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Orientadores: Doutor Jorge Miguel Alves Fernandes,

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Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Ciência Política, especialidade em Política Comparada.

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Abstracts

English

Coalitions are the most common form of government in presidential systems, and the burgeoning literature on the topic has recently shifted its focus from the formation and termination stages to the governance stage of the coalition life cycle. However, this literature often adopts a narrow view of delegation, treating the president as the coalition's sole principal, and has focused mainly on the role of presidents in monitoring coalition partners. Political parties have been overlooked. Furthermore, research on coalition governance under presidentialism remains limited to Brazil. As such, this thesis sets out to address the following question: do coalition parties in presidential systems "shadow" one another with an eye on reducing agency loss, that is, do they appoint junior ministers or committee chairs to (committees overseeing) portfolios controlled by another party or the president? To address this question, this thesis makes three contributions. First, it proposes an alternative conceptual framework for coalition governance in presidential systems: the *presidential compromise model*, which conceives of the president and parties collectively forming a principal that delegates authority to the coalition's members. Second and third, it looks at the conditions under which political parties employ junior ministers and committee chairs to shadow their coalition partners. Using an original data set covering 31 cabinets in nine multiparty presidential democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, this thesis finds that shadowing is a function of the degree of agency loss the coalition expects to a specific portfolio and of institutional learning. Specifically, it finds that the shadowing of nonpartisan ministers is positively affected by presidential powers and democratic experience, while committee shadowing is a function of ideological distance, portfolio salience and committee powers. These results suggest that parties strategically employ junior ministers and committee chairs to curb delegation perils and implement their collective policy agenda.

Keywords: coalition governance, coalitional presidentialism, Latin America, Africa, Asia.

Português

Presidentes ao redor do mundo governam cada vez mais através da formação de coligações. A literatura sobre presidencialismo de coligação tem expandido o seu foco das fases de formação e terminação das coligações para a fase da governança. Paralelamente à sua expansão substantiva, a literatura sobre presidencialismo de coligação tem começado a ir além das suas origens latino-americanas, mas investigação sobre casos noutras regiões continua limitada. O conceito da governança coligacional (*coalition governance*) tem a sua origem na literatura sobre os sistemas parlamentaristas e gira em torno da questão de como as coligações governam, tendo um foco especial na delegação entre os parceiros da coligação. A investigação sobre a governança coligacional em sistemas presidencialistas ainda encontra-se num estado iniciante e tem se limitado a estudos de caso de um único país: o Brasil. Ademais, a mesma tem tendido a adotar o ponto de vista do presidente ao invés do dos partidos da coligação.

Esta tese busca preencher estas lacunas através de uma exploração comparativa da governança coligacional em sistemas presidencialistas, incluindo casos fora da América Latina, e focando na perspetiva dos partidos da coligação, tratando-os como "principais" (*principals*) da coligação junto ao presidente. Mais especificamente, a tese faz três contributos: (1) a elaboração de um modelo teórico para a governança coligacional nos sistemas presidencialistas, chamado de "modelo de compromisso presidencial" (*presi-*

dential compromise model), e que é baseado em práticas existentes nalguns sistemas presidencialistas, além de analisar comparativamente e quantitativamente a utilização de dois instrumentos pelos partidos da coligação para fins de "monitoramento e comunicação de informações" (*monitoring and reporting*) relativo aos parceiros: ministros júnior e presidentes de comissões parlamentares.

Um capítulo é dedicado a cada uma destas contribuições. Capítulo 1 identifica um modelo implícito que é dominante na literatura sobre presidencialismo de coligação, e que trata o presidente como único principal da coligação e os partidos que integram-na como os seus agentes. O nome que é dado para este modelo é "modelo de primazia presidencial" (*presidential primacy model*). Por contraste, o capítulo observe que este modelo não aplica-se de forma exaustiva às práticas observadas no presidencialismo de coligação, citando exemplos do Brasil, do Chile e do Uruguai. Tomando inspiração do "modelo de compromisso coligacional" (*coalition compromise model*) que tem origem na literatura parlamentarista, o capítulo elabora uma perspetiva alternativa sobre a governança coligacional nos sistemas presidencialistas: o "modelo de compromisso presidencial" (*presidential compromise model*). Em seguida, o capítulo analisa os métodos dos quais os partidos nos sistemas presidencialistas dispõe para limitar a "perda de agência" (*agency loss*) em relação ao presidente e os seus demais parceiros de coligação, utilizando um quadro teórico para a delegação que consiste de quatro elementos: o "desenho de contratos" (*contract design*), "*triagem e seleção*" (screening and selection), "*monitoramento e comunicação de informações*" (monitoring and reporting), e "*controlos institucionais*" (institutional checks).

Os capítulos 2 e 3 partem deste quadro teórico e analisam empiricamente dois instrumentos da categoria de monitoramento e comunicação de informações numa amostra de nove países em três continentes. Estes países foram selecionados com base nos seguintes critérios: (1) uma experiência democrática significativa, operacionalizada com base numa pontuação *Polity V* positiva durante ao menos quatro mandatos presidenciais ou 16 anos; (2) a predominância de gabinetes multipartidários (ao menos 75% do tempo); (3) o equilíbrio geográfico entre as diferentes regiões, (4) uma preferência para casos emblemáticos, nomeadamente, aqueles que são prominentes na literatura sobre o presidencialismo de coligação. Estes critérios levaram a uma amostra que consiste de um total de 9 países, nomeadamente: o Brasil, o Chile e o Uruguai na América Latina; o Benin, o Quênia, e o Maláui em África; e a Indonésia, as Filipinas e o Sri Lanka na Ásia. O Benin teve de ser omitido do terceiro capítulo pelo facto de os presidentes daquele país tenderem a ser independentes (sem partido), o que era problemático para o desenho da investigação daquele capítulo, por motivos que serão explicados de forma mais detalhada no mesmo. Por outro lado, o Sri Lanka teve de ser omitido do Capítulo 4 porque não havia comissões parlamentares independentes do poder executivo no período de interesse.

Capítulo 3 analisa a nomeação de ministros júnior ("MJs" daqui por diante) pelos partidos da coligação para acompanharem (*shadow*) os ministros dos demais partidos da coligação, assim como os ministros independentes, os quais tendem a ser leais ao presidente. 'Acompanhamento' é definido aqui como uma situação na qual um ministro do partido A é acompanhado por um ministro júnior do partido B no mesmo ministério. Os resultados demostram que há uma maior probabilidade de os partidos acompanharem ministros independentes na medida que os presidentes se tornam mais poderosos. Os resultados também sugerem que a duração da experiência democrática interage positivamente com os poderes do presidente no seu impacto sobre o acompanhamento, o que indica haver um processo de aprendizagem institucional em curso. Capítulo 4, por sua vez, analisa a utilização das presidências das comissões parlamentares ("PCs" aqui por diante) para fins de acompanhamento. Aqui, 'acompanhamento' é definido como uma situação em que um ministro do partido A é acompanhado por um PC do partido de coligação B numa área de políticas públicas correspondente à do ministério. Capítulo 4 exclusivamente leva em consideração os ministros partidários, porque os ministros independentes limitam o número de possibilidades ao acompanhamento por parte dos partidos da oposição ou por parte dos demais partidos da coligação, sendo que, por definição, não podem ser acompanhados pelo próprio partido, já que eles não têm partido. Portanto, a inclusão dos ministros independentes distorceria os resultados, pelo facto de automaticamente haver uma probabilidade maior de serem acompanhados de acordo com a definição acima mencionada. Os resultados demostram que tanto a distância ideológica entre o partido do ministro e a média ponderada da coligação, quanto a saliência dos ministérios, têm um impacto positivo sobre o acompanhamento.

Ademais, os resultados sugerem que sistemas de comissões poderosos reduzem a incidência do acompanhamento, o que pode ser relacionado ao risco elevado de perda de agência intrapartidária nos sistemas caracterizados pela divisão de poderes.

A principal implicação destes resultados é que, nos sistemas presidencialistas caracterizados pela predominância de governos de coligação, os partidos da coligação fazem uso estratégico de ferramentas institucionais para monitorarem os seus parceiros. As variáveis-chave que influenciam este monitoramento, porém, parecem depender do tipo de ferramenta utilizada, no sentido em que o acompanhamento por MJ é principalmente uma função dos poderes do presidente e da idade da democracia, enquanto o acompanhamento por PC é principalmente impactado pela distância ideológica, a saliência dos ministérios e pelos poderes das comissões. Isto por sua vez sugere que os partidos ingressam nas coligações, ao menos em parte, por motivações relacionadas à implementação de políticas públicas, e buscam assegurar que todos os parceiros da coligação implementem de forma fidedigna as políticas públicas que foram previamente acordadas.

Porém, esta tese também sofre de algumas limitações. Em primeiro lugar, o monitoramento não é diretamente observado. Ao invés disto, a constelação de ministros, MJs e PCs é usada como variável proxy para inferir a existência de tal monitoramento. Porém, a dita configuração não constitui evidência definitiva para o monitoramento supostamente feito por parte dos MJs e PCs que acompanham os ministros dos demais partidos da coligação. Em segundo lugar, as assimetrias no acesso aos dados entre as regiões deixaram a amostra desequilibrada, no sentido de que as observações dos países latino-americanos predominam. Isto pode afetar a generalizabilidade dos resultados. Em terceiro lugar, o fato de o número de países incluído ser relativamente pequeno significa que a investigação não está muito bem equipada para testar os efeitos das variáveis que são praticamente fixas ao nível do país, como os poderes presidenciais e das comissões. Por último, cada dispositivo de monitoramento foi analisado em isolamento, pois considerar a interação entre os dois teria levantado dificuldades na definição da unidade da análise e na determinação da ordem temporal das variáveis, o que significa que qualquer impacto de um dispositivo sobre o outro, que possa ter afetado os resultados, não foi levado em consideração.

Em reposta às limitações acima mencionadas, investigações futuras deveriam fazer trabalho de campo incluindo entrevistas com os atores políticos de interesse para poderem observar o monitoramento na prática. Estudos quantitativos deveriam expandir a amostra com mais países e anos, e utilizar métodos mais avançados, como simulações Monte Carlo, que sejam melhor equipados para simular o fato de que os padrões de acompanhamento não são fixas de antemão, e analisar múltiplos dispositivos de monitoramento de forma simultânea, embora isto requeira superar o desafio de determinar qual observação antecede à outra: a nomeação dos MJs ou a eleição dos PCs. Outras empreitadas relevantes incluem estudar quais partidos têm a maior probabilidade de acompanharem os parceiros, ao invés de determinar quais ministérios têm a maior probabilidade de serem acompanhados. Por último, o impacto do monitoramento sobre as políticas públicas deve ser estudado tanto quantitativamente, quanto qualitativamente.

Palavras-chave: governança coligacional, presidencialismo de coligação, América Latina, África, Ásia.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Presidents worldwide increasingly govern through coalitions (Chaisty et al., 2018). The literature on coalitional presidentialism has slowly begun to expand its focus from the formation and termination stages to the governance stage of the coalition lifecycle. In parallel with its substantive expansion, the coalitional presidentialism literature has also begun moving beyond its Latin American origins (Chaisty, 2014; Chaisty et al., 2018), but research on cases in other regions has remained limited.

The literature on coalition governments initially focused on parliamentary systems, and preoccupied itself primarily with static issues, the formation of coalitions, their makeup and their termination (Strøm & Müller, 1999). Few scholars seemed to care about what happened in between: how did coalitions actually govern? This is where the concept of coalition governance entered the scene. Coalition governance revolves around precisely the question of how coalitions govern, being especially concerned with delegation among coalition partners (Bergman et al., 2021a). Coalition governance can be understood in terms of delegation problems and the solutions to these problems. Two fundamental problems plague coalition governments. First, the executive branch is compartmentalized into discrete departments, each of which is headed by a minister, and each minister is both an agent of the cabinet and, at least in parliamentary systems, where cabinets are collectively responsible, also a co-principal, complicating the principal-agent relationship (Andeweg, 2000). Furthermore, ministers have privileged access to information on the goings on in their ministries, information that is hidden from their colleagues (Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Thies, 2001). This informational advantage allows ministers to take policy within their portfolios towards their own or their parties' ideal points, deviating from the coalition compromise (ibid.). This is known as shirking (Müller, 2000). Second, in coalition governments, the ministers come from multiple parties, which have divergent preferences, and ministers are essentially double agents that respond to two competing principals: the cabinet and the party (Andeweg, 2000). The fact that different ministers respond to different parties provides them with the incentive to shirk, whereas the compartmentalized nature of the cabinet provides them with the opportunity to act on those incentives.

When scholars began to take delegation in coalition governments seriously, it was initially believed that the aforementioned challenges were insurmountable and that coalition cabinets would inevitably descend into a situation of mutual abdication of control by the coalition partners over one anothers' portfolios (Laver & Shepsle, 1996). Essentially, it was assumed that ministers were perfect agents of their parties and acted as "policy dictators" within their jurisdictions (ibid.). This pessimistic view was challenged by a group of authors who argued that 1. mutual abdication was Pareto suboptimal, and 2. coalition governments were equipped with a set of tools that they could employ to actually govern together and enforce the coalition compromise (Strøm & Müller, 1999; Thies, 2001). The literature then shifted its focus towards empirically studying the usage of these tools, including coalition agreements (Strøm & Müller, 1999; Müller & Strøm, 2008; Moury, 2011, 2013) and the matching of junior ministers (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer & Pierce, 2011) and committee chairs (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll & Cox, 2012) from one coalition party to ministers of another to keep tabs on said ministers and prevent them from shirking, to name a few examples.

The development of the literature on coalition governments in presidential systems largely mirrored that of its parliamentary counterpart. For a long time it was believed that coalition governments were not

a relevant phenomenon in presidential systems, a view influenced by Linzian arguments about the "perils of presidentialism", the idea that presidential systems inherently tended towards interbranch conflict and breakdown, especially in combination with multiparty systems (Linz, 1990; Mainwaring, 1993). This pessimistic view began to shift when empirical works emerged which demonstrated that the majority of presidents whose parties did not control legislative majorities governed with coalition cabinets (Cheibub et al., 2004). Simultaneously, a literature developed that sought to identify the conditions under which presidents built coalitions (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006), as well as examine and explain the makeup of those cabinets, focusing on the proportion of non-partisan to partisan ministers (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010; Lee, 2018a), the fairness of the distribution of cabinet posts among the coalition parties (Amorim Neto, 1994; Amorim Neto & Tafner, 2002; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010), and their ideological composition (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011). The end of the coalition life cycle also attracted attention, with scholars studying the breakdown or erosion of presidential coalitions (Altman, 2000; Acosta & Polga-Hecimovich, 2011). More recently, pre-electoral coalitions have come into focus (Kellam, 2017; Borges et al., 2021; Albala et al., 2023; Albala & Couto, 2023).

The logical next step was to move beyond this focus on the static characteristics of coalitions towards coalition governance. Research on coalition governance in presidential systems is still in an incipient state and has largely confined itself to case studies of a single case: Brazil. Specifically, coalition monitoring by committee chairs (Inácio & Rezende, 2015), junior ministers (Pereira et al., 2017) and legislative information requests to ministers (Silva & Medina, 2023) have been studied in the Brazilian context. Notably, the latter two works have adopted the perspective of the parties rather than that of the president, which has been largely overlooked in the coalitional presidentialism literature[1].

It is not completely clear why coalition governance in the sense of Bergman et al. (2021a) has attracted so little attention in the presidential context. At the time of writing, in 2024, nine years have passed since the first work explicitly dealing with this issue was published (Inácio & Rezende, 2015), and only two other works on the topic have been published since then. Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter (2015) write about agency loss from presidents to ministers but focus on single-party rather than coalition cabinets. That leaves Pereira et al. (2017) and Silva & Medina (2023) aside from Inácio & Rezende (2015). Three studies in nine years, on one country: Brazil. Part of the reason likely has to do with data access. Brazil is an obvious starting point for studying coalition governance as it has a long-established tradition of studying coalitional presidentialism and has brought forth many of the prime experts on coalitional presidentialism. In fact, it was a Brazilian political scientist, Sérgio Abranches (1988), who coined the term 'coalitional presidentialism'. Brazil is also known to be a data rich country, where public institutions have well developed data infrastructures. The same, however, is arguably true for other Latin American countries like Chile and Uruguay. However, my own data collection efforts made me realize how much more difficult it was to obtain data on junior ministers and committee chairs in the Asian and African countries of my sample.

But data access seems to be only a part of the problem. After all, the data on Latin American countries is accessible, but interest in coalition governance has remained lacking. This is probably related to the predominant focus of the president as the only relevant actor in presidential cabinets, something I elaborate further on in Chapter 2. In that sense, presidents are expected to manage delegation to their ministers, but parties, and thus coalitions, are not taken into account.

This thesis attempts to fill these lacunae by exploring coalition governance in presidential systems comparatively. It does so in three work packages: (1) theorizing more properly a coalition compromise model akin to that developed for the parliamentary literature (Bergman et al., 2021a), which it shall call the presidential compromise model, and which is rooted in observed practice in existing presidential systems, as well as comparatively and quantitatively analyzing the use of two different instruments by coalition partners for 'monitoring and reporting'[2] purposes vis-à-vis their partners: (2) the employment of junior ministers, and (3) legislative committee chairs.

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[1] Important exceptions include Altman (2000); Magar & Moraes (2012); Inácio (2013).

[2] See Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991).

The broader contributions made by this thesis are threefold: (1) the adoption of a global perspective by including countries on three continents, (2) a data collection effort of difficult to mobilize data on officials below the ministerial level, where it was often not clear from the outset whether this data could be obtained at all for some of the African and Asian cases, and (3) a focus on the perspective of the coalition parties, taking their motivations and objectives seriously.

Each of work package has its own chapter in this thesis. Chapter 2 identifies an implicit model that is dominant in the coalitional presidentialism literature, and which treats the president as the sole principal of the coalition and the coalition parties as his agents. It proceeds to call this the presidential primacy model. The chapter then argues that this model does not exhaustively apply to the observed practice of coalitional presidentialism, citing examples from Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Taking inspiration from the coalition compromise model that emerged from the parliamentary literature, it formulates an alternative perspective on coalition governance in presidential systems: the presidential compromise model. It then proceeds to examine the methods parties in presidential systems can employ to limit agency loss to the president and to their partners, making use of Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991)'s framework of contract design, screening and selection, monitoring and reporting, and institutional checks.

Chapters 3 and 4 then build onto this theoretical framework and empirically examine two agency-loss reducing instruments within the category of monitoring and reporting in a sample of 9 countries on three continents. These countries were selected based on the following criteria: (1) significant democratic experience, operationalized as having a positive Polity V score for at least four presidential terms or 16 years; (2) an overwhelming share of multiparty cabinets (at least 75% of the time); (3) geographic balance across regions; (4) a preference for what could be called emblematic cases, those that have featured prominently in the literature on coalitional presidentialism. These criteria led to a sample totaling 9 country cases, which are Brazil, Chile and Uruguay in Latin America, Benin, Kenya and Malawi in Africa, and Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka in Asia. Benin had to be omitted from Chapter 3 as a result of the fact that presidents there tend to be independent, which posed a problem for the research design of that chapter, for reasons that will be explained in more depth there. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, had to be omitted from chapter 4 as there were no independent legislative committees at the time of interest.

Chapter 3 looks at the employment of junior ministers (henceforth JMs) by coalition parties to "shadow" ministers from other parties as well as those independent ministers loyal to the president. Shadowing here is defined as a situation where a minister from party A is overseen by a junior minister from party B in the same portfolio. It finds that parties are more likely to shadow non-partisan ministers when presidents are more powerful. It also finds that the age of democracy positively interacts with presidential powers in its impact on shadowing, suggesting that there is an institutional learning curve at play. Chapter 4 then analyzes the use of parliamentary committee chairs (henceforth CCs) for shadowing purposes. Here, shadowing is defined as a situation where a minister from party A is overseen by a CC from coalition party B in a matching jurisdiction. This chapter only considers partisan ministers, as non-partisan ministers limit the number of possibilities to being overseen by the opposition or by a coalition party, but they can per definition not be overseen by their own party, which they do not have. Including independent ministers would therefore distort the results, as they would automatically be more likely to be shadowed. Chapter 4 finds that shadowing is positively impacted by the ideological distance between a minister's party and the weighted coalition mean, as well as by the salience of portfolios. It furthermore suggests that powerful committee systems reduce the incidence of shadowing, which may be related to the increased risk of intraparty agency loss in separation of powers systems.

The main implication of these findings is that, in presidential systems characterized by the prevalence of coalition governments, coalition parties strategically employ institutional tools to keep tabs on their partners. The key predictors of keeping tabs appear to depend on the type of tool, however, with JM-based shadowing being mainly a function of presidential powers and the age of democracy, while CC-based shadowing is primarily impacted by ideological distance, portfolio salience and committee powers. This in turn implies that parties join coalitions, at least in part, for policy motivations, and strive to assure that the collectively agreed-upon policy agenda is faithfully implemented by all coalition partners.

However, this research also suffers from a number of limitations. First of all, it is unable to directly observe monitoring by JMs and CCs, instead relying on the observable partisan allocation of these offices to infer the underlying intention of monitoring. Nevertheless, this limitation is shared by many of the key works on coalition shadowing in parliamentary systems, such as Thies (2001), Lipsmeyer & Pierce (2011) and Carroll & Cox (2012). Taking the observed non-randomness of the allocation of offices with monitoring power, given its correlation with variables governing the coalition actors' strategic considerations, and marshalling it as evidence of monitoring, has been standard practice in this literature.

Second, the small number of countries included force me to take caution when interpreting the effects of variables that are by and large constant at the country level, namely presidential powers (Chapter 3) and committee powers (Chapter 4). Third, asymmetries in data access across regions have led to an unbalanced sample, with implications for the generalizability of the findings. Fourth, and related to the first limitation, is that the research cannot completely disentangle office motivations (i.e., spoils division) from monitoring motivations behind the allocation of JMs and CCs (Pukelis, 2016). Fifth and finally, each empirical chapter looks at one method in isolation, as taking both into account simultaneously would lead to issues regarding the definition of the unit of analysis across and within countries,[3] and ignores alternative methods, making it impossible to isolate substitutability effects, whereby the use of one method turns the other superfluous and vice-versa.

Future studies should take the present research agenda further by: (1) investing in the collection of more data on more cases, while moving beyond the paradigmatic cases of my initial comparative foray into the subject; (2) examining which parties are more likely to do the shadowing, rather than looking at which party characteristics affect the likelihood of a minister being shadowed; (3) detecting the actual occurrence of shadowing in practice using interview methods; (4) analyzing the usage of multiple monitoring devices simultaneously, and (5) studying the effect of shadowing on policy outcomes. This introduction proceeds with more detailed summaries of the thesis' three main chapters.

Summary of Chapter 2: Models of Coalition Governance in Presidential Systems

Chapter 2 begins with the observation that the coalitional presidentialism literature has, to differing degrees of explicitness, largely assumed that the president is the sole principal of the coalition, and the coalition parties her agents. It refers to this view as the presidential primacy model. However, building on the concept of *transversalismo* (Boeninger, 1998; Lanzaro, 2012a), whereby governance in each policy jurisdiction is shared among multiple parties, such as in Chile's *Concertación* governments, as well as on the coalition compromise model (Bergman et al., 2021a) from the parliamentary literature, Chapter 2 formulates an alternative view on coalition governance in presidential systems, which it calls the presidential compromise model. This term echoes both the coalition compromise model, as well *presidencialismo de compromiso*, which Lanzaro (2012b) uses to describe the Uruguay's democratic governments of the 20th century and associates with *transversalismo*. This alternative view conceives of coalition parties as co-principals alongside the president. It treats the coalition as a stable alliance of parties supporting the president, underpinned by a mutually agreed-upon policy agenda.

In its opening sections, Chapter 2 reviews the existing coalitional presidentialism literature, focusing on the delegation perils inherent to coalition government, the additional risks introduced by the separation of powers, as well as on the solutions to such perils from the perspective of the president. In its main contribution section, it then reviews the solutions parties can employ to reduce agency loss to one another and to the president. Some of these have been previously studied, while others are more speculative, although all of them are derived from existing literature. Regarding contract design, Chapter 2 highlights the importance of pre-electoral coalitions for tying presidents to the mast regarding their promises (Kellam, 2017). When it comes to screening and selection, it considers inter-party candidate selection for the

[3] The unit of analysis in chapter 4 is constrained by both the inauguration of the legislature as well as that of the president, whereas in Chapter 3 it is only constrained by the inauguration of the president.

presidency at the pre-electoral stage as a mechanism whereby parties can exert control over the selection of the president as well as other parties to coalesce with (Golder, 2006). Monitoring and reporting can be achieved by the methods that are studied in this thesis, shadowing by JM and CC, aside from a number of additional legislature-based methods such as legislative review and information requests to ministers. Finally, while admitting that hard institutional checks are non-existent in coalition governance, and especially *vis-à-vis* the president, the chapter identifies legislative committees with gatekeeping power, as well as gate-keeping ministries and agenda cartels as (voluntary) institutional checks arrangements.

The chapter then proceeds with a discussion in which it raises a number of questions. First, it asks to what extent the presidential compromise model is representative of the global coalitional presidentialism experience. While a number of governments certainly come close to it, notably those of the *Concertación*, those of post-dictatorship Uruguay as well as those of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, future research should point out to what extent these represent the broader population of cases. Second, the question of how well this model travels to other contexts with directly elected presidents, that is, semi-presidentialism and its subtypes. A president in a premier-presidential system governing with a unified coalition government, that is, where both the prime minister and the president belong to the same party or coalition, would probably be the closest approximation to the presidential compromise model. Fourth, following recent research that has linked presidential coalition characteristics to policy outcomes (Chaisty & Power, 2023), it asks how a governance experience in line with the presidential compromise model could affect policy outcomes, but signals that this is primarily a question for future research and would require additional data to confirm. Finally, the strength of the agency-loss-reducing mechanisms available to parties is compared with those available to presidents, and it is found that especially ex-post mechanisms—monitoring and reporting and institutional checks—favor presidents.

Summary of Chapter 3: Shadowing by Junior Minister

Chapter 3 observes that shadowing by JM has only been studied in one case, Brazil, and from the perspective of the president rather than that of the parties. It sets out to address this gap by quantitatively analyzing JM-based shadowing by parties in the 8 countries mentioned in the opening subsection of this introduction. The chapter operationally distinguishes between two types of shadowing: nonpartisan shadowing, which is when a partisan JM shadows a nonpartisan minister, and partisan shadowing, which is when a partisan JM shadows a partisan minister from a different party. All remaining configurations—a nonpartisan minister with nonpartisan JM, or a partisan minister and a JM from the same party—constitute 'no shadowing'.

The chapter formulates three hypotheses on correlations with variables we should see if parties employ JMs for shadowing purposes: (1) ideological distance between the minister's party and the coalition's weighted mean position, which is a predictor of agency loss among coalition partners and should be positively correlated with partisan shadowing; (2) presidential powers, which is a predictor of agency loss to the president and should be positively associated with nonpartisan shadowing—nonpartisan ministers being treated as faithful presidential agents as they owe their positions to the president only (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015)—; (3) the age of democracy, operationalized as the number of years since the country last became democratic, to account for the institutional learning effect that shadowing may be subject to. Regarding this last hypothesis, an interaction effect is expected between the age of democracy and presidential powers, whereby democratic experience strengthens the positive effect of powers on shadowing, as parties learn how to govern together with strong presidents.

Using a fractional response regression model (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996), necessary due to the fact that the outcome values are not independent of one another,[4] the chapter finds support for hypotheses 2 and 3, but not for 1, as the effect of ideological distance is negative rather than positive. This is attributed

[4] Central to statistical inference is the 'independent observations assumption', which means that the observations in a sample must not influence one another. In the case of Chapter 3, this observation is violated, because if party A decides to shadow a portfolio held by party B in the first round of office allocation, it would have fewer JMs left to cover its own portfolios in a second round,

to the possibility that parties that are ideologically distant from the coalition have incentives to resist shadowing by their partners.

Summary of Chapter 4: Shadowing by Committee

Like Chapter 3, Chapter 4 starts from the observation that shadowing by committee has only been studied in one case, Brazil, and sets out to address that gap using a broader set of countries. It innovates by treating committees not only as monitoring devices but also as institutional checks, as they tend to have gatekeeping powers over bills (Fortunato, 2021; Zubek, 2021). Unlike Chapter 3, Chapter 4 only looks at one type of shadowing, that which Chapter 3 called partisan shadowing, and excludes nonpartisan ministers from the sample for reasons set out in the opening section of this introduction.

It also identifies three variables with the potential to affect the incidence of shadowing: ideological distance, which affects the probability of agency loss, portfolio salience, which affects the impact of agency loss on policy outcomes, and committee powers, which affect the effectiveness of monitoring. The first two hypotheses are straightforward: the greater the ideological distance between the minister and the coalition mean, the greater the chance that the respective portfolio is shadowed, and the more salient the portfolio, the greater the probability that it is shadowed. The expectation regarding committee powers, however, is more complex: more powerful committees could induce shadowing, but they could also discourage it, as they may excessively constrain ministers. Finally, it could be that committee powers have no effect on shadowing within countries, as they mostly vary across countries, and shadowing would still make sense even when committees are weak compared to other countries. The chapter therefore remains agnostic with regard to the effect of committee powers.

