, is configured in a kind of crisis that leaves this spiritual principle helpless, ready to be conquered by external forces opposing it⁴⁰¹. To Hegel the spiritual principle is rather elevated through itself and rises to a higher level of self-comprehension, imposing new tasks to itself in order to broaden its activity. The works of men in name of self-interest are not properly the aim of this spiritual activity, but still in each of these particular aims, if we are to look for some ultimate purpose, this can only be shown through a third category that stands between men and the world, that is reason which is in both.

This end can also be looked at from a different aspect, such as that of religion and instead of the plan of reason we have the plan of God, but still under this construction God would assert himself in us and is not something unearthly that should be “kept at distance and conveyed to the far side (*jenseits*) of human things and knowledge”. Hegel advocates that we can know God, as he is in fact in our consciousness, otherwise every representation of God would be empty talk. The task of God or the task of reason has for its final aim what can be called God’s will or the idea, that is, the spiritualization of the world or to bring about the infinite to the finite⁴⁰². In such a task, freedom is the way by which the idea brings itself forward, the realization of freedom is humanity’s end and to this effect history is the history of the advancement of freedom.

The contemplation of the ends of history has a major place in Oliveira Martins’s thought and he thinks that the study of the aims of history belongs particularly to the department of philosophy of history, constituting as such his philosophical reading of history. In his philosophical world history, Hegel continues the idea of Kant’s universal history and the consideration of history as a whole, with the characterization of its main course and aims. Following the same basic procedure while thinking history, although quite different from Kant’s method, they propose a rational plan of the history that takes place in the world. Oliveira Martins will also engage in mediations of this kind in his book *Tábuas de Cronologia e Geografia Histórica* but precisely to show some doubts about the possibility of a philosophy of history in a universal sense. In the chapter *Teoria da História Universal*, which is part of

⁴⁰¹ See on this topic Augusto Santos Silva, "Morte, mediação, história: uma viagem tanatográfica ao pensamento de Oliveira Martins" in *Revista da História Económica e Social*, 1984, 14, julho-dezembro, pp.1-40.

⁴⁰² See *Philosophy of history*, *op. cit.* pp.146-147.

the introduction of the above book, we are told that such a system is chimerical if it claims to be scientific as we cannot account for a greater part of human histories. This is when philosophy of history, as a method not limited by the scientific one, should make its appearance in the consideration of history, and his judgement on philosophy of history is that:

“Proceeding in a different manner, [with the] use of metaphysical divination, and imposing its discoveries on reality, the philosophy of history, (always debatable as a philosophy) does not fall under the domain of this critique. It could ignore the histories of not only many, but all the peoples, and not even so would it be less true – in the degree and specie of truth compatible with the speculation of such nature”⁴⁰³

The philosophical reading of history for Oliveira Martins is then something different from what Hegel drafts in his *Lectures on Philosophy of History* with his historical worlds. The separation between what is object of thought (of a metaphysical consideration of reality) from the positive knowledge of this reality, makes the philosophy of history into something that looks for laws or the great movements of civilizations. But when constituted as theories they do not apply to the phenomenal world because it cannot embrace its diversity. From this point on this study will move to what, for Oliveira Martins, constitutes philosophy of history, where the nexus of totality in history is to find its existence only in thought⁴⁰⁴.

⁴⁰³ “Procedendo de outra forma, usando da adivinhação metafísica, e impondo a sua descoberta á realidade, a filosofia da história, (discutível sempre como filosofia) não cai porém sob o domínio desta crítica: poderia desconhecer as histórias não só de muitos, senão de todos os povos, e nem por isso seria menos verdadeira – daquele grau e daquela espécie de verdade compatível com a especulação de tal natureza” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Tábuas de Cronologia e Geografia Histórica*, 1st ed., Lisboa, Livraria de António Maria Pereira, 1884, p.VIII.