In line with previous research on parliamentary systems (Carroll & Cox, 2012), Chapter 4 employs a multilevel logistic model, whereby portfolios are grouped into their ministers' parties at a secondary level. This is important, because some parties may be more broadly policy-seeking than others and thus may be more likely to shadow portfolios controlled by their partners rather than covering their own, whereas others may be more narrowly interested in the policy jurisdictions they themselves control and resist shadowing. Support for hypotheses 1 and 2 is found, but committee powers have a negative effect, which is attributed to the risk of intra-party agency loss between cabinet representatives and legislators under separation of powers. Specifically, legislators may monitor and check ministers from partner parties in ways unforeseen by their party's cabinet representatives, and strong committees would exacerbate this risk. However, it must be kept in mind that the small number of countries included in the sample do not make this research design very well suited to testing the effect of variables that are largely fixed at the country level (in this case committee powers).

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making shadowing of those portfolios by other parties more likely. This issue is partially remedied by the fractional response model.

Chapter 2

Models of coalition governance in presidential systems

Introduction

The literature on coalitional presidentialism has expanded from its Brazilian origins (Abranches, 1988) to other countries in Latin America (Lanzaro, 1998; Serrafero, 1999; Malamud, 2001) and across the world (Hamid, 2012; Chaisty et al., 2014, 2018; Mietzner, 2016). Simultaneously, the literature on multiparty presidentialism[1] has moved from a pessimistic outlook on that particular institutional combination (Mainwaring, 1993) to an optimistic perspective emphasizing coalition building to overcome institutional deadlock and democratic breakdown (Cheibub et al., 2004; Cheibub & Limongi, 2010; Power, 2010).

After having established that coalitions are frequently formed in multiparty presidential systems, the literature shifted its focus from the formation and termination stages to the governance stage of the coalition lifecycle. However, it has largely confined itself to studying the role of presidents in managing coalitions, and the tools and resources presidents use to keep their coalition partners in check in the legislature as well as the executive branch (Raile et al., 2011; Chaisty et al., 2014, 2018; Mietzner, 2016; Inácio & Llanos, 2016; Pereira et al., 2017; Bertholini & Pereira, 2017; Chaisty & Chernykh, 2017; Mejía-Guinand et al., 2018). I argue that this disproportionate emphasis on the actions and motivations of presidents to the detriment of those of the remaining coalition partners stems from an implicit view of the president as the principal of the coalition, without taking into consideration alternative ways to conceive of coalition governance. I call this view the presidential primacy model.

I argue that treating the president as the principal of the coalition is not the only valid way of approaching coalition governance in presidential systems. Instead, I propose an alternative model, which treats the coalition—defined as a stable interparty alliance—as a collective principal composed of its constituent entities (Andeweg, 2000). I call this the presidential compromise model. While the related coalition compromise model, according to which "partners try to constrain ministers from other parties by using various coalition governance mechanisms" (Bergman et al., 2021b, pp. 3-4), is used in the parliamentary literature, it had hitherto not been ported to presidential systems, which are characterized by different dynamics. The rationale is that gaining a better understanding of coalition governance in presidential systems requires taking into account the motivations and preferences of all coalition actors, not just the president.

While the president is constitutionally the principals of the cabinet, coalition government does not necessarily imply the president is also the de facto principal of the coalition parties. While I do not deny that presidents are powerful actors, they are not the only characters with agency and, especially in the context of coalition government, do not rule alone. This is not only a theoretical assumption, but has been observed 'in the wild', for instance in Chile's *Concertación* governments, which were characterized by "a dynamic of transversal relationships between ministers and other public officials, belonging to

[1] Whereas multiparty presidentialism describes an institutional context, coalitional presidentialism refers to an outcome within that context: occurrence of coalition cabinets.

different coalition parties" (Lanzaro, 2012a, p. 47). This *transversalismo* (Boeninger, 1998; Lanzaro, 2012a) presupposes a different understanding of the chain of delegation in presidential coalition cabinets, as it treats all coalition parties as co-principals.

However, rather than treating the presidential primacy and presidential compromise models as competing models, I treat them as different perspectives: one from the president's point of view, the other from the junior partners' point of view. This latter perspective has also begun to attract interest (Inácio & Rezende, 2015; Silva & Medina, 2023).

This paper aims to provide a conceptual framework for studying presidential coalition governance, as well as a review of the existing literature and how it fits into said framework. Specifically, after discussing the agency loss risks in coalition governments and the solutions to them, I review the existing literature on coalition governance in presidential systems. I then introduce the presidential compromise model and review some of the solutions that coalition parties, rather than the president alone, have at their disposal to reduce agency loss to their partners. This is followed by a discussion in which I comparatively evaluate the effectiveness of the agency loss solutions associated with each model and conclude that, while the ex ante solutions do not clearly favor presidents over parties or vice versa, presidents are in a privileged position vis-à-vis parties to exploit the ex post solutions.

Governing together: problems and solutions

In the context of coalition governance, independently of the political system, parties have an incentive to drift from the (unwritten) coalition agreement because they want to maximize their office and policy benefits. Specifically, parties can aim to extract more from their portfolios than is warranted or steer policy in a direction than deviates from the coalition compromise. What allows parties to act on these incentives is the hidden information, unavailable to the principal, that they possess about the goings on of the ministries they control as well as the hidden action (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991, pp. 25-26) they can execute within these ministries. Laver & Shepsle (1996) argued that, due to the complexity of legislation, ministers have too little time and expertise to "poke their noses" into the affairs of other ministries (p. 32). Furthermore, because of their access to civil service specialists in their jurisdictions and their ability to formulate law proposals, they can choose what issues to keep off the cabinet's collective agenda, while reducing the full range of lawmaking possibilities to a few discrete alternatives (pp. 37-38).

Laver & Shepsle (1996) thus assumed that far-reaching ministerial discretion was a given in coalition governments (p. 32). This view has come to be known as the ministerial government model (Bergman et al., 2021b, pp. 3-4). Strøm & Müller (1999) criticized Laver and Shepsle's model on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, they ask why rational actors would design their institutions in a way that gives parties such far-reaching agenda powers and prevents them from agreeing on mutually beneficial policy positions in each policy area (p. 274). Empirically, they argue that ministerial government does not correspond to actually observed coalition governance in parliamentary systems, in which decisions on "issues of major salience" are taken collectively by the cabinet (pp. 274-75). They also point out that, contrary to what Laver and Shepsle argue, coalition partners have institutional mechanisms to their disposal which facilitate the enforcement of collective coalition agreements (p. 275). For instance, departments can be shared between multiple ministers of different parties, junior ministers from one party may be assigned to portfolios of which the minister in charge is affiliated to another party, and clauses requiring joint ministerial action in the implementation of legislation may be added to the coalition agreement (ibid.). This view is what has come to be known as the coalition compromise model (Bergman et al., 2021b, pp. 3-4).

According to this model, solutions to the problem of agency loss can be divided into four categories: contract design, screening and selection, monitoring and reporting and institutional checks (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). The first category concerns an ex ante mechanism (which is employed before entering into an agreement): contract design (Strøm, 2000, p. 271). Contracts align the incentives of principals and agents by specifying positive rewards for agents' behavior in line with the principal's interests, as well as negative rewards (sanctions) for behavior that harms the principal (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991,

p. 28). In the context of parliamentary coalition governance, the most important type of contract-design solution is the coalition agreement, a public document detailing the coalition's collectively agreed-upon policy pledges (Strøm & Müller, 1999; Müller & Strøm, 2008; Moury, 2011, 2013).

A second category of ex ante mechanisms is screening and selection. Principals lack information on their agents' type, that is, their traits, such as their talents and work ethic (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991, p. 25). This can lead to a problem known as adverse selection, whereby agents of undesirable types are selected (ibid.). While principals cannot be certain about how their prospective agents will perform the functions delegated to them, screening can provide them with indicators or signals of the qualities they seek in their prospective agents (p. 30). In the context of coalition governance, an example of screening and selection would be parties coalescing with ideologically close partners in order to reduce conflict or agency loss (Axelrod, 1970; Swaan, 1973).

The third category is ex post (which is employed after an agreement has been made): monitoring and reporting requirements. Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991) identify three instruments in this category: requiring the agent to regularly report on their activities, direct "police patrol" oversight, and indirect monitoring through third parties who are affected by the agent's actions, so-called "fire alarms" (pp. 31-32). The latter is generally considered to be the most cost-efficient (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). In the context of coalition governance, these fire alarms can be junior ministers (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer & Pierce, 2011) or committee chairs (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll & Cox, 2012; Fortunato et al., 2019) from parties other than that of the respective minister. More generally, parties can make use of legislative review and scrutiny to monitor ministers belonging to other parties (Martin & Vanberg, 2004, 2005; Martin & Whitaker, 2019; Höhmann & Sieberer, 2020; Höhmann & Krauss, 2022).

Finally, the fourth category, also ex post, are institutional checks, which are defined as an arrangement such that "when authority has been delegated to an agent, there is at least one other agent with the authority to veto or to block the actions of that agent" (p. 34). Institutional checks work particularly well when the involved agents' incentives are opposed to one another, such that "ambition is (…) checked by ambition" (ibid.). In the context of coalition governance, an example of institutional checks is when parties compose a minimal winning coalition, which can individually act as veto players (Tsebelis, 1995). Another example is when certain policy areas are shared between multiple ministries or when gatekeeping ministries exist which must approve of the decisions made by other ministries (Thies, 2001, p. 583).

Coalition governance in presidential systems

Presidentialism introduces additional agency loss risks, which mainly result from the different delegation chain between the branches of government as well as within the executive. In a parliamentary system, there is a single chain of delegation running from voters to the parliament, then to the cabinet, and finally to the ministerial departments. In contrast, presidentialism features a "grid" of delegation where voters simultaneously delegate authority to two distinct agents: the president and the congress, both of which delegate to the departments (Strøm, 2000). This affects the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, as in presidential systems, the origin and survival of these two branches are separate, whereas in parliamentary systems, they are fused (Shugart & Carey, 1992).

Under presidentialism, legislatures and governments have greater autonomy from each other compared to parliamentarism. In parliamentary systems, the executive typically dominates the legislative process because it possesses significant agenda-setting power through the confidence vote and the ability to link specific policy issues to matters of confidence (Cox, 1987; Huber, 1996; Tsebelis, 2009). This is evident in the higher legislative passage rates of prime ministers compared to presidents (Saiegh, 2011). Thus, "policymaking power is concentrated to governments in parliamentary systems and to parliaments in presidential ones – exactly the opposite of what their names indicate" (Tsebelis, 2009, p. 17). Consequently, all else being equal, legislatures have a greater role in shaping policies and challenging executive authority under presidentialism than under parliamentarism. Additionally, the separation of powers affects the interests of legislators and presidents: the distinct election methods for the executive and legislature result in a separation of purpose between them, with legislators focusing more on local interests

Table 2.1: Delegation in parliamentary and presidential systems

	Executive-legislative delegation	Intra-executive delegation
Parliamentarism	Single chain from voters to parliament to cabinet to ministries	Collective responsibility: head is primus inter pares
Presidentialism	Grid: voters to legislature and voters to president, and both legislature and president to ministries	Hierarchical delegation: head is primus solus

and securing targeted funds for their constituencies, while presidents are responsible for national-level policies (Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

Presidentialism, however, not only features a different delegation structure between the branches of government but also inside the executive branch. Instead of a *primus inter pares*, we have a *primus solus* (Sartori, 1994): a president with the authority to appoint and dismiss ministers at his discretion, without directly impacting his own tenure in office (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). Table 2.1 summarizes these differences. Consequently, the concept of a coalition takes on a distinct character under presidentialism. Nevertheless, the fact that presidents whose parties lack legislative majorities have frequently formed majority coalition cabinets (Cheibub et al., 2004) attests to their reliance on support from parties other than their own. After all, stable legislative majorities, built upon a fair distribution of coalition benefits, serve as an effective means of shepherding the government's policy agenda through the legislature (Amorim Neto, 2006). While presidential government coalitions may operate more hierarchically than their parliamentary counterparts, even there junior coalition partners exert influence over policy outcomes (Magar & Moraes, 2012).

The different nature of presidentialism leads to a number of unique agency loss challenges. First, as the above discussion on the confidence vote implies, chief executives have less control over their coalition's legislative contingent than do prime ministers. Second, the aforementioned separation of purpose is reproduced within parties, splitting them into a legislative wing and an executive wing, meaning that presidents face greater intra-party agency loss than prime ministers (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). Third, as the president takes most of the credit for good government performance, coalition parties have less of an incentive to stay loyal to the president for the duration of the presidential term (Altman, 2000, p. 261).

But coalition parties also face agency loss vis-à-vis the president. There are two distinct delegation relationships here: one from the presidential party to the president and another from the junior partners to the president. The first relationship has been thoroughly theorized by Samuels (2002) and Samuels & Shugart (2010) and will not be further discussed here. Let it suffice to say that presidential parties have few means to keep their own president in office in check, and the means that do exist are extremely costly for the parties themselves. When it comes to the second delegation relationship, from the junior partners to the president, the clearest example of agency loss from a (pre-electoral) coalition to the president is the latter simply reneging on her campaign promises or agreements made with her coalition partners. The prevalence of policy switches by Latin American presidents attests to the fact that this is no hypothetical danger (Stokes, 2001; Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Campello, 2014; Lupu, 2014, 2016). However, this kind of agency loss is highly visible and allows parties to immediately apply sanctions if they consider that to be in their interest. More insidious kinds of agency loss are ministerial drift in favor of the president in portfolios controlled by nonpartisans (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015) or copartisans loyal to him, or the use of personal advisory networks, inner cabinets populated by loyalists or the agencies attached to the institutional presidency to bypass the ministries altogether (Siavelis, 2016; Inácio & Llanos, 2016; Batista, 2013).

I will now review the literature on coalition governance in presidential systems, following the same 4-way typology as in the previous section. Contract design has not been explicitly studied in the presidential literature, as formal, written coalition agreements are very rare (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 227); (Freudenreich, 2018, p. 8). However, when we adopt a less literal understanding of contract design and treat it as a general, mutual understanding between principal and agent of expectations and of the set of rewards and sanctions related to the (non)fulfilment of those expectations, much of the so-called presidential toolbox literature can be situated within contract design. This literature emphasizes that presidents possess tools such as cabinet appointment powers, budgetary powers and lawmaking powers they can use as carrots and sticks in order to induce the cooperation of their coalition partners (Raile et al., 2011; Chaisty et al., 2014, 2018). Just like an employer offering prospective employees a salary and other benefits in exchange for the latter becoming effectively his agent, a coalitional president 'hires' parties, offering them patronage, pork and policy in exchange for their service, that is, voting along with the government on key policy proposals on the floor of the legislature.

When it comes to screening and selection, presidential coalition cabinets tend to be composed of parties positioned close to the president's ideological position (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011), and so do pre-electoral presidential coalitions (Kellam, 2017, pp. 405-406).

Monitoring and reporting can take a number of forms. First, the appointment of junior ministers, either nonpartisan or affiliated with a different party than that of the minister, to portfolios to serve as fire alarms and report back to the president in case of deviant conduct (Pereira et al., 2017). Second, presidents can also place trusted advisors within certain ministries in order to obtain information on the goings-on within those ministries (Siavelis, 2016, p. 582), or make use of the agencies that are part of the institutional presidency to keep tabs on partisan ministers (Inácio & Llanos, 2016; Mejía-Guinand et al., 2018).

Finally, little has been written on institutional checks in presidential coalition governance, but gatekeeping ministries of the type mentioned in the previous section exist. A conspicuous example would be the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which controls the resources of most other agencies (Wood & Waterman, 1991, pp. 804-805). In coalitional presidentialism, this solution could be combined with the appointment of nonpartisan officials, loyal to the president, to key offices in order to limit agency loss (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). For instance, the gatekeeping ministry could be entrusted to a nonpartisan official.

The presidential compromise model

Much of the literature cited above tends to take the president implicitly as the sole principal. Inácio & Llanos (2016) succinctly capture the spirit of the contemporary coalitional presidentialism literature when they write that "presidents transform different parties into their agents" (p. 537). As such, authority is seen as flowing from the top down: from presidents to parties. I will henceforth refer to this as the presidential primacy model. It echoes a governance model from the parliamentary literature known as the prime ministerial model (Bergman et al., 2021b, pp. 3-4). In its crudest form, the prime ministerial model assumes "the exertion of monocratic authority by the premier", either by "decid[ing] policy across all issue areas in which she or he takes an interest; by deciding key issues which subsequently determine most remaining areas of government policy; or by defining a governing ethos, 'atmosphere' or operating ideology which generates predictable and determinate solutions to most policy problems, and hence so constrains other ministers' freedom of manoeuvre as to make them simple agents of the premier's will" (Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990, p. 6, p. 8).[2]

While presidents, and especially those in Latin America, are widely seen as very powerful (Alegre & Maisley, 2022), this does not mean that coalition government necessarily need to descend into presidential autocracy. In fact, in the Spanish language literature, the concept of *transversalismo* has been in

[2] It must be pointed out that this model is not realistic for coalition governments in parliamentary systems, and in fact emerges from the literature on the UK and its single party cabinets.

use since the 1990s. It is not clear who coined it, but it seems to have already been in usage[3] during the Aylwin government (1990-1994) and described the way that government operated, and specifically the fact that ministers of one coalition party where matched with subsecretaries belonging to another coalition party, as *duplas pluralistas* or pluralist pairs (Boeninger, 1998, pp. 452-453). Lanzaro (2012a) defines the term as a "dynamic of transversal relations between ministers and other public officials, belonging to the different coalition parties, that has a variable but important impact on government processes and public policy" (p. 47). Lanzaro argues that the *Concertación* governments (including the one led by Aylwin) were characterized by *transversalismo* (p. 47). A closely related term is *presidencialismo de compromiso*, or presidentialism of compromise, which Lanzaro (2012b) uses to describe Uruguay's democratic governments of the 20th century, where "a dynamic of transversal transactions between sectors of the traditional parties" prevailed.[4]

I argue that the concept of *transversalismo* reflects a different coalition governance model from the dominant presidential primacy model, and that it approximates the coalition compromise model from the parliamentary literature, with its emphasis on governing together and mutual monitoring. However, rather than using the term 'coalition compromise model', which is primarily associated with parliamentary systems, I will henceforth use the term 'presidential compromise model' when talking about this model in the context of coalitional presidentialism, echoing the term *presidencialismo de compromiso*, and in order to emphasize that we are talking about the presidential variety of the coalition compromise model.

While the presidential primacy model conceives of delegation relationships as authority flowing from the top down, with a president transforming parties into its agents, the presidential compromise model represents a more bottom-up view of delegation. Here, I conceive of a presidential coalition government as a relatively stable alliance of parties supporting a president. The president and the set of coalition parties together can be seen as a collective principal to the coalition's individual component parts, akin to Andeweg (2000)'s understanding of the parliamentary coalition cabinet mentioned in the introduction. Note that I do not argue that the president can be compared to a prime minister, or that presidential coalition cabinets are as horizontal and consensual as their parliamentary counterparts. Rather, I argue that the observed practice of *transversalismo* suggests that, at least in some contexts, coalition parties have a stake in the general policy agenda that is pursued by the government, rather only being interested in the policy areas of the portfolios the party controls, such as in the ministerial government model, or in the particularistic office benefits and pork that come with *oficialismo*[5] (see Kellam (2015) on "parties for hire"), such as in the presidential primacy model. They thus are co-principals collectively, along with the president, aside from being agents individually.

Rather than being flat characters, parties in the presidential compromise model have agency and interests that they actively pursue. They shape the government's agenda by inserting their own policy goals into it (Magar & Moraes, 2012). More importantly, as we will see shortly, they possess sanctions with the potential to be costly for presidents. Table 2.2 summarizes the two models. In what follows, I review some of the mechanisms that can be employed to make the presidential compromise model work, focusing specifically on the perspective of parties.

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[3] In Boeninger (1998)'s words: *"La estuctura interna del gobierno de Aylwin y el funcionamiento de equipos y duplas pluralistas fortalecieron la cohesión de la alianza, dando lugar a lo que se pasó a denominar el 'partido transversal' de Ministros, subsecretarios y altos funcionarios."* (p. 452). The phrase "*se pasó a denominar*" loosely translates to "came to be known as", suggesting that the term emerged spontaneously rather than having been coined by an expert.

[4] The double simultaneous vote means that seemingly single party governments in Uruguay actually operate as coalitions of different factions or *sectores*.

[5] Defined as "the political tendency of those who support the government" or "the set of people of a party or coalition of parties that constitute the government of a country" by the *Diccionario Panhispánico del Español Jurídico* (`https://dpej.rae.es/lema/oficialismo`).

Table 2.2: Summary of coalition governance models

	Presidential primacy model	Coalition compromise model
Principal	President	President and parties collectively, bound by coalition compromise
Agent(s)	Individual coalition parties	President, individual coalition parties
Contract design	Presidential toolbox	Legislative support, pre-electoral coalitions
Screening and selection	Based on ideological proximity to the president, credibility assessed through repeated interactions	Pre-electoral coalitions, ideological proximity to the parties, credibility assessed through repeated interactions, term limits
Monitoring and reporting	Junior ministers, advisory networks, institutional presidency	Junior ministers, committee chairs, legislative review, information requests
Institutional checks	Shared jurisdictions, gatekeeper ministries	Shared jurisdictions, legislative committees, agenda cartels

Contract design

While post-electoral coalition agreements are rare in presidential systems, pre-electoral coalition agreements are not (Deheza, 1998; Kellam, 2017). Several authors have found that pre-electoral coalitions in presidential systems help constrain presidents in the ensuing period. Kellam (2017) argues that pre-electoral coalitions in presidential systems are especially useful for policy-seeking parties compared to office-seeking parties, as it is more costly for presidents to renege on publicly-made policy pledges than promises of office benefits, which tend not to be publicized. However, other authors have demonstrated that even promises of office benefits are largely kept by presidential candidates once they are elected, as cabinet formation is strongly influenced by pre-electoral agreements (Freudenreich, 2018; Albala, 2021; Borges et al., 2021). Furthermore, cabinets originating from pre-electoral agreements are more stable than those that do not, suggesting that presidents keep their office promises throughout their terms in office (Albala et al., 2023). Hence, pre-electoral coalition agreements in presidential systems appear to serve many of the same functions as their post-electoral parliamentary counterparts.

I will now examine the rewards and sanctions coalition parties can impose on the rest of the coalition and the president. As I mentioned previously, the main asset parties bring to the table and the main reason presidents build coalitions at all are legislative seats. Despite the lawmaking prerogatives presidents may possess, decisions in congresses everywhere are made by majority vote.[6] Presidents whose own party lacks such a majority may find it in their interest to coalesce with other parties. Presidents may also choose to cobble together ad-hoc majorities around each and every legislative proposal, but this comes with high transaction costs and is therefore not very efficient (Strøm & Nyblade, 2009).

Thus, while providing legislative support constitutes parties' main reward, retracting that support constitutes their main sanction. Note that, to sanction the president, coalition parties do not have to

[6] Even though presidents often possess unilateral lawmaking prerogatives, these tend to be subject to ex post congressional approval and their excessive usage may provoke backlash from the legislature and the courts (Amorim Neto & Tafner, 2002); (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 420); (Amorim Neto, 2018, p. 308).

actually fire him from the presidency, which would be a complex endeavor.[7] It suffices to sabotage the president's aims. But when a pivotal party retracts its support, this can greatly weaken the government with knock-on effects that can eventually lead to impeachment. For instance, in August 2015, a faction of the PMDB (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* or Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) led by Eduardo Cunha, the Speaker of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, officially broke with the Rousseff government, in which party prominent Michel Temer served as the vice president (Melo, 2016, p. 53). This move was widely seen as the beginning of the end of the Rousseff presidency, as Cunha would accept an impeachment petition in December of that year, ultimately culminating in Rousseff's impeachment in May 2016 (Melo, 2016, p. 53); (Amorim Neto, 2016, p. 48).[8]

However, the willingness of one or more parties to abandon the coalition depends on the attractiveness of the reversion outcome. And the cost of defection to the president depends on the availability of alternative parties that could substitute the defector.

Screening and selection

Looking at screening and selection from the perspective of the junior partners (i.e., the non-presidential parties) may seem counterintuitive at first sight. After all, the identity of the formateur (i.e., the president) is fixed and the choice of coalition membership is reduced to accepting or rejecting the president's offer (Cheibub, 2006, p. 54, pp. 57-58). Likewise, an individual junior partner is unlikely to have any control over which other parties are invited to the coalition. However, that is when we are talking about post-electoral coalitions. Kellam (2017) writes that "pre-electoral coalitions (also called alliances or pacts) usually involve candidate nomination agreements made among parties before the election to govern together afterwards if they are electorally successful." (p. 392). Hence, while presidential candidate selection appears to be an intraparty decision pur sang, it may often be a deeply interparty affair. Furthermore, looking at the situation in this way, the fixed identity of the president is less obvious, because we are talking about a moment at which the presidential election has not even taken place yet. Of course, the president is eventually elected directly by the electorate, but intra-party coordination can be crucial for the outcome of that election (Golder, 2006). In combination with the literature cited in the previous subsection which shows that many Latin American cabinet coalitions originate in pre-electoral coalitions, the idea that the selection of the president is per definition external to post-electoral coalition bargaining loses ground.

That being said, we can now examine the criteria based on which parties select the potential presidential candidates to ally with. The most obvious candidate is again ideology and I have in the previous section cited work showing that the likelihood of parties forming pre-electoral coalitions increases as the ideological distance between them decreases (Kellam, 2017). But there is also the issue of credibility. One way for parties to screen potential partners for credibility is through repeated interactions. In Golder (2006)'s words: "It is also important to realize that political parties are engaged in repeated interactions. If a coalition partner refuses to honor the terms of an electoral agreement, then that party may find itself unable to gain electoral coalition partners in the future" (p. 40).

Hence, these repeated interactions are one of the main mechanisms that allow political actors to screen their potential partners. While Golder writes about pre-electoral coalitions, her words equally apply to post-electoral ones. However, repeated interactions are not a good mechanism for selecting outsider presidents, who simply do not have a political track record.

One mechanism that can help make presidential candidates' promises more credible is the existence of term limits. Golder (2006) argues that this is what has facilitated the formation of pre-electoral coali-

[7] A large enough coalition might be able to impeach its president, although the presidential party is unlikely to go along with this as the reputational damage would likely be too great (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 110). Therefore, any impeachment attempt would almost necessarily require reaching across the aisle to the opposition for support.

[8] Amorim Neto (2016) does not see Cunha's behavior itself as an explanatory factor of Rousseff's impeachment, but rather as a manifestation of a broader conflict between the PMDB and Rousseff, and sees the latter as one of the true causes of Rousseff's fall (p. 48).

tions in South Korea, where political leaders have frequently entered into long-term agreements based on them taking turns in running for president. The promise of stepping down in favor of a partner in the next election is more credible when presidents are not allowed to be reelected. As such, in Golder's words, term limits "provide[] for the temporal divisibility of the presidential office." (p. 83).[9]

Monitoring and reporting

In the section "Coalition governance in presidential systems", I cited literature arguing that presidents can use junior ministers to shadow their partners (Pereira et al., 2017). While this is certainly the case for nonpartisan junior ministers, the partisan junior ministers employed in such a manner do not only report to the president, as the constitution dictates, but also to their own parties. Although presidents formally appoint junior ministers, to the extent that they bargain with coalition partners over office, which they already do when it comes to cabinet ministers, these partners may be able to negotiate strategic junior minister appointments in portfolios held by other parties for shadowing purposes. This way, not only can they shadow other parties, but also the president herself, for instance in portfolio's headed by nonpartisans loyal to the president. While empirical analysis on parties' use of junior ministers for shadowing in presidential systems is still lacking, it would be a fruitful avenue for future research.

But parties can also monitor one another through the legislature. Legislature-based monitoring methods are particularly salient in presidential systems, where policymaking authority is generally concentrated to the legislature (Tsebelis, 2009, p. 17). Furthermore, legislature-based methods have a number of advantages over executive-based ones: they are cheaper (executive branch officials have executive roles and limited time for shadowing); more effective, as the legislature is actually empowered to pass bills while junior ministers are not; and the legislature possesses institutions specially designed for monitoring cabinet portfolios: committees (Martin & Vanberg, 2005).

More specifically, a party that manages to secure the chair position of a committee for one of its members is in a good position to monitor the corresponding portfolio. Committee chairs have formal and informal powers that allow them to set the agenda and gather information on the goings-on within the ministry they oversee (Fortunato et al., 2019). As committee chairs in practice tend to be appointed by party leaders in spite of formal regulations (Pereira & Mueller, 2004; Sherlock, 2012), parties belonging to governing coalitions bargain over committee chairs with their partners, and could negotiate chairs in committees whose jurisdictions match those of portfolios held by other parties or nonpartisans with the intention of using them for shadowing. In a case study on Brazil, Inácio & Rezende (2015) find that this type of "horizontal" shadowing between coalition partners is a function of intra-coalitional ideological distance, the seat share held by the minister's party and the size of the committee. However, contrary to expectation, ideological distance is associated with a reduction rather than an increase in shadowing. This is interpreted as parties distant from the coalition avoiding shadowing and opting for monopolistic control of their portfolios instead (p. 326). On the other hand, Alberdingk Thijm (2024) found that, in a larger sample of multiparty presidential systems around the world, ideological distance does correlate with an increase in committee shadowing.

A second legislature-based monitoring method is the use of official information requests to ministers. Again, coalition party A's caucus members filing an information request to a minister affiliated with coalition party B would constitute coalition monitoring. Silva & Medina (2023) find that such monitoring increases as a function of the ideological dispersion within the coalition. Furthermore, they find that such monitoring positively impacts ministerial survival, which implies that it serves to prevent the kind of ministerial drift that would justify dismissal. A third method is assigning rapporteurs from one coalition party to bills proposed by another coalition party (Freitas, 2016, p. 99).

Other legislature-based coalition monitoring methods, such as legislative review, have been studied in the context of parliamentary systems (Martin & Vanberg, 2004, 2005; Martin & Whitaker, 2019; Höh-

[9] *Contra* Kellam (2017).

mann & Sieberer, 2020; Höhmann & Krauss, 2022), but not in presidential ones. However, there is no reason to assume that they could not apply to presidential systems too.

Institutional checks

In theory, minimal winning coalitions could function as institutional checks under presidentialism. However, parties that block legislative proposals emanating from the government could be expelled from the coalition by the president and substituted by another one without affecting the latter's survival in office. Again, everything depends on contextual factors, such as the size and bargaining power of the party and whether it is the presidential party or not, as well as the availability of potential partners to replace the expelled party. However, this goes back to a basic principle that I discussed before: the presidential compromise model can only work if all actors, most importantly the president, are willing to make it work. If coalition members' vetoes are answered with expulsion, the government ceases to follow the presidential compromise model and reverts to the presidential primacy model. The very idea of institutional checks in presidential coalition governance is thus a shaky one and cannot be taken too literally, as these checks are never hard and only operate within the scope of an overarching agreement of governing consensually.

Keeping the aforementioned caveat in mind, we can now look at some of the institutional checks mechanisms used in coalitional presidentialism. First, Amorim Neto et al. (2003)'s concept of the agenda cartel is a type of institutional checks structure:

> "An agenda cartel—at least in its ideal type—is any mechanism for ensuring that the legislative agenda is first hammered out within the cartel and then imposed on the assembly. A parliamentary agenda cartel is one in which the 'hammering out' stage is such that each component party of the cartel has a veto on the placement of items on the agenda" (550-551).

They characterize at least some Brazilian governments as having operated as agenda cartels, specifically those led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) (p. 552).

In the previous section, we considered the possibility of presidents exploiting overlapping policy jurisdictions and gatekeeping ministries to their advantage: by appointing nonpartisan ministers to the relevant positions. Keeping the aforementioned caveat in mind, parties could also check one another and the president's nonpartisan ministers through the same mechanisms, albeit using partisan ministers rather than technocrats. Another possibility is the use of committee chairs: aside from monitoring devices, committees often have the power to amend or block legislation (Fortunato, 2021; Zubek, 2021), allowing them to act as institutional checks.

Discussion and concluding remarks

In this paper, I set out to review the literature on coalition governance in presidential systems, identifying two distinct models that students of this topic have implicitly adopted. Table 2.2 summarizes these models and their associated agency loss solutions. The presidential primacy model conceives of presidents as the *de jure* and *de facto* principals of coalition governments. This model emphasizes that it is presidents who decide: 1. whether to govern through a coalition or unilateral means, 2. what parties they invite to the coalition, 3. the payoffs to be offered to those parties 3. the policy to be pursued by the government. The role of parties in this model is undertheorized and they are generally reduced to rule takers with little agency and desires of their own, whose support to the president is bought off with different kinds of coalition goods and enforced through rewards, sanctions and monitoring by direct presidential agents. The presidential primacy model is also strictly post-electoral in its focus, and ignores or underplays the importance of the pre-electoral stage.

The presidential compromise model, on the other hand, while acknowledging the key role played by the president, is more attentive to parties' agency and motivations. It conceives of the coalition as led by a collective principal, composed of the president and the coalition parties, bound by the coalition compromise, an (unwritten) agreement among them. This collective principal in turn delegates authority

to the coalition's individual components, be it the ministers, the parties' legislative caucuses and the president herself. Furthermore, the presidential compromise model emphasizes the importance of the pre-electoral stage, which is where many presidential coalition governments originate. Before the election, parties coalesce around presidential candidates or even collectively decide which of their own potential candidates will be the alliance's candidate. After the election, if their candidate turns out victorious, the coalition parties assure that the latter fulfils the promises he made on the campaign trail through their main reward and sanction, the provision or retraction of legislative support, and monitor the president, his direct agents and one another using their own partisan agents, whether in the executive or in the legislature.

A number of questions now arise. First, which of the two models corresponds best to the observed reality of coalition governance? This is a question to which the answer undoubtedly varies with time and place. Different countries have different customs in place that vary over time within these countries, and each coalition government is likely to have its own unique dynamics. In this, the *transversalismo* of Chile's *Concertación* governments, Uruguay's *presidencialismo de compromiso* and the agenda cartels of Brazil's Fernando Henrique Cardoso constitute emblematic cases. The question is how representative these cases are of the broader population of coalitional presidentialism, or if they constitute mere outliers. But this question may not be the most relevant, as I do not posit the two models in competition with each other, but rather treat them as alternative perspectives, each with its own merits and uses.

A second, related question, concerns whether and how well the models identified here travel to other institutional contexts featuring directly elected presidents, particularly semipresidential systems and their subtypes. Given the existence of a coalition cabinet as a fixed assumption, a president in a premier-presidential regime governing in cohabitation might simply be better described by the parliamentary coalition compromise model, as it is the coalition cabinet with parliamentary confidence that makes most of the important decisions. A president in a president-parliamentary regime would lie closer to the other extreme, and might be even closer to the presidential primacy model than the average president in a pure presidential system (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 41). Finally, a president in a premier-presidential regime governing with a unified coalition government would probably constitute the closest approximation of the presidential compromise model, as she would lead a coalition in which the continuation of that unified status depends on the continued support of the junior coalition partners. However, her authority would rest primarily on influence over her own party rather than the more formidable constitutional prerogatives that pure presidents possess (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 42). If her party failed to build or maintain a majority coalition in parliament, an alternative majority could form a government, which would render her largely powerless.

Third, does the kind of coalition governance model in place during a given presidency at a given point in time affect policy outcomes or even the quality of democracy? The latter question has recently attracted interest and preliminary evidence suggests that more coalescent coalitions are associated with a higher commitment to the provision of public goods in presidential systems (Chaisty & Power, 2023). A high degree of coalescence indicates that, at the contract design stage, there is a good correspondence between the seats a party is expected to contribute to the coalition on the floor of the assembly and the payoff it will receive for it. It may indicate that the governance experience gravitates toward the presidential compromise model but it does not guarantee it. Political control over office does not guarantee that coalition parties receive influence in determining the general direction of government policy. In order to find out to what extent that is the case, additional data is needed, such as on the extent to which parties receive policy influence and monitor one another and the president. Only then could a hypothetical relationship between the type of governance model and democratic quality be decisively tested.

Finally, there is the question of the comparative strength of the agency loss solutions available to the president and those available to the parties. One conclusion is that, while the ex ante mechanisms do not universally favor presidents over parties or vice versa, the ex post mechanisms do benefit presidents more than parties. That is, both presidents and parties possess substantial rewards and sanctions, provided that the effectiveness of those depends on contextual factors, and both have influence over screening and selection, with parties especially having leverage at the pre-electoral stage. However, when it comes to

monitoring and reporting and institutional checks, the president's constitutional powers over the structure of and appointments to the executive branch places him in a better position to design and exploit monitoring arrangements and institutional checks. This provides presidents with better information on the activities of their junior partners in office than vice versa, and allows them to gatekeep these partners in a way that the latter cannot reciprocate (recall that there are little to no hard checks that parties can place onto presidents). This means that presidents are more likely to uncover and sanction shirking by parties than the other way around, giving presidents more leeway to drift from the coalition compromise than parties.

This conclusion may not be surprising, but this analysis helped reveal exactly where the advantage of presidents lies. This insight in turn can serve as a piece of advice to coalition parties on how to partly overcome their informational disadvantage, namely, by insisting on being granted access to monitoring devices and the creation of credible institutional checks arrangements as key conditions for supporting the president.

The models presented in this paper should help students of coalition governance in presidential systems to theoretically underpin their work and decide whether they are working from an implicit understanding of coalitions as being led by a president or of coalitions being more horizontal arrangements based on a set of compromises in which authority is delegated to the coalition's component parts. They should also help them identify the relevant agency loss solutions for each perspective. Future research should continue to examine these solutions in a variety of countries and periods separately as well as comparatively, both quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Especially qualitative case studies on the actual practice of delegation and on how political actors themselves conceive of the delegation structure of the coalitions they participate in are urgently needed.

Chapter 3

Coalition shadowing by junior minister

Introduction

Coalitions are the most common cabinet arrangement in presidential democracies (Cheibub et al., 2004, 2014; Chaisty et al., 2018; Kellam, 2017). Presidents and parties relinquish power by delegating authority over policy formulation, enactment, and implementation to make the cabinet work efficiently. Delegation, however, is not costless. Presidents and parties have different policy preferences, which creates agency loss if cabinet members use their informational advantages and authority to advance policy goals not aligned with the coalition's collective preferences (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991).

The prevalence of coalitions in presidential systems spawned a vast literature on coalition formation (Altman, 2000; Amorim Neto, 2006; Kellam, 2017; Borges et al., 2021), executive-legislative relations and budget appropriations (Samuels, 2002; Pereira & Mueller, 2004), the role of presidential agenda-setting powers in multiparty cabinets (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Alemán & Navia, 2016), and coalition durability and defection (Altman, 2000; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012).

In recent years, a growing body of scholarly work has focused on coalition governance in presidential democracies (Lee, 2018a; Pereira et al., 2017; Silva & Medina, 2023). However, this literature remains in its infancy. First, most works on coalition governance in presidential democracies focus almost exclusively on how *presidents* keep tabs on parties to prevent policy drifting. By looking at coalition governance primarily from the vantage point of the president, the literature overlooks the other partners of coalitions: political parties. Second, most contributions are limited to case studies or regional studies, not least because of the prohibitive costs of cross-regional data collection. Consequently, unlike parliamentary democracies whose coalitions have been systematically analyzed from a comparative perspective, comparative lessons about coalition governance in presidential democracies remain limited.

In this paper, we contribute to the literature on coalition governance in presidential democracies. Our research question is: Under what conditions do political parties employ junior ministers to keep tabs on their coalition partners in multiparty cabinets in presidential democracies? Like in parliamentary democracies (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer & Pierce, 2011; Greene & Jensen, 2016), we argue that political parties use junior ministers to keep tabs on their coalition partners, including presidential agents. Presidents have the unilateral capacity to nominate cabinet members, which some might argue creates a strong constraint for parties to access junior ministers' positions for coalition governance purposes. Why would presidents forgo their authority and offer political parties the opportunity to use their junior ministers to guarantee their policy benefits? Although coalition formation dynamics are beyond this article's scope, a vast literature shows that presidents offer cabinet positions to political parties in exchange for support (Ames, 2001; Amorim Neto & Tafner, 2002; Cheibub, 2006; Raile et al., 2011). Otherwise, presidents risk having low legislative passage rates and potential backlash from legislators and courts if they make excessive usage of unilateral prerogatives such as decrees (Saiegh, 2011; Amorim Neto, 2006).

Following a similar logic to parliamentary democracies, where parties bargain for coalition governance arrangements during government formation (Martin & Vanberg, 2004; Strøm et al., 2010), we assume that presidents and parties negotiate junior ministers posts during the coalition formation stage. The creation of a coalition governance mechanisms is embedded in the coalition formation. Parties de-

mand access to coalition governance mechanisms in exchange for their support. In so doing, they can avoid paying the electoral and political costs of supporting the executive without extracting, at least partially, policy benefits. For reasons of empirical tractability, in this paper we focus in explaining coalition governance mechanisms once they are in place. Explaining coalition formation is beyond the scope of this article.

Using an original data set covering 28 cabinets in 8 countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, we make a comparative contribution to the literature on coalition governance in presidential democracies. First, contrary to our expectations, we find that parties are less likely to keep tabs on a minister if the minister's party is farther away from the coalition's ideological weighted mean position. Second, our evidence shows that political parties use junior ministers more extensively in the presence of powerful presidents to keep tabs on presidential agents in the cabinet. Finally, we show that democratic experience matters for coalition governance. There is a learning curve for political parties to keep tabs on the agents of powerful presidents in multiparty cabinets.

In addition to our innovative theoretical contribution to the role of political parties in coalition governance in presidential democracies, our paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to deal systematically with coalition governance in presidential systems from a cross-regional perspective, including data from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.[1] Admittedly, our contribution has an unbalanced sample, with an overrepresentation of Latin American countries for which we introduce a statistical control. Nevertheless, our original data set allows us to draw conclusions beyond individual countries and regions and to explore the dynamics of presidentialism in Africa and Asia, which have been overlooked in the comparative literature in favor of Latin America.[2]

The Dangers of Governing Together

Governing together is complex and forces partners to make hard choices to reduce agency loss and solve conflicts in the coalition. First, multiparty cabinets comprise several actors whose policy preferences are heterogeneous, which increases transaction costs in collective decision-making (Indridason & Kam, 2008; Martin & Vanberg, 2014; Fortunato, 2019). Second, multiparty cabinets face more significant dangers of uncertainty and opportunism because parties may take advantage of informational asymmetries to extract policy benefits (Falcó-Gimeno & Indridason, 2013; Strøm et al., 2008).

Third, coalitions everywhere suffer from the dangers of non-simultaneous exchange, which incentivizes parties to defect from the coalition once they have extracted the benefits that matter to them (Weingast & Marshall, 1988). After marshaling these benefits, political parties have few incentives to pay the costs associated with incumbency (Altman, 2000; Mejía Acosta, 2009). In presidential coalitions, this problem is magnified as presidents claim credit for the government's performance, further weakening parties' willingness to remain in the coalition once they extract policy benefits (Kellam, 2015). Additionally, in contrast to parliamentary democracies, where defecting from the coalition is electorally risky as it often triggers the downfall of the government and elections (Huber, 1996), the fixed-term nature of presidential executives means that parties have greater incentives to behave opportunistically. Anecdotal evidence illustrates this danger. When asked whether his governing coalition would survive until the end of his term, Uruguayan president Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990-1995) responded, "when the next elections approach, it is impossible to maintain the same level of proximity between us. Two different parties cannot appear to be intermixed and tied together in front of the citizenry. (…) That we will not arrive at the next election with a coalition is written on the cover of the book" (Altman, 2000, p. 274). Finally, in presidential democracies, presidents can dismiss ministers without jeopardizing the government's tenure. This power should facilitate their role as arbiters and policy coordinators among coalition

[1] See, however, Chaisty et al. (2018), who also take a cross-regional perspective. However, the authors focus primarily on how presidents use coalition management tools to govern coalitions instead of delegation models.

[2] See, however, Lee (2018a,b) for important contributions on East-Asian presidential democracies.

partners (Abranches, 1988; Amorim Neto et al., 2003; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). However, delegation suffers from hidden information, which creates difficulties in detecting whether coalition partners are meeting their end of the bargain.

The Solutions

The dangers discussed in the previous section create strong incentives for political actors to devise institutional solutions that make governing together less costly and more predictable (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer & Pierce, 2011; Carroll & Cox, 2012; Fortunato, 2019). Coalition governance mechanisms include thematic cabinets or cabinet committees, whereby cabinets are subdivided into smaller groups organized around certain thematic areas (Martínez-Gallardo, 2010). Ministers could use these devices to extract information about the activities of cabinet colleagues with related jurisdictions. Additionally, legislative committees and their chairs serve as a tool to retrieve information in coalition contexts (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll & Cox, 2012; Pukelis, 2016; Inácio & Rezende, 2015). Finally, Silva & Medina (2023) study coalition monitoring through official information requests submitted to ministers by legislative parties. The authors find that coalition partners file more information requests as the ideological range of the coalition increases. Furthermore, Silva & Medina (2023) find that the incidence of information requests positively affects ministerial stability—which suggests that information requests prevent the kind of ministerial drift that would justify dismissal if discovered.

This paper focuses on junior ministers as an efficient institutional solution for coalition governance perils. While in parliamentary systems, extensive literature focuses on junior ministers in coalitions, to the best of our knowledge, Pereira et al. (2017) make the only contribution about junior ministers in presidential democracies. However, the authors focus on how *presidents* rather than parties use junior ministers to keep tabs on their coalition partners in Brazil. Before we move forward, it is worth discussing why junior ministers are effective as a coalition governance tool in multiparty governments. Coalition monitoring is not a formal function of junior ministers. The official job description of junior ministers does not entail coalition governance. However, as Thies (2001) extensively describes, their role in the government structure puts them in a privileged position for coalition governance. For one, junior ministers work directly with their minister, assisting the latter with policy formulation and executive. In addition, junior ministers coordinate the activities of governmental agencies falling under the ministry's authority and stand in for the minister in their absence. Importantly, junior ministers have privileged access to information about the day-to-day running of their ministerial department. Consequently, parties use junior ministers to help them curb information asymmetries and, importantly, to serve as fire alarms if the minister deviates from the coalition compromise (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Furthermore, in line with Thies (2001), junior ministers serve a deterrence function: ministers who know they are being monitored are less likely to behave opportunistically, not least because they want to minimize the risk of being fired.

Our Contribution

In this paper, our goal is to explain the extent to which political parties use junior ministers for coalition governance purposes. Unlike much existing literature, whose focus is primarily circumscribed to coalition governance from the vantage point of the president, we consider the role of parties. The comparative study of junior ministers is challenging. Although they have different official roles depending on the country, junior ministers share several features that make them functionally equivalent across countries: (1) they are second in line to the department heads; (2) they are constitutionally appointed and dismissed by presidents; (3) they have executive responsibilities within the departments in which they are placed. Appendix A.2 provides a detailed description of the politics of junior ministers in our eight countries.

Ideally, political parties would deploy junior ministers to as many of their partners' ministries as possible. However, parties face significant constraints that warrant discussion before we move into our hypotheses. First, parties do not have unlimited access to junior ministers positions, a fixed-sum resource

subject to bargaining among coalition partners. Second, parties face a trade-off between demanding more junior ministers to monitor coalition partners and using junior ministers to keep their portfolios at arm's length from other parties. Third, as Martin & Vanberg (2004) remind us, junior ministers face time constraints. Time spent on monitoring activities reduces the time they spend fulfilling other tasks. These three assumptions inform our thinking about how parties use junior ministers strategically in coalitions.

Before we discuss our hypotheses, it is worth clarifying the nature of ministers in presidential democracies and its implications for junior ministers. Extensive literature shows that nonpartisan ministers play an essential role in presidential democracies as agents of the president (Amorim Neto, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015; Lee, 2018b). Presidents use nonpartisan technocratic ministers to serve as their agents to avoid intra-party agency loss. Consequently, when political parties use junior ministers, they target nonpartisan ministers to keep tabs on presidential agents and partisan ministers to monitor parties' agents.

Ideological Heterogeneity

Numerous studies on coalition governance in parliamentary democracy highlight the positive correlation between ideological heterogeneity and the likelihood of monitoring (Martin & Vanberg, 2004; Lipsmeyer & Pierce, 2011; Carroll & Cox, 2012). By contrast, existing scholarly work on presidential systems yields mixed evidence. While some studies find that ideological heterogeneity impacts the employment of coalition governance tools (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Pereira et al., 2017; Silva & Medina, 2023), others find no such relationship (Inácio & Rezende, 2015).

We expect that political parties have more incentives to keep tabs on partisan ministers whose parties are more ideologically distant from them. Considering the constraints on the usage of junior ministers discussed above, parties need to be strategic in making decisions about their monitoring efforts. Ergo, party elites should use junior ministers to curb delegation perils from parties whose ideological position makes them more likely to drift from the equilibrium reached during the coalition bargaining process. This discussion brings us to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Parties use partisan junior ministers to keep tabs on partisan ministers whose parties are ideologically more distant from the government's position.*

Presidential Powers

In multiparty cabinets in presidential democracies, presidents are more than a *primus inter pares*. As Sartori (1994) reminds us, presidents are a *primus solus*. Consequently, political parties have incentives to monitor nonpartisan ministers who serve as agents of the president (Amorim Neto, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). What conditions incentivize parties to invest more resources in monitoring nonpartisan ministers?

According to Shugart (1998), more powerful presidents can *unilaterally* veto changes to the policy status quo or "establish a new status quo that differs from legislative preferences" (p. 4).[3] Consequently, we expect political parties to monitor nonpartisan ministers in contexts where presidents are more powerful, not least because the latter can influence policy outcomes independent of the collective preferences of the coalition. Nonpartisan ministers matter because they are indispensable in designing and implementing presidential policies. If political parties do not monitor nonpartisan ministers of powerful presidents, the latter could easily turn into *policy dictators* (Laver & Shepsle, 1990).

Of course, powerful presidents might circumvent ministries in designing their preferred policies. Junior ministers, some might argue, would be rendered useless as a monitoring mechanism. However, even if presidents design their policies using, for example, ancillary government agencies, they still need ministries to implement them. Even highly powerful presidents do not have the time and resources to

[3] This only happens under certain conditions. For example, when vetoes cannot be overridden and only temporarily. The same is valid for decrees: even though Congress can override them, doing so can be very costly when decrees have immediate effect and effect profound changes from the status quo (Shugart, 1998).

implement and manage their policies on a daily basis. Thus, ministers matter as pivotal centers of information and policy implementation. This discussion brings us to our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *Parties are more likely to monitor nonpartisan ministers as presidential powers increase.*

Democratic Experience

In our third hypothesis, we examine the effect of democratic experience in using coalition governance mechanisms. We expect that parties are more likely to keep tabs on nonpartisan ministers as democratic experience increases. An extensive body of scholarly work shows that actors learn how to use the rules of the game for their benefit. Importantly, democratic experience makes "actors develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future" (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 4).

There are at least two motivations for monitoring nonpartisan ministers to increase with democratic experience. First, presidents learn the benefits of coalescing and permitting coalition governance arrangements in fragmented institutional contexts. Insofar as monitoring is not only a function of parties' willingness but also of presidential permission, as presidents learn how to navigate the rules of the game, a more consensual governing style is likely to emerge with more democratic experience. There are numerous examples in multiparty presidential systems of presidential policy gridlocks because of failed unilateral governing attempts. For example, the first president of Indonesia's current democratic period, Abdurrahman Wahid, was impeached in 2001 after two years of erratic and unilateral rule (Mietzner, 2016). He was succeeded by his vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who governed in a consensual matter, building a "classic coalitional cabinet". Sukarnoputri was, after her term finished, succeeded by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who "celebrated [coalitional presidentialism] as a virtue of stable governance" (Mietzner, 2016, p. 213). The same happened in Brazil, where the erratic and unilateral first directly elected president after democratization, Fernando Collor de Mello, was impeached and succeeded by a vice-president, Itamar Franco, and then another directly elected president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, both of whom were skilled coalition leaders (Amorim Neto, 2018). Second, existing literature shows that party elites adapt their behavior to institutional contexts to maximize their payoffs (Benoit, 2007). In presidential democracies, over time, parties operating in systems with powerful presidents learn how to use existing institutional channels to counterbalance the president's influence in multiparty governments.

Together, we expect that democratic experience makes powerful presidents relinquish power to allow parties to monitor nonpartisan ministers in exchange for a more stable government. Party elites should learn that junior ministers are useful in constraining presidents. This discussion brings us to our third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *As democratic experience increases, parties are more likely to monitor nonpartisan ministers of powerful presidents.*

Empirical Strategy

To answer our research questions about the extent to which political parties use junior ministers for coalition governance in presidential democracies, we use an original data set on the composition of 28 coalition governments in 8 countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Ideally, we would have liked to include more countries and years to capture greater institutional and behavioral heterogeneity. In most presidential democracies, however, there are few systematic data sources of executive composition, including ministers and junior ministers. Faced with a similar problem, Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter (2015)'s strategy involved researching ministers and junior ministers individually to retrieve as much information as possible. We follow a similar approach. A constellation of criteria and considerations has guided our data collection efforts. First, in addition to pure presidential systems, we follow Chaisty et al. (2018), including president-parliamentary regimes, in which the president is the head of the cabinet and has the

power to fire ministers unilaterally.[4] Second, our research question requires the inclusion of multiparty cabinets with a substantive partisan component. This condition forces us to exclude several countries. For example, South Korea and Peru—where most ministers are technocrats or nonpartisans—and Costa Rica, Argentina, and Bolivia, where coalitions are rare or have been rare in recent decades. It also forces us to exclude countries where presidents tend to be independent, such as Benin, as the position of the president and her agents would be impossible to determine. Third, following Chaisty et al. (2018), we include countries whose Polity V score is positive to guarantee they are democratic. Fourth, data availability is limited and unequally distributed across countries and regions. We therefore decided to focus on ideal-typical cases with long democratic experience and frequent coalition governments while assuring a broad geographical scope with three countries for each macro-region (Africa, Asia, Latin America) where presidentialism is a common form of government; our case selection has been constrained by data availability. In building our data set, we leveraged several data sources, such as WhoGov (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), partial secondary data sets, and primary data sources at the country level. Additionally, we retrieved data from official government sources and Wikipedia.[5] The countries included in our data set are Brazil (1995-2019), Chile (1990-2018), Indonesia (2014-2019), Kenya (2013), Malawi (2020), Philippines (2016), Sri Lanka (2005-2015), and Uruguay (1990-2020).[6] Our case selection allows us to make a cross-sectional comparison of Latin American, African, and Asian countries, which enriches our contribution because each region is typically analyzed in isolation. Additionally, the dynamics of African and Asian presidentialism are still understudied compared to their Latin American counterparts. This set of countries meets our scope conditions while offering a representative sample of democratic multiparty presidential systems whose executives frequently constitute multiparty cabinets. In the final section, we discuss the extent to which our results travel to different geographies.

For each cabinet, we record cabinet partisanship on "day-one coalitions" (Chaisty et al., 2018), that is, coalitions formed in the first few months after the inauguration of the president.[7] For each cabinet, we record the partisanship of each minister (i.e., heads of whole government departments rather than government agencies or other officials with cabinet rank that do not head a true ministry) and junior minister. Ministers and junior ministers whose partisan affiliation is missing are recorded as nonpartisans. Our countries of interest display a high degree of heterogeneity regarding the number of junior ministers in each portfolio and their role and position in the cabinet hierarchy. For example, in Brazil, there is only one junior minister per ministry, whose functions explicitly include monitoring.[8] By contrast, in Kenya, there are multiple junior ministers in each ministry, and each of them is assigned to head a specific subdepartment. Like most works dealing with junior ministers in parliamentary democracies, our intuition is that these positions are functionally equivalent across countries, which makes them comparable. Appendix A.2 offers a detailed discussion of the formal responsibilities of junior ministers for each country in our sample.

Model and Variables

Our modeling strategy defines y_i as our dependent variable for each ministerial portfolio i. Specifically, we construct y_i to take one of three different discrete values based on the type of monitoring on each

[4] The two countries in our sample that fall into this category are Kenya and Sri Lanka.

[5] We were granted secondary data on Uruguay (1990, 1995, 2000) by courtesy of Koolhaas (2003), on Brazil (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007) by courtesy of Pereira et al. (2017) and on Chile (all terms in the sample) by courtesy of González-Bustamante & Lavados (2020).

[6] For Indonesia, we excluded all pre-2014 cabinets because junior ministers were prohibited from being affiliated with parties before 2012. For Kenya, we excluded the 2017 government as President Uhuru Kenyatta's Jubilee Alliance of parties merged into a single party, the Jubilee Party. For Sri Lanka, we excluded the most recent inauguration year (2019) because data on the presidential party's left-right positions was unavailable.

[7] Because of data constraints, we disregard cabinet reshuffles during the presidential term.

[8] See Decreto Nº 9.982, de 20 de agosto de 2019, Chapter IV, section I where junior ministers are explicitly ordered to "monitor and evaluate the execution of the projects and actions of the [respective government department]".

ministerial portfolio. When ministers do not have junior ministers keeping tabs on them, y_i equals 0 (*No monitoring*). When parties monitor nonpartisan ministers, y_i takes a value of 1 (*Nonpartisan monitoring*). When parties monitor a partisan minister, y_i takes a value of 2 (*Partisan monitoring*).[9] In light of the bounded nature of our dependent variable, we use a fractional response regression model (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996; Mullahy, 2015). This modeling strategy allows us to account for the trade-offs between the three alternative outcomes by observing which increases when others decrease. Additionally, we consider $\mathbf{x}_i$ to be the vector of covariates that includes our independent variables of interest and $\mathbf{z}_i$ to be a vector of additional controls. In addition to using this procedure to estimate the parameters, we cluster our standard errors at the country level to account for potential within-country errors correlation. Ideally, we would also include country-level fixed effects. However, in our models, several covariates (e.g., presidential powers) are invariant at the country level. We believe that the country level clustering included in our models offers partial control for country heterogeneity.