⁴⁰⁴ See on this same problem for instance Labriola who under different assumptions also hints at thought as that which brings unity to the separateness of historical moments, and also considers universal history as lying outside science. Antonio Labriola, *Scritti filosofici e politici*, Einaudi Editore, Torino, 1973, p.21-25.

4.4 Philosophy of History

The philosophy of history that we uncover when appreciating Oliveira Martins's writings goes beyond the universal history theory he advanced in 1884, based on "positive knowledge" and known history. In *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã* we have perhaps the most complete form of this philosophy of history. An extract of this text along with some other relevant ones on this subject is reproduced by Pedro Calafate in a selection of texts of Oliveira Martins as part of the chapter philosophy of history⁴⁰⁵. But already before this important work of 1878, in an unpublished letter to Batalha Reis, probably from 1874, his philosophy of history is synthesized in a couple of pages.

In this letter we are told that the laws of evolution in history should be examined under two aspects. One is that of a natural and ethnological evolution, the other is the moral and philosophical evolution. In the first aspect we have that which is instinctive, constantly renovating itself, with the ascension of new races tending for civilization or higher stages of it. In the second aspect this natural instinct can already be said to be present in it, but spiritually structured, that is, in an unconscious form. Therefore, the moral evolution constitutes the knowledge of oneself and nature, and this object is constant and identical through time.

These two aspects are almost completely separated, but they come together by relational structures and from the earlier example of natural instinct, this aspect is embraced in the spirit or in the so called moral philosophical aspect by the unconsciousness, as its co-relative. The two aspects, one coming from nature, the other coming from spirit, are not coincident but mirror each other and are accessible to one another through a third structure mediating between them. What then brings the "relation or affinity" between the two aspects, as a mediator, is metaphysics. This structure is said to be the essential basis of all that exists. Metaphysics for Oliveira Martins is the ideal, of which men are only an approximation, but he still says that this ideal "has only a logical reality"⁴⁰⁶, it does not have a concrete existence.

The philosophy of history, which Oliveira Martins calls the philosophy of the moral history of humanity, consists in the transformation of "the instrument" by which man represents things viz. consciousness. The moral aspect gains again the preponderance it has in his dialectics. Oliveira Martins sees morality as the active and predominant element which suffers transformations through time in

⁴⁰⁵ See Pedro Calafate, *Oliveira Martins*, Verbo, Lisboa, 1991, pp.55-103.

⁴⁰⁶ "Here it comes however, next to the notion of infinite on the one hand, and the natural laws of the animal transformation on the other hand, [the proof that] this Ideal only has a logical reality: let's not complicate this problem." / "Aqui vem porém, a par, a noção de infinito de um lado, e as leis naturais de transformação animal do outro, provar-nos que esse Ideal tem uma realidade somente lógica: não compliquemos a questão." Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, gently provided to me by Prof. Dr. Sergio Campos Matos, *Op. cit.*

the consciousness of man. In the old ways of making history, moral, doctrinarian, or the more recent consideration of external phenomenal aspects of epochs and the conditions of certain successes; all these ways have a gist of truth in them because they considered the moral character of history, they create models which look at the system of laws and the physical environment of society. They were, however, not yet history in the modern sense because what is really intimate and essential to history is the system of institutions and collective ideas; they are “for society what organs and sentiments are for the individual”⁴⁰⁷. Oliveira Martins proposes that history or at least a historical narrative also begins when these become its object. Like in Hegel, history only really begins when we have the first institutions which form the state and through them the moral aspect is objectivized in the ethical community.

The institutions are first apprehended by man in a symbolic-mystical way, only later will these ideas be institutionalized and transformed into something else capable of really explaining them. The old institutions are to be reformed not demolished as if the past had no importance. Through this progressive conscious of the ideal, specific moments of it are not absolutized⁴⁰⁸. He follows Vico in the saying that man creates his own world, but for Oliveira Martins man is not completely conscious of it, nor should he be, otherwise it would not make sense to have this creation in the first place as it would be something static. He prefers the notion of civilizational types which progressively gain consciousness of their essence until the attainment of self-consciousness or the return onto its essence. Each of the civilization types have a “maximal and minimal limit inside of which it is licit for the individual to have conscious of creation”⁴⁰⁹.