Our vector of independent variables $\mathbf{x}_i$ includes three covariates. First, we include a measure of *Ideological Heterogeneity*. We turn to the V-Party project (Lührmann et al., 2020) to gauge ideological positions based on the left-right scale running from 0 to 6, with 0 representing far-left and six representing far-right. Country experts have been asked to place parties based on their stance on economic issues. Our variable measures the distance between the party holding the portfolio and the mean position of the set of cabinet parties weighted by their seat share. This measure allows us to understand how distant each coalition partner is from the ideological mean of the parties that agreed to govern together. Our second independent variable captures *Presidential Powers*. We use Shugart & Carey (1992)'s canonical classification, updated with recent data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins & Ginsburg, 2021). Table A.2 details our measurement. Finally, we include a measurement of *Age of Democracy*, as the number of years since the most recent year in which the country reached a positive Polity score. We use a quadratic version of this variable to account for non-linear effects.

The vector of controls $\mathbf{z}_i$ includes time-variant government- and country-specific variables to control unobserved heterogeneity. It includes two variables. First, we add a covariate for the *President's margin of victory* to control for potential imbalances in bargaining power in the coalition. Presidents with high margins of victory are politically more powerful than those elected with low margins. The measurement considers the percentage point difference between the president and the second-most voted candidate. Second, we include a dummy variable for *Latin America*, which takes a value of 1 for all Latin American countries and 0 otherwise. Because of the prevalence of Latin American cases in our sample, we include this variable to account for unobserved region-specific heterogeneity and to ensure that our findings are robust beyond the region. Table 3.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our models.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics

	Count	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Ideological heterogeneity	610	-1.31	1.85	-6.91	0.80
Presidential powers	610	19.66	4.00	10.00	24.00
Age of democracy	610	28.26	18.86	1	67
President's margin of victory	610	12.52	8.54	1.09	33.57
Latin America	610	0.59	0.49	0	1

Findings

Table 3.2 presents the results. Our primary outcome of interest is the likelihood of parties keeping tabs on their coalition partners in multiparty cabinets in presidential democracies. We fit two specifications

[9] We code cases with multiple junior ministers as follows. If at least *one* junior minister falls into the abovementioned categories, we code the minister as being monitored. For example, if there are four junior ministers and only one belongs to a party other than the minister, we code that event as *Partisan monitoring*.

using a fractional response regression. In both specifications, we use the absence of monitoring as the baseline category against which we compare the likelihood of tab-keeping on nonpartisan ministers, i.e., presidential agents (Amorim Neto, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015), and partisan ministers, that is, partisan agents. All specifications include our vector of control variables, and we include robust standard errors at the country in parentheses.

We start by examining the results for Hypothesis 1. Recall that we expect parties to be more active in keeping tabs on partisan ministers whose parties are ideologically more distant from the coalition mean. The latter matters because it represents the government formation equilibrium all partners agreed to when they coalesced to govern together. Figure 3.1 shows the predicted marginal effects of *Ideological heterogeneity* on monitoring. For clarity, we show the three outcomes: no monitoring, nonpartisan monitoring, and partisan monitoring. Against our expectations, political parties do not increase their monitoring activities. Results suggest that increasing ideological heterogeneity in multiparty governments in presidential democracies reduces the likelihood of partisan shadowing. Importantly, results show that the most likely outcome in coalitions with high ideological heterogeneity is the absence of monitoring activities. Our intuition behind this result is that cabinets where partners have strong ideological differences face difficulties in reaching an equilibrium to permit monitoring activities.[10]

Next, we turn to the impact of *Presidential Powers* on the likelihood of political parties monitoring nonpartisan ministers. Recall that we expect parties to increase their monitoring activities of nonpartisan ministers working as agents of powerful presidents. Model (1) in Table 3.2 shows that presidential powers positively affect the likelihood of monitoring. For a better understanding of the effects of the coefficient, Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effects of presidential powers on nonpartisan shadowing. Results show that comparatively weak presidents whose powers sum up to ten on our scale do not increase the likelihood of monitoring. However, as presidential powers increase, particularly for presidents whose powers range between twenty and twenty-four in our scale, results suggest a substantial increase in the monitoring of nonpartisan ministers. Results confirm Hypotheses 2. Political parties and presidents agree to an equilibrium where the former allow the latter to use partisan junior ministers to keep tabs on nonpartisan ministers.

Next, we examine the effects of democratic experience in moderating the effect of presidential power on the likelihood of parties monitoring presidential agents in the cabinet. Model (2) in Table 3.2 displays the results. Recall that we use a non-linear term of *Age of Democracy* to account for non-linear effects. Thus, we make a triple interaction to gauge the moderating effect of a non-linear term of *Age of Democracy* on *Presidential Powers*. Results show a significant result. To better understand this result, Figure 3.3 plots the predicted effects of the triple interaction. Findings suggest that, in line with our hypothesis, the increase of presidential powers has different impacts on the likelihood of monitoring nonpartisan ministers depending on the length of democratic experience. As political elites become more experienced with the rules of the game and update their expectations and beliefs based on experience, they are more likely to monitor presidential agents. Figure 3.3 further shows that above a threshold of thirty years of democracy, there is a decline in this pattern. This result, however, is driven solely by Sri Lanka.[11] Taken together, our comparative results lend support to Hypothesis 3.

Our results are robust to the inclusion of our vector of controls. Against our expectations, the *Presidential margin of victory* decreases the monitoring likelihood, however, it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Finally, our results are robust to the inclusion of our *Latin America* dummy, which shows that our findings about parties in multiparty cabinets have implications for all three regions in this study.

[10] We conducted several further analyses to unpack the relationship between ideological heterogeneity and monitoring. For example, we included non-linear terms, threshold tests, and several interaction effects. However, most of our results failed to reach conventional statistical significance thresholds.

[11] Appendix A.3 shows results excluding Sri Lanka.

Table 3.2: Determinants of junior minister shadowing

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Non-partisan	Partisan	Non-partisan	Partisan
Ideological heterogeneity	-0.07	-0.38*	-0.02	-0.38**
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Presidential powers	0.82**	0.70**	1.80**	1.13***
	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.58)	(0.21)
Age of democracy	0.11	-0.17**	2.98*	0.39
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(1.44)	(0.37)
Age of democracy^2	-0.00	0.00***	-0.08*	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Presidential Powers × Age of democracy			-0.13*	-0.02
			(0.06)	(0.02)
Presidential Powers × Age of democracy^2			0.00*	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Presidential margin of victory	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Latin America	2.64*	4.02***	2.35*	4.39***
	(1.09)	(1.20)	(1.16)	(1.08)
Intercept	-23.58***	-18.22***	-43.98***	-27.81***
	(5.99)	(5.10)	(13.28)	(5.78)
Observations	610		610	
Clusters	8		8	
AIC	724.63		712.05	
Log likelihood	-355.31		-349.02	

Notes: Baseline category: No shadowing. Robust standard errors in parentheses at the country level. $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$.



Figure 3.1: Predicted marginal effects of ideological heterogeneity on coalition monitoring

This figure depicts the predicted marginal effects of e. Coefficients depict predicted values calculated from Model (1) in Table B.6.



Figure 3.2: Predicted probability of presidential powers on coalition monitoring

This figure depicts the predicted margins of presidential powers on nonpartisan monitoring. Predicted values calculated from Model (1) in Table B.6.



Figure 3.3: Predicted probability of presidential powers on coalition monitoring moderated by the age of democracy (years)

This figure depicts the predicted margins of presidential powers moderated by the age of democracy (years) on nonpartisan monitoring. Predicted values calculated from Model (2) in Table B.6.

Conclusion

Multiparty cabinets are now the norm in presidential systems (Chaisty et al., 2018). Making executive coalitions to gain legislative support is the institutional solution to overcome gridlock and make democracy work in separation-of-powers systems (Cheibub, 2006). Our understanding of agency loss associated with multiparty governments in presidential democracy is gaining traction in the literature (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015; Pereira et al., 2017; Chaisty et al., 2018). This body of work is still in its infancy and has yet to take full advantage of received wisdom from studies on coalition governance in parliamentary democracies. Furthermore, comparative work on this matter has been limited because micro-level data are difficult to access and collect.

Our paper provides important insights into our understanding of coalition governance in presidential democracies. First, unlike most literature, which focuses primarily on presidents and their preferences and behavior, our paper focuses on political parties and their role in coalition governance. Ours brings political parties to the fore to understand how they keep tabs on their coalition partners to curb delegation perils. Second, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first cross-regional comparative work on coalition governance in presidential democracies. Importantly, we use data from Latin American, African, and Asian countries, which allows us to draw generalizable conclusions about coalition governance under separation of powers. Finally, our contribution considers the impact of democratic experience, a matter of particular importance when it comes to using coalition governance formal (and informal) institutions (Carroll et al., 2006).

Our work advances scholarly understanding of coalition governance in presidential democracies by making three contributions. First, we find that, in contrast to other authors studying coalition governance (Martin & Vanberg, 2004; Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011), parties are less likely to keep tabs on partisan ministers as the ideological distance between them increases, while being slightly more likely to shadow nonpartisan ministers. Second, junior coalition partners tend to keep tabs on nonpartisan ministers when the president is more powerful. Finally, we identify a moderation effect between presidential powers and democratic experience, whereby parties are more likely to focus their shadowing efforts on nonpartisan ministers when presidents are more powerful, especially in combination with a long democratic track record. This points toward an institutional learning process by which parties' strategic considerations become more pronounced as democracy institutionalizes.

The main implication of these findings for our understanding of how multiparty governments work is that they lend further support to the literature bridging parliamentary and presidential systems (Cheibub, 2006). Furthermore, the findings help us better to understand political parties' incentives in presidential democracies. While Samuels & Shugart (2010) suggest that parties primarily focus on vote-seeking strategies in presidential democracies, our findings imply that parties also follow strong policy-seeking strategies in separation-of-powers systems. The fact that party leaders use junior ministers to monitor policy outcomes in coalitions is telling of their policy concerns.

Our study, however, like any other, also suffers from limitations. First, we are cautious about the causal nature of our findings. Our results are primarily descriptive. However, in light of the field's infancy, we believe ours is an important contribution to moving comparative research forward on coalition governance in presidential democracies. Second, like most studies on junior ministers in coalition governance in parliamentary democracies, our data do not allow us to discern the motivation for appointing junior ministers, given that motivations other than shadowing exist, such as satisfying parties' need for office spoils (Pukelis, 2016). Third, our sample suffers from a geographical imbalance due to real-world data collection constraints for regions with shorter democratic experience and more difficult data access. In order to partly compensate for this, however, we included a dummy for Latin American country years. Our results are robust to the inclusion of said dummy, which suggests that Latin American countries are not the primary driver of our results. However, further work should use more data as they become available to add more countries to the analysis.

Our foray into coalition governance in presidential democracies raises several vital clues for future research. Rather than on the *determinants* of intra-coalition monitoring, future research should look at the

impact of monitoring patterns on policy *outcomes*. Fine-grained case studies are also needed to confirm at the micro-level the patterns observed at the macro-level by investigating junior ministers' day-to-day functioning within the departments where they are positioned to find concrete evidence of monitoring activity.

Chapter 4

Coalition shadowing by committee

Introduction

Presidents in minority situations often need the support of other parties to be able to govern effectively, which they obtain by handing them cabinet portfolios (Amorim Neto, 2006), pork (Ames, 2001; Raile et al., 2011), and policy influence (Magar & Moraes, 2012). To the extent that parties seek policy influence, and these policy interests transcend the jurisdiction of the portfolio(s) they control, they will want to keep tabs on their partners. A nascent literature on coalition governance[1] in presidential systems has emerged over the past few years. When it comes to contract design, presidential pre-electoral coalitions seem to serve some of the same functions that coalition agreements do in parliamentary systems, as they also involve presidents and parties making public policy pledges that are costly to renege on (Kellam, 2017). Regarding screening and selection, presidential coalition cabinets also tend to be composed of parties that are ideologically close to the president (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011). Monitoring and reporting has also attracted attention, especially concerning the Brazilian case. Authors have studied the employment of junior ministers (Pereira et al., 2017), committee chairs (Inácio & Rezende, 2015) and coalition legislators filing information requests (Silva & Medina, 2023) for shadowing ministers. All three of these are case studies of Brazil, however, comparative research on the topic still lacking.

In this paper, I seek to investigate the issue of intra-coalitional monitoring cross-nationally and cross-regionally, focusing on the use of committee chairs by parties in multiparty presidential cabinets. I set out to answer the question: do coalition partners under presidentialism strategically employ committee chairs to keep tabs on one another? As the separation of powers causes legislatures to be more relevant and powerful as policymaking actors (Tsebelis, 2009), the role of legislative committees in managing intra-coalitional delegation is a particularly salient topic under presidentialism. Committee chairs have important (informal) agenda-setting prerogatives and privileged access to information that makes them particularly suitable as monitors of ministerial portfolios (Fortunato et al., 2019). They also have the power to amend or block legislation, enabling them to play the role of institutional checks (Fortunato, 2021; Zubek, 2021). While not always de jure, their election is de facto strongly influenced by party leaders (Strøm, 1998; Pereira & Mueller, 2000), giving the latter substantial leverage to negotiate chairs of desired committees. The added benefit is that the legislators they pick for the job are loyal to the party leadership (Santos & Rennó, 2004; Pearson, 2015).

To investigate the aforementioned research question, I marshal an original database of committee chairs in 8 presidential and president-parliamentary systems around the world. These 8 cases are emblematic of coalitional presidentialism. I argue that, if parties negotiate and employ committee chairs with an eye on reducing agency loss to their cabinet partners, the pattern of committee chair appointment

[1] I use the term 'coalition governance' in the sense (Bergman et al., 2021a), who define it as the middle stage of the coalition lifecycle and associate it with delegation among coalition partners. Coalition governance in this usage is not to be confused with 'coalition management', a term adopted by many students of coalitional presidentialism that refers primarily to the president's use of 'coalition tools' to attract and retain the (overt) support of coalition partners, rather than being concerned with reducing (hidden) agency loss to coalition partners (Praça et al., 2011; Chaisty, 2014; Pereira et al., 2016; Bertholini & Pereira, 2017; Chaisty et al., 2018).

should reflect parties' strategic considerations. In particular, I expect shadowing to be more likely in portfolios held by parties whose ideal points are further away from those of the coalition and in portfolios that are more salient. Furthermore, I test the effect of committee system powers, for which I formulate an ambiguous expectation. On the one hand, more powerful committees could have no effect on shadowing, as shadowing might be desirable regardless of committee powers. On the other hand, committees' enhanced effectiveness could encourage shadowing. A third possibility is that powerful committees may, as a result of the separation of purpose inherent in presidentialism (Samuels & Shugart, 2010), introduce additional agency-loss risks between ministers and legislators that discourage committees' use for shadowing. Employing a multilevel logistic regression model, I find support for the first and second hypotheses. Committee powers are associated with a reduction in the incidence of shadowing, lending support to the third part of the ambiguous expectation. However, this result warrants caution, as the small number of countries included in the study makes it is difficult to attribute the observed variance in shadowing to committee powers. More cases would be needed to exclude effects from idiosyncratic differences between countries.

The results thus suggest that coalition partners under separation of powers seek to assure that collective policy pledges are faithfully implemented.

Coalition governance in presidential systems

In any cabinet, ministers possess hidden information on the goings on of their ministries vis-à-vis their principals, which provides them with incentives to follow their own or their parties' interests (shirking) rather than that of their principal (Thies, 2001). In coalition cabinets, the risk of agency loss is magnified, as these are composed of multiple parties with divergent preferences (ibid.). In this, the coalition cabinet itself can be seen as a collective principal that delegates to the same ministers that constitute it (Andeweg, 2000)[2]. When agents deviate from the contract agreed upon with their principals, the latter are said to suffer agency loss (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991).

Solutions for agency loss can be divided into four categories: contract design, screening and selection, monitoring and reporting and institutional checks (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). Contract design is about aligning the incentives of principal and agent through a schedule of rewards and sanctions tied to the agent's behavior (ibid.). In the context of coalition governance, the most important type of contract-design is the coalition agreement, a public document detailing the coalition's collectively agreed-upon policy pledges (Strøm & Müller, 1999; Müller & Strøm, 2008; Moury, 2011, 2013; Höhmann & Krauss, 2022). Screening and selection concerns choosing and screening potential agents to avoid adverse selection (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). In the context of coalition governance, an example of screening and selection would be parties coalescing with ideologically close partners in order to reduce conflict or agency loss (Axelrod, 1970; Swaan, 1973).

Monitoring and reporting can take different forms, the most efficient of which is by the use of "fire alarms", that is, making it possible for third parties who are affected by the agent's actions to report undesired action to the principal (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). In the context of coalition governance, these fire alarms can be junior ministers (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer & Pierce, 2011; Pereira et al., 2017; Greene & Jensen, 2016) or committee chairs (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005; Carroll & Cox, 2012; Inácio & Rezende, 2015; André et al., 2016; Pukelis, 2016; Fortunato et al., 2019) from parties other than that of the respective minister. Finally, institutional checks are said to exist when one agent has the power to block the activities of another agent (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). An example would be a minimal winning coalition, in which each member acts as a veto player (Tsebelis, 1995). In fact, legislative committees can also serve as institutional checks. They can often rewrite bills, or even refuse to report them out of committee altogether, which Zubek (2021) aptly describes as the "gate-keeping of bills" (p. 1023).

[2] Of course, under presidentialism, the formal principal of the cabinet is the president. However, a president who chooses to govern through a coalition cabinet is per definition not governing alone. Informally, we can then also treat the presidential coalition cabinet as a collective principal.

Early models of coalition governance were produced with parliamentary systems in mind. However, presidential systems differ from their parliamentary counterparts in important ways, and these differences pose certain unique dilemmas for coalition governance. Most importantly, the chain of delegation is radically different under presidentialism. Presidentialism is characterized by a 'grid' of delegation whereby voters simultaneously delegate to two separate agents, the president and the congress, both of which delegate to the departments (Strøm, 2000). Parliamentarism, on the other hand, is characterized by a single chain of delegation from voters to the parliament, from the parliament to the cabinet and from the cabinet to the ministerial departments (ibid.). This difference affects executive-legislative relations in the sense that, under presidentialism, the origin and 'survival' of these two branches of government is separate, whereas it is fused under parliamentarism (Shugart & Carey, 1992).

Legislatures and governments under presidentialism are therefore better able to operate autonomously from one another than under parliamentarism. Under parliamentarism, the executive tends to dominate the legislative process due to the formidable agenda-setting power conferred onto it by the confidence vote and the ability to tie specific policy issues to matters of confidence (Cox, 1987; Huber, 1996; Tsebelis, 2009). This is reflected by the fact that prime ministers have higher legislative passage rates than presidents (Saiegh, 2011). As such, "policymaking power is concentrated to governments in parliamentary systems and to parliaments in presidential ones – exactly the opposite of what their names indicate" (Tsebelis, 2009, p. 17). All else equal, legislatures should therefore have greater relevance as loci of policymaking and contestation of executive power under presidentialism compared to parliamentarism. Aside from the empowerment of the legislature, the separation of powers has an effect on the interests of legislators and presidents. The different election methods for the executive and the legislature lead to a separation of purpose between those branches. That is, while legislators are more attuned to local interests and focus on securing targeted funds for projects in their constituencies, presidents are held accountable for national-level policy (Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

Presidentialism, however, does not only have a different pattern of delegation between the branches of government, but also within the executive branch. Rather than a *primus inter pares*, we are dealing with a *primus solus* (Sartori, 1994): a president who appoints and dismisses ministers at will, without that directly affecting her own survival in office (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). The whole concept of 'coalition' is therefore markedly different under presidentialism. Nevertheless, the fact that presidents whose parties did not hold legislative majorities have frequently crafted majority coalition cabinets (Cheibub et al., 2004) attests to presidents' dependence on support from parties other than their own. After all, stable legislative majorities underpinned by a distribution of coalition 'goods' are an efficient means of getting one's policy program through the legislature (Amorim Neto, 2006). While presidential government coalitions may function in a less horizontal manner than their parliamentary counterparts, its junior partners have some leverage and influence over political outcomes (Magar & Moraes, 2012).

The delegation patterns characteristic of presidentialism, both between the branches of government as well as within the executive, create agency loss risks. First, the separation of purpose produces a misalignment of interests between the branches, making coordination across those branches, a hallmark of coalition government (Cheibub & Limongi, 2010), more difficult. This also manifests itself within parties (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Party representatives in the executive branch might therefore not be 100% aligned with their parties' congressional leaders (Lupu, 2016), which generates incentives for agency loss in both directions. Second, the hierarchical nature of cabinets means that intra-executive interactions tend to be bilateral—between the chief executive and individual ministers—rather than multilateral (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). This deprives the minister(s) of party A of information on the activities of the minister(s) of party B. Monitoring among coalition partners should therefore be even more important in such a context.

The mechanics of shadowing by committee chair

But why are legislative committees useful for tab-keeping and acting as institutional checks on ministerial drift? First, the committee system incentivizes and enables policy specialization by its members

(Krehbiel, 1991), especially when committee jurisdictions closely correspond to ministerial ones (Martin & Vanberg, 2005). Committees with more policy expertise are in a better position to monitor the corresponding minister. Such exclusive correspondence also causes committee members and ministers to frequently rub shoulders. For instance, in Chile, "some of the most substantive interaction between ministers and legislators occurs during the committee deliberation phase, before a bill is reported to the floor for final passage" (Alemán & Navia, 2016). Second, committees have powers that allow them to obtain information from the ministries they oversee, such as the ability to hold hearings of government officials, compel the attendance of witnesses and demand evidence (Martin & Vanberg, 2005). Third, committees can stop drift dead in its tracks by rewriting deviant bills to bring them closer to the coalition compromise (Fortunato, 2021, pp. 114-15). Appendix B.5 shows that committees have at least some of these powers in all country cases.

That does not settle the issue of committee chairs themselves, however. Chairs have substantial agenda powers that they can use to scrutinize government bills (Fortunato et al., 2019). In some of the country cases studied here, such as Brazil and Malawi, committee chairs have substantial formal agenda-setting powers. In others, such as Benin and the Philippines, committee chairs respectively sit on a leadership body, *la Conférence des Presidents*, with the chamber's leadership and the party leaders (Benin); or participate in statutory monthly coordination meetings with the Speaker (the Philippines). In yet others, such as Indonesia and Uruguay, the statutory powers of committee chairs are more modest and are restricted to determining the ordering of conflicting reports supported by an equal number of members (Uruguay) or submitting draft laws to the chamber's legislation body (Indonesia). Appendices 3 and 5 provide an overview of formal chair powers. However, modest formal powers often camouflage more substantial informal powers (Fortunato et al., 2019). For instance, in Indonesia, "the rules of procedure are poorly elaborated and provide a great deal of latitude for committee chairs to interpret and apply at their discretion" (Sherlock, 2012, p. 561). All in all, regardless of their statutory powers, we can assume that committee chairs are influential figures both within and without their committees.

Now that we have established that committees are effective monitoring instruments and their chairs have important formal and informal powers within them, the third component of the argument requires that committee chairs act as agents of their parties. According to the partisan coordination perspective of legislative organization, majority parties or coalitions as agenda cartels instrumentalize the committee system (and other legislative leadership posts) to serve their own partisan or coalitional goals (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Amorim Neto et al., 2003). In multiparty systems, committee assignments and chairmanships tend to be allocated to parties proportionally to seat share (Carroll et al., 2006). Party leaders then tend to control the nominations to the committees. These leaders will tend to select loyal party members, and legislators' ambitions to obtain a coveted position as a committee member, especially as a chair with prestige and policy influence, serves as an incentive to be loyal to the party (Cox & McCubbins, 1993).

In all of my country cases, committee assignments follow the principle of proportionality (see Appendix B.5). Furthermore, committee assignments explicitly involve party leaders in all cases except for Chile and the Philippines (ibid.). However, in Chile, congressional delegation leaders can request the transfer of their members away from the committees they were originally assigned to, subject to the approval of the Chamber's Secretary. In the Philippines, the Majority (defined as the congress members who voted for the winning candidate for Speaker) and the Minority (those who did not) determine committee assignments (ibid.). To the extent that the Majority and Minority are made up of reasonably disciplined parties, however, party leaders are likely to have a major influence.

In all of the country cases, except for the Philippines, committees elect their own chairs[3]. However, formal procedures again often mask informal ones and in European parliamentary democracies, chair selection often results from interparty negotiations (Strøm, 1998, p. 41). There are also examples of such informal procedures from some of my country cases. For instance, in Brazil, while committee chairs are

[3] In the Philippines, chair selection happens simultaneously with the committee assignments on the proposal of the Majority, subject to confirmation by the plenary (Appendix B.5).

officially elected by secret ballot within the committee, in practice they are selected by the party leaders (Pereira & Mueller, 2000). Likewise, in Indonesia, formally, each party may propose one candidate for committee chair (Appendix B.5). The chair is then elected within the committee by 'consensus', only going to a nominal vote when consensus cannot be achieved (ibid.). However, this is what (Sherlock, 2012) has to say about the role of 'consensus' in Indonesian legislative politics:

> "(…) consensus does not mean that each and every DPR member has to agree individually to a proposition for it to be passed. In effect, it is only the party leaders in the committee or plenary session who deliver the votes of their party: consensus is, in reality, an agreement amongst party leaders. If agreement cannot be reached on the floor of the meeting (often because just one or two parties are dissenting and thus unanimity cannot be achieved), the leaders retire to a closed meeting and usually emerge with a decision to which all parties and their members are then said to have agreed to." (p. 561)

Table 4.1 summarizes formal and informal chair selection procedures in each of my country cases. It also indicates whether committee chairs rotate during the legislative term, or are reappointed annually. The latter applies to three countries in the sample. Committee chairs that serve for the entire term should theoretically be able to accrue more expertise and consolidate more power over their committees. In sum, in legislatures across political systems and the world, party leaders can negotiate committee chairs even in spite of formal regulations that do not specify a role for them in this process. While most coalition parties are unlikely to be able to pick their top choices for committees to control (Carroll & Cox, 2012, p. 227), they have at least some influence over this.

Table 4.1: Chair selection procedures

Country	Formal rules	Informal rules (if known)	Rotating[4]
Benin	Committee members elect by absolute majority with run-off.	-	No
Brazil	Committee members elect by absolute majority with runoff.	Party leaders select chairs[5].	Yes
Chile	Committee members elect by simple majority.	Chair selection is a deeply partisan affair. Parties strive to control specific committee chairs[6].	No
Indonesia	Committee members elect by consensus.	Consensus means agreement among party leaders[7].	No
Kenya	Committee members elect.	-	No
Malawi	Committee members elect.	Party loyalty takes precedence over protocol[8].	Yes
Philippines	House Majority and Minority elect, subject to House confirmation.	-	No[9]
Uruguay	Committee members elect.	Intraparty negotiations determine chair selection. Faction leaders play an important role in this[10].	Yes

[4] Coded 'yes' if chairs rotate during the legislature. In those cases, the chair serves for one year. Otherwise, the chair serves for the entire legislative period.
[5] Pereira & Mueller (2000).
[6] Alday (2022).
[7] Sherlock (2012).
[8] Kasambara (2019).
[9] Not explicitly stated in the standing orders, but empirically confirmed.
[10] Chasquetti (2016, p. 223).

Determinants of shadowing by committee chair

The main argument of this paper is that coalition parties strategically negotiate committee chairs with an eye on reducing informational asymmetries and agency loss vis-à-vis their partners. That is, shadowing by committee chair should be more likely when parties either: 1. expect a greater degree of agency loss to a specific party due to preference divergence; 2. have more to fear from agency loss as it concerns portfolios they care about or that are generally considered important. Finally, the potency of the shadowing device of interest may also play a role, but it is not clear what role, if at all. These three considerations are captured by the following three main independent variables: the ideological distance between the portfolio-holding party and its partners, the prestige of portfolios and the powers attributed to the committee system.

Ideological distance

The first factor that should be relevant for shadowing is ideology. Ideological differences between agents and principals are a sign of preference divergence and heighten the risk of agency loss (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). Studies on committee chair-based coalition monitoring have found ideological distance between the minister and the coalition to be a key predictor of shadowing in parliamentary systems (Carroll & Cox, 2012) as well as in presidential systems (Inácio & Rezende, 2015). However, the latter study finds a negative rather than a positive effect of ideological distance on intra-coalitional shadowing in Brazil (ibid.). Nevertheless, the weight of the comparative evidence points in the direction of ideological distance positively affecting shadowing. In a presidential coalition government, the cabinet coalition as a whole can be seen as the informal principal of the individual ministers (the president being the constitutional principal). As the distance between the portfolio-holding party and this principal increases, we should see an increase in either type of shadowing. This brings me to my first hypothesis:

H1: *The greater the ideological distance between the portfolio-holding party and the weighted mean position of the coalition, the greater the probability that the portfolio is shadowed.*

Portfolio salience

Finally, not all portfolios are created equal and those portfolios with the greatest potential to shape national policy should be most heavily monitored by coalition partners. Research on parliamentary systems has shown that parties are more likely to employ junior ministers to shadow portfolios that are most salient to them (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer & Pierce, 2011; Greene & Jensen, 2016). A case study on junior minister-based coalition shadowing in Brazil, however, did not find a significant effect for portfolio salience (Pereira et al., 2017), and neither did a case study on committee-based shadowing in that country (Inácio & Rezende, 2015). The danger of ministerial drift to high-impact portfolios is compounded if those portfolios are controlled by parties that are ideologically distant from the coalition compromise. Hence, we can expect a positive interaction between portfolio salience and ideological distance. This brings me to my second hypothesis:

H2a: *The greater the salience of the portfolio, the greater the probability that the portfolio is shadowed.*

H2b: *Higher salience portfolios are especially likely to be shadowed when they are controlled by parties whose ideal points are located further away from the coalition compromise.*

Committee powers

As we saw in the previous section, committees are more effective monitoring instruments and institutional checks when they are granted certain powers. This is supported by empirical evidence. Thies (2001) finds that junior ministers are less often used for shadowing in Germany compared to his other country cases, which he attributes to that country's strong committees being used instead for that purpose. This is confirmed by Kim & Loewenberg (2005) for the German case and by Lipsmeyer & Pierce (2011)

in a large-n study of several parliamentary countries. Furthermore, André et al. (2016) find that legislatures in (parliamentary) countries where coalition governments are the norm develop strong committees designed for keeping tabs, and Zubek (2015) finds that more heterogeneous cabinets are more likely to adopt reforms extending committee powers. More directly, Carroll & Cox (2012) find that committee shadowing is more likely in (parliamentary) countries with strong committees.

We could therefore expect that, when committees are more powerful, parties should be more interested in employing them for tab-keeping. Furthermore, this effect should interact with ideological distance: committee powers should matter less for shadowing when parties are close to the coalition mean compared to when they are distant from it. However, one could also argue that, within a given country, if coalition parties are interested in shadowing, they should have that interest regardless of how powerful their committee system is in comparison to other countries.

Furthermore, the specificities of presidentialism warrant caution when applying hypotheses derived from parliamentarism. Following the section "Coalition governance in presidential systems", the separation of purpose generates intra-party agency loss between executive officials and congressional delegations. This means that a committee chair of party A may scrutinize a minister from party B in ways unforeseen by party A's cabinet representatives. The key point is that, compared, to, say, junior ministers, who are part of the executive and more easily controlled by their copartisan ministers or presidents, there exists a degree of uncertainty when parties rely on their legislators for shadowing, as these come with their own biases and interests. The interference of these biases in the monitoring process is likely to be more pronounced when committees are powerful, which may make cabinet parties more wary of committee-based shadowing under those circumstances. This is especially a problem where committees have gate-keeping powers that can be used to sabotage the cabinet's lawmaking ability.

As an example of such a misalignment between a party's congressional delegation and its cabinet representatives, in 2006, the Indonesian PPP (United Development Party), a junior coalition partner of president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, withdrew two of their ministers from the cabinet—Sugiharto of State-Owned Enterprises and Suryadharma Ali of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises—over disagreements with the party's congressional delegation (Rachmadi, 2006)[11].

Due to the difficulty of making credible ex-ante predictions about the effect of committee powers on shadowing outcomes, which may be positive, negative or absent, I refrain from formulating a hypothesis on this and remain agnostic about the result.

Case selection and data

Case selection was driven by three criteria: 1. substantial experience with democracy (at least four presidential terms or 16 years), 2. an overwhelming share of multiparty governments (at least 75% of the time), 3. geographic balance, 4. a preference for emblematic cases that have featured prominently in the literature on coalitional presidentialism. The WhoGov cross-sectional dataset was used to shortlist cases classified as "presidential democracies" where criteria 1 and 2 held. This led to a list of 13 cases in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe. To this list, Uruguay was added, where apparent single-party governments are actually coalitions of multiple factions and, following Altman (2000), are treated as such in this paper. Accordingly, 100% of Uruguay's governments in the period for which I have data can be considered coalitions. The only European case, Switzerland, was excluded because it is too *sui generis* a case to be grouped together with regular presidential systems. There were three Asian cases, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, and in order not to skew the sample too much towards any specific region, a target of three cases per region was adopted. However, it turned out that Sri Lanka did not have

[11] Not much later, the party canceled the withdrawal of the ministers, on the grounds that the problems between them and the party had been resolved, attributing the initial conflict to miscommunication between the ministers and the congressional delegation (Rachmadi, 2006).

an independent committee system[12] and therefore had to be excluded. In Latin America, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Suriname and Uruguay fit the criteria. Of these, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay feature most prominently in the literature on coalitional presidentialism[13] and were therefore selected. In Africa, Sierra Leone, Benin, Malawi and Kenya were eligible, and the latter three were selected as they have been studied most profoundly in this context[14].

These constitute most likely cases: if committee-based coalition shadowing is not observed in these cases, it is unlikely to be observed in any presidential system featuring multiparty cabinets[15]. Limitations in data access—mainly a problem for the African cases—further limited the number of government-legislature pairs included within countries. This led me to include the following country years in the sample: Benin (2015), Brazil (1995-2019), Chile (1990-2018), Indonesia (2004-2019), Kenya (2008-2013), Malawi (2014), the Philippines (2004-2016), and Uruguay (1995-2020)[16].

I chose to focus on what Chaisty et al. (2018) have termed "day-one coalitions", which are those coalitions formed immediately after the inauguration of a new president. This is because coalitions and cabinets tend to change over the course of the presidential office term, and coalitions later in the term are subject to markedly different dynamics than those formed at the start of the term (Altman, 2000). Specifically, analyzing coalition governance over the course of the electoral cycle would imply taking into consideration the possibility that shadowing may decrease over time because parties become less interested in policy as elections approach. While that is an interesting question worthy of exploration, it is simply beyond the scope of this paper. Following the 'most-likely' logic the research design has followed so far, shadowing should be most likely at the beginning of the term when time horizons are still long and there is more at stake policy-wise. As far as operationalization is concerned, I maintain a strictly cabinet-based definition of coalitions, that is, the set of parties represented in the cabinet, whether or not the government is supported on the assembly floor by parties without cabinet representation. The main reason is that access to data on legislative coalitions differs markedly among countries.

These day-one cabinets were then matched to legislative periods, where it was important to make sure that committee chair elections were held close to the inauguration date of the cabinet. After all, the paper is built on the assumption that committee chair elections respond to cabinet makeup. This meant matching presidential inaugurations to legislative inaugurations. In some cases this proved problematic, especially for Benin and Malawi[17].

Another challenge was matching the committees to the departments. In the case of Indonesia, the correspondence between committees and departments is specified in detail by the standing orders. In the remaining cases, the correspondence had to be established by consulting both the exact jurisdictions of the committees in the standing orders as well as the exact jurisdictions of the departments on the respective websites and matching them. As the structure of the executive branch as well as the committee system

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[12] 'Sectoral Oversight Committees' (SOCs), were only established in 2016, with the only policy-related committees existing up to that point being the 'Ministerial Consultative Committees', which were chaired by the minister in charge of the corresponding portfolio and therefore hardly independent of the executive (Tennakoon & Jayathilake, 2021, pp. 157, 160). It would have been possible to include the 2019 day-one cabinet, were it not for the fact that V-Party lacked data on the then-presidential party, the SLPP.

[13] See Abranches (1988), Figueiredo & Limongi (2000), Amorim Neto (2002) and many others cited in this paper on Brazil, Carey (2002) and Alemán & Saiegh (2007) on Chile and Altman (2000) and Magar & Moraes (2012) on Uruguay.

[14] See Chaisty et al. (2014, 2018).

[15] This is what Levy (2008) calls the "inverse Sinatra inference—if I cannot make it there, I cannot make it anywhere" (p. 12).

[16] See Appendix B.1 for a list of the cabinets included in the study.

[17] In Benin, out of the two day-one legislatures for which I had data access, 2015 and 2019, I had to exceptionally use non-initial cabinets, and ultimately had to drop 2019 as that year's elections saw the prohibition of all but two parties (*Benin: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report*, 2021), including all parties to which the sitting ministers were affiliated, without it being clear to which of the two legal parties they had switched if at all. A similar problem existed for Malawi, where the electoral court annulled the results of the 2019 presidential election, which had been held concurrently with the legislative election, but which now had to be redone (Phiri, 2020). The president elected in the second election was only inaugurated in 2020, such that there is no link between committee chair allocation (which had taken place in 2019) and cabinet composition.

change frequently over time in most countries, this process had to be repeated for each cabinet-legislature pair. Committees that did not match any executive department, such as housekeeping committees, or which matched only executive agencies without ministry status, which was the case for many Philippine committees, were excluded from the analysis.

For cabinet data, I largely relied on WhoGov (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), triangulated with case-specific official or media sources in case of doubts. For data on committee chairs, I heavily relied on the legislatures' websites, where necessary in combination with the Wayback Machine[18], and also made use of hansards and media reports for legislatures whose websites did not have this information, supplemented with secondary data in one case [19]. See Appendix B.4 for more details on data sources.

Model and variables

My unit of analysis is the portfolio-country year. My sample includes 417 portfolios held by partisan ministers in 31 coalition cabinets. My dependent variable, shadowing, takes a value of 1 when at least half the committees overseeing a given portfolio are chaired by members of cabinet parties other than that of the minister in charge. Otherwise, it takes a value of 0. Table 4.2 visualizes this coding. Shadowing was observed for 195 out of 417 portfolios, or 47% of the sample. While I used the terms 'monitoring' and 'shadowing' interchangeably up to this point, henceforth I will use the term 'shadowing' strictly in the sense defined above. The reason is that 'monitoring' implies a deliberate activity on the part of the committee chair that I do not directly observe in this study. Furthermore, shadowing can serve both a monitoring as well as an institutional checks function.

Portfolio-minister pairs are nested into the ministers' parties and into cabinets, both of which are in turn nested into countries. As these higher-level units were sampled from larger populations, such a nested data structure violates a key assumption of linear regression, that is, the independence of the residuals (**?**, p. 206). Observations belonging to the same higher-level unit may be more alike one another than observations belonging to different higher-level units. For instance, certain parties may be more likely to want to monopolize certain ministries and resist shadowing—let's say a farmers' party and the agriculture portfolio. Alternatively, certain cabinets may have collectively decided for partners to shadow one another, and certain countries may have different norms when it comes to coalition governance, e.g. consociational norms whereby coalition cabinets are expected to govern together.

As my outcome variable is binary, the correct empirical strategy is logistic regression. However, due to my nested data structure, this logistic model must also be multilevel. Multilevel analysis "aims to disentangle the within-cluster effects (…) from the between-cluster effects" (Sommet & Morselli, 2017, p. 206). In this type of analysis, the number of clusters or second-level units is more important than the number of observations in each cluster, and simulations have shown that at least 50 second-level units are necessary to obtain accurate standard errors (ibid.). The question then becomes what higher-order level to choose for this study. Countries are too few in number, as there are only 8. Cabinets are more numerous but with 31 cabinets I still do not have enough to meet the 50-unit threshold. Parties in the sample, on the other hand, number 73. Not only that, but the between-cluster variance of the dependent variable is higher for parties than for cabinets and countries. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC) reveal that 24% of the variance in shadowing is explained by interparty differences, but only 15% by between-cabinet differences and 20% by intercountry differences. Hence, clustering by parties is the most sensible approach. My empirical strategy is thus similar to the one used by Carroll & Cox (2012), who also use a multilevel logit model clustered by ministers' parties.

[18] `https://archive.org/web/`

[19] Brazil: for the period 1995-1999, I used data from the CEBRAP Legislative Database (`https://bancodedadoslegislativos.com.br/`), which was granted to me by the courtesy of Danilo Medeiros and Pedro Henrique Reis Pereira.

As such, the model specification is represented by Eq. 1 below (adapted from Sommet & Morselli (2017)).

$$P(Y_i = 1) = \frac{exp(B_{\infty} + (B_{10} + u_{1j}) * x_{ij} + B_{01} * X_j + u_{0j})}{1 + exp(B_{\infty} + (B_{10} + u_{1j}) * x_{ij} + B_{01} * X_j + u_{0j})} \tag{4.1}$$

…in which $P(Y_i = 1)$ is the conditional probability that the outcome variable (shadowing) equals one for a portfolio i, B_{∞} is the fixed intercept, B_10 is the fixed slope of level-1 predictor variable x_ij, which affects a portfolio i controlled by a party j, B_01 is the fixed slope of level-2 predictor variable X_j, which affects a party j (this variable is located at the party level and thus affects parties as a whole rather than specific portfolios), u_1j is the deviation of the cluster-specific slope of x_ij from its fixed slope, which is included to control for the possibility that the effect of x_ij on Y_i differs between clusters, and u_0j is the random intercept variance.

My vector of independent variables includes five covariates, three of which are treated as main independent variables, and two as control variables. Starting with the first group, ideological distance from the coalition mean is the distance between the ideal point of the minister's party in a one-dimensional policy space and the seat share-weighted mean position of the parties represented in the cabinet. Data on ideological positions was taken from the V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al., 2020), specifically its economic left-right scale running from 0 to 6, where 0 corresponds to the far-left and 6 to the far-right. Second, in the absence of a party-specific portfolio salience measure for my country cases, I use an indicator from WhoGov called 'portfolio prestige', which classifies portfolios into three categories, High, Medium and Low Prestige, based on their jurisdictions. For instance, portfolios such as Defense, Interior and Finance are coded as High Prestige, portfolios such as Agriculture, Housing and Transportation are coded Medium Prestige, while portfolios such as Sports, Tourism and Family are coded as Low Prestige (WhoGov online appendix, p. 66)[20].

Third, for committee powers I use an indicator developed by André et al. (2016), which is based on nine items[21]. Although the indicator was developed with parliamentary systems in mind, the items are perfectly applicable to and relevant for presidential systems. My coding of this indicator, based on constitutions, standing orders and other laws regulating committee powers, can be found in Appendix B.5 for all eight country cases. Figure 4.1 displays committee powers over time for each country. Committee powers tend to be relatively stable over time, with most of the variation being the result of changes in the constellation of cabinet portfolios and committees that affect items 1 and 2. The major exception is Kenya, where a 2010 constitutional overhaul drastically altered committee powers. On the other end of the spectrum, committee powers remained constant over time in Indonesia, with its meticulously fixed committee-portfolio 'partnerships'. Interestingly, all of the cases with varying powers display upward trends, suggesting that committees tend to become more numerous and come to match the portfolio structure more closely over time.

The first of my two control variables is seat share, which is simply the number of seats held by the portfolio-holding party divided by the sum of the seats held by the set of cabinet parties multiplied by 100. Data on the number of seats occupied by each party as well as legislature size came from a variety of case-specific official election sources. A party's seat share can affect its allotment of committee chairs, and parties with more chairs have greater leeway to appoint those to their own portfolios, thus preventing those portfolios from being shadowed by their partners. Seat share is also an indicator of a party's bargaining power within the coalition, which it can exploit to negotiate more favorable shadowing outcomes. Second, age of democracy is operationalized as the number of years since the last time a country reached a positive Polity V score. This variable could affect shadowing for two reasons. First, a longer experience with

[20] Retrieved from `https://politicscentre.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/media/4116/whogov_onlineappendix.pdf`

[21] These are: 1) the number of committees, 2) the degree of correspondence of committee jurisdictions to ministerial portfolios, 3) the ability to compel ministerial attendance and testimony, and 4) civil servants' attendance and testimony, 5) the existence of permanent staff for administration, drafting and research, 6) the ability to initiate legislation, and 7) rewrite bills whereby the committee version of the bill takes precedence over the original version in plenary voting, 8) the committee stage preceding the plenary stage, and, finally, 9) timetable control (André et al., 2016, p. 111).

Table 4.2: Coding of the outcome variable, shadowing

Party minister	Party committee chair		
	A	B	C
A	0	1	0
B	1	0	0

Notes: Parties A and B are cabinet parties, while party C is an opposition party. For simplicity, the table shows a situation in which one committee oversees the portfolio.

democracy should be related to a greater degree of institutionalization of inclusive values and practices, affecting for instance the degree to which CCs are allotted to opposition parties (Carroll et al., 2006, pp. 163-66). Second, shadowing may be subject to a learning curve that takes time for political actors to understand and put into practice.

Returning now to the model specification, recall that we are dealing with two levels: the portfolio level (1) and the party level (2). Out of the independent variables, only portfolio prestige is located at level 1. Ideological distance and seat share are strictly located level 2. While committee powers and age of democracy are in reality located at the country level, in practice they are taken to lie at the party level, because the country level is not taken into account in this model. Now it also becomes clear why the random slope term u_{1j} is included: this is to account for potential between-party differences in the effect of portfolio prestige on shadowing. Parties may differ in the value they place on a given portfolio, and controlling a high-salience portfolio could affect their willingness to allow shadowing.

For ease of interpretation of the estimates, all continuous independent variables were grand-mean centered (Sommet & Morselli, 2017, p. 211). Portfolio prestige appears in the form of two dummy variables, “high prestige” and ”low prestige”, with ”medium prestige”, where most observations are concentrated, as the baseline.



Figure 4.1: Committee powers over time, grouped by country.

Results and discussion

The regression coefficients and the odds ratios are reported in Table 4.3. Model 2 adds the interaction effects. I begin by examining the results associated with Hypothesis 1, which expects monitoring to increase as a party's distance to the coalition's weighted mean position increases. Table 4.3 shows that the effect is significant at the 0.1 level in model 1 and comes with the right sign. The odds ratio of 1.90 in model 1 suggests that a unit increase in a portfolio-holding party's distance from the weighted coalition mean is associated with a 90% increase in the probability of the portfolio being shadowed. Figure 4.2 shows the predicted probabilities of shadowing as a function of ideological distance in model 1. It reveals that every unit increase in the probability of shadowing is associated with a 20 percentage point increase in the probability of shadowing. Of course, the relative increase going from -0.5 to 0.5 is greater than that going from 0.5 to 1.5 (recall that the variable is centered on the sample mean). The former is associated with a jump from around 40% probability to around 56% (a 40% increase), whereas the latter is accompanied by a jump from around 56% to about 71% (a 27% increase). These effects are more modest than those suggested by the odds ratios.

When adding the interactions in model 2, however, the impact of ideological distance diminishes and loses its significance at the 0.1 level, while the interactions themselves are not significant. This could point to suppression: apparently, the interactions of distance with portfolio prestige and committee powers explain part of the variance in shadowing, which was previously explained only by distance. Hypothesis 1 holds, but with the caveat that some of the effect of distance is explained by its interaction with prestige and powers.

Moving on to Hypothesis 2a, which predicts shadowing to increase as a function of portfolio prestige, the log odds for high prestige comes with the wrong sign and fails to reach significance. The odds ratio of 0.72 indicates that a high prestige portfolio is on average 38% less likely to be shadowed than a medium prestige counterpart. On the other hand, low prestige comes with the expected sign and is significant at the 0.05 level. The odds ratio of 0.36 suggests that a low prestige portfolio is 2.78 times less likely to be shadowed than a medium prestige one. Figure 4.3 shows the predicted probabilities of shadowing for portfolio prestige. It suggests that the probability of shadowing increases from around 25% at low prestige to around 48% at medium prestige, to then come down to 40% at high prestige. The drop in shadowing probability from medium to low prestige amounts to a percentage decrease of about 48%, again more modest than the odds ratio suggests. This result leads me to accept H2a, with the caveat that the negative effect of prestige on shadowing is primarily driven by low prestige portfolios being less likely to be shadowed. The effect of prestige also appears to be curvilinear, but since the effects of medium and high prestige cannot be statistically distinguished from one another, this cannot be confidently affirmed.

Hypothesis 2b expects high salience portfolios to be more likely to be shadowed, especially when they are held by parties that are distant from the ideological coalition mean. This is borne out by the log odds of the interaction between ideological distance and high prestige, which comes with a positive sign. The odds ratio suggests that, for high prestige portfolios, every unit increase in ideological distance makes the portfolio 69% more likely to be shadowed, which is greater than the main effect of distance. This effect is not significant, however. For low prestige portfolios, on the other hand, one unit increase in ideological distance reduces the probability of shadowing by a factor of 7. This result is counter-intuitive. Even when prestige is low, we would still expect ideological distance to positively affect shadowing. A possible explanation could be that ideologically distant parties resist shadowing across the board, which they get away with in low prestige portfolios but not in medium or high prestige ones. In any case, the lack of significance leads me to reject H2b.

Finally, the effect of committee powers is highly significant at the 0.01 level, and comes with a negative sign. The odds ratio of 0.68 suggests that a unit increase in committee powers makes shadowing 1.47 times less likely to occur. Figure 4.4 shows the predicted probabilities of shadowing as a function of committee powers and suggests every one-point increase in committee powers is associated with a decrease in the probability of shadowing of 10 percentage points, corresponding to a percentage change of around -18%. Furthermore, in line with the initial expectations, the interaction between committee

powers and ideological distance comes with a positive sign, and the odds ratio implies that, when either variable is held constant, a one-unit increase in the other is associated with a 29% increase in the odds of shadowing. This suggests that the interaction with committee powers reinforces the effect of ideological distance, while the interaction with distance mitigates the negative impact of powers. This effect is insignificant, however. I will analyze these results in more detail after discussing the controls.

Seat share comes with the right sign and is highly significant, although the effect size is quite small: a unit increase in the seat of the party in charge of a given portfolio leads to an average decrease in the probability of the portfolio being shadowed of only 3%. Finally, age of democracy fails to reach significance and has an odds ratio very close to 1, meaning that democratic experience is largely irrelevant for the observed shadowing patterns.

Table 4.3: Determinants of committee chair shadowing

	(1)	(2)
Ideological distance	0.64^{+}	0.44
	(0.35)	(0.47)
	[1.90]	[1.55]
High prestige	-0.32	-0.29
	(0.29)	(0.33)
	[0.72]	[0.75]
Low prestige	-1.01*	-1.19*
	(0.47)	(0.53)
	[0.36]	[0.30]
Committee powers	-0.38**	-0.35**
	(0.12)	(0.13)
	[0.68]	[0.70]
Seat share	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
	[0.97]	[0.97]
Age of democracy	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
	[1.00]	[1.00]
Ideological distance x high prestige		0.52
		(1.00)
		[1.69]
Ideological distance x low prestige		-1.94
		(1.75)
		[0.14]
Ideological distance x committee powers		0.25
		(0.34)
		[1.29]
Constant	0.22^{+}	0.17
	(0.14)	(0.16)
	[1.25]	[1.18]
Random effects:		
Intercept	$7.85*10^{-6}$	$3.32*10^{-6}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Low prestige	$2.95*10^{-1}$	$3.97*10^{-1}$
	(0.54)	(0.63)
Medium prestige	$2.54*10^{-2}$	$5.92*10^{-2}$
	(0.16)	(0.24)
High prestige	$1.74*10^{-1}$	$6.21*10^{-1}$
	(0.42)	(0.79)
Log likelihood	-250.2	-249.0
Observations	417	417
Clusters	73	73

Notes: the second model adds the interactions, standard errors are reported in round brackets below the estimates and odds ratios in square brackets below the standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in round brackets below the random effects. $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$.



Figure 4.2: Predicted probabilities of shadowing as a function ideological distance.



Figure 4.3: Predicted probabilities of shadowing as a function of portfolio prestige.



Figure 4.4: Predicted probabilities of shadowing as a function of committee powers.

The committee powers result lends support to the final prediction proffered in the "Committee powers" subsection, namely that relying on strong committees for monitoring and reporting and institutional checks comes with its own set of agency loss risks as a result of the separation of powers. However, caution is warranted as there are alternative explanations that must be examined as well: 1. stronger committees may also allocate more influence to the minority or individual dissenting members, and 2. stronger committees may have relatively weaker chairs, meaning that control over the chair is not as useful. These explanations are examined in Appendix B.3, but no evidence is encountered in support of either of them. This does not mean that the prediction stands confirmed, however: due to the small number of countries it covers, the data is not very well suited to test it. Nevertheless, the committee powers result is interesting and warrants further investigation in a larger sample of countries, preferably one including both parliamentary and presidential systems.

Conclusion

A burgeoning literature on coalition governance in parliamentary systems has established that coalition partners govern together and manage delegation to one another's ministers through a variety of methods. The one that has attracted most attention is monitoring by junior ministers, committee chairs, and a host of legislative instruments. In presidential systems, however, where multiparty cabinets are now the norm, this issue has gained some traction but has so far been limited to case studies on Brazil. This is unfortunate, because the greater centrality of legislatures in presidential systems means that the role of committees in shadowing is not only more salient but is likely to be characterized by unique dynamics and therefore deserves to be studied comparatively.

My contribution to the literature is threefold. First, I approach committee-based shadowing in multiparty presidential systems comparatively, including emblematic country cases from three continents in my sample. Second, I present original data on committee chairs in these systems, and employ an existing measure of committee powers (André et al., 2016) that I coded by hand based on my collection of data from legal documents governing legislative organization. Third, I find that shadowing is positively associated with the ideological distance between a minister and the coalition, as well as with the salience of portfolios.

More concretely, I ask whether cabinet parties in presidential systems keep tabs on one another using committee chairs. I formulate three hypothetical effects we should see if committee chairs truly serve intra-coalitional monitoring and institutional checks functions. Based on a multilevel logistic regression analysis, I present three main findings related to these hypotheses. First, in line with the literature on coalition governance, I find that the ideological distance between a minister and the coalition compromise increases the probability that that minister is shadowed by a committee chair from another coalition party. Second, like parliamentary studies, I find a significant effect of portfolio salience on shadowing. Specifically, low salience portfolios are less likely to be shadowed than medium and high salience ones. Third, I do not find a significant interaction effect of salience and distance, but including that interaction does reduce the significance of the main effect of distance to below conventional levels. Additionally, in contrast to the parliamentary literature, I find that committee powers reduce rather than increase the incidence of shadowing. This result can potentially be attributed to the greater risk of agency loss between parties' cabinet representatives and congressional delegations under separation of powers, making cabinet parties more wary of committee-based shadowing when committees are stronger. However, this result must be interpreted with caution, as the small number of cases does not allow me to disentangle the effects of committee powers from those of idiosyncratic country-level differences. In sum, the results tentatively suggest that parties in presidential coalition governments employ committee chairs to shadow portfolios held by their partners.

One of the main implications of these results is that, under presidentialism, parties join coalitions (partially) for policy reasons and have an interest in assuring that the coalitions' agreed-upon policy objectives are implemented by their partners.

However, this study also suffers from a number of limitations. First, in the absence of qualitative evidence of shadowing, it must be kept in mind that the observed patterns of committee chair and portfolio allocation do not in itself constitute definitive evidence of shadowing by said committee chairs (Pukelis, 2016). Second, the study does not control for alternative shadowing devices that may be used, such as junior ministers, parliamentary questions or interministerial committees, which could affect committee-based shadowing (Carroll & Cox, 2012). Third, asymmetries in data access between countries and regions means that the share of Asian and especially African cabinets in the sample is smaller than what would have been ideal, with the potential to affect the generalizability of the findings.

Future research should, first, invest in data collection and aim to replicate a study of the kind at hand on a larger sample of countries and cabinets, moving beyond paradigmatic cases after my initial foray into the subject. Second, it must investigate not only which portfolios and parties are more likely to be shadowed, but also which parties are more likely to do the shadowing. Finally, fine-grained case studies that employ interviews with legislators in one or more relevant countries must be conducted to shed light on how committee-based shadowing actually works in practice.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Coalition government implies delegation among parties. Delegation comes with the risk of agency loss, which is magnified in coalitions consisting of parties with different ideological positions. Under separation of powers, the risk of agency loss is magnified as coalitions and parties need to coordinate across branches. Up until this point, coalition governance—how coalitions manage internal delegation—in presidential systems has received relatively little attention, and existing works have focused on a single case: Brazil. Furthermore, the existing coalitional presidentialism literature has tended to adopt the vantage point of the president and worked from the assumption that the president delegates authority to her coalition partners, to the detriment of the perspective of the latter.

This thesis sets out to fill the lacunae of the existing literature in three work packages. First, it ports the coalition governance model from the parliamentary literature to a presidential context, and dubs it the presidential compromise model, arguing that this concept is rooted in real-world experiences of coalitional presidentialism. It also theorizes a number of mechanisms parties have at their disposal with which to hold their partners and the president to the coalition agreement—which, under presidentialism, tends not to be written down (Freudenreich, 2018). Second and third, it quantitatively analyzes the use of two 'monitoring and reporting' (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991) mechanisms by parties in a sample of 8 countries on three continents using logistic regression models: shadowing by junior ministers (JMs and by committee chairs (CCs). It shows that the use of these two devices is a function of a number of variables that correlate with agency loss or institutional learning: the age of democracy and presidential powers (JMs), as well as ideological distance, portfolio salience and committee powers (CCs).