Early constructions of the past have for Oliveira Martins some truth in them and should not be completely abandoned; we should look within them for what is truthful⁴¹⁰. This is where his idea of society as a collective being, an organism, comes forward. The reform of the institutions is thus not merely going back to regenerate the past neither is it the complete denial of that past but the

⁴⁰⁷ “para a sociedade como os órgãos e os sentimentos são para o individuo” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *História de Portugal*, *op. cit.* p.VII.

⁴⁰⁸ “In conclusion then, we understand that the reform of the old aristocratic institutions was necessary. [But we do not applaud] the new law, that in overturning everything, as made of this contest the absolute measure of its capacity” / “Concluindo, pois, entendemos que era necessária a reforma das velhas instituições aristocráticas, sem aplaudirmos a lei nova que derrubando tudo, fez do concurso um metro absoluto e único da capacidade” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, vol. 1, *op. cit.* p.370.

⁴⁰⁹ “entre os limites máximo e mínimo dentro dos quais é lícito ao indivíduo ter a consciência da criação” See Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, gently provided to me by Prof. Dr. Sergio Campos Matos, *op. cit.*

⁴¹⁰ “Such philosophy, of which the last signs of life we still hear, could not discover what sum of natural liberty and organic necessity existed in the old institutions, even if its representatives had no conscious of this.” / “Uma tal filosofia, cujos últimos estros de vida ainda ouvimos, não podia descobrir que soma de verdade natural e de necessidade orgânica havia nas instituições antigas, embora os seus representantes de isso não tivessem consciência.” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, vol. 1, *op. cit.* p.371.

progressive gaining consciousness of what in our own creation makes us human, civilized creatures and a being “susceptible of an educated consciousness”⁴¹¹ with society not as an aggregate of individuals but a living organism that grows from its own active principle and reflects on its own activity.

Returning, however, back to the way in which mysticism acquires a scientific form, he sees in the Germanic spirit this mystical tendency, just as the two already mentioned sciences of the spirit had their foundation in antiquity, coming from this natural instinct, which in an ideal form is a religious mysticism. One is the science of the ideal, the other is the science of justice and morality. The Middle Ages is an epoch where these latter sciences seen as instincts, which led to the mystical thought, reinvent themselves and then found again a new positive existence. The polemic with Vilhena about the characterization of the Middle Ages is above all a debate around the philosophy of history.

The passage where he speaks of the Germanic races as the carriers of this mysticism, which in itself carries the mysteries of development, tells us that:

“The still barbarous Germanic Race, conceived spirit and nature by means of symbols and myths, it had solely the noncognitive faculties in exercise. 2° of the morbid delirium that took hold of the world when the antique spirit reached the most perfect form, compatible with its raw-material of sentiments, instincts etc... that characterize the meridional races and were formulated imaginatively in the Etruscan, Hellenic etc... symbolism and theogonies. The apparition of this delirium that strongly characterizes Middle Ages”

(...)

“after the education of the Germanic spirit began, that is with Renaissance, this is when all the mysticism of the new race could begin to be formulated rationally and to be combined, for this reason, with the rationalist conceptions of Antiquity. Our civilization concludes naturally and logically, when the instincts of the Germanic people acquire the degree of education corresponding to the Latins; then the mythic and symbolic creations of Middle Ages could be classified and explained, as it were, to a certain extent, those of primitive Italy and Greece. Europe would have given what it could for the work of conscious creation; and humanity would enter, through another crisis in another circle, in a new *ricorso*”⁴¹²

⁴¹¹ “susceptível de consciência educada” Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, *op. cit.*