The thesis thereby makes three broader contributions: (1) incorporating countries spanning three continents to embrace a global viewpoint, (2) undertaking a challenging, original data collection effort on officials below the ministerial rank, particularly in African and Asian contexts, and (3) prioritizing the vantage point of coalition parties', seriously considering their motivations and goals.

The main implication of the aforementioned findings is that coalition parties in presidential systems have an interest in policy that transcends the domains of the portfolios assigned to them, and seek to assure that their partners stick to the collectively agreed upon policy direction.

However, this research also suffers from a number of limitations. First, monitoring is not directly observed, and instead, the constellation of ministers, JMs and CCs is used as a proxy for such monitoring. However, the aforementioned configuration does not constitute conclusive evidence for monitoring activities carried out by the JMs or the CCS who shadow ministers from other parties. Nevertheless, much of the literature on the topic, including some of its most influential works, suffers from the same issue. Second, asymmetries in data access across regions have rendered the sample imbalanced, with Latin American observations predominating. This may affect the generalizability of the findings. Third, the comparatively small number of countries included in the thesis means that it is poorly suited for testing the effects of variables that are by and large fixed at the country level, such as presidential and committee powers. The results relating to these variables should therefore be interpreted with caution. Finally, each monitoring device was examined in isolation—looking at the interaction between the two would have led to problems in defining the unit of analysis—, which means that any possible impacts of one on the other, which may have affected the results, were not taken into account.

In response to the aforementioned limitations, future research should focus on the following tasks, not necessarily in the order in which they are listed. First, students of coalition governance in presidential systems should undertake fieldwork including interviews with the political actors of interest in order to observe monitoring in practice. Second, quantitative studies should expand the sample with additional countries and years, and use more advanced methods, such as Monte Carlo simulations, which are better able to simulate the fact that shadowing patterns are not fixed *ex ante*. Third, multiple monitoring devices should be analyzed simultaneously, although this would require overcoming the challenge having to determine of what observation temporally precedes the other: the appointment of JMs or the election of CCs. Fourth, scholars should examine which parties are more likely to do the shadowing, instead of which portfolios are more likely to be shadowed. Fifth, the effect of monitoring on policy outcomes should be studied both quantitatively and qualitatively[1]. Sixth and finally, research should move beyond policy and begin to consider the need for monitoring as it relates to clientelism and particularistic politics: after all, executive departments do not only make policy but also command significant resources that can be, and are often, used for patronage and pork-barrel politics. Ministers, whether they are technocrats or partisans, face strong incentives to use these resources as payoffs to their clienteles and sponsors, which can be voters in their local bailiwicks or private companies that offer attractive future career opportunities.

[1] Octavio Amorim Neto and Igor Acácio are currently working on a book chapter that looks at the impact of committee monitoring on civil-military relations in Brazil.

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Appendix A

Appendix Chapter 3

A.1 Cabinets

Table A.1: Cabinets

Country	Cabinet Formation Year	President	Cabinet Parties
Brazil	1995	FHC 1	4
	1999	FHC 2	4
	2003	Lula 1	6
	2007	Lula 2	8
	2011	Rousseff 1	7
	2015	Rousseff 2	9
	2019	Bolsonaro	6
Chile	1990	Aylwin	5
	1994	Frei	4
	2000	Lagos	4
	2006	Bachelet 1	4
	2010	Piñera 1	2
	2014	Bachelet 2	6
	2018	Piñera 2	3
Indonesia	2014	Jokowi 1	6
	2019	Jokowi 2	6
Kenya	2013	Kenyatta 1	5
Malawi	2020	Chakwera	4
Sri Lanka	2005	Rajapaksa 1	7
	2010	Rajapaksa 2	13
	2015	Sirisena	6
Uruguay	1990	Lacalle	2
	1995	Sanguinetti 2	2
	2000	Batlle	2
	2005	Vázquez 1	6
	2010	Mujica	8
	2015	Vázquez 2	7
	2020	Lacalle Pou	4

A.2 Country-level details

Presidential powers

Table A.2: Presidential powers

Country	Package Veto Override	Partial Veto Override	Decree	Budgetary Powers	Exclusive Introduction of Legislation	Proposal Referenda	Cabinet formation	Censure	Cabinet Dismissal	Dissolution of Assembly	Total
Uruguay	1	3	0	3	2	0	3	2	4	1	19
Brazil 1988	1	2	4	2	1	0	4	4	4	0	22
Brazil 2001	1	2	2	2	1	0	4	4	4	0	20
Indonesia	4	4	0	4	0	0	4	4	4	0	24
Philippines	0	3	0	3	0	0	3	4	4	0	17
Kenya	0	3	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	10
Malawi	1	0	0	4	0	2	4	4	4	0	19
Sri Lanka	0	0	1	0	0	4	4	2	0	3	14
Chile	2	3	0	3	2	2	4	4	4	0	24

Junior ministers

Brazil

In Brazil, the second position in the hierarchy of the ministry is that of the *Secretário-Executivo*, or Executive Secretary, of which each ministry has one. The responsibilities of the Executive Secretary are: 1) "to coordinate, consolidate and submit the global action plan of the [respective government department] to the Minister of State", 2) "to monitor and evaluate the execution of the projects and actions of the [respective government department]", 3) "to supervise and coordinate the activity of the member bodies of the organizational structure of the [respective government department]", 4) "to supervise and coordinate the articulation of the bodies of the [respective government department] with the central bodies of the systems related to the area of competence of the Executive Secretariat", 5) "to substitute the Minister of State in his/her removals or legal or regulatory impediments", 6) "to exercise any other attributions that may be assigned to him by the Minister of State".[1] The president signs the appointment decrees of Executive Secretaries that appear in the country's official gazette (*Diário Oficial da União*), under the header "Acts of the Executive Power".[2]

Chile

In Chile, the second position in the hierarchy of the ministry is that of the *Subsecretario*, or undersecretary. Each ministry has one or more Undersecretariats, which normally correspond to different sub-areas within the portfolio, each of which is headed by an Undersecretary.[3] Undersecretaries are the "direct collaborators" of the ministers. They are responsible for "coordinat[ing] the action[s] of the bodies and public services of the sector, (...) exercis[ing] the internal administration of the Ministry and fulfill the

[1] Decreto Nº 9.982, de 20 de agosto de 2019, Chapter IV, section I.

[2] An example of such a decree can be found here.

[3] Ley Nº 18.575, organica constitucional de bases generales de la administración del estado, art. 24

other functions that the law attributes to them".[4] Furthermore, ministers are subrogated by the earliest appointed undersecretary of their ministry, unless the president nominates another undersecretary to that effect.[5] In fact, Undersecretaries are always appointed by the president.[6]

Indonesia

In Indonesia, the second position in the hierarchy of the ministry is that of the *Wakil Menteri* or Vice Minister, of which each ministry has either one or none at all. The Vice Minister is directly below and responsible to the minister, and her main duty is to assist the minister in implementing the ministry's tasks, specifically, "to assist the Minister in the formulation and/or implementation of the Ministry's policies and to assist the Minister in coordinating the achievement of strategic policies across (...) organizational units in the Ministerial environment".[7] Vice Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President.[8]

Below the Vice Minister, or directly below the minister in the absence of a Vice Minister, there is another junior minister position, namely, that of the *Sekretaris Jenderal*, or Secretary General, of which each ministry has one. However, because Secretaries General are prohibited from having party affiliations, they are excluded from the analysis, as their partisan identify does not result from the deliberate decisions of political actors, but is instead fixed by law.[9]

Kenya

In Kenya, the second position in the hierarchy of the ministry is that of the *Principal Secretary*, which heads a State department (a sub-division of a ministry, of which each ministry may have one or more).[10] No other duties are stipulated by the constitution. Principal Secretaries are nominated by the president from "among persons recommended by the Public Service Commission", and are appointed by him "with the approval of the National Assembly" (art. 155), but may be dismissed by the president without further conditions (art. 132.2d).[11]

Malawi

In Malawi, there are two junior ministers positions. First is that of the *Deputy Minister*, which are members of the cabinet.[12] While the constitution does not specify the number of Deputy Ministers that may be appointed per ministry, empirically we found that the portfolios of Deputy Ministers tended to correspond to the names of the ministries, that ministries tended to have one Deputy Minister at most and that the majority of ministries did not have a Deputy Minister. The constitution stipulates the duties of cabinet members without differentiating between ministers and Deputy Ministers.[13] The second junior minister position is that of the *Principal Secretary* (PS), with each PS heading one or more government departments under the supervision of a minister or Deputy Minister.[14] Again, empirically we found that

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[4] Ley Nº 18.575, organica constitucional de bases generales de la administración del estado, art. 24

[5] Ley Nº 18.575, organica constitucional de bases generales de la administración del estado, art. 25

[6] Chilean Constitution of 1980, art. 32.7

[7] Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia nomor 60 tahun 2012 tentang Wakil Menteri, pasal 1-2.

[8] Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia 60 tahun 2012 tentang Wakil Menteri, pasal 4.

[9] Secretaries, including Secretaries General, are structural offices of echelon 1A or "Middle High Leadership Positions" (Jabatan Pimpinan Tinggi Madya)(Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia nomor 7 tahun 2015 tentang organisasi Kementerian Negara, pasal 88). The officials that occupy offices of echelon 1A are in turn civil servants (pegawai negeri) (Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia nomor 47 tahun 2009 tentang pembentukan dan organisasi Kementerian Negara, pasal 70). Finally, civil servants are prohibited from being members of, or supporting, political parties (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia nomor 43 tahun 1999 tentang perubahan atas Undang-Undang nomor 8 tahun 1974 tentang pokok-pokok kepegawaian, pasal 3).

[10] Kenyan Constitution of 2010, art. 155.

[11] Kenyan Constitution of 2010, arts. 132.2d, 155.

[12] Malawian Constitution of 1994, art. 92.1.

[13] Malawian Constitution of 1994, art. 96.1.

[14] Malawian Constitution of 1994, art. 93.2.

the portfolios of the Principal Secretaries corresponded to the names of the ministries, with most, but not all ministries having one PS, the remainder having no PS at all. Other than supervising government departments, no additional duties are specified for Principal Secretaries.

Philippines

In the Philippines, the second position in the hierarchy of the ministry is that of the *Undersecretary*. We empirically found that each Department (ministry) had one Undersecretary or more, each being responsible for a particular sub-division and its corresponding policy area within the department. The powers and duties of the Undersecretary are the following:

"1) Advis[ing] and assist[ing] the Secretary in the formulation and implementation of department objectives and policies, 2) Oversee[ing] all the operational activities of the department for which he shall be responsible to the Secretary; 3) Coordinat[ing] the programs and projects of the department and be responsible for its economical, efficient and effective administration; 4) Serv[ing] as deputy to the Secretary in all matters relating to the operations of the department; 5) Temporarily discharg[ing] the duties of the Secretary in the latter's absence or inability to discharge his duties for any cause or in case of vacancy of the said office, unless otherwise provided by law. Where there are more than one Undersecretary, the Secretary shall allocate the foregoing powers and duties among them. The President shall likewise make the temporary designation of Acting Secretary from among them; and 6) Perform such other functions and duties as may be provided by law".[15] Undersecretaries are appointed by the president upon nomination by the respective Secretary.[16]

Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka, there are two kinds of junior ministers to which cabinet ministers delegate to: *Ministers who are not members of the cabinet*, who are often referred to in the sources as *State Ministers*, and *Deputy Ministers*.[17] The constitution does not specify any hierarchical relationship between non-cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers. We therefore treat them as equals. The Constitution further states that cabinet Ministers may delegate to either type of junior minister, "any power or duty pertaining to any subject or function assigned to such cabinet Minister, or any power or duty conferred or imposed on him by any written law".[18] Empirically, we found that ministries could have zero, one, or multiple non-cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers. Both non-cabinet Ministers as well as Deputy Ministers are appointed "from among the Members of Parliament" by the president, on the advice of the prime minister.[19]

Uruguay

In Uruguay, the second position in the hierarchy of the ministry is that of the *Subsecretario*, or Undersecretary, of which each ministry has one.[20] Undersecretaries are proposed by ministers, but appointed by the president.[21] They may replace ministers in the latter's absence, if so appointed by the President.[22] Information about the powers and duties of Undersecretaries could not be retrieved, apart from the fact that these are regulated by the Executive Power.[23]

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[15] Executive Order No. 292 [BOOK IV/Chapter 2-Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries]

[16] Executive Order No. 292 [BOOK IV/Chapter 10-Appointments and Qualifications]

[17] Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978, arts. 44-45

[18] Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978, arts. 44.5, 45.2

[19] Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978, arts. 44.1, 45.1

[20] Uruguayan Constitution of 1966 (Reinstated in 1985), art. 183.

[21] Uruguayan Constitution of 1966 (Reinstated in 1985), art. 183.

[22] Uruguayan Constitution of 1966 (reinstated in 1985), art. 184.

[23] Uruguayan Constitution of 1966 (reinstated in 1985), art. 182.

A.3 Further empirical results

In this appendix, we show the results for Hypothesis 3 by excluding Sri Lanka from the sample. Findings show that our results confirm Hypothesis in comparative perspective.



Figure A.1: Predicted probability of presidential powers on coalition monitoring moderated by age of democracy (years)

This figure depicts the predicted margins of presidential powers moderated by age of democracy (years) on nonpartisan monitoring excluding Sri Lanka from the sample. Predicted values calculated from Model (2) in Table B.6.

Appendix B

Appendix Chapter 4

B.1 Cabinets

Table B.1: Cabinets

Country	Cabinet Formation Year	President	Cabinet Parties
Benin	2015	Boni Yayi	5
Brazil	1995	FHC 1	4
	1999	FHC 2	5
	2003	Lula 1	6
	2007	Lula 2	8
	2011	Roussef 1	7
	2015	Roussef 2	10
	2019	Bolsonaro	6
Chile	1990	Aylwin	5
	1994	Frei	4
	2000	Lagos	4
	2006	Bachelet 1	4
	2010	Piñera 1	2
	2014	Bachelet 2	6
	2018	Piñera 2	3
Indonesia	2004	Yudhoyono 1	8
	2009	Yudhoyono 2	6
	2014	Jokowi 1	6
	2019	Jokowi 2	6
Kenya	2008	Kibaki 2	4
	2013	Kenyatta 1	5
Malawi	2014	Mutharika	2
Philippines	2004	Arroyo	4
	2010	Aquino	2
	2016	Duterte	3
Uruguay[1]	1995	Sanguinetti 2	7
	2000	Battle	4
	2005	Vázquez 1	6
	2010	Mujica	8
	2015	Vázquez 2	7
	2020	Lacalle Pou	4

[1]For Uruguay the number of party factions rather than the number of parties is reported.

B.2 Descriptive statistics

Table B.2: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
ideological distance	417	0.38	0.41	0.000	2.04
committee powers	417	3.04	1.29	1.80	5.76
seat share	417	32.35	24.51	0	100
age of democracy	417	17.97	8.47	1	35

Table B.3: Portfolio prestige

	Low	Medium	High
Portfolio prestige	32	305	80

B.3 Alternative explanations for the committee powers result

Starting with the first explanation, we should see greater minority and individual influence in stronger committee systems, and smaller influence in weaker committee systems. Malawi has by far the strongest committees with a score of 5.79, but its Standing Orders do not make any mention of special rights for minority or dissenting members. Brazil has the second most powerful committees (average score 4.72), but also does not have any privileges for minority members, other than that each committee must include at least one minority member. At the other end of the spectrum, with the weakest committees, we have Uruguay (average score 1.87), where dissenting members may attach their opinions to the committee report or submit an alternative report, and Chile (average score 1.90), where dissenting minority votes are included in the report. Minority parties and individual members are most influential in Indonesia, where decision-making in committee is governed by consensus, while its committee strength (3.05) sits just below average (3.33). The 3 remaining systems, Benin, Kenya, and the Philippines, all score between 2 and 4, and all except Benin allow for minority and dissenting reports. Overall, influential minorities and individual members cluster around the middle and the lower end of the committee powers spectrum, meaning that the first explanation does not hold. Table B.4 lists minority influence for each country.

The second hypothesis is trickier to evaluate, as the legislatures under study have a plethora of different prerogatives they assign to committee chairs. The most common and least remarkable responsibilities of chairs are convening and presiding over committee meetings. In addition to that, chairs may have additional powers that can be subdivided into a number of recurring categories: formal designation as spokespersons of their committees; special voting powers, such as having an original (first) vote or a casting vote to decide the outcome of tied votes; agenda-setting powers such as determining the Order of the Day or drafting committee reports, as well as timetable powers such as requesting extensions for bills; partial veto powers such as the power to decide whether to accept amendments proposed by committee members; statutory membership on house leadership bodies or the ability to convene and/or participate in meetings with such bodies; and appointment powers such as the right to appoint rapporteurs. There are also negative powers, such as the dependence on the confidence of a majority of committee members. Table B.5 shows the chair powers for each country. If we impressionistically assign one point for each power in each of these categories, and subtract 0.5 points for confidence vote procedures (keeping in mind that chairs are likely to enjoy majority support anyway), while ignoring the generic convening and presiding activities, we can assign the following scores to each country's committee chairs:

- Benin: 2 points;
- Brazil: 3 points;
- Chile: 0.5 points (only determines topics for 'easy dispatch' rather than the whole agenda);
- Indonesia: 2 points (0.5 points for each power as the powers are assigned to the committee leadership as a whole, plus 1 point for the chair's informal discretion);
- Kenya: 1 point (0.5 points for the original vote, which is not quite as powerful as a casting vote, and -0.5 points for the existence of a confidence vote);
- Malawi: 3 points;
- Philippines: 1 point;
- Uruguay: 0.5 points (not a real casting vote and only determines the ordering of the two competing reports).

Table B.5 lists chair powers for each country.

Plotting chair powers against average committee powers, as shown in Figure B.1, a clear positive correlation between chair powers and committee powers appears. The most powerful committee systems,

those of Malawi and Brazil, also have the most powerful chairs, with 3 points each[2]. On the other hand, the weakest committee systems, those of Uruguay and Chile, also have the weakest chairs (0.5 points each). All of the remaining countries' chairs have 1 or 2 points, placing them right in the middle. Of course, the sample size is too small and the chair powers coding too crude to make any reliable inferences, but at least it is possible to say beyond reasonable doubt that the second explanation is not supported by these data.

The fact that these alternative explanations do not seem to hold lends further support to the theory that relying on strong committees for monitoring and reporting and institutional checks comes with its own set of agency loss risks as a result of the separation of powers. All in all, the committee powers result is interesting and warrants further investigation in a larger sample of countries, preferably one including both parliamentary and presidential systems.

[2] It could be argued that the shorter tenures of Brazilian and Malawian chairs diminish their power. However, even if we subtract one point, these countries would still be at the level of Benin and Indonesia and still have relatively strong chairs.

Table B.4: Minority and individual members' influence

Country	Committee powers	Minority of individual member influence
Benin	2.50	-
Brazil	4.72	Committees must include a member of the minority. Non-members are allowed to speak during committee discussions.
Chile	1.90	Votes by the minority are included in the committee verdict.
Indonesia	3.05	Consensus system suggests greater influence for opposition parties and individual members. However, what we know about how consensus plays out in practice attenuates the influence of individual members[3].
Kenya	2.86	In 2008, the Opposition had a statutory majority of one in a number of permanent committees[4]. Minority and dissenting reports were allowed in 2013.
Malawi	5.79	-
Philippines	3.92	Members of the majority and the minority speak alternately during committee meetings. Dissenting opinions may be attached to reports.
Uruguay	1.87	Dissenting opinions may be attached to reports, or emitted as alternative reports.
Mean	3.33	

[3] See Sherlock (2012).
[4] These were the Public Accounts Committee, the Public Investments Committee, the Local Authorities and Funds Accounts Committee, and the Budget Committee (2008 Standing Orders, arts. 187, 188, 189, 190).

Table B.5: Committee chair powers

Country	Committee powers	Chair powers
Benin	2.50	Convenes committee meetings, evaluates acceptability of amendments proposed by her committee. Sits on the Conference of Leaders together with the Speaker, remaining Assembly leaders and congressional party leaders.
Brazil	4.72	Convenes and presides over meetings. Selects rapporteurs. May convene meetings with the College of Leaders (which consists of leaders of congressional delegations). Determines committee agenda.
Chile	1.90	Presides over committee meetings, opening, suspending and closing them, determines topics of "easy dispatch" (but does not determine the order of the day, which is determined by agreement among committee members).
Indonesia	3.05	No unilateral powers, only as part of the committee leadership, which can submit draft laws to the Legislation Body (which are then forwarded to the DPR) and request extensions for deliberations on bills. Informally, chairs have a great degree of discretion in applying statutes[5].
Kenya	2.86	Presides over and convene committee meetings, acts as spokesperson. Has an original vote. Is subject to the confidence of an absolute majority of committee members.
Malawi	5.79	Convenes and presides over committee meetings. Has a casting vote in case of ties. Drafts committee reports. Sits on the Committee of Chairpersons, which has a coordinating role.
Philippines	3.92	Participates in monthly meetings with the Speaker (along with the vice-chairpersons).
Uruguay	1.87	Has a casting vote in case of two conflicting reports signed by equal number of members: chair decides which one is placed first in the file.
Mean	3.33	

[5]Sherlock (2012, p. 561).



Figure B.1: Chair powers plotted against committee powers.

B.4 Data sources and coding

Dependent variable

The operationalization of the dependent variable has been explained in depth in the section Model and variables. The coding of and data collection for this variable consisted of three components: 1. collection of committee chair data, 2. collection of cabinet data, 3. matching committees to ministerial portfolios. I will discuss each in turn.

1. *Committee chair data:* the collection of committee chair data required a tailor-made approach for each country. Below I briefly list the procedure and source for each country.

    - *Benin:* the official website of the National Assembly of Benin combined with the Wayback Machine[5]. This source also lists the party affiliations of the CCs. In case of uncertainty, online media sources were consulted for confirmation purposes.
    - *Brazil:* for the period 1995-1999, I used the CEBRAP Legislative Database[6], which were granted to me by the courtesy of Danilo Medeiros and Pedro Henrique Reis Pereira. This dataset contained both the names as well as the party affiliations of the CCs. For the remainder of the period, I consulted data from the Open Data platform of the Chamber of Deputies[7]. For this same period, I had to collect the party affiliations of the CCs separately, by looking up their names on the main website of the Chamber of Deputies[8].
    - *Chile:* for the more recent legislatures, I used the website of the Chamber of Deputies of Chile in combination with the Wayback Machine[9]. I then took the party affiliations from the Wikipedia page corresponding to the legislature at hand[10]. For older legislatures not available through the above method, I consulted the website of the Library of the National Congress of Chile[11], which also listed the party affiliations of the CCs.
    - *Indonesia:* for the Indonesian case, the most accessible and complete source of data on committee chairs and their party affiliations turned out to be Wikipedia, where, for the period 2014-2024, each of the DPR's 11 committees had its own entry[12]. For the period 2009-2014,

[5] For the 7th legislature, which began in 2015, and is the only legislature that made it to the final case selection, I used the following link: `https://web.archive.org/web/20180904163019/https://assemblee-nationale.bj/index.php/presentation/organisation_et_fonctionnement/commissions-permanentes-de-lassemblee-nationale/`. The year 2018 was part of the 7th legislature, and the source indicates that CCs are appointed for the duration of the legislature. However, as changes in chairs invariably occur in 3 years, all names were double checked using online media sources and altered where necessary.

[6] `https://bancodedadoslegislativos.com.br/`

[7] `https://dadosabertos.camara.leg.br/arquivos/orgaosDeputados/xlsx/orgaosDeputados-L51.xlsx`. Note: one can change the number of the legislature in the link (L51) to the one of interest (e.g., L52).

[8] `https://www.camara.leg.br/busca-geral?termo=Luiz+Piauhylino`. Note: one can change the name of the deputy in the link (Luiz Piauhylino) the name of the deputy of interest.

[9] The procedure I followed was taking the link `https://www.camara.cl/legislacion/comisiones/comisiones_permanentes.aspx#marca`, plugging it into the Wayback Machine (`https://archive.org/web/`) and navigating to the date of interest. I used this link (`http://www.camara.cl/`) with the Wayback Machine for data from before 2009. For the remainder of the countries, whenever I made use of the Wayback Machine, I used the same procedure.

[10] `https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/LVI_periodo_legislativo_del_Congreso_Nacional_de_Chile`. Note: "LVI" in the link can be changed to the roman numeral corresponding to the legislature of interest.

[11] `https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/corporaciones/periodo_detalle?inicio=1998-03-11&fin=2002-03-10&periodo=1990-2026&cam=Diputados`. Note that the legislative period can be changed.

[12] `https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komisi_I_Dewan_Perwakilan_Rakyat_Republik_Indonesia`. Note: the roman numeral of the committee in the link ("Komisi I") can be replaced by the number of the committee of interest.

I made recourse to a third-party website, Jari Ungu, founded with the goal to facilitate communication between constituents and their representatives[13]. For the period 2004-2019, I also relied on Wikipedia, but for this period, the CCs and their parties are listed on the main page of the respective legislature[14].

- *Kenya:* for the 10th Parliament CCs, I used the Hansards recorded by the third-party Parliamentary monitoring organization Mzalendo[15]. I then looked up the party affiliations on the now defunct website of the Parliament of the Republic of Kenya[16]. For the 11th Parliament CCs and party affiliations I consulted Wikipedia[17].
- *Malawi:* I used the now defunct website of the Parliament of Malawi for CCs and their party affiliations[18].
- *Philippines:* for the 13th Congress (2004-2007) CCs, I used the website of the Congress of the Philippines in combination with the Wayback Machine[19]. For the party affiliations of the CCs of said period, I used Wikipedia[20]. For the CCs and party affiliations of the 15th (2010-2013) and 17th (2016-2019) Congresses, I made use of Wikipedia and the Wayback Machine[21].
- *Uruguay:* I consulted the names of the CCs on the website of the Parliament of Uruguay[22]. I took the party affiliations from Wikipedia[23].

2. *Cabinet data:* I used WhoGov as the base source for the names and party affiliations of the cabinet ministers. I triangulated this with the Wikipedia pages of each cabinet or presidency to make sure I collected the day-one cabinet and not the cabinet on the date used by WhoGov. I also corrected the names of the portfolios where necessary—which often change over time. I only included actual ministries in the dataset and not agencies with cabinet rank, as it can be difficult to treat such agencies as functional equivalents to ministries, especially cross-nationally.
3. *Committee-portfolio matching:* perhaps the most complex part of the data collection process, this required the collection of four different types of data: 1. the names of the committees; 2. the

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[13] `https://jariungu.com/berita_list.php?idBerita=5553&daftar-komisi-i-dpr-ri`. Note: the lower case roman numeral of the committee in the link ("komisi-i") can be replaced by the number of the committee of interest.

[14] `https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dewan_Perwakilan_Rakyat_Republik_Indonesia_(2004%E2%80%932009)`

[15] `https://info.mzalendo.com/hansard/`. Note: the members of the committees were appointed on 30-4-2008, in the 14:30 sitting, as reported in the Hansard of that date. However, chairs are elected within committee meetings but these elections do not seem to be reported in the Hansard. The procedure used was therefore to search for the name of each committee in the Hansard database linked above, to see if any PM identified himself as the chairperson of the respective committee.

[16] `https://web.archive.org/web/20080616160507/http://www.bunge.go.ke/members.php`

[17] `CCs:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/11th_Parliament_of_Kenya;partyaffiliations:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_members_of_the_National_Assembly_of_Kenya,_2013%E2%80%932017.`

[18] `https://web.archive.org/web/20140802164419/http://www.parliament.gov.mw/docs/general/Committees2014-2019.pdf`

[19] `https://web.archive.org/web/20041014012725/congress.gov.ph/committees/`

[20] `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/13th_Congress_of_the_Philippines`

[21] 15th Congress: `https://web.archive.org/web/20130619133904/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Philippine_House_of_Representatives_committees`. 17th Congress: `https://web.archive.org/web/20161006071413/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Philippine_House_of_Representatives_committees`.

[22] `https://parlamento.gub.uy/camarasycomisiones/representantes/comisiones/73/comision-integracion`. Note: the date can be altered in the box after Fecha. Other committees can be selected using the left-hand menu, by clicking Comisiones -> Comisiones, and then selecting the committee of interest in the list at the bottom of the page.

[23] `https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:XLIII_Legislatura_de_la_C%C3%A1mara_de_Representantes_de_Uruguay_(1990-1995)`. Note: the legislature number (roman numeral) and dates in the link can be replaced with those corresponding to the legislature of interest.

policy jurisdictions of the committees, if available; 3. the names of the ministerial departments; 4. the policy jurisdictions of the ministerial departments, and, in some cases, the sub-departments. I again used a tailor-made approach for each country. There were roughly three types of cases: 1. the correspondence between committees and portfolios was stipulated by the Standing Orders (Indonesia); 2. the committee jurisdictions were specified in the Standing Orders but without these being explicitly linked to ministerial departments; 3. no data on the precise committee jurisdictions was available. In the first case, no additional action had to be taken. In the second case, I looked for correspondences between the committee jurisdictions and the departmental jurisdictions and coded accordingly. In the third case, the matching had to be based purely on the names of the committees and the portfolios. Below, I explain the process for each country in more detail.