⁴¹² “A raça germânica, ainda barbara concebia ainda o espírito e a natureza por meio de símbolos e de mitos: tinha unicamente as faculdades incognitivas em exercício. 2° do delírio mórbido que se apoderou do mundo quando o espírito antigo atingiu a forma mais perfeita compatível com a sua matéria-prima de sentimentos, de instintos etc que caracterizam as raças meridionais e se formularam imaginativamente no simbolismo e nas teogonias etruscas, helénicas etc... A aparição desse delírio que caracteriza fortemente a idade-média”

The Germanic races are in a lower level in comparison to the Latin races, but at the same time he gives to them the mission of being the commanding force of the future and, as in Hegel, the Germanic world is the modern spirit of the world. If we take away this racist jargon, what he sees as the source of development is the unconscious force of man, the “fantasy”, “delirium”, “morbid”, “madness” but at the same time the “genius”, “prophetic” force. When man acquires a conscious form of this delirium then the future, in a way, has its answers in the past, in this mystical thought that characterizes the Middle Ages. To recover from these prodigious thoughts in a rational form, is the role of the German spirit. What stands out in this interpretation and strikes us as interesting to be noted is the critique various strands of socialism are subjected to, viewing them as fantasies and insanities that should be dismissed, but here he sees these fantasies, in a religious form, as something to be valued. In this respect, for instance, the scientific socialism of Marx also considers, in some ways, utopian socialism as valuable and a source of inspiration. But can it be said that Oliveira Martins completely dismisses those strands of socialism?

If we attend at his *Teoria do Socialismo* there he considers the imagination of “idealist systems” in general, as the ideal that expresses the imagination of society and points to the realization of men’s ends. Even if not capable of refounding society, they set at least the lines by which this refoundation lives⁴¹³. He proceeds in giving little importance to these and denounces their “vulgar knowledge” although the ideal they express is something to be appropriated. He has a similar discourse about the international socialist movement in the last pages of his letter to Batalha Reis, where socialism together with French spiritualism may give place to some new revealed truth of metaphysics. He does not dismiss the “socialist fantasies” completely but this is the tendency and already in his *Portugal e o Socialismo* (1873), we have a distinction between mystical socialism, which he says was expelled from the International in the Hague congress, and the socialism he identifies as communism where the individual person is absorbed in an abstract collective⁴¹⁴. He will later identify the second one, on the

(...)

“Depois de começada a educação do espirito germânico, isto é com a Renascença, é que todo o misticismo da nova raça pôde começar a formular-se racionalmente e a combinar-se, por isso, com as concepções racionais da Antiguidade. A Nossa civilização conclui naturalmente e logicamente, quando os instintos dos povos germânicos tiverem adquirido o grau de educação correspondente aos latinos; então as criações míticas e simbólicas da Idade-Média terão sido classificadas e explicadas, como o foram, até certo ponto, as da Itália e Grécia primitiva. A Europa terá dado o que pôde dar para a obra da criação consciente; e a humanidade entrará, por outra crise se noutra círculo, um novo ricorso.” Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, *op. cit.*

⁴¹³ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Teoria do Socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.270.

⁴¹⁴ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Portugal e o Socialismo: exame constitucional da sociedade Portuguesa e a sua reorganização pelo socialismo*, *op. cit.* p.71.

contrary, as a utopian mechanicism or as a Darwinian individualism of competition⁴¹⁵, as opposed to the moralizing socialism of the state.

The underlining point is that this unconscious force that points out the way of development, also subsists in society and not merely in the ideal. It has, in fact, a natural existence and generally expresses itself in religious forms. Therefore, it constitutes a natural mysticism and the Middle Ages were rich in this regard. "This is why the Middle Ages [was] mediately a progressive epoch, but immediately and externally reactionary"⁴¹⁶. The progressive aspect is the combination of the rational aspects of antiquity with the German mysticism that, for him, characterizes Middle Ages, where this combination is able to create the institutions that can solve the problems that could not be solved in Antiquity.