- *Benin:* case 2. I retrieved committee jurisdictions from an online media article[24].
- *Brazil:* case 2. The names of the committees in the source from which I took the CCs were at times erroneous, as they were based on the most recent committee names. I therefore triangulated the committee names with those used in the Chamber of Deputies' official gazette (Diários da Câmara dos Deputados[25]). I retrieved committee jurisdictions from the Standing Orders (Regimento Interno da Câmara dos Deputados)[26] of each legislature. Finally, for the policy jurisdictions of the ministries I relied on the Wikipedia pages of the respective ministries, which were often quite complete, recurring to various additional sources in the cases where Wikipedia was unsatisfactory.
- *Indonesia:* case 1. I obtained the correspondences between committee and portfolio jurisdictions from the sources in the footnote[27]
- *Kenya:* case 2. I obtained committee subjects from the Standing Orders[28]
- *Malawi:* case 3. No source could be found for the 2014-2019 committee jurisdictions. The only Standing Orders available are those from 2013 which do not mention the subjects of the vast majority of standing committees. The matching of committees with portfolios was therefore done based on common sense and experience with other countries in the sample. For instance, in the absence of a dedicated labor committee, the labor portfolio is related to the social affairs committee in some countries, and so this same decision was made for Malawi, which also lacks a specialized labor committee.

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[24] `https://archives.beninwebtv.com/2019/05/benin-parlement-le-role-de-chaque-commission-permanente/`

[25] `https://imagem.camara.leg.br/pesquisa_diario_basica.asp`

[26] Retrieved from: `https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/rescad/1989/resolucaodacamaradosdeputados-17-21-setembro-1989-320110-norma-pl.html`. These are the most recent standing orders, which, however, indicate all amendments made to it over time. Following the amendments to the section on committee jurisdictions allowed me to piece together the entire period.

[27]

- 2019-2024: Website of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia: Komisi I. retrieved from `https://www.dpr.go.id/akd/index/id/Tentang-Komisi-I`. Note: the number of the committee in the link can be replaced by the number of the committee of interest.
- 2014-2019: Wikipedia: Komisi Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia. Retrieved from `https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komisi_Dewan_Perwakilan_Rakyat_Republik_Indonesia`.
- 2009-2014: Website of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia: Komisi I and Wayback Machine (12-2-2010). Retrieved from `https://web.archive.org/web/20091005175813/www.dpr.go.id/id/Komisi/Komisi-I`. note: the number of the committee in the link can be replaced by the number of the committee of interest.
- 2004-2009: DPR RI Periode 2004 – 2009, Tahun Pertama. Retrieved from `http://repositori.dpr.go.id/43/1/LAPORAN%20KINERJA%202009%20-%202014%20%282%29.pdf`.

[28] 2008 Standing Orders: `http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=324`. 2013 Standing Orders: `http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2020-10/Standing_Orders_2013.pdf`. Matching these to the portfolios was not very challenging, but I did verify portfolio jurisdictions in ambiguous cases by consulting the respective ministry websites.

- *Philippines:* this was by far the most labor-intensive case. Not only does the Philippines have by far the greatest number of committees of the sample, it also has a plethora of government agencies that are not full departments. Many of the committees correspond only to such agencies, and so for each committee I had to check whether there was a specific agency in charge of the respective policy area and whether that agency was subordinate to a department or directly to the presidency. In the former case, I would match the committee to the parent department, and in the latter case, I would exclude the committee from the analysis. I used a variety of sources for this procedure, mostly relying on departmental websites in combination with the Wayback Machine. I obtained the committee jurisdictions from the Rules of the House of Representatives, 18th Congress[29].
- *Uruguay:* similar to Chile, but even more straightforward. Committee and portfolio names and attributions were even more stable over time than in the Chilean case, and corresponded even more closely. For the committee jurisdictions, I relied on the official gazette of the Chamber of Deputies of March 6th, 1990 (Diário de Sesiones de la Cámara de Representantes de 6 de marzo de 1990, p. 125)[30].

Independent variables

1. *Ideological distance:* ideological positions are based on the *Economic left-right scale* (v2pariglef) variable from V-Party, which, as I mentioned previously, is based on a scale running from 0 to 6, with 0 representing far-left and 6 representing far-right, on which country experts have been asked to place parties in terms of their stance on economic issues. Specifically, I use a version of the variable called "v2pariglef_mean", which is simply the mean of the experts' codings. Ideological distance is then defined as the absolute difference between the position of the portfolio party and the mean position of the set of cabinet parties, weighted by seat share. Although V-Party is impressively complete, a few smaller coalition parties were not covered by it. Those parties were excluded from the calculation. The small size of these parties means they would not have significantly impacted the overall calculation had they been included.
2. *Portfolio prestige:* based on the *Portfolio prestige* variable from WhoGov. The WhoGov codebook contains an exhaustive list of ministerial policy areas and the corresponding classification in terms of Low, Medium or High prestige. As my dataset came to differ from the WhoGov dataset as a result of corrections of portfolio names based on case-specific sources, I ended up coding this variable by hand, making recourse to the WhoGov dataset only in case of ambiguity.
3. *Committee powers:* based on André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator. I refer to Appendix 4 for an in-depth description of the coding of this indicator for each country.
4. *Seat share:* a party's seat share is simply the number of seats held by the portfolio-holding party divided by the sum of the seats held by the set of cabinet parties, multiplied by 100. Data on the number of seats occupied by each party as well as legislature size came from a variety of case-specific official and unofficial election sources.
5. *Age of democracy*: based on the *Durable* variable from Polity V, which is operationalized as "the number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score)". In all cases, this 'regime change' corresponded to the generally accepted democratization date.

[29] https://www.congress.gov.ph/download/docs/hrep.house.rules.pdf

[30] Retrieved from https://biblioteca.parlamento.gub.uy/PublicacionesPeriodicas/busquedalibreTimeLine/redirect?Id=glBI2alSqVt773jEo4n7QcfbD5HK7XKfz9ScSSpHUTxf8C6lXi9g5P83ArPv7CWPB6OlC6YLigprJzLxzmlEIvoTJ4ylGLzEu/fxG3MNOAkqoUNpffW0XFR38v2_aEaWdRKaEKqxlt7FEYjd6CxDcQ==.

B.5 Country-level details on committees and their powers

This appendix contains information on committee assignments, chair selection, committee powers and committees' roles in the legislative process for all eight country cases. Each section ends with the coding of **?** committee strength indicator, which is based on the codebook made available by those authors in their article's online supporting materials.

Benin

Committee assignments and chair selection
Congressional delegations present lists of candidates to the Bureau (leadership body) of the National Assembly (*Assemblée Nationale*), keeping in mind the proportional representation of each party in each committee. After consulting with party leaders, the Bureau draws up a definitive list, which is then voted on by the Assembly (Standing Orders of the National Assembly of Benin, art. 31)[31]. Each committee then elects its own chairperson (art. 33), by the same procedure in which the members of the Bureau, including the Assembly's Speaker, are elected, that is, by absolute majority, with a runoff round if any candidate fails to obtain an absolute majority in the first round (art. 15).

Committee and chair resources and powers
Committee jurisdictions are strict: a given matter may only be brought to a single committee (art. 34.4). Decisions within the committee are taken by simple majority vote, with a quorum of a majority of its members (arts. 35.5d, 35.5a). Committee chairs have the sole right to convene their committees (art. 35.1). They do not, however, have a casting vote. If the vote on is tied, the motion to be voted on fails (art. 35.5c). Committee meetings are not open to the public (art. 35.6). Committees can compel members of the government to provide testimony ("*Les membres du gouvernement sont entendus*[32] *par les commissions à la demande de ces dernières*") (art. 35.4). The permanent committees can be authorized by the parent chamber to launch "information or enquiry missions" (*missions d'information ou d'enquête*) on issues within their jurisdictions (art. 36).

Permanent committee chairs sit on the "Conference of leaders" (*la Conférence des presidents*), a body composed of the Speaker of the National Assembly, as well as the remaining members of the Bureau and the leaders of the parliamentary (party) groups (art. 37). The Conference of leaders opines on the legislative agenda (*ordre du jour*), which is proposed by the Speaker (art. 38).

Committee chairs and rapporteurs (who are elected by the committee by the same procedure as the chairs—art. 33.1) can be assisted in the plenary session by the Assembly's civil servants or technicians (art. 36). Committees can furthermore appeal to any individual or expert for consultancy (art. 34.7).

The committee stage precedes the plenary stage: that is, no matter may be brought to the Assembly without having first been the subject of a committee report (art. 48.2). Bills and proposals for resolutions are sent to the competent committee after having been tabled (art. 74.8). The Speaker refers every bill tabled with the Bureau to the competent committee (art. 80.1). Financial matters are mandatorily referred to the committee in charge of finance (art. 34.6). The committee may propose amendments to bills assigned to it, as long as these are within the domain of the law as established by article 98 of the Constitution, and the committee chair evaluates the acceptability of such amendments (art. 81.2). The report produced by the committee is then printed and circulated within the Assembly (art. 81.1). The Conference of leaders then decides whether to include the committee report in the legislative agenda (arts. 84.1, 38). If it is included in the agenda, the committee report is debated in plenary session (arts. 85, 86.1). First, the bill's articles are debated one by one (art. 87.1). The cited committee may oppose

[31] Retrieved from `https://assemblee-nationale.bj/index.php/presentation/textes_fondamentaux/texte_fondamentaux/`.

[32] From the entry on '*entendre*' of the online Larousse dictionary (`https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/entendre/29878`): "6. *En parlant de la police, de la justice, recevoir un témoignage, une déposition*" / "6. In reference to the police, justice, to receive a testimony, a deposition."

the examination of any amendment not previously submitted to it (art. 87.2). If the Assembly decides not to proceed to the discussion of the articles, the Speaker declares the proposal not carried (art. 87.3). Otherwise, the Chamber proceeds to the discussion of the amendments, which are discussed and voted on before the base text (arts. 88.1, 5). Before the plenary vote on the bill as a whole, a second reading or re-referral to the committee responsible can be requested (art. 89.1). If accepted, the committee produces a second report on which the Assembly then votes (art. 89.3). Finally, after all articles have been voted on, the bill as a whole is voted on (art. 91.1).

When it comes to committees' control over the timetable, the Standing Orders do not make explicit any general deadlines. Article 81.1 states: "The reports of the committees shall be tabled, printed and distributed within such a period of time as to enable the National Assembly to proceed usefully to the discussion of the bills, proposed bills or resolutions". Furthermore, the Assembly can invoke an urgency procedure (art. 78), in which case the committee must submit its report within a delay determined by the Assembly (art. 79). Notably, an article is dedicated to stating that "the permanent committees guarantee information to the National Assembly, to enable it to exercise its control over government policy" (art. 120.1).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

- NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees: 5. Lowest observed value in sample. Partial score: 0.
- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios: 0 full matches to single portfolio, 0 partial matches (all committees matched to more than one portfolio).
- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): YES
- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and testimony): NO
- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): NO
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation): NO
- REWRITE (does the plenary vote on the bill as amended by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): NO (each article is voted on separately)
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): YES
- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): not explicitly specified, but timetable is set by the plenary in case of urgency procedure → 0.5 points
- TOTAL SCORE: 2.5

Brazil

Committee assignments and chair selection

Committee assignments follow proportional representation of the congressional delegations and legislative blocks (*Blocos Parlamentares*) and always include a member of the Chamber of Deputies (*Câmara dos Deputados*) Minority[33] (Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies, art. 23)[34]. The distribution of

[33] The Majority is defined as the party or legislative block composed of the absolute majority of Chamber members, whereas the Minority is defined as the second largest grouping that differs from the Majority in relation to its support for the government or lack thereof. When no grouping holds an absolute majority, the Majority is defined as the largest party or legislative block (art. 13).

[34] Retrieved from `https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/rescad/1989/resolucaodacamaradosdeputados-17-21-setembro-1989-320110-norma-pl.html`.

committee seats among the congressional delegations and blocks is determined by the *Mesa* (the Chamber's leadership body) (art. 26). Every deputy can only be on one committee and has the right to be a member of at least one committee (ibid.). In the first legislative session, the congressional party leaders communicate to the Speaker the lists with the names of the prospective committee members (art. 28). These lists do not seem to require the approval of either the Speaker or the plenary, but the Speaker makes the assignments if the congressional leadership fails to do so (ibid.). Committee chairs are elected "by their peers" for a mandate of one year (art. 39). The procedures for those elections follow those of the election of the *Mesa* as stipulated in art. 7 (art. 39.3), that is, by secret ballot and by absolute majority with a run-off for the two candidates with the most votes in case no candidate obtains an absolute majority in the first round (art. 7).

Committee and chair resources and powers

Committee powers include, but are not limited to, summoning[35] government ministers to provide information on any previously established matter; forwarding written information requests to ministers through the Mesa (Chamber leadership body); soliciting testimony from any authority or citizen, monitoring and supervising the accounting, financial, budgetary, operational and patrimonial control of the Union and entities of direct and indirect administration in coordination with the Permanent Mixed Committee; determining the execution, with the help of the Federal Court of Accounts, of due diligence, expertise, inspections and audits of an accounting, financial, budgetary, operational and patrimonial nature, in the administrative units of the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Powers; exercising oversight and control over the activities of the executive power; proposing the suspension of normative acts of the Executive Power that exceed the regulatory power or the limits of legislative delegation (art. 24).

Committee meetings are in principle public, but can be held in private if the committee decides so (art. 48).

Each committee has its own specialized staff (*secretaria*), which assists it in administrative tasks (art. 62). Aside from their *secretarias*, committees can draw on "technical-legislative" counseling and consultancy within their policy jurisdictions from the Chamber's institutional counseling body (art. 64).

The committee chair convenes and presides over all committee meetings (art. 41). He selects rapporteurs (art. 41), may at any time convene meetings with the "College of Leaders" (*Colégio de Líderes*, a body consisting of the leaders of all congressional delegations) (art. 42), and determines the agenda of the committee meetings (art. 47). Rapporteur selection is no small matter in the Brazilian system, because rapporteurs' opinions come before the committee opinion in reports, as explained in more detail below.

The committee stage precedes the plenary stage, that is, proposals are always assessed and reported by the appropriate committee before being discussed by the plenary (arts. 53, 128). The written committee report (*parecer*) consists of three parts: the report (*relatório*), in which the matter under scrutiny is exposed, the verdict of the rapporteur together with his opinion on whether the matter should be approved, totally or partially rejected or substituted or amended, and, finally, the opinion of the committee, including with its members' votes (art. 129). Bills approved by a committee in the Chamber are sent directly to the Senate, unless one tenth of Deputies make recourse, in which case the proposal is discussed (art. 58) and voted on by the plenary, in whole or in part (art. 132.2). This recourse must explicitly indicate which elements of the matter considered by the committee will be the subject of deliberation by the plenary (art. 58.3). Furthermore, all proposals are referred to the Committee of Finance and Taxes, to check their compatibility with the annual budget, and to the Committee of the Constitution, Justice and Citizenship, to check their constitutionality and legality (ibid.). These gatekeeping committees' decision to turn down a proposal is binding (art. 54). Committees take decisions by simple majority vote, with a quorum of

[35] Per article 50 of the Constitution, "the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, as well as any of their committees, can summon a Minister of State or other heads of agencies directly subordinate to the Presidency of the Republic, to personally provide information on a predetermined topic, whereby their absence without adequate justification amounting to a crime of responsibility [crime de responsabilidade]" (`https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm`).

a majority of their members (art. 57). Non-member Deputies are allowed to speak during committee discussions (art. 57.8).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

- NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees:
  - 1995: 16. Partial score: (16 - 5)/44 = 0.25[36]
  - 1999: 16. Partial score: 0.25
  - 2003: 18. Partial score: (18 - 5)/44 = 0.30
  - 2007: 20. Partial score: (20 - 5)/44 = 0.34
  - 2011: 20. Partial score: 0.34
  - 2015: 23. Partial score: (23 - 5)/44 = 0.41
  - 2019: 25. Partial score: (25 - 5)/44 = 0.45
- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios:
  - 1995
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 3
    - Partial score: 6/16 + 0.5*3/16 = 0.16
  - 1999
    - Full matches: 3
    - Partial matches: 5
    - Partial score = 3/16 + 0.5*5/16 = 0.34
  - 2003
    - Full matches: 3
    - Partial matches: 7
    - Partial score = 3/18 + 0.5*7/18 = 0.36
  - 2007
    - Full matches: 5
    - Partial matches: 6
    - Partial score = 5/20 + 0.5*6/20 = 0.40
  - 2011
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 5
    - Partial score = 6/20 + 0.5*5/20 = 0.43
  - 2015
    - Full matches: 10
    - Partial matches: 5
    - Partial score = 10/23 + 0.5*5/23 = 0.54
  - 2019
    - Full matches: 4
    - Partial matches: 17

[36] Score normalized on scale from 0 to 1, with minimum observed value in sample (5, BEN) corresponding to 0 and maximum observed value (49, PHL 2016) corresponding to 1.

    - Partial score = 4/25 + 0.5*17/25 = 0.50

- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): YES
- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and testimony): NO (only ministers or heads of agencies directly subordinate to the presidency)
- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): yes, but only for administrative tasks, not for drafting documents and research → 0.5 points
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation): YES[37]
- REWRITE (can committees rewrite bills and does the plenary vote on the amended bill by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): yes, but only unless one tenth of deputies make recourse, in which case the bill is voted on, in whole or in part, by the plenary → 0.5 points
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): YES
- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): NO (deadlines for committee decisions on bills determined by article 52)
- TOTAL SCORE:
    - 1995 = 4 + 0.25 + 0.16 = 4.41
    - 1999 = 4 + 0.25 + 0.34 = 4.59
    - 2003 = 4 + 0.30 + 0.36 = 4.66
    - 2007 = 4 + 0.34 + 0.40 = 4.74
    - 2011 = 4 + 0.34 + 0.43 = 4.77
    - 2015 = 4 + 0.41 + 0.54 = 4.95
    - 2019 = 4 + 0.45 + 0.50 = 4.95

Chile

Committee assignments and chair selection
Committee assignments follow proportional representation of the parties constituting the Chamber of Deputies (*Cámara de Diputados*) (Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies of Chile, art. 216)[38]. Committee members are elected by the Chamber on the proposal of the *Mesa* (Chamber leadership body) (art. 218). The *Mesa* is composed of the Speaker (*Presidente*), a first Deputy Speaker (*primer Vicepresidente*) and a second Deputy Speaker (*segundo Vicepresidente*) (art. 45). However, congressional leaders (*presidentes de comité*) can request transfer of their members to different committees subject to approval from the Chamber secretary (art. 218). Committee chairs are elected by their committees by simple majority vote in the first meeting of the legislative period (*período legislativo*) (art. 245) for the duration of the legislative period (art. 238), which lasts four years (art. 1.11).

[37] `https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/573454-SAIBA-MAIS-SOBRE-A-TRAMITACAO-DE-PROJETOS-DE-LEI`

[38] Retrieved from `https://www.camara.cl/camara/doc/leyes_normas/reglamento.pdf`

Committee and chair resources and powers

Committee resolutions (*resoluciones*) are made by simple majority vote, whereas committee agreements (*acuerdos*) are made by absolute majority, that is, with a quorum of a majority of committee members (art. 199). The Finance Committee (*Comisión de Hacienda*) must made aware (*conocer*) about all articles of bills reported by the standing committees that are related to the state budget and state finances (art. 226). Meetings can be public or secret, when two thirds of the committees' members decide so (art. 250).

The committee stage precedes the plenary stage, that is, every bill submitted for consideration by the Chamber must be reported by the competent committee (art. 119). This can be overruled, however, by unanimous decision of the Chamber, except when it concerns the Finance committee (art. 119). In the first committee report, the committee may reject the bill, either in its entirety or specific articles (art. 302). If accepted, the plenary discusses the bill, a stage called general discussion (*discusión general*), where it may reject or accept the bill in its entirety, or introduce observations (*indicaciones*) (arts. 129, 274). In case the Chamber adds observations to the bill, the bill returns to the competent committee which then produces a second report, in which it pronounces itself about the observations made by the plenary, and, if it so wishes, introduces its own amendments (art. 275).

In the second report, the committee may suppress, modify and introduce articles, and approve a final version of the bill (art. 303). This new version of the bill then goes back to the Chamber, where it is subjected to particular discussion (*discusión particular*), in which only the changes (newly introduced articles, suppressed existing articles, modified articles) made by the second committee report are discussed and voted on one by one (art. 131). Those articles left untouched by the committee are automatically accepted (ibid.).

Committees can solicit written reports from the relevant authorities and the attendance of civil servants and "will hear" (*oirán*) the institutions or persons they deem convenient (art. 301).

The committee chair, among other prerogatives, presides over the committee meetings, opening, suspending and closing them, determines the topics of "easy dispatch" (*Fácil Despacho*) and their order, and the articles that should be made known to the Finance Committee (art. 244). The chair does not set the entire agenda, however: after the topics of easy dispatch have been expedited, which can take up to 30 minutes (art. 259), the meeting proceeds to the Order of the Day (*Orden del Día*), which is determined by agreement among the committee's members (*acuerdo*) (arts. 263-264).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

- NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees:
  - 1990: 15. Partial score: (15 - 5)/44 = 0.23
  - 1994: 17. Partial score: (17 - 5)/44 = 0.27
  - 2000: 17. Partial score: 0.27
  - 2006: 18. Partial score: (18 - 5)/44 = 0.30
  - 2010: 23. Partial score: (23 - 5)/44 = 0.41
  - 2014: 24. Partial score: (24 - 5)/44 = 0.43
  - 2018: 27. Partial score: (27 - 5)/44 = 0.50
- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios:
  - 1990
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 7
    - Partial score: 6/15 + 0.5*7/15 = 0.63
  - 1994
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 8

    - Partial score: 6/17 + 0.5*8/17 = 0.60
  - 2000
    - Full matches: 4
    - Partial matches: 10
    - Partial score: 4/17 + 0.5*10/17 = 0.53
  - 2006
    - Full matches: 4
    - Partial matches: 12
    - Partial score: 4/18 + 0.5*12/18 = 0.56
  - 2010
    - Full matches: 4
    - Partial matches: 15
    - Partial score: 4/23 + 0.5*15/23 = 0.50
  - 2014
    - Full matches: 5
    - Partial matches: 14
    - Partial score: 5/24 + 0.5*14/24 = 0.50
  - 2018
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 17
    - Partial score: 6/27 + 0.5*17/27 = 0.54

- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): NO (only solicit, not compel—only the Chamber, at the request of one third of deputies, can summon ministers (Chilean Constitution, art. 52.1b))
- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and testimony): NO (only solicit, not compel)
- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): NO (the Standing Orders mention a committee secretary, but does not make clear what this official's duties are).
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation): NO (art. 7)
- REWRITE (can committees rewrite bills and does the plenary vote on the amended bill by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): NO (committees' amendments are voted on separately).
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): YES
- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): NO (deadline of 6 months for committees to vote on bills after their referral, art. 17)
- TOTAL SCORE:
  - 1990 = 1 + 0.23 + 0.63 = 1.86
  - 1994 = 1 + 0.27 + 0.60 = 1.87
  - 2000 = 1 + 0.27 + 0.53 = 1.80
  - 2006 = 1 + 0.30 + 0.56 = 1.86
  - 2010 = 1 + 0.41 + 0.50 = 1.91
  - 2014 = 1 + 0.43 + 0.50 = 1.93
  - 2018 = 1 + 0.50 + 0.54 = 2.04

Indonesia

Committee assignments and chair selection

Each member of the Indonesian House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia* – DPR-RI), except members of the House leadership, must be a member of at least one committee (art. 9, Standing Orders of the DPR-RI)[39]. The DPR leadership, in consultation with the fraction (*fraksi*: congressional delegation) leaders, determines the composition of the membership of the committees by the principle of consensus (*musyawarah*) and following proportionality to the number of members of each fraction (art. 56). If the aforementioned actors fail to reach consensus, the composition of the committees is brought to a vote in plenary session of the DPR (ibid.). The fraction leaders propose the names of the prospective committee members, also following the principle of proportionality, which are then decided on in a plenary meeting of the DPR (ibid.).

The committee leadership (*pimpinan komisi*) is collegial in nature and consists of one chair (*ketua*) and at most four vice chairs (*wakil ketua*) (art. 85.1-2). The committee leadership is elected as one package by the committee members by the principle of consensus, and each fraction may propose one candidate (art. 58.2-4). Members of the committee leadership are elected for a period of five years, or the length of one legislative period (art. 58.6). In case a committee is unable to elect a leadership by consensus, the selection of the leadership is brought to a vote within the committee, whereby the set of candidates with the highest number of votes wins (art. 58.10).

Committee and chair resources and powers

Each committee (as well as the other internal bodies of the DPR) is assisted by a staff unit consisting of administrative and expert staff (art. 27).

Committees have legislative, budgetary and oversight functions (art. 59). Regarding the first function, the committees' tasks include but are not limited to the preparation, discussion, and refinement of draft laws (art. 59 .1). Regarding the second function, committees determine the budgets of the ministries and agencies that are their partners (*mitra kerja* – essentially, those ministries and agencies overseen by a particular committee) of the committee (art. 59.2c). Regarding the third function, committees are tasked with overseeing the implementation of laws—including the state budget—and regulations that fall within their policy jurisdictions (art. 59.4a), as well as government policy (art. 59.4d). Furthermore, committees can hold work meetings (*rapat kerja*) with the government, represented by ministers, as well as hearings (*rapat dengar pendapat*) with government officials and agency heads (art. 59.5). Importantly, decisions taken in the aforementioned work meetings with government officials are binding and must be implemented by the government (art. 61). Committees also have the right to, through such work meetings and hearings, provide binding recommendations to state and government officials, judicial entities as well as citizens and residents (art. 62).

Although such recommendations are binding, the Standing Orders nor other legislation governing the DPR indicate that committees can compel the presence of government officials by force (*memanggil paks*a), this right being seemingly reserved for the DPR itself (arts. 73.1-4).

When it comes to the legislative process, committees are among the actors that can introduce draft laws, the others being legislators, joint committees, or the Legislation Body (*Badan Legislasi*)[40] (art. 113.3). The committee leadership submits draft laws to the head of the Legislation Body (*Badan Legislasi*) (art. 118). The DPR decides whether it endorses draft laws submitted to it after the fractions have given their opinions on it (art. 135.1). The DPR may then either approve the bill with or without amendments or reject it (art. 135.2). In case the bill is approved without amendments, it is forwarded to the president (art. 135.8), who will then appoint ministers to represent her in discussing the bill with the DPR (art.

[39] *Peraturan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2020 Tentang Tata Tertib*. Retrieved from `https://www.dpr.go.id/tentang/tata-tertib`.

[40] The Legislation Body is tasked with harmonizing and consolidating draft laws coming from legislators or committees (art. 129).

135.10)[41]. If the bill is approved with amendments, the Deliberative Body (*Badan Musyawarah*) assigns it to a standing committee, a joint committee, the Legislation Body or a special committee, which will then be tasked with refining it, taking into account the opinions of the fractions (art. 136). This assignment is based on the content of the draft law and the policy area of the committee (art. 137.1). If the draft bill was proposed by a committee, however, that committee is prioritized in the assignment (art. 144.1). If the bill falls within the policy jurisdiction of two committees, it is assigned to two committees (art. 137.4), and if it falls within the jurisdiction of more than two committees, it is assigned to the Legislation Body (art. 137.5). Hence, the plenary stage precedes the committee stage, which weakens the power of committees in the legislative process (**?**, p. 46).

The committee (or other body the bill was assigned to) then has 30 days to complete the 'perfection' (*penyempurnaan*) of the draft law, for which the leadership of the committee or other body can request an extension of 20 days to the Deliberative Body (arts. 138.1-3). If, after the deadline has passed, the committee has not completed the revision of the draft law, the version that was approved by the plenary is deemed to have been finalized and sent to the president (art. 138.4). In case it completes the revision in time, the draft bill is sent to the leadership of the DPR, which then forwards it to the president with the request to appoint a minister to represent her in deliberating the draft bill with the committee (or other body to which the bill was assigned) (art. 140). The president then has 60 days to appoint a minister to discuss the draft bill with the DPR, failing which, the DPR leadership reports the bill to the plenary to decide on the follow-up (art. 141).

After the president has appointed said minister, the discussion of the bill takes place at two levels: level one in the committee (or other body) with the minister representing the president, and level two in plenary session of the DPR (art. 142). First, the bill is again assigned to a committee (or other body) by the Deliberative Body based on the aforementioned criteria (arts. 143-45). The level-one discussion must be carried out within three legislative sessions at most, but an extension can be granted by the plenary of the DPR at the request of the committee (or other body) leadership (art. 152). The committee takes a decision on the bill by consensus, with a quorum of half its membership (arts. 162.1-2). If an agreement cannot be reached within the committee, the bill is decided on by the plenary of the DPR (art. 162.4).