According to his theory of universal history, the originality of a nation is what gives it strength and this also applies to civilizational types. We owe the originality of the modern age to the Middle Ages, because there we have side by side the barbaric customs and the Roman code of law, the first being oligarchic while the second is democratic⁴¹⁷. Therefore, as a mediating figure of a civilizational type, Middle Ages is progressive, but it is also reactionary when we consider it in its external manifestation. Middle Ages has not yet acquired all the higher forms of civilization which come forward with a philosophical understanding of its own civilizational type. The originality only really manifests itself when the contradictory elements are harmonized.

The modern age is the reconstitution of a democratic and civilized epoch that reproduces Roman democracy, but it is superior because it can embrace other peoples, it has acquired a universalistic character⁴¹⁸. This idea of society creating the means of its emancipation is present since

⁴¹⁵ See J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Política e Economia Nacional*, *op. cit.* pp.96.

⁴¹⁶ "É por isso que a idade-média é uma época mediatamente progressiva, mas imediatamente e exteriormente reacionária" Oliveira Martins unpublished letter to Jaime Batalha Reis, *Op. cit.*

⁴¹⁷ "It had stayed also next to the barbaric customs, the Roman codes of law, philosophical and democratic or Caesarist; and the societies, images of Jano, presented simultaneously two faces – one oligarchic, the other democratic – contrasting origins and eminently instructive debates" / "tinham ficado também ao lado dos usos bárbaros, os códigos do direito romano, filosófico ou democrático ou cesariano; e as sociedades, imagens de Jano, apresentavam simultaneamente duas faces – uma oligarquia, outra democrática – origem de contrastes e debates eminentemente instructivos" J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Tábuas de Cronologia*, *op. cit.* p. XXXI.

⁴¹⁸ "such is the concourse of causes that brought again the European nations to a civilized or democratic epoch, to a philosophical age, to a period that reproduces, under a nomological or social-organic point of view, that of roman democracy; but it is therefore incomparably superior to antiquity because it embraces in it all the branches of the European family, for this reason it expresses the assimilated sentiments by the Semite [family], for this reason it is now Universal, whereas ancient democracy, particular to the Latin peoples, expressed only the strong but limited genius of the Roman, educated by the subtle Greek intelligence" / "Tal é o concurso de causas que trouxe de novo as nações europeias a uma época civilizada ou democrática, a uma idade filosófica, a um período que reproduz, sob o ponto de vista nomológico ou orgânico-social, o da democracia romana; mas que é incomparavelmente superior á Antiguidade por isso que abraça em si todos os ramos da família europeia, por isso exprime os sentimentos assimilados por a do génio semita, por isso que é já agora universal,

very early on as, for instance, when Oliveira Martins first attributes a fundamental role to credit in the solution of the social question that degladiated Rome. The conditions for the creation of credit were essential to the Germanic people with their self-interest and the spirit of independence sedimented in the protestant reform. Since the continual renewal of civilizational types comes from unconscious forces, both ideal and instinctive, he attaches these forces to religion as its primary natural appearance.

The consideration of Roman or Germanic civilizational types still brings with it some positive knowledge of those realities, but, given the degree of generality, it also carries with it an ideal that was not perfectly realized. The more history becomes concrete, the less the ideal is realized. Therefore, Oliveira Martins denies the scientific character of history when it has something to do with positive data, but he still does not deny there can be some laws in the spirit as set forward in his *O Helenismo e Civilização Cristã*. The later writings lean, however, towards a history along the lines of positive knowledge, furnished by natural sciences with a subsequent approximation to the race theories. He thus argues, in his theory of universal history, against laws in history because there his object is precisely history in its phenomenal manifestation that is in nature, where history unfolds spontaneously, independent of the laws of spirit.