After a decision has been taken at the first level, the bill is discussed, at the second level, by the plenary of the DPR and the president to make a decision (art. 164.1). The decision is preceded by the submission of a report of the results of the level-1 discussion, including the opinions of the fractions and the DPD (upper house), and the overall result of the level-1 discussion, verbal statements of rejection or approval from the fractions and members, the final opinion from the President, delivered by the minister representing him (ibid.). If the DPR cannot come to an agreement by consensus, a decision is made by majority vote (art. 164.2). If the DPR and the president cannot come to an agreement, the bill may not be reintroduced in the same legislative session (art. 164.3). If an agreement is reached by the aforementioned parties, the bill is sent to the president to be ratified into law (art. 164.4). If the president does not ratify the bill within 30 days, it becomes a law anyway (art. 164.6).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

- NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees: 11 (all years). Partial score: (11 - 5)/44 = 0.14
- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios:
  - Full matches: 0
  - Partial matches: 1
  - Partial score: 0.5*1/11 = 0.05 (all years)
- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): NO
- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and testimony): NO

[41] The Indonesian president does not have formal veto power, but must give his approval before the bill can be voted on in plenary session (Kawamura (2010); Indonesian Constitution, art. 20).

- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): YES
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation): YES
- REWRITE (can committees rewrite bills and does the plenary vote on the amended bill by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): YES (committee version of bill approved or rejected as a whole by plenary)
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): NO
- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): NO
- TOTAL SCORE: 3.05 (all years)

Kenya

Information based on the 2013 Standing Orders, unless indicated otherwise. The 2008 situation, from before the 2010 constitution, is described only if it substantially deviates from the 2013 situation and prompts a different coding on a given item.

Committee assignments and chair selection
Departmental Committees are select committees (Standing Orders of the National Assembly of Kenya[42], art. 216.1) with jurisdictions corresponding to those of the government departments. Members of Departmental Committees are "nominated by the Committee on Selection in consultation with parliamentary parties at the commencement of every Parliament" (ibid.). Committee members serve for the duration of the parliamentary term (art. 216.2). The Committee on Selection is in turn composed of the Leader of the Majority party, who is the chair, the Leader of the Minority party, and between 11 and 19 members nominated by the parliamentary parties and approved by the House (art. 172.1). In nominating select committee—including Departmental Committee—members, the Selection Committee follows the principle of proportionality to each party's seat share (art. 174.1). Each member can serve in a maximum of two Departmental Committees (art. 174.3). The list of nominations is then brought to the House for approval (art. 175.1). At a given select committee's first meeting after its constitution, it "elect[s] its chairperson and vice-chairperson from among its members" (art. 178.1a) by secret ballot (art. 179.1). Thus, the phrasing of the Standing Orders suggests that the chairperson's mandate is equal one Parliament, which is empirically verified by the committee chair sources (see the respective section of the appendix).

Committee and chair resources and powers
Committees "exercise all the powers and privileges bestowed on Parliament by the Constitution and statute, including the power to summon witnesses, receive evidence and to request for and receive papers and documents from the Government and the public" (art. 191)[43]. Cabinet Secretaries "shall attend before a committee of the National Assembly, or the Senate, when required by the committee, and answer any question concerning a matter for which the Cabinet Secretary is responsible" (art. 153 of the 2010

[42] Retrieved from `http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2020-10/Standing_Orders_2013.pdf`.

[43] The corresponding article in the 2008 Standing Orders is art. 173. Retrieved from `http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=324`.

Constitution[44])[45]. However, while public officers[46] can be summoned to appear before the Assembly or a committee, "except upon the direction of the President, no public officer shall refuse (…) [to] give evidence before the Assembly or a committee, relating to the correspondence of any civil department or to any matter affecting the public service to the latter (National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, Revised Edition 2012 [1998], art. 182.3[47])[48].

Departmental committees "investigate, inquire into, and report on all matters relating to the mandate, management, activities, administration, operations and estimates of the assigned Ministries and departments" (Standing Orders, art. 216.5a). They also "vet and report on all appointments where the Constitution or any law requires the National Assembly to approve", except for those made by the Committee on Appointments (art. 216.5f).

Committees "may, with the approval of the Speaker, engage such experts as it may consider necessary in furtherance of its mandate" (art. 203).

Chairpersons "(a) preside at meetings of the committee; (b) perform the functions and exercise the powers assigned to office of the Chairperson by the committee, resolutions of the Assembly or legislation; (c) [act as] the spokesperson of the committee" (art. 180). They can also convene committee meetings (but so can at least seven members by petition) (art. 182). Committee members may, by absolute majority, file a motion of no confidence in the chairperson, triggering a new election for that position (art. 193.1). Chairpersons of select committees (except those of the Business Committee) "have an original vote but not a casting vote" (art. 194.1). Decisions within committees are taken by majority vote (art. 196.2), and votes, if not unanimous, are recorded in the minutes with the names of the members voting for and against (art. 196.4). In 2008, the Opposition had a statutory majority of one in the following select committees (but not in any Departmental committee): the Public Accounts Committee, the Public Investments Committee, the Local Authorities and Funds Accounts Committee and the Budget Committee (2008 Standing Orders, arts. 187-190). No such majorities were reserved for the opposition in 2013. In that year, however, any committee member could append a minority or dissenting report to the committee report even after the latter had been adopted by a majority of members (2013 Standing Orders, art. 199.5).

The minutes of select committees (including Departmental Committees) are published (art. 190). MPs may attend meetings of committees of which they are not members (art. 195). Committee meetings are open to the public "unless in exceptional circumstances the Speaker has determined that there are justifiable reasons for the exclusion of the public" (art. 198.1).

Regarding committees' role in the legislative process, committees could introduce legislative proposals in 2013 (art. 114.1). This was not the case in 2008, however (art. 104, 2008 Standing Orders). The Speaker then determines whether the legislative proposal is a Money Bill, in which case he assigns it to the Budget and Appropriations Committee (art. 114.3a, 2013 Standing Orders). If the proposal was

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[44] Retrieved from `http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010`

[45] The situation in 2008, before the 2010 constitution, comes down to the same thing. As mentioned above, art. 173 of the 2008 Standing Orders is more or less identical to art. 191 of the 2013 Standing Orders. In 2008, Members could forward written or oral questions to Ministers with the approval of the Speaker (arts. 42.1-3). In the case of oral questions, the Minister was "required to appear in the House to reply on the designated day" (art. 42.8). Since this was a power of the House, the committees also had this power, per art. 173. Nothing is said about civil servants, however.

[46] "Public office" is defined by the 2010 constitution as "an office in the national government, a county government or the public service, if the remuneration and benefits of the office are payable directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of money provided by Parliament", while "public officer" is defined as "(a) any State officer; or (b) any person, other than a State Officer, who holds a public office" and "public service" is defined as the collectivity of all individuals, other than State officers, performing a function within a State organ" (art. 260). Both Cabinet Secretaries and civil servants are therefore public officers.

[47] Retrieved from `http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2017-05/NationalAssembly_PowersandPrivileges__Act__Cap6.pdf`.

[48] The same phrasing can be found in the 1998 version of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act (art. 18.3). Retrieved from `https://web.archive.org/web/20111106000441/http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=366&Itemid=`.

not introduced by a committee, the Speaker assigns it to the relevant committee, which in turn submits its comments on the proposal to the Speaker within 14 days (art. 114.3b). The Speaker then determines whether to reject or proceed with the proposal, and if he decides to proceed with it, the proposal is published as a Bill (art. 114.4).

The Bill is then brought to the House for First Reading, after which the Speaker again assigns it to the relevant committee (art. 127.1). The committee then produces a report within 20 days, in which it may propose amendments (How Law is Made[49], p. 4), and which is followed by the Second Reading of the bill in the National Assembly (Standing Orders, art. 127.4). After the bill has been read a second time, the House votes on whether to move it to the next stage (How Law is Made, p. 4). It is then assigned to a Committee of the whole House (Standing Orders, art. 130.1). The committee stage thus precedes the plenary stage. The Committee of the Whole House then sequentially votes on each clause and amendment, and can approve clauses and schedules with or without amendments (How Law is Made, p. 5). If the Committee of the Whole House accepts the bill, it is brought to the plenary for a vote (Standing Orders, art. 136). Amendments are not allowed at this stage, but Members who wish to amend the bill can propose its re-committal to a Committee of the Whole House (ibid.). In that case, the Committee of the Whole House considers only the re-committed matters (art. 138.1). A bill accepted by the House goes to Third Reading and amendments may again be proposed (art. 139). If the Assembly eventually accepts the Bill, it is sent to the Senate for concurrence (art. 142), and eventually to the president (art. 153).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

- NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees:
  - 2008: 15. Partial score: (15 - 5)/44 = 0.23
  - 2013: 19. Partial score: (19 - 5)/44 = 0.32
- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios:
  - 2008
    - full matches: 0
    - partial matches: 1
    - partial score: 0.5*1/15 = 0.03
  - 2013
    - full matches: 1
    - partial matches: 3
    - partial score: 1/19 + 0.5*3/19 = 0.13
- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): attendance and responding to questions yes, but President can block provision of evidence → 0.5 points
- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and oral testimony): attendance and responding to questions yes, but President can block provision of evidence → 0.5 points
- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): NO
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation):
  - 2008: NO
  - 2013: YES

[49] Retrieved from `http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2018-04/2_How_Law_is_Made.pdf`.

- REWRITE (can committees rewrite bills and does the plenary vote on the amended bill by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): NO (Committee of the Whole House votes on each clause and amendment separately)
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): YES
- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): NO
- TOTAL SCORE:
  - 2008: 2 + 0.23 + 0.03 = 2.26
  - 2013: 3 + 0.32 + 0.13 = 3.45

Malawi

Information based on the Standing Orders as of 2013.

Committee assignments and chair selection
Committee assignments are determined by the Assembly "on the recommendation of the Business Committee" (art. 184.1, The Standing Orders of the Malawi Parliament[50]). Party Whips submit lists of prospective committee members to the Business Committee (art. 184.2), which takes into account the "balance of political parties represented in the National Assembly" in determining the provisional committee assignments (art. 148.4). The Business Committee, in turn, consists of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker(s), the Leader of the House, the Government Chief Whip, the Leader of the Opposition and Opposition Party Whips (art. 187.1), the Speaker serving as the committee's Chairperson (art. 187.2). The so-called Constitutional Committees, those that are established by the Constitution, which are the Public Appointments Committee, the Budget and Finance Committee, the Legal Affairs Committee and the Defence and Security Committee are reappointed annually (art. 181.1a). The Standing Committees, which are established by the House and constitute the remainder of permanent committees, are appointed for the duration of the Parliament (art. 181.1). At a committee's first meeting after a general election it elects its Chairperson and Vice Chairperson (art. 201.1).

Committee and chair resources and powers
The powers of committees include "summoning or subpoenaing any person to attend and give evidence before a Committee at a stated time and place", and "requiring any person to disclose and produce to the Committee any papers and records in that person's control, possession and custody relevant to the Committee's proceedings" (art. 183.1). This includes any office holder[51].

Portfolio-related committees may furthermore "inquire into and report on any matter referred to it either by the House, including pre-legislation proposal, bill, motion, petition, vote or expenditure, other financial matter, report or document", inquire into "annual reports of government ministries, departments, commissions or statutory authorities or state-owned enterprises presented to the House", and "study the programmes and policy objectives of their respective assigned Ministries, statutory corporations and public bodies funded by the Treasury and the effectiveness for their implementation" (art. 196.1).

Committee meetings may allow for visitors "when it is examining a witness or gathering information in other proceedings", but visitors have to leave when the chair or the committee as a whole decides so (art. 213).

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[50] http://zachimalawi.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-standing-orders-of-malawi-parliament.html

[51] "The National Assembly and any committee of the National Assembly shall have the power to conduct investigations and exercise the power to subpoena the attendance of any person or office holder whosoever (…) and failure to attend without leave or without valid reason or excuse shall be held to be a contempt of the National Assembly or committee in question" (art. 60.3 of the Constitution of Malawi, retrieved from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017.pdf).

Each committee has its own staff, consisting of "a Committee Clerk, a Parliamentary Counsel, a Parliamentary Researcher and, [the committee] may, through the office of the Clerk, engage the services of technical consultants" (art. 214.1).

Committee Chairpersons are tasked, among other things, with convening and presiding at committee meetings (art. 201.4). Committee chairs have a casting vote within their committees in case the vote is tied (art. 199.4). They also draft the committee reports, which the committee then votes on as if it were a bill, according to the rules of the Committee Stage as stipulated by art. 161 (see below) (art. 215). Furthermore, the chairs of all committees sit on the Committee of Chairpersons, which is chaired by the Speaker and which has a coordinating role (art. 195).

Regarding committees' role in the legislative process, committees may introduce bills (art. 154.8). After a bill has been initiated, it is published in the Gazette and a copy of it is circulated among all Members 28 days before it is First Read in the House (art. 157.2). It is then assigned by the Speaker to "the relevant Standing Committee for consideration" (art. 157.3). The After the aforementioned 28 says have passed, the First Reading of the bill takes place in the House (art. 159). A motion is then voted on, which, if passed, moves the bill to Second Reading (ibid.). The Second Reading begins with a debate and vote on the committee report—if one has been submitted—which may contain the committee's recommendations for amendments, however, the amendments themselves are only debated in the subsequent Committee of the Whole House (art. 160.5). The next step is a debate on the bill itself, in which notice of amendments may be given (but these are again only debated in a Committee of the Whole House) (art. 160.7). The Second Reading is concluded with a vote, which, if passed, moves the bill to the subsequent stage (art. 160.8).

In this subsequent stage, known as the Committee Stage, the bill is considered by a Committee of the Whole House (art. 161.2). The bill is considered clause by clause, where for each clause a vote is held in which it may either be rejected or accepted (ibid.). Amendments to existing clauses are considered when the relevant clause is considered (art. 162.1). New clauses may also be introduced, and amendments to those are proposed and 'disposed of' before each new clause is voted on (art. 162.4). Bills may furthermore be recommitted to a Standing Committee by motion at this stage (art. 162.6). Finally, the bill as a whole is voted on (art. 162.7). If passed, the bill, still in a Committee of the Whole House, moves to the Report Stage, in which another vote is taken, which, if passed, moves the bill to the Third Reading (art. 163). At the Third Reading in the House, no further amendments are allowed (art. 164.3), and the bill is again voted on (art. 164.2). If this final vote passes, the bill is submitted for Presidential assent (art. 166).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees: 19. Partial score: (19 - 5)/44 = 0.32

- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios:
  - Full matches: 5
  - Partial matches: 8
  - Partial score: 5/19 + 0.5*8/19 = 0.47
- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): YES
- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and testimony): YES
- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): YES
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation): YES
- REWRITE (can committees rewrite bills and does the plenary vote on the amended bill by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): NO (amendments are voted on separately)
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): YES

- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): NO (28 days between initiation and second reading)
- TOTAL SCORE: 5 + 0.32 + 0.47 = 5.79

Philippines

Committee assignments and chair selection

Committees are organized "on the basis of proportional representation of the Majority and the Minority" (Rules of the House of Representatives: 18th Congress[52], sec. 27). Committee members are selected respectively by the Majority (those members that supported the winning candidate for Speaker—sec. 8) and the Minority (sec. 31). The committee assignments are then confirmed by the House (sec. 31). The first member on the list of members of each committee is the chairperson, and the subsequent members on the list are the vice-chairperson, whose number can range from 4 to 10 depending on the total number of members serving on the committee (ibid.). Hence, in contrast to most of the other country cases, committees do not elect their own chairpersons. The first member on the list of committee members elected by the Minority is considered the "senior minority member" (sec. 31). Nothing is said about the powers of said senior minority member. Any given House member cannot sit on more than one committee (sec. 33). The Speaker, the Deputy Speakers, the Majority Leader, the Deputy Majority Leaders, the Minority Leader and the Deputy Minority Leaders and the chairperson of the Committee on Accounts have "voice and vote" in all committees (sec. 31).

Committee and chair resources and powers

Committees are tasked with "study[ing], deliberat[ing] on and act upon all measures referred to them inclusive of bills, resolutions and petitions, and shall recommend for approval or adoption by the House those that, in their judgment, advance the interests and promote the welfare of the people" (sec. 26). Furthermore, they "have oversight responsibilities to determine whether or not laws and programs addressing subjects within their jurisdictions are being implemented and carried out in accordance with the intent of Congress and whether or not they should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated" (ibid.). Finally, committees may "conduct hearings and inquiries on issues and concerns within their respective jurisdictions" (ibid.). Committees must obtain the approval of the Committee on Rules for such inquiries (Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, sec. 2) and can, as part of such inquiries, subpoena witnesses (sec. 8), including government officials (sec. 9).

In terms of counseling, committees may "engage the services and assistance of experts and professionals from the public or private sectors as may be needed in the performance of their functions" (sec. 26). Committees also have a secretariat headed by a secretary, which is tasked with issuing public notices of committee meetings and hearings (sec. 35), taking note of absences (sec. 36), preparing committee reports (sec. 48), managing all of the committee's documentation and delivering it the Congressional Archives (art. 149).

Committee "meetings and public hearings shall be open to the public subject to reasonable regulations in the interest of security, order, and the safety of persons in attendance" (Rules of the House of Representatives: 18th Congress, sec. 42). Members of the majority and the minority are allowed to speak alternately during committee meetings (sec. 37).

Committee chairpersons and vice-chairpersons participate in statutory monthly meetings conducted by the Speaker "to set legislative targets, review performance in the attainment of targets, ensure that the priority legislative measures of committees are attuned to the legislative agenda of the House, and resolve such other issues and concerns that affect the operations and performance of the committees" (sec. 15c). Decisions within the committee are taken by simple majority, with a quorum (sec. 39).

The committee stage precedes the plenary stage: bills are referred by the Secretary General of the House to the appropriate committee right after First Reading (sec. 43). Bills are generally only referred to

[52] Retrieved from `https://www.congress.gov.ph/download/docs/hrep.house.rules.pdf`.

one committee, and if they fall under the jurisdiction of more than one committee, are referred to the committee "whose jurisdiction the subject matter directly and principally relates to" (sec. 44). However, any bill that "entails the appropriation of public funds or contains tax or revenue proposal" must subsequently be referred to Committee on Appropriations or the Committee on Ways and Means by the committee to which it was first referred (ibid.). The committee to which the bill was initially referred is responsible for submitting a report to the House, in which it may incorporate the suggestions of the Committees on Appropriations or Ways or Means or, in the case of a dissenting opinion by the latter, attaches them to the report as an annex (ibid.). Dissenting opinions of committee members are attached to the committee report (sec. 39). Committees "may decide to approve a bill or resolution with or without amendments, a substitute bill or resolution, or a consolidated bill or resolution [a combination of two or more bills on the same subject[53]]" (sec. 46). Committees may also turn down bills (sec. 49). The House retains the right of recall: "Any Member may present to the Secretary General a motion in writing to discharge a committee from the consideration of a bill or resolution referred to it if such committee fails to act thereon after more than thirty (30) session days from its referral" (sec. 50). If signed by one fifth of the House membership, the bill is "included in the Calendar of Business and reported in the next session of the House" (ibid.).

A bill acted favorably upon by the committee goes to Second Reading, where it is debated and voted on (sec. 53). After the closure of the plenary debate, committee amendments are considered and acted upon, followed by individual amendments (secs. 56-57). The (amended) bill is then voted on by the House (sec. 57). If approved, it goes to Third Reading, whereby no amendments may be proposed, and the bill is voted on nominally (sec. 58). If approved, it is transmitted to the Senate for concurrence (sec. 60). Bills in the Senate pass through a similar process (sec. 61), and, if accepted, are transmitted to the President for her assent (sec. 65).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

- NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees:
  - 2004: 42. Partial score: (42 - 5)/44 = 0.84
  - 2010: 48. Partial score: (48 - 5)/44 = 0.98
  - 2016: 49. Highest observed value in sample. Partial score: 1
- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios:
  - 2004
    - Full matches: 12
    - Partial matches: 18
    - Partial score: 12/42 + 0.5*18/42 = 0.50
  - 2010
    - Full matches: 10
    - Partial matches: 24
    - Partial score: 10/48 + 0.5*24/48 = 0.46
  - 2016
    - Full matches: 12
    - Partial matches: 22
    - Partial score: 12/49 + 0.5*22/49 = 0.47
- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): only with the approval of the Committee on Rules → 0.5 points

[53] https://www.congress.gov.ph/legisinfo/?v=process

- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and testimony): only with the approval of the Committee on Rules → 0.5 points
- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): yes, but only for administrative tasks and drafting documents, but not for research → 0.5 points
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation): NO
- REWRITE (can committees rewrite bills and does the plenary vote on the amended bill by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): NO (committee amendments voted separately)
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): YES
- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): NO (plenary has right of recall)
- TOTAL SCORE:
  - 2004: 2.5 + 0.84 + 0.5 = 3.84
  - 2010: 2.5 + 0.98 + 0.46 = 3.94
  - 2016: 2.5 + 1 + 0.47 = 3.97

Uruguay

Information based on the current Standing Orders, last amended on November 10, 2020.

Committee assignments and chair selection
At the opening of each legislature, a Special Commission (*Comisión Especial*) is nominated, which consists of a delegate of each parliamentary group (*sector parlamentario*[54]) (Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies of Uruguay—Reglamento de la Cámara de Representantes, art. 15)[55]. This commission is tasked with determining the distribution of committee seats among the parliamentary groups (ibid.). Each delegate has the same number of votes within the Special Commission as her parliamentary group within the Chamber (ibid.). The Speaker (*Presidente*) appoints the committee members on the proposal of the parliamentary groups (art. 17). Each Representative (*Representante* or member of the Chamber), except for the Speaker, must be a member of a Permanent Committee (art. 15). Committees elect a Chairperson (*Presidente*) and a Vice-Chairperson (*Vicepresidente*) on a yearly basis (art. 123).

Committee and chair resources and powers
Committees may deliberate when at least a third of their members is present, and may take decisions by absolute majority (art. 125). Permanent committees do not seem to be able to compel ministerial attendance and testimony, only the Chamber can do so by resolution of a third of its members (art. 119 of the Uruguayan Constitution[56]). Committees do not have dedicated staff, but can invite public servants and individuals to be heard, or make use of the Chamber's technical consultancy service (Asesoría Técnica) (art. 133). Committees can propose to the Chamber to shelve a matter referred to them by a two-thirds majority, but the committee minority can oppose this (art. 135).

The Chamber can determine that committee proceedings be secret, meaning that they are only open to the committee's members, the plaintiff in case of an investigation, and those especially invited by the

[54] Intra-party factions, which, in Uruguay, run for election with their own lists, are also considered parliamentary groups (art. 18a of the Standing Orders of the Chamber of Deputies of Uruguay).

[55] Retrieved from `http://www.diputados.gub.uy/docs/REGLAMENTO_CRR.pdf`.

[56] Retrieved from https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/constitucion/1967-1967

committee (art. 126). Ministers may participate in committee meetings but do not have a vote (art. 180 of the Uruguayan constitution).

Committee chairs have a kind of casting vote, but only for the following purpose: when the committee produces two conflicting reports, each signed by an equal number of members, the chair decides which one is placed first in the file (Standing Orders, art. 134). However, the Chamber determines with which of the two reports it proceeds for debate (ibid.).

Regarding committees' position in the legislative process, any matter that is presented to the Chamber is communicated in writing to the Speaker, who then determines the destination (i.e., committee) of that matter (art. 137). The Chamber then votes on this destination (art. 138). In the case of bills, the full text is distributed among the members of the Chamber as soon as they are received by the Chamber (art. 142). The Representatives then have 30 days to submit amendments (ibid.). After that, the submitted amendments are analyzed by the committee, which decides whether to accept (in whole or in part) or reject them (ibid.). Permanent Committees have 90 days to take a decision (*expedirse*) about any matter from the moment that the matter has been forwarded to them (art. 128). Dissenting committee members can add remarks to the committee report on a bill or attach a replacement report or bill to the majority-approved version (art. 134). The committee report is then distributed among the Representatives (art. 143), after which it is debated and voted on in the plenary (art. 145).

Similar to the Chilean case, matters are debated in two modes: in general (*discusión general*) and in particular (*discusión particular*) (art. 52). In the general debate, any given matter is debated as a whole, with the objective to decide whether the Chamber should take it up at all (ibid.). After the closure of the general debate, there is the particular debate, in which each of the bill's articles are discussed one by one (art. 55). First, the committee's version of the bill is discussed, followed by the version of the original author, and finally the version of the committee minority (art. 64). In the particular discussion, substitute articles, new articles or amendments to these articles may be proposed (art. 65). The proposed articles and amendments are discussed together with the bill's article they substitute, and after voting if they are additional articles (art. 66). If the bill's sponsor or one of its co-sponsors accepts the amendments to an article, that version of the article is voted on (art. 67). If they reject the amendments, the version of the article proposed by the committee is voted on, followed by the remaining versions in the order they were presented in, with all substitutes for an approved version being discarded (ibid.).

Coding André et al.'s (2016) committee strength indicator

- NUMBER of legislative and oversight committees:
  - 1995-2015: 15. Partial score: (15 - 5)/44 = 0.23
  - 2020: 14. Partial score: (14 - 5)/44 = 0.20
- CORRESPONDENCE between committees and portfolios:
  - 1995
    - Full matches: 5
    - Partial matches: 7
    - Partial score: 5/15 + 0.5*7/15 = 0.57
  - 2000
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 7
    - Partial score: (6 + 0.5*7)/15 = 0.63
  - 2005
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 7
    - Partial score: 0.63

  - 2010
    - Full matches: 6
    - Partial matches: 7
    - Partial score: 0.63
  - 2015 o Full matches: 7 o Partial matches: 6 o Partial score: (7 + 0.5*6)/15 = 0.67
  - 2020 o Full matches: 8 o Partial matches: 4 o Partial score: (8 + 0.5*4)/14 = 0.71
- MINISTER (can committees compel ministerial attendance and evidence): NO
- CIVIL SERVANTS (can committees compel civil servants' attendance and testimony): NO (only invite, not compel)
- STAFF (do committees have dedicated staff): NO
- INITIATE (do committees have the right to initiate legislation): NO
- REWRITE (can committees rewrite bills and does the plenary vote on the amended bill by the committee or are committees' amendments voted on separately from the original draft): NO (committee amendments voted on separately)
- STAGE (does the committee stage precede the plenary stage): YES
- TIMETABLE (does the committee control its timetable OR does the plenary control it or does the plenary have the right of recall): NO
- TOTAL SCORE:
  - 1995: 1 + 0.23 + 0.57 = 1.80
  - 2000-2010: 1 + 0.23 + 0.63 = 1.86
  - 2015: 1 + 0.23 + 0.67 = 1.90
  - 2020: 1 + 0.20 + 0.71 = 1.91

B.6 Additional results

Table B.6: Determinants of committee chair shadowing (country-level random effects)

	(1)	(2)
Ideological distance	0.60^{+}	0.54
	(0.32)	(0.42)
High prestige	-0.33	-0.33
	(0.28)	(0.28)
Low prestige	-0.98*	-1.14*
	(0.43)	(0.49)
Committee powers	-0.39***	-0.38***
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Seat share	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age of democracy	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideological distance x high prestige		0.17
		(0.72)
Ideological distance x low prestige		-1.82
		(1.62)
Ideological distance x committee powers		0.09
		(0.27)
Constant	0.22^{+}	0.20
	(0.13)	(0.15)
Random effects:		
Intercept	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Low prestige	$5.17*10^{-14}$	$1.25*10^{-12}$
	$(2.27*10^{-7})$	$(1.12*10^{-6})$
Medium prestige	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
High prestige	$1.77*10^{-13}$	$4.47*10^{-14}$
	$(4.20*10^{-7})$	$(2.11*10^{-7})$
Log likelihood	-250.3	-249.4
Observations	417	417
Clusters	8	8

$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$
Note: the second model adds the interactions, standard errors are reported in round brackets below the estimates and odds ratios in square brackets below the standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in round brackets below the random effects.

Appendix C

Statement on Authorship

Eu, Joris Alberdingk Thijm, declaro que sou o autor do trabalho entitulado title, o qual eu apresentei para as Provas Académicas no Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa. Eu também declaro que a autoria deste trabalho é exclusivamente minha, exceto pelo Capítulo 3, o qual foi escrito em coautoria com o Dr. Jorge Fernandes, e cuja divisão de tarefas foi a seguinte: recolha e organização dos dados (Joris Alberdingk Thijm), análises estatísticas (Jorge Fernandes), escrita (50% Joris Alberdingk Thijm, 50% Jorge Fernandes).

O Direito de Autor deste trabalho pertence ao seu autor. Fazer citação direta do mesmo é permitido, desde que as partes citadas sejam atribuídas ao autor. Este trabalho não pode ser reproduzido exceto pelo meu consentimento por escrito previamente obtido.

Assinatura e data:

16 de maio de 2024