The ideal dear to him in the 1870s is later something he is not so enthusiastic about. The philosophy of history and the laws it can furnish are something questionable as a philosophy. This philosophy of history, in a moral sense, persists. The ideal is still something to regulate development but is informed by this theoretical development which pays attention to the role positive existence. Besides this notion of an ideal which governs the concrete development, but is never reached, there is also another notion of a return onto this ideal, of attaining full conscience of one's civilizational type by realizing it. How are these two notions harmonized? One proclaims the ideal is only a guiding vector, the other that this ideal can be realized.

In the reception of Silva Cordeiro' book on philosophy of history, Oliveira Martins warns that the ideal is only an *ought to* and should not be taken to be actually existing. Oliveira Martins prefixes an ideal and a return onto the essence to the Hegelian idea of civilization enriching itself by posing ever more complex tasks to itself. For Hegel this returning of civilization to what it first was, enlarged in what is, as it accomplishes its tasks, is self-produced and achieves its ends. However, for Oliveira Martins this ideal, even if returning to itself, is at the same time not achievable, only an approximation is possible. This return onto the essence, for Oliveira Martins, happens because the ideal meets the limits of human abilities. As a result the ideal is altered and enters another phase. The separation he makes of natural and spiritual laws explains why this ideal cannot be enforced; nature and its laws are

ao passo que a democracia antiga, particular dos povos latinos, apenas exprimira o génio forte mas limitado do romano, educado pela inteligência subtil do grego" J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Tábuas de Cronologia, op. cit.* p. XXXIII.

of a different kind, they resist the impositions of human spirit and the ideal can be only imperfectly realized.

The metaphor of a return to the starting point has been used on Oliveira Martins when, in his last works, he restarts the writing of biographies of great individualities rather than wider historical considerations such as his *History of Portugal*. Silva Cordeiro also tells us Oliveira Martins's later development in support of monarchy and Caesarism was also something that could already be found in his youth. Did he already displayed this conservative side since his youth? It seems contradictory when looking at his first texts, when they are the most filled with revolutionary zeal, federalist and socialist ideas, some even speaking of a humanist period, while at the same time, these are some of the more rigid and dogmatic of his texts with his idea of a natural evolution or even of a fatality in the development of society.

5. Conclusion

In these concluding notes I would like, on the one hand, to recapitulate the complex relation between Hegel and Oliveira Martins and, on the other hand, to uncover questions or lines of development that remain open.

The youthful writings of Oliveira Martins foresaw an interest in German culture and philosophy in particular. The judgement on certain political matters, concerning for instance Prussia, fluctuated. First, we have a praise of "Berlin's philosophy" in *Febo Moniz*. Subsequently, in a series of articles in *O Comércio* he manifests some doubts over Prussia's political ambitions, whereas around the 1870s in *A Republica*, a newspaper in which he wrote but where authorship of some articles is not certain because they are not signed, there, the attack on Prussia's expansionism is vehement. Finally in Oliveira Martins's *Teoria do Socialismo* (1872) we have a more clear differentiation between philosophy and the politics in Germany, but the relation between Prussia's expansionism and Hegel's philosophy is still there. Did he maintain this judgement? After the 1880s he seems inclined to view Hegel differently.

The interpretation of Hegel's philosophy in light of the political situation played an important role in the readings of Oliveira Martins. The sources from which he became acquainted with Hegel tended to portray him predominantly in conservative and absolutist undertones. While Proudhon, who also shared this idea, distorted the Hegelian dialectic with his more own Kantian understanding of the antinomies supported by Fourier's serialism, which hampered Oliveira Martins's understanding of Hegel's dialectic.

Although the initial readings of Oliveira Martins are undoubtedly French, the existence of other Hegelian sources, especially of Anglo-Saxon and Italian origin is something that could also be further explored. Besides Oliveira Martins's interest in Spain and his relation with Spanish intellectuals, where Krausism was widely popular and Hegel also had some audience, or the Italian Hegelians which produced numerous studies and translations, these are all possible sources for contact with Hegel's philosophy. He could have become familiar with these later in life as we know he possessed an 1878 English edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, as well as Vico's original texts in Italian, hence, we may then ask if this was a language he read fluently. Moreover, could his Germanism also have come from other sources?

The political aspects of Oliveira Martins's thought are embedded in the debates regarding the nature of the government and the theory of state, where the politico-juridical texts of Hegel are a referential. This is the case with the problem of freedom and authority, which is posed initially by Oliveira Martins in the traditional way of opposed tendencies, but with the resolution in justice as a third element. The debates around Hegel's vision of freedom and authority are a topic of heated

discussions, with some defending a Hegel closer to liberalism⁴¹⁹, others as opposed both to liberal and to conservative political theories⁴²⁰, while yet others make a closer relation with conservatism⁴²¹. Can we without a shadow of doubt affirm Hegel was a conservative? It seems easier to do so than to say he was a revolutionary, but that would be an oversimplification without a thorough consideration of the points or the basis for such an assertion.

The ends of history is another issue that was slightly touched upon by us but is a topic of great contemporary interest, particularly the idea of tendencies in history. Whereas for Hegel the advancement of liberty is the tendency of history, for Oliveira Martins equality enjoys a similar role. The modern appropriation of Hegel makes use of this idea of an end to historical development in order to justify the current societal relations as inevitable. But is this the case with Hegel? The dialectical idea of self-development and the recognition of contradiction as an integral part of reality seems to prohibit this interpretation. The latter interpretation seems closer to the detractors of Hegel who accused him of taking existent reality for what is rational.

In Oliveira Martins's consideration of the ends of history the idea of humanity's future is further developed when he envisages a society of super-abundance, where in the "plenitude of wealth profit will disappear" because capital "becoming superabundant becomes collective"⁴²². This is an idea that enjoys acceptance and is expanded by António Sérgio in his cooperativist socialism. These ideas tend, in Oliveira Martins, to be balanced out by others emanating from his defense of chance in history, drawing him further away from Hegel's philosophy of history.

Such ideas of Oliveira Martins are thus rightly expressed in his economic writings, where the search for laws is possible through the study of institutions, while history is on a different level of knowledge. These strict divisions that he adopts, which is a tendency we find in the positivists, could also be a topic to be explored. Does history not also cover the institutions and the study of laws? Oliveira Martins certainly gives indications that "nothing exists by itself, independent, everything shakes, everything penetrates and relates [to each other]"⁴²³, but then in other writings he makes a

⁴¹⁹ See Terry Pinkard, *op. cit.*

⁴²⁰ See Domenico Losurdo, *Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns*, *op. cit.*

⁴²¹ See Renato Cristi, *Hegel on Freedom and Authority*, University of Wales, Cardiff, 2005.

⁴²² "Se na plenitude da riqueza o lucro desaparece, como vimos, também no pleno desenvolvimento da circulação desaparece o prémio do dinheiro, pois o crédito, nas suas variadíssimas modalidades (notas, cheques, letras, etc...) torna-o tão superabundante quanto a civilização em geral torna superabundante os capitais móveis." J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, *op. cit.* p.177.

"É por isso que, se nós sabemos já que na plenitude da riqueza o capital não terá juro ou renda, tornando-se superabundante se tornou colectivo" idem, *ibidem*, p.204.

⁴²³ "Nada existe por si, independente: tudo se penetra e se relaciona" idem, *ibidem*, p.89.

distinction “between philosophy of history and nomology”⁴²⁴, precisely because the first one cannot give laws, but can it give tendencies?

This idea of chance in history is traced by Joaquim de Carvalho, Fernando Catroga and Sergio Campos Matos to Cournot, who Oliveira Martins cites while discussing the topic of philosophy of history. How he matured these thoughts and moved from the fatality of the laws of history to chance in historical development, is important in order to understand his judgement on philosophy of history.

Political economy, in the same way as history, is a law of the spirit, “not a physical law” and as such the formulas it provides are not absolute, only historical. In his social and political writings the ethicisation of political economy draws him closer to the catheter socialists, which Marx identifies as the demise of political economy⁴²⁵. The condemnation of materialism or the interference of the physical laws with the spirit, enjoys a similar separateness in the thought of Oliveira Martins because the latter should not interfere with the objects of experience⁴²⁶.

The relation of Oliveira Martins with philosophy and the alignments or the basis of different philosophical schools is something not dealt with but it is a topic of interest, particularly his understanding of idealism and materialism. His tendency is to take idealism in a moralizing fashion while understanding materialism as instinctive. As such, idealism in philosophy is preferable.

The German idealism and culture is thus, as earlier stated, held in high esteem. While the passage through France of these ideas initially worries him⁴²⁷, later on he is actually glad they reach Portugal via France⁴²⁸. It remains to be seen, however, in which ways, for Oliveira Martins, were these ideas altered? The sources of Hegel’s reception in France were looked upon, but what was Oliveira Martins’s own critical analysis of this reception of German ideas in France? It remains fragmentary and part of it is to be found in newspaper articles, especially when he discusses literary schools.

The materialism as something instinctive is similar to the accusation of the lack of dynamism attributed to materialism. The historicism which develops in Germany, which was made notice of in

⁴²⁴ “entre filosofia da história e nomologia”[1886?] Letter to Barros Gomes, J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Correspondência*, op. cit. p.84.

⁴²⁵ See Jan Rehmann, *Max Weber: Modernisation as Passive Revolution: Gramscian Analysis*, translated by Max Henniger, Brill, Leiden, 2015, p.60.

⁴²⁶ “Materialism in philosophy, individualism in law, free-trade in the economy, [these] are coeval and correlative aberrations” / “O materialismo na filosofia, o individualismo na jurisprudência, o livre cambismo na economia, são aberrações coevas e correlativas” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Regime das Riquezas (elementos de crematística)*, op. cit. p.8.

⁴²⁷ See page 59 of the present work.

⁴²⁸ “There is therefore a side of the Germanic ideas that has fortunately only been assimilated by us after it has passed through France” / “há por isso um lado das ideias germânicas que felizmente só tem sido assimilado por entre nós depois de passar por França” J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Os poetas da escola nova, Páginas desconhecidas*, op. cit. pp.199-200

the previous chapter, advocates that humans are historical but only in an ideal sense, where a series of variations take place in the mind, but history in a material sense remains outside reason and as such the critique of the fixity of rationality is thrown on to materialism. Is matter or are the instinctive based physical laws ahistorical for Oliveira Martins?

The later approach to Hartmann and Schopenhauer's philosophy gives another meaning to the vocabulary earlier used in relation to Hegel and Proudhon. This study was not able to focus on the teachings he reaped from them, as it falls outside our main topic, but he considers those as the "modern philosophies" of Germany⁴²⁹.

This exposition focused on the main points of interest in the relationship of Oliveira Martins with German philosophy and Hegel, having as a nodal point the sources from which he gathered those ideas. Certain aspects have turned a thematic guided orientation to which a couple of others could be added, such as the anthropological and religious considerations of Oliveira Martins and their relationship with the protestant reform. The conclusions of our findings are to be found in the exposition itself but Hegel can be said, in short, to have a lasting presence in Oliveira Martins's thought.

⁴²⁹ "[The] modern philosophies, (Schopenhauer-Hartmann) taking evolution from the point in which the investigations of the wise have left it, have been rationally defining progress, which science recognises as a fact; because they also expose in a rational manner, the essence of this force, of which universality the sciences have also discovered and philosophy confirms." / "Modernas filosofias, (Schopenhauer-Hartmann), tomando a evolução no ponto a que as investigações dos sábios a levaram, têm definido racionalmente o progresso, que a ciência reconhece como um facto; porque expõem, também de um modo racional, a essência dessa força, cuja universalidade também as ciências descobriram, e a filosofia confirma." J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Elementos de Antropologia: História natural do homem*, op. cit. p.70.

